USAAF/RAF vs VVS 1945

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NevadaK

Senior Airman
440
714
Oct 10, 2019
As a bit of framing for this scenario,

A few years (decades) ago when I was in college, I came across a thesis paper that analyzed the possible outcomes of a conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The paper's position was that if a conflict were to break out it would happen fairly quickly to the fall of Berlin when both western and eastern forces were at their strength in theater. While the paper determined that the most likely outcome was Soviet victory in Europe due to the overwhelming superiority of ground forces it determined that this was only possible if the VVS could maintain air parity for 60 days. So the what if is, could the Western Allies achieve air superiority of the VVS in time to affect the outcome of such a conflict?

For instance:
  • Would an 8th Air Force strategic air campaign produce a similar outcome of air dominance?
  • Would the Western Allies ground attack capabilities affect Soviet tactical operations? One thing the paper pointed out was that the Soviet Army had a critical weakness in ground transport as they did not produce their own trucks as these were all lend lease and would be hard to replace when damaged!
  • Would Western Allies air forces be able to deflect VVS' strategy of flooding combat areas with overwhelming numbers?

Your thoughts are welcomed.
 
This is an interesting exercise.
Yet, in my opinion, for a better understanding of the Soviet ground forces strengths and weaknesses, we need to take into account the situation with manpower in USSR. Some post-Soviet historians suggested that the Soviet Army in 1945 faced the imminent crisis due to demographic situation. 17-year old boys were conscripted officially and in large numbers since 1943 and there was a practice of conscripting 15-16 y.o. to NKVD troops and auxiliary units. Some voenkomats already in 1944 registered more 17-year-olds than all other ages. And there was another problem: from about 1927-1928 the number of births went down in USSR and the mortality rate among young males remain as low (if not worse) as before 1914. Add to that the "quality"of manpower grown up during the war: poor nutrition, lack of medical service and education, etc.

As for the questions raised:
1. Probably it would but Allies would need time (and bear costs of all kinds) to adapt to new tactics since VVS was not LW.
2. Ground transport. Very good point. While the number of trucks in the USSR in 1945 was huge there was a regular deficit of fuel and lubricants which could become critical with the lend-lease interruption. Also the deficit of rail engines (lend-lease again). Should Allies manage to hit refineries and POL storages, the Soviet Army would be stopped in its tracks, probably.
3. Again, as in p.1, Allied forces would need to learn and to adapt. How quickly they could in real life, we can just speculate...
 
This is an interesting exercise.
Yet, in my opinion, for a better understanding of the Soviet ground forces strengths and weaknesses, we need to take into account the situation with manpower in USSR. Some post-Soviet historians suggested that the Soviet Army in 1945 faced the imminent crisis due to demographic situation. 17-year old boys were conscripted officially and in large numbers since 1943 and there was a practice of conscripting 15-16 y.o. to NKVD troops and auxiliary units. Some voenkomats already in 1944 registered more 17-year-olds than all other ages. And there was another problem: from about 1927-1928 the number of births went down in USSR and the mortality rate among young males remain as low (if not worse) as before 1914. Add to that the "quality"of manpower grown up during the war: poor nutrition, lack of medical service and education, etc.

As for the questions raised:
1. Probably it would but Allies would need time (and bear costs of all kinds) to adapt to new tactics since VVS was not LW.
2. Ground transport. Very good point. While the number of trucks in the USSR in 1945 was huge there was a regular deficit of fuel and lubricants which could become critical with the lend-lease interruption. Also the deficit of rail engines (lend-lease again). Should Allies manage to hit refineries and POL storages, the Soviet Army would be stopped in its tracks, probably.
3. Again, as in p.1, Allied forces would need to learn and to adapt. How quickly they could in real life, we can just speculate...

Thanks Dimlee,

In my opinion a USAAF Strategic Air Campaign against the VVS would look a lot like the pre-invasion campaign against german mobility and transportations targets and would be the one aspect of such an air war where it would be the VVS adapting to allies tactics rather than the other way around. A high altitude campaign would force the VVS into the same disadvantages that the LW faced, dedicating fighters to attacking bombers and being at a disadvantage to USAAF protecting fighter escorts. Fighting at an altitude where VVS fighters are less than optimal vs P-51's and P-47's.

At lower altitudes it looks a lot different and I agree, USAAF/RAF would have to develop new tactics fairly quickly.

Thanks!
 
Interesting scenario.

To the third point "Would Western Allies air forces be able to deflect VVS' strategy of flooding combat areas with overwhelming numbers?".

The only 2 areas where the US and UK really had a technology advantage (that would matter in this scenario IMO) were the Atom Bomb and Radar etal. If we leave out the Atom Bomb (which would make the scenario untenable for the Soviet Union in 1945) then Radar etal is the only major factor.

The radar systems and the fighter control systems and methodologies developed by the UK in the early-war had increased considerably in capability by the end of the war. The EW/FC systems used for anti-V1 duties would be equally(?) effective against low flying aircraft, and the various late-war AMES EW/GCI systems were quite effective. By the end of the war the UK had developed very capable mobile systems (ie transportable to a location where they could then be temporarily emplaced).

The early-war UK methodologies had been passed to the US, who were already developing systems to meet their own needs. The highly capable late-war Project Cadillac in the PTO being just one result of what the US came up with.

If I were an opposing air force I would not like the idea of dealing with any of these systems. I am not saying that Radar etal would be the deciding factor, but I think it would have a significant effect vs VVS aircraft trying to penetrate the US/UK sectors to any depth.
 
Interesting scenario.

To the third point "Would Western Allies air forces be able to deflect VVS' strategy of flooding combat areas with overwhelming numbers?".

The only 2 areas where the US and UK really had a technology advantage (that would matter in this scenario IMO) were the Atom Bomb and Radar etal. If we leave out the Atom Bomb (which would make the scenario untenable for the Soviet Union in 1945) then Radar etal is the only major factor.

The radar systems and the fighter control systems and methodologies developed by the UK in the early-war had increased considerably in capability by the end of the war. The EW/FC systems used for anti-V1 duties would be equally(?) effective against low flying aircraft, and the various late-war AMES EW/GCI systems were quite effective. By the end of the war the UK had developed very capable mobile systems (ie transportable to a location where they could then be temporarily emplaced).

The early-war UK methodologies had been passed to the US, who were already developing systems to meet their own needs. The highly capable late-war Project Cadillac in the PTO being just one result of what the US came up with.

If I were an opposing air force I would not like the idea of dealing with any of these systems. I am not saying that Radar etal would be the deciding factor, but I think it would have a significant effect vs VVS aircraft trying to penetrate the US/UK sectors to any depth.
That's quite a thought, Soviet Spitfire IX's adopting TARAN tactics against lone B-29's armed with nukes flying deep unescorted missions over Soviet territory. Messy.
 
Thanks Dimlee,

In my opinion a USAAF Strategic Air Campaign against the VVS would look a lot like the pre-invasion campaign against german mobility and transportations targets and would be the one aspect of such an air war where it would be the VVS adapting to allies tactics rather than the other way around. A high altitude campaign would force the VVS into the same disadvantages that the LW faced, dedicating fighters to attacking bombers and being at a disadvantage to USAAF protecting fighter escorts. Fighting at an altitude where VVS fighters are less than optimal vs P-51's and P-47's.

At lower altitudes it looks a lot different and I agree, USAAF/RAF would have to develop new tactics fairly quickly.

Thanks!

Yes, probably the pre-invasion scenario would be the most natural choice for the Allies in this situation, at least as a starting point for further planning. There was an experience and there was a success, so why to invent something else. But would it be as effective as in 1944?

Let's consider two types of operations:
Strategic bombing.
Soviet-controlled East/Central Europe in 1945 was not the Reich in 1944. Infrastructure was either poorly developed or seriously damaged, factories shut down or running at the low output (except those deep inside the USSR territory). Overall, not so many objectives except rail hubs. Probably it looked as "poor" as Korea after 1950 in terms of strategic targets. There were many such targets in the USSR itself, especially outside of still ruined Belorussia and Ukraine, but too far away.
If Allies manage to stop the Soviet offensive and retain what was later known as Western Germany, distances to main industrial areas in Moscow/Yaroslavl region are around 2,000 km and to Povolzhye (from Gorky and down) 2,500-2,700 km. A bit shorter if Allies establish bases in Denmark. US bombers (assume B-29 are not in ETO yet) can hardly reach the targets and British aircraft as Lancaster operates at the maximum range with the reduced payload. Please correct if I'm wrong.
Soviet PVO (air defence) has failed spectacularly in 1943 when Luftwaffe has destroyed much of the industry of Povolzhye region. Despite improvements made in further 2 years, I don't think the same PVO could stop Allied strategic air campaign in 1945. The success of such a campaign would probably be determined by the quality of intelligence, so limited bombloads are delivered to the right targets and not spread away around vast territories.

Interdiction campaign.
Many targets of opportunity and Allies had the equipment and experienced aviators for the job. Soviet air defences at the front line and in rear areas were probably no worse (or better) equipped than German in 1944. VVS is effective at low/mid altitudes. Allies have some jets - will they become a trump card? Communication, logistics, equipment reliability, command and control - this is where Allies had the upper hand, in my opinion.
But "providence is on the side of big battalions"...
VVS front units on May 10th, 1945:
bombers 2,977
sturmoviks 3,585
fighters 6,268
Including 1,664 aircraft in reserve. Serviceability rates around 85%.
Source:
ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА --[ Военная история ]-- Советская авиация в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-1945 гг. в цифрах
It makes sense to compare with Allied numbers.
 
If I were an opposing air force I would not like the idea of dealing with any of these systems. I am not saying that Radar etal would be the deciding factor, but I think it would have a significant effect vs VVS aircraft trying to penetrate the US/UK sectors to any depth
Valid point.
And VVS is not really prepared for deep penetration. No experience and Il-2/Il-10 have limited range. So, probably Allied supply lines remain untouched until 50-100 km beyond the front line as it was with Germans on the Eastern Front.
 
Interesting scenario.

If I were an opposing air force I would not like the idea of dealing with any of these systems. I am not saying that Radar etal would be the deciding factor, but I think it would have a significant effect vs VVS aircraft trying to penetrate the US/UK sectors to any depth.

I hadn't thought much about the role radar would have played in such a scenario. Having brought it up, we should also consider the impact late war refinements in western allies use of proximity fuzing would have had on antiaircraft defenses effectiveness.

Thanks for your comments.
 
Yes, probably the pre-invasion scenario would be the most natural choice for the Allies in this situation, at least as a starting point for further planning. There was an experience and there was a success, so why to invent something else. But would it be as effective as in 1944?

Interdiction campaign.
Many targets of opportunity and Allies had the equipment and experienced aviators for the job. Soviet air defences at the front line and in rear areas were probably no worse (or better) equipped than German in 1944. VVS is effective at low/mid altitudes. Allies have some jets - will they become a trump card? Communication, logistics, equipment reliability, command and control - this is where Allies had the upper hand, in my opinion.
But "providence is on the side of big battalions"...
VVS front units on May 10th, 1945:
bombers 2,977
sturmoviks 3,585
fighters 6,268
Including 1,664 aircraft in reserve. Serviceability rates around 85%.
Source:
ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА --[ Военная история ]-- Советская авиация в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-1945 гг. в цифрах
It makes sense to compare with Allied numbers.

Greetings Dimlee,

I made a small effort to see if I could find the strength of UK/USAAF forces at the same time, but wasn't successful. My guess is that the western allies would have a decided advantage in the number of bombers (heavies and mediums), the VVS would have a decided advantage in dedicated ground attack aircraft and possibly in fighter aircraft. Some of it depends on whether you include the MTO in those figures. Given the range of most USAAF equipment they would participate in the theater.

Thanks for sharing.
 
Valid point.
And VVS is not really prepared for deep penetration. No experience and Il-2/Il-10 have limited range. So, probably Allied supply lines remain untouched until 50-100 km beyond the front line as it was with Germans on the Eastern Front.

This brings up another thought as well. The western allies air forces would be able to operate from bases well outside of air coverage by the VVS while the entirety of VVS operations would be under the air coverage of the western allies. This would be a significant advantage to the western allies who could employ tactics where you would wait until VVS aircraft had to return for rearming and refueling and attack them on the ground.
 
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This brings up another thought as well. The western allies air forces would be able to operate from bases well outside of air coverage by the VVS while the entirety of VVS operations would be under the air coverage of the western allies. This would be a significant advantage to the western allies would could employ tactics where you would wait until VVS aircraft had to return for rearming and refueling and attack them on the ground.

It makes sense. VVS operated for quite a long time in the situation of air supremacy without a threat of enemy attacks of the airfields. Personnel and the whole system was probably very relaxed. Actually, it was already demonstrated in June 1944 when Luftwaffe has successfully bombed Soviet-US airbase near Poltava.
 
The Allies have a much better chance of interdicting Soviet supplies than the soviets do of interdicting Allied supplies.
Allies cannot reach Soviet centers of production from Europe but they can cut supply lines (railroads mostly).
The Soviets have much ability to cut Allied supply lines.
Allies also have some facilities in the Mid east, especially Iran, for mounting strikes into the Soviet oil fields near Baku.
Granted planes (and ground crew) would have to be transfered

Soviet planes and tanks and artillery are more susceptible to supply problems than Allied forces.
 
VVS supplied mostly by railroad. I am reminded of the difficulties the Germans had once into USSR with the different gauge of rail and this nullified the efficient use of rail in supply. Is the reverse for the USSR not also true?

While all sides had made great improvements to aircraft towards the end of the war, it seems to me much more so for the Allies, at least to the end of 1945. VVS has nothing to compare to B-29, the B-32 is now available in small but increasing numbers. Jet fighters make appearances at the front. Aircraft late to the party in early 1945 are now showing in numbers in late 1945 such as the P-51H, Tempest, Bearcat, F2G and etc. Airbases can now be had all over western Europe cutting down distances. I imagine allied bases near the lines are much more tenable than the Soviets'. Can one imagine the VVS sending a bunch of sturmoviks and medium bombers to be met by F2G's and Bearcats while Meteors and P-80's provide top cover against VVS escorts? There's not a lot on the VVS side to interdict B-29's and B-32's at high altitude covered by P-51H and P-47N. What about our night fighting ability vs the VVS? Mosquitos and P-61's (hey, maybe even some left over Uhu's? Would F4U-5 be available?) I imagine this can have an impact as well. They can also cover night bombers...

The Soviets have a large edge on artillery and armor already in the theater. Airpower used with impunity can really mess up their day. See June-October 1944 for the Germans on western front for the effect. Typhoons, P-47's, F4U-4. If reaching into the plains of USSR where unhampered by tree cover, it can get messy. See Stuka vs t-34 and German armor vs Sturmovic.

What about a reconstituted French Army thrown into the mix for a shot of manpower?

Naval superiority. Not much flowing into Murmansk now, is there? I imagine most shipping has ceased and the USSR can be starved fairly quickly. Especially since Uncle Sugar stopped importing.

IMHO, the Soviets would have to do what Hitler tried against them and that is strike and move very quickly gaining ground before the Allies can respond effectively.
 
Gentlemen,

If my math is correct, and my eyesight OK, at the end of May 1945, the USAAF had in Europe (ETO and MTO combined)
4520 heavy bombers
1404 medium bombers
1058 light bombers
5840 fighters

I did not look/find serviceability rate

Of course in this scenario, the RAF numbers would need to be added to those totals.

Source AAF Statistical Digest page 156.

As for the western Allies gaining air superiority, IMO it depends on the altitude where the majority of air combats take place.

FWIW

Eagledad
 
VVS supplied mostly by railroad. I am reminded of the difficulties the Germans had once into USSR with the different gauge of rail and this nullified the efficient use of rail in supply. Is the reverse for the USSR not also true?

While all sides had made great improvements to aircraft towards the end of the war, it seems to me much more so for the Allies, at least to the end of 1945. VVS has nothing to compare to B-29, the B-32 is now available in small but increasing numbers. Jet fighters make appearances at the front. Aircraft late to the party in early 1945 are now showing in numbers in late 1945 such as the P-51H, Tempest, Bearcat, F2G and etc. Airbases can now be had all over western Europe cutting down distances. I imagine allied bases near the lines are much more tenable than the Soviets'. Can one imagine the VVS sending a bunch of sturmoviks and medium bombers to be met by F2G's and Bearcats while Meteors and P-80's provide top cover against VVS escorts? There's not a lot on the VVS side to interdict B-29's and B-32's at high altitude covered by P-51H and P-47N. What about our night fighting ability vs the VVS? Mosquitos and P-61's (hey, maybe even some left over Uhu's? Would F4U-5 be available?) I imagine this can have an impact as well. They can also cover night bombers...

The Soviets have a large edge on artillery and armor already in the theater. Airpower used with impunity can really mess up their day. See June-October 1944 for the Germans on western front for the effect. Typhoons, P-47's, F4U-4. If reaching into the plains of USSR where unhampered by tree cover, it can get messy. See Stuka vs t-34 and German armor vs Sturmovic.

What about a reconstituted French Army thrown into the mix for a shot of manpower?

Naval superiority. Not much flowing into Murmansk now, is there? I imagine most shipping has ceased and the USSR can be starved fairly quickly. Especially since Uncle Sugar stopped importing.

IMHO, the Soviets would have to do what Hitler tried against them and that is strike and move very quickly gaining ground before the Allies can respond effectively.

Rail gauges... Bogie exchange is a routine operation that was done well by Germans and by the Soviets. I think it can be just a minor inconvenience in this scenario.

As per initial condition, the conflict starts soon after the fall of Berlin, so probably it's too early for B-29, B-32, new fighters and jets in large numbers?

Night bombing - VVS is 3-4 years behind the Allies in this field. Same with night air defence, so Bomber Command aviators would operate in the environment less hostile than before. Could they find many strategic targets within the range, besides some marshalling yards, is another question.
 
Bogie exchange is easy but what was the russian railways loading gauge ?
Would russian rollingstock be able to pass standard gauge station platforms , fit standard gauge bridges ,pass each other on adjacent standard gauge tracks tracks ?
broad gauge does usually have a more generous loading gauge but even standard gauge varied and still does from country to country.
 
A personal view is that the Russian forces would need to win quickly or face serious losses. I believe the VVS is often overrated when compared to the allied airforces.. Basically it had no Heavy Bombers and as a result no strategic capability. The Allied heavy bombers flying by day at altitude with the escorts available would have almost total freedom to operate wherever they wanted and the RAF night Bombers would have equal freedom as the VVS had basically no night fighters. The long lines of communication would be open, marshalling yards, storage depots and similar targets would be sitting ducks and almost defenceless. The Medium bombers B25, B26, Boston's Mosquito's were far in advance of what the VVS were equipped with.

Russian fighters were short ranged, lacked altitude performance, often poorly armed and would be at a serious disadvantage trying to attack the B17's, B24's and inevitably the B29's that could have been brought to bear. There is a reason why the Luftwaffe and Japanese airforces went to 4 x 20mm and often tried to use 30mm. That said the Yak 9 TD is an interesting idea.
Let us also not forget the PR capabilities of the allied forces, they were simply unmatched and would have been a significant benefit in the vast open spaces of Russia. Plus if the Allies broke through then the airlift capability would be a significant boon.

The IL2/10 would have been at serious risk of being one shot weapons. At the end of the day they were roughly the same size and performance of the Fairy Battle. Of course they could take a massive amount of damage, but they would have been hit and even if they got back the serviceability rates for the next attacks would quickly have become dismal. The fighter defences of the allied forces would have been overwhelming and the RAF 20mm cannon would have been critical, plus of course the far better command and control.
Put it another way. We are comparing IL2 against the Typhoon and P47. If they met in combat which side would you rather be on, Allied or Russian?

I should emphasise that I am not trying to pretend that the individual Russian fighters or pilots were poor, a lot of them weren't. The LA5FN, LA7 in particular were very capable aircraft and if you got into a low/medium level fight with them you had better watch out. It's at the strategic and technical level where the VVS were outclassed
 
I would agree that if the conflict started when Berlin fell, (or even a few months after?) the Allies would not be able to get very many of the more advanced types into service. Trying to transfer several wings of B-29s to Europe would be a very large undertaking and not completed in a few weeks. Same for the jets, a few on combat trials is very different than several hundred in service in the summer/fall of 1945.
Allied AA may not be better than the Germans but it was probably better supplied (more ammo), how fast the Allies might be able to deploy more AA guns is subject to question. a fair amount was parked or sent back to depot as un-needed due to the low level of german air attacks on ground troops.

The, on average, more heavily armed Allied fighters would have an easier time with the IL-2/10. You don't have to shoot the engine or pilot (it does help) but severe damage to wings or tail could prove fatal. It is not one on one combat but attrition over a number of weeks. Pilot and gunner survive crash landing of plane with flat tires or one landing gear leg still retracted but plane is a write off?

About the only real targets for the Allied heavy bombers are rail junctions and bridges, most manufacturing is well out of range unless the bombers are based in Iran (and even then???) leaving them available for carpet bombing troop concentrations. A bit wasteful but both armies would be facing troop shortages more than bomb shortages. Soviet ability to bomb the allied held railroads (or the French/West german road net) is much less. Raids could be staged on the ports but it is around 275 miles (or more depending on how far behind the lines the Soviet air bases are) to Amsterdam let alone the other ports.
Soviets were using lend lease B-25s in some of their heavy bomber regiments. Soviets cannot (and should not) try to play the long range game. The Allies hold all the cards.
Trying to penetrate several hundred miles into allied, radar controlled, air space is not going to end well.
 
Bogie exchange is easy but what was the russian railways loading gauge ?
Would russian rollingstock be able to pass standard gauge station platforms , fit standard gauge bridges ,pass each other on adjacent standard gauge tracks tracks ?
broad gauge does usually have a more generous loading gauge but even standard gauge varied and still does from country to country.

Good questions. Gauge (width in particular) difference could be a problem, indeed. Unless there were yards and double tracks already adopted for dual gauge.
 

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