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Soviet Union, not Russia...Russia had a major problem in 1945-46.
It was the Western Allies that were supplying the fuel for the Western Lend Lease aircraft. It was also the Allies that were supplying a large part of the Tetra ethyl lead to allowed the Russian fuel to get into the 95 octane range. How much stuff they had stockpiled and how long it would last?
2nd problem is that it is only around 330-350 miles from Tehran to Baku. Given several months to deploy (like you would need to move a number of B-29s anywhere in the summer/fall of 1945) the Soviets were be facing heavy bombing from air bases in Iraq-Iran and given the amount of rail, road and barge infrastructure that that existed for the Lend Lease supply route/s building the bases would not be overly hard.
Russia had some very good scientists and engineers. They had a rather crappy/spotty infrastructure to supply certain materials in large quantities.
Agree. The Soviet PVO (air defence) demonstrated a lack of ability to learn and adapt even after such disasters as German bombings of the industry and fuel stocks in May-June 1943 (Operation Carmen II of Luftwaffe).In terms of intercepting B-29 raids the USSR air defence system had not been tested, radar coverage was limited and would be hit by the full suite of jamming the allies had developed.
The Western Allies would also have to interdict the Lend-Lease convoys.I posted a related thread a few years back, based on some of the scenarios that were being assessed in 1945. In general, the big question was if war did break out between the USSR and the West would the West be able to secure air superiority soon enough to prevent Soviet troops from overrunning western Europe. The timeline was something like 60-90 days assuming Soviet forces continued an all out offensive on the West. This was all based on the Soviet having a much larger ground force than the Allies in Europe.
For the Western Allies, a high altitude strategic campaign against Soviet stocks, rail capabilities, and the VVS was the surest path to achieving victory. It would not require B-29's and could be carried out by existing USAAF and RAF equipment. VVS fighters would be at a distinct disadvantage against western fighters at altitude and eventually would be ground down leaving Soviet ground forces exposed.
These scenarios discounted Soviet activities in other fronts as they would draw resources from the main point of combat. FWIW, a comparison of forces in 1945 would show that the US alone fielded a larger military than the USSR although spread throughout the globe. Add in the other allies and the USSR would be at a significant men and material disadvantage.
In 1942/43, the British and Americans started to supply aircraft with two-stage superchargers to their combat squadrons. Whether or not strategic bombing shut down German industry is controversial, but it was a disaster for the Luftwaffe. The Germans started to issue two-stage supercharged aircraft in early 1945, when it no longer mattered. Allied ground forces were inside Germany.The Soviet air defense demonstrated its weakness not only in repulsing the raids on Poltava, but also on Gorky, Yaroslavl and Saratov in 1943 - they led to a serious reduction in the manufacture of military production (the Saratov aircraft plant and the Yaroslavl tire plant were destroyed, the Gorky automobile plant and the Saratov oil refinery were badly damaged). ...
It is uncontroversial at least with regard to the fuel production.Whether or not strategic bombing shut down German industry is controversial, but it was a disaster for the Luftwaffe.
The Germans on the Eastern Front flew at the same altitudes as the Soviets, which were determined by the flight altitude of German and Soviet bombers (4.5-5.5 km). Advantages due to altitude characteristics were not of great importance. Air battles were carried out at altitudes of up to 5 kilometers, with a proper formation of combat orders (echeloning of groups by altitude) the use of tactics "hit and run" was mutually difficult. The problem was not the altitude of the Soviet engines, but the poor training of the pilots, who had a miserable flight time after aviation schools (sometimes many times less than that of the Japanese kamikazes!).The VVS's job was to support Soviet forces on the ground, so they built low altitude aircraft. This allowed the Germans to fly in at higher altitudes and pounce on them using hit and run tactics.
The high scores of the German aces were primarily due to the problems of the Soviet pilot training system and the lack of flexibility in tactics and stupid planning (both at strategic and operational levels). The inadequate performance of Soviet aircraft only worsened the situation, but was not the main cause.This is one of the explanations for the Luftwaffe's spectacular kill claims.
The Soviets were well aware of the need for high-altitude interceptors, but could not bring high-altitude engines up to the required performance parameters. There was a lack of qualified personnel and production capacity. The entire Soviet system was focused on the fulfillment of quantitative goals, which often led to a decrease in qualitative characteristics.The Soviets will need to re-think some doctrine. The Germans were unable to do effective strategic bombing over Great Britain.
The Soviets were extremely lucky that the Germans had too few bombers and they were inadequate for strategic bombing. But even the available aircraft caused serious damage to the Soviets in 1943-1944, destroying facilities deep in the Soviet rear (the Volga region). Had the much better protected and higher altitude bombers of the Western Allies been used, the result for the Soviets would have been extremely sad.The USA and the Soviet Union were out of the question. Strategic bombing was not a problem for the Russians during WWII.
The Western Allies wouldn't need escort fighters. Soviet 85mm anti-aircraft artillery would not be effective enough against bombers, night interceptors would not be feared. I think even daytime bombing from altitudes of 7-8 km would not result in heavy losses of bombers.Long range escort fighters are effective only when you have technological superiority over the enemy.
The development of high-altitude interceptors continued in the USSR throughout the war and by 1945 at least one aircraft could be put into production (I-225). The limiting factor was the engines. My impression is that Mikulin rested on his laurels after the introduction of the AM-38/AM-42 into production and did not pay enough attention to the high-altitude engines, which had many troubles. As a result, the deadlines were pushed back by a year, and then came the era of jet engines - German and then British models were introduced in series.My point above is that the Russians need two or three years to re-think doctrine and develop new aircraft.
If I must engage you in air combat, I want to approach you at a higher altitude. The Germans were able to do this. The altitude is energy that I can convert to speed when we wind up at the same altitude. I can use my superior energy to hit and run and not give you an opportunity to shoot back at me.The Germans on the Eastern Front flew at the same altitudes as the Soviets, which were determined by the flight altitude of German and Soviet bombers (4.5-5.5 km). Advantages due to altitude characteristics were not of great importance. Air battles were carried out at altitudes of up to 5 kilometers, with a proper formation of combat orders (echeloning of groups by altitude) the use of tactics "hit and run" was mutually difficult. The problem was not the altitude of the Soviet engines, but the poor training of the pilots, who had a miserable flight time after aviation schools (sometimes many times less than that of the Japanese kamikazes!).
The high scores of the German aces were primarily due to the problems of the Soviet pilot training system and the lack of flexibility in tactics and stupid planning (both at strategic and operational levels). The inadequate performance of Soviet aircraft only worsened the situation, but was not the main cause.
It sounds like she did not use a P-47 Thunderbolt. Teenaged girls should not be allowed to own them.Michelle Weitz shot me down once in junior high.
"Higher altitude" was achievable for the Soviets as well.If I must engage you in air combat, I want to approach you at a higher altitude.
And the Mississippi flows into the Gulf of Mexico! Why do you have to cite platitudes here?The Germans were able to do this. The altitude is energy that I can convert to speed when we wind up at the same altitude.
I described you that this factor was out of critical importance in the Eastern front.I described this as one of the reasons the Germans ran up high kill claims.
Which one? 37-mm guns on Yaks and Cobras?Also, Soviet armament was not very good, and Germans tended to survive being shot down.
Or not.In the west, Thunderbolts shot them down once.
My comment about not being able to bomb Great Britain was sarcastic.The Soviets were well aware of the need for high-altitude interceptors, but could not bring high-altitude engines up to the required performance parameters. There was a lack of qualified personnel and production capacity. The entire Soviet system was focused on the fulfillment of quantitative goals, which often led to a decrease in qualitative characteristics.
The Soviets were extremely lucky that the Germans had too few bombers and they were inadequate for strategic bombing. But even the available aircraft caused serious damage to the Soviets in 1943-1944, destroying facilities deep in the Soviet rear (the Volga region). Had the much better protected and higher altitude bombers of the Western Allies been used, the result for the Soviets would have been extremely sad.
The Western Allies wouldn't need escort fighters. Soviet 85mm anti-aircraft artillery would not be effective enough against bombers, night interceptors would not be feared. I think even daytime bombing from altitudes of 7-8 km would not result in heavy losses of bombers.
The development of high-altitude interceptors continued in the USSR throughout the war and by 1945 at least one aircraft could be put into production (I-225). The limiting factor was the engines. My impression is that Mikulin rested on his laurels after the introduction of the AM-38/AM-42 into production and did not pay enough attention to the high-altitude engines, which had many troubles. As a result, the deadlines were pushed back by a year, and then came the era of jet engines - German and then British models were introduced in series.
Hmmm Wiki again!Intended as a very long-range (VLR) escort fighter, the F-82 Twin Mustang was designed to escort Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers on missions exceeding 2,000 mi (3,200 km) from the Solomon Islands or Philippines to Tokyo, missions beyond the range of the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and conventional P-51 Mustangs.
If needed they could have gone into production in Jan. 1946.
As I hinted at the beginning of the thread, the I-220 to I-225 series was developed as a continuation of the OKB MiG high-altitude fighters. In addition to engines with different superchargers from the Il-2 series, two or three models also had turbo compressors. We can discuss how good/lasting they were, but it doesn't mean that they had to be developed from scratch. And as primitive as they were, the Yak-9PD series was (albeit not very successfully) used to intercept Ju 86P/Rs that still flew a little higher than bomber formations. I am not saying that the USSR could successfully defend itself, but that some technical basis did exist.The development of high-altitude interceptors continued in the USSR throughout the war and by 1945 at least one aircraft could be put into production (I-225). The limiting factor was the engines. My impression is that Mikulin rested on his laurels after the introduction of the AM-38/AM-42 into production and did not pay enough attention to the high-altitude engines, which had many troubles. As a result, the deadlines were pushed back by a year, and then came the era of jet engines - German and then British models were introduced in series.
The MiG Design Bureau was created during Polikarpov's business trip to Germany by moving employees of Polikarpov's design bureau who worked on Project Kh (russian "Х"), which later became the I-200. The Project Kh was started by Polikarpov, who tried to avoid early publicity of the project. The I-200 was designed as a front-line fighter, not a high-altitude interceptor. But when it became clear that in this role it was useless, it was used to create a high-altitude interceptor.As I hinted at the beginning of the thread, the I-220 to I-225 series was developed as a continuation of the OKB MiG high-altitude fighters.
Which superchargers exactly? There were modifications of MiG-3 with AM-38 and AM-38F, both - typical low-altitude front-line fighters. By 1943 Mikoyan realized that he could not compete with Yakovlev and Lavochkin on front-line fighters, so he switched exclusively to the development of high-altitude interceptors. Developed in 1942, the I-220 was not originally conceived as a high-altitude interceptor - it was supposed to be equipped the AM-37, but the finalization of the latter was abandoned. Installation of the AM-39 was a forced decision, but the engine was not completed by the deadline, so it was necessary to put the AM-38F, with which the I-220 demonstrated excellent performance. And only in 1943 it was decided to develop a high-altitude interceptor on its basis.In addition to engines with different superchargers from the Il-2 series,
Stable operation of the turbochargers was not achieved. Additionally, there were serious troubles with engine's oil system.two or three models also had turbo compressors.
The M-105PD installed on the Yak had a two-stage SC with a turbo coupling, developed under Dollezhal's supervision since 1940. It was by no means primitive, but the Soviets were not succeed to bring it to an acceptable condition by the end of the war.And as primitive as they were, the Yak-9PD series was (albeit not very successfully) used to intercept Ju 86P/Rs that still flew a little higher than bomber formations. I am not saying that the USSR could successfully defend itself, but that some technical basis did exist.
Were the Russians desperate for high altitude performance. Ju86s were a nuisance, not an existential threat. They did have Spitfire_IXs. The Soviets were interested in low altitude ground support.The Soviets were unable to perfect the high-altitude piston engines to the required performance even under the most favorable conditions. I believe that under the conditions of war continuation with high casualties and destruction of industry by raids of hundreds of heavy bombers, the probability of accomplishing this task tends to zero.