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Nevertheless, an engine with acceptable performance (AM-39FN2 aka AM-40) did not appear until the end of 1945, and its serial production began only in late 1946. It is difficult to say whether it was possible to accelerate its finalization, but most likely yes, a mass series could be expected in early 1946. In reality, from the middle of 1945 Mikoyan and Gurevich already focused on the development of the I-250 (another absolutely futile idea).
Thus, in early 1946, the Soviets could have fighters capable of intercepting the B-29 - I estimate the effectiveness as rather low, but B-29 losses could be much higher than in the raids on Japan if bombers were detected in time taking into account the potential numbers of Soviet fighters.
The Soviets used radars, but the most industrial centers deep in the European part of the USSR had either completely inadequate radar detection or even not at all.
No new technology was required to manufacture these fighters, so they could be produced in fairly large quantities if necessary.
The most intriguing question is where the Soviets will get the high-octane gasoline for the manufactured high-altitude fighters.
I would like to see the frequency distribution of the various reasons for technical failures.
Or reduces the chance of overconsumption of fuel. And airplanes with engines with fewer defects could also be delivered. Or just new engines for replacement.
The B-29 was a fundamentally new machine, there was not yet much experience with such aircraft. All the "big bombers" became not big enough.
Soviet fighters in 1945 weren't huffing for breath at 25k, they started huffing somewhere around 28k, if not higher. That's why I asked at what altitudes flights over the USSR are supposed to be carried out. In any case, this is in no way comparable to the raids on Japan from the Marianas where only a relatively small part of the route assumed a high-altitude (over 20k) flight.
The problem is that by the time of B-29 deployment in Europe, it is too late to blanket the airfields - the bombers from the 8th and 15th AF will be doing that. B-29s are needed for strategic destruction of industrial potential of the USSR, their use for tactical tasks is little justified, in my humble opinion.
Nor Spam.
In summer 1945 they will be less important. Yak-3PD can reach serial production earlier - already in September/October 1945.Serial production in "early 1946" when what we're talking about is summer 1945.
I think 5,000-6,000 out of a total of about 10,000. That's what was available on May 10, 1945 (AF + AD + Navy). Plus, the monthly production.Say, by winter 1945 you get B-29s shifted to Europe, you still have literally a couple of thousand B-17s and B-24s doing what they've been doing for three years already. How many thousands of Soviet fighters are there capable of combatting even those older models?
So they are available.Because you're going to need thousands of them.
The reasons are obvious, they have been mentioned many times here. The question is how fast the accumulated reserves will be consumed.They're not getting high-test fuels because it's no longer being sent via LL. Neither are the tires, boots, steel ingots, aluminum billets, chemicals for explosives, etc.
I think 5,000-6,000 out of a total of about 10,000. That's what was available on May 10, 1945 (AF + AD + Navy). Plus, the monthly production.
So they are available.
The reasons are obvious, they have been mentioned many times here. The question is how fast the accumulated reserves will be consumed.
I need statistics, numbers, not just a list.Great, go look it up. In James Scott's Black Snow, the overheating issue is listed first and foremost as a problem.
Or less often, the fuel ran out over the ocean. I prefer to operate with numbers.Lowering bombing altitude was originally done to improve accuracy, but it was seen that a concomitant benefit was that fewer overheat aborts and engine fires occurred.
At least two, may be more. The first one was shot down by a woman, or rather a woman/man pair from the same regiment, claim was confirmed. But in general, the He 177 was so unreliable and used in extremely difficult conditions not for intended purpose (Stalingrad, winter-spring 1943) that its losses were very high.No doubt there were other technical failures. Say, how many He-277s did the Soviets shoot down?
Ok, the real value of soviet fighters is difficult to estimate. May be, I overestimate it. Who can make an unbiased reliable estimation?There were plenty of B-17s and B-24s capable of bombing at 25,000 foot, albeit slower and shorter in range. But I'm unsure the VVS had enough capable fighters to counter them.
Of course, the Soviets will have a very hard time. But they already have a high percentage of experienced pilots. Anyway, I don't see the point in guessing.Substandard radar defense net, fighters that while fast are optimized for lower altitudes and short in range, I'm thinking they hope the -29s don't show up. They're going to have their hands full all the same.
Soviet fighters perform better as well.And these are bombers that have been tested and largely had defects addressed.
It's not "years of experience" at all. Rather, it is a rather modest experience.We had 18 months' experience with B-29s by June 1945. And many of their crews were crews which had flown in 8th AF ETO ops.
I.e., a whole new machine, much more complicated and less reliable.As for "became not big enough", that's really an appeal to hindsight. A B-29 was a hell of a lot bigger than anything a Soviet fighter pilot had ever seen. A lot harder to kill. A lot more counterfire. A lot harder to even catch.
3x20 or 3x23 or 1x23+2x20 or 1x37+2x12.7 - weak armament?!Without good fighter direction, and especially considering the short range of Soviet fighters, acquiring an efficient intercept is going to be mighty hard. Now factor in small numbers of these fighters, and their relatively weak armament, and the large numbers of bombers they'll be attacking. It's not good math.
The range of Soviet fighters was quite sufficient to counter Allied tactical aircraft. It would not be a decisive factor. Much more important is the training of the pilots. And here I find it difficult to say whether the Soviets had sufficient training in 1945. Probably not. But the occasional air combats with the Americans demonstrated rather equality.You're right that the 8th and 15th AFs will be doing yeoman's work, but blanketing the airfields will be on the B-26s and A-26s, Mosquitoes, and other tacair. The downside to Soviet fighter air is that their ranges are so short that their airfields must needs be within tactical counterair -- and that frees up the 8th and 15th heavies to strike at railyards, depots, and other, deeper targets.
Ok, you prefer to fight longer with heavier losses.I wouldn't try to destroy USSR's industry -- it's too far away for even B-29s.
I know of one good example where a large number (several hundred) of B-17s during the day tried to bomb a large railroad junction with several bridges over a river. As a result, only one bridge suffered non-critical damage and was quickly repaired. The railroad structure suffered little damage and transportation continued after a day or two.But I'd cripple their ability to bring anything to the front.
Out of how many hundreds of missions?I know of one good example
Or 3x20. Or 3x23. Or 1x37+2x12,7. They were definitely able to shoot down bomber or escort fighter. I wonder if they would have had the courage to attack a bomber formation like the Germans. I don't know.Wait, so you think the Soviets will have 5-6000 fighters capable of getting to 25,000 with one 23-mm and two 12.7mm guns and putting a stop to B-17s and B-24s? Through P-51 escorts?
What do Liberty ships have to do with this discussion?Right. And meanwhile, there's Liberty ships, no longer worried about U-boats, traversing the Atlantic at will.
Doesn't matter.All that fuel no longer going to USSR, where do you think it's going?
I will not respond to what I consider irrelevant to the discussion.All that food? Backstock of steel or chemicals for explosives, that'll keep in a warehouse, but food and fuel, those are consumables and you will not move without them. No more hi-test fuel? How fast and high will your fighters fly? No more C-rats? Now you have to move more labor to agriculture to make up the deficit. When you look at it big-picture, sure, the fighting on the ground will be tough for a bit, but the cards ain't in the East.
Facing the Western Allies, alone, and with no more LL, the Soviets might make temporary inroads into Central Europe, but I'm skeptical those inroads will last.
How many hundreds of missions involving hundreds of B-17s in a single raid on a railroad junction are known?Out of how many hundreds of missions?
Do more research and get back to me.How many hundreds of missions involving hundreds of B-17s in a single raid on a railroad junction are known?
I need statistics, numbers, not just a list.
Or less often, the fuel ran out over the ocean. I prefer to operate with numbers.
At least two, may be more. The first one was shot down by a woman, or rather a woman/man pair from the same regiment, claim was confirmed. But in general, the He 177 was so unreliable and used in extremely difficult conditions not for intended purpose (Stalingrad, winter-spring 1943) that its losses were very high.
Ok, the real value of soviet fighters is difficult to estimate. May be, I overestimate it. Who can make an unbiased reliable estimation?
Of course, the Soviets will have a very hard time. But they already have a high percentage of experienced pilots. Anyway, I don't see the point in guessing.
Soviet fighters perform better as well.
It's not "years of experience" at all. Rather, it is a rather modest experience.
I.e., a whole new machine, much more complicated and less reliable.
3x20 or 3x23 or 1x23+2x20 or 1x37+2x12.7 - weak armament?!
The range of Soviet fighters was quite sufficient to counter Allied tactical aircraft. It would not be a decisive factor. Much more important is the training of the pilots. And here I find it difficult to say whether the Soviets had sufficient training in 1945. Probably not. But the occasional air combats with the Americans demonstrated rather equality.
Ok, you prefer to fight longer with heavier losses.
I know of one good example where a large number (several hundred) of B-17s during the day tried to bomb a large railroad junction with several bridges over a river. As a result, only one bridge suffered non-critical damage and was quickly repaired. The railroad structure suffered little damage and transportation continued after a day or two.
I will not respond to what I consider irrelevant to the discussion.
What do Liberty ships have to do with this discussion?
That has the ring of truth.Besides, the USAAF is going to just send B-29's on impossibly long range missions just for the hell of it,....
Another chirp from the sidelines:Just a chirp from the sidelines, I do not think the P-80 in 1945-46 will be a factor with it's short range and unreliable engine. These were mostly solved by 1950 just in time for Korea.
Did they, those confirmed claims vs own true losses comparisions are rather useless in giving info about the real life facts. The writers of the report did not even know what aircraft North Koreans had, even at the beginning of the war they had Yak-9Ps, a post-war version and a bit different animal than Yak-7 or plain Yak-9 or even Yak-9D....Then your Soviet fighters get to the B-29's analog-computer FC system which managed a positive kill-ratio against jets.