Question for you U-Boat experts

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But the we would be at war with Japan as it happened on Dec 7th. I would suspect a sizable majority would have supported increased measures against Germany for the sub threat off of N America.

If Germany didnt declare war on us, then the war in the Atlantic would have been quite a political and military minefield.
 
But the we would be at war with Japan as it happened on Dec 7th. I would suspect a sizable majority would have supported increased measures against Germany for the sub threat off of N America.

If Germany didnt declare war on us, then the war in the Atlantic would have been quite a political and military minefield.

Syscom...

With regard to the first paragraph, I do not think such thing was a likely event. How come?

Easy. During 1939/40/41 U-boats operated under severe restrictions and directions issued by the High Command. Hitler was deeply concerned U-boat operations in the Atlantic could be seen in Washington as a direct threat to U.S. shipping; Dönitz issued directions to U-boat commanders accordingly.

That a U.S. vessel would be misidentified by some skipper then torpedoed was the primal fear; such restrictions implied a tremendous headache for U-boat commanders due to the complexity of conditions confronted when patrolling the seas, especially at night or poor weather. There would be times when proper identification of the vessel was nearly impossible.

Sound evidence to support and substantiate the assertion lies on the fact a large number of merchant vessels were first intercepted by the U-boat, a German party conducted boarding of the ship to review papers and cargo, and if the vessel was from a non-combatant, the Germans let her continue sailing.

All in all, the Germans did everything possible to avoid hitting any U.S. vessel during the first two years of the war. On the contrary, the U.S. had been involved in convy escort tasks, and also harassed some U-boats until the USS Reuben James was sent to the bottom by U-552 -under Erich Topp-.

Utter rubbish to officially declare yourself neutral while embarking on escorting vessels that belong to one side that is the enemy of another in times of war.

So if the U.S. remains neutral and political manouvering in order to gain congress support for war in Europe becomes impossible for Nice Grandpa Roosevelt, and keeping in mind U-boat policies in the Atlantic to avoid frictions with the U.S.A., i do not think the USA messes with U-boats.

If the oil supply for Great Britain becomes partially or completely severed due to Japanese action in the Far East, then oil from different regions must be found...where? Caribbean Sea...U-boats proceed onto the area, so the Royal Navy would have a new -CRITICAL- sector to protect with its very own resources.

Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean plus Caribbean...seems well beyond the potential of the Royal Navy.
 
Glad you found my post of interest guys.

U-boat areas of operations

Sept 39 - May 40
- inshore off Portugal to ~ mid Norway
- a few on the southern route from Sierra Leone

June 40 to Mar 41
- major area - north and west of Ireland extending to near Iceland and with decreasing numbers to mid Atlantic
- south coast of England, Bay of Biscay, decreasing in numbers to Sierra Leone

Apr 41 to Dec 41

- mid Atlantic - Iceland to Sierra Leone

Jan 42 to July 42

- off the American coast, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, Venezuela
- some along the convoy route from Sierra Leone

Aug 42 to May 45
- all over the Atlantic area from north of the Natal/Sierra Leone line
- Off the coast of South Africa

If I get the scanner going will post the maps.

The biggest problem with the convoys was not getting the ships to GB but with getting them unloaded and turned around in a quick time to return for more material. There was not the port facilities in GB for doing so when the large number of ships arrived.

If the Soviets had not received, say, the hundreds of thousands of Lend Lease military vehicles (Studebackers) that proved essential to have a large number of mechanized army units deployed in combat operations, they would have had to produce a similar type of vehicle all by themselves, with the predictable consequences:
The amount of L-L received by the Soviets in the last year of the war was approx. what they received since the start of L-L.

As to L-L trucks, this might be of interest which has only 19% of Soviet trucks being imported.

Imported

22/6/41 - nil
01/01/42 - nil
01/01/43 - 22,000
01/01/44 - 94,100
01/01/45 - 191,300
05/01/45 - 218,100
total - 525,500 - 19%

Lend Lease trucks in Russia

As can be seen, L-L trucks were not as important as some would like to think.
 
Only 19% that's quite remarkable, I always knew the Soviets had transport of their own in extremely large numbers but I never thought the U.S truck supplies made up a low percentage. It helps with the scale of things on the Eastern Front, really - doesn't it? I've mentioned L-L to the Soviet Union in the "Did the U.S save Europe" thread in quite some detail for ground vehicles.

Reading your posts AL, it seems that the U-boat threat has been inflated over all these years; a menace nevertheless.
 
The mere presence of an aircraft would make a U Boat submerge and that alone significantly increased the chances of the convoy getting through. They were of course slower and had reduced the chances of them recharging their batteries.
The aircraft used in Coastal Command at the time were obsolete bombers, Whitley, Hampden plus Hudsons and a few Wellingtons. Those that could have been used are Sterlings and Halifax's. With a reduced bombload and additional fuel tanks they could have gone a long way to closing the gap.

The Sterling in particular would have been useful as it didn't have a high operating ceiling which isn't a problem on A/S duties and it was very manoeverable for a plane of its size. In addition it had bomb cells in the wing which leant themselves to the use of fuel tanks.

However, as I said at the start the chances of Bomber Command releasing these aircraft were slim at best.

Re: the last point you need a POD where Lancaster Halifax production was higher earlier, to enable Stirlings (and it is 'Stirling' not 'Sterling') to be released from the Bombing campaign over Germany. Though the Stirling might also have made a useful addition to the Desert Air Force!?

RE: the second point Coastal Command's best asset was its flying boats, principally the Sunderland - perhaps instead of building the Stirling, Shorts should have made a 'super Sunderland' - bigger engines longer range,
 
Fair points, I was only thinking of the Stirling as a plane that could have been of use in Coastal Command and which Harris may not have complained about losing from his bomber forces.
 

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