I don't know a lot about the final few months of the war in Europe but with the Battle of the Bulge shocking the military at the end of 1944, ending in early 1945, I suspect there was no let up of the accelerator unto VE day. Plans may have been made for a wheel to the Pacific but I suspect nothing had been implemented. As such, I suspect there were significant stores in the US, in England, and at forward support bases.It may depend on where stockpiles were.
Stockpiles in Europe or Stockpiles in the US waiting to go to the Far East?
Soviet AAA in WWII is probably one of the worst studied segments of USSR military history. Several books issued until 1991 have created a rather "rosy" picture focusing on the issues which Luftwaffe experienced over Moscow and Leningrad. The myth about successful PVO (anti-aircraft defense) was shaken considerably in the post-Soviet period when numerous failures became known: Stalingrad in 1942, destruction of the Soviet industry of Povolzhye region in May-June 1943, Poltava raid in 1944, etc. As for the front line AAA units, they were numerous in 1945 but their efficiency was seldom tested due to LW declining strength. Radar equipped 8x85 mm batteries and new command centers were introduced at the end of 1944 as a part of new organizational structure but as far as I know, this internal "reform" was far from complete in May 1945. I agree that the lack of proximity fuse and poor radar coverage is one of the main disadvantages of the Soviets in this scenario.Russian anti aircraft weapons were effective in particular the 25mm and 37mm but my understanding is that they were few and far between.
As for the Russians mounting massed air attacks, I agree they might but the Russian GA aircraft in particular the IL2 would almost be a one shot weapon. As I have mentioned in other threads the number of fighters available to the British and USA were vastly more than was available to the Germans and the Russian forces would have faced considerable losses
Thanks for this, I wasn't aware of the problems with the Il10. To be honest though it would have made little difference. An IL10 would be almost as vulnerable as an Il2 when faced with the fighters fielded by the allied airforces. Let's not forget that the GA Typhoons and P47 would have overwhelming advantages should they come across an Il2 or Il10.According to Oleg Rastrenin (who is probably the best expert in everything related to Il-2 and Il-10), the Soviet ground attack aviation was in the difficult transition period in 1945. Factories were forced to switch to Il-10 as soon as possible, but this new aircraft was full of bugs by design, and the haste and the pressure did not help to improve the production quality. Unreliable engines, weak undercarriage, deformation of the fuselage skin and control surfaces, etc. 118th GShAP, one of the three regiments equipped with Il-10, has stopped its operations on the 2nd day after numerous incidents. All 45 brand new Il-10s were grounded and shipped back to the USSR.
Most probably, the overall combat effectiveness of Sturmovik regiments in late spring and in summer 1945 dropped due to the low serviceability of new equipment and the cease of production of the (more reliable) old one.
The observation that the allies would have been exposed to heavy artillery bombardments like they had never experienced is correct, but and its a big but, that assumes that the Russians could muster such a force without being seen. It's something that I would doubt. British and USA artillery were very effective and I have read more than one report that has stated that the British Artillery units were the most effective in the army. The number of weapons available to an ordinary division was considerably more than it's Russian equivalent, they were very effective and the command and control flexible, effective and comprehensive. It would be a major assumption to believe that the Russians would have had it all there own way.
Has long as I know, the Soviets were very capable hiding and concealing their artillery and troops from the eyes of the Luftwaffe (maskirovka) and manage to surprise the germans several times (Kursk, Bragation).
Sure, the Western Allies got an inmense advantage in reconaissance but I doubt if it would made an inmediate impact in the search of targets or the US & british GA planes would have to loitier over the front lines trying to seek them, with the AAA risk.
I think those numbers would have been matched by the allied forces. If you include the fighters assigned to defend the UK (ADGB) would probably comfortably exceed them. I admit to not knowing the exact size of the 2TAF but believe it to be in the area of 60 squadrons which would be about 1,100 aircraft. Add the 9th Air Force into the mix plus the medium bombers available and its going to be a good number. The 2TAF and 9th Air Force are primarily the GA units and would stand a much better chance against opposing fighters than an IL 2 or IL 10. At the end of the day a Typhoon or P47 that doesn't want to get caught, takes a lot of catching and if they want to fight, they stand a good chance. The Russian aircraft are simply out of options in those situations.
1) The overwhelming advantage in strength and offensive combat skill would give them an immediate advantage on the ground against the western allies.
2) The western allies would have around 60 days to stabilize the front, or risk losing the European Continent, assuming that Soviet forces would advance at an average of 10 miles per day or less.
The U.S. military industry was still capable of turning out tremendous amounts of equipment, plus there were new types in the pipeline: P-51H, F8F, plus the Jets (aside from the P-80) like the Ryan FR and others.
The U.S. had the B-29 and the B-32, plus several super-heavy tanks in the works that were cancelled when Germany collapsed.
There was also the proposal by Patton to rearm the Germans and turn them loose on the Soviets...