USAAF/RAF vs VVS 1945

[NevadaK]

The S.U. had advantages, and some serious disadvantages. Not yet mentioned:
1: Operate carriers and battle fleets into Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, rendering the Kara peninsula including Leningrad vulnerable to attack.
2: If a landing force takes Murmansk, the Finns can be supplied directly from the North.
3: Since we have Denmark, the Baltic is our pond. Liberation Movements in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be supported. Finland can be supported directly.
4: If a landing force takes Arkhangelsk, Moscow is 600 miles South. This would divert divisions from the Western Front to secure the Northern Front. The threat of doing this would divert forces.
5: The Finns have no love of the Soviet Union, and Allied air groups operating from Finland could hit most of Soviet industry.

Advantages:
1: Stalin knew all these things. He held on to half of Europe because we (U.S. Gov't) were sympathetic to the Bigger-Nazis-Than-German-Nazis. Plus, Hitler had done more to unify the disparate peoples of the S.U. than Stalin had.
2: Stalin did not care for the blood of his people, so long as he won all was good. So the S.U. appeared ready to 'go the second mile'.
3: Another question is Morale: How much fight did the Americans have in them at this time? The Nazis were the objective and it was obtained; continuing to Moscow "wasn't signed up for". Since England and France hadn't vilified the Soviets for Poland's sake, the false message of Stalin being our ally stuck. Stalin "the Father of Nations" (his words) has no allies, only subjects, enemies, and useful idiots. England and Germany were rather exhausted, France cared only for France, and the loyalties of the peoples and governments of South Europe are not well known to me.

Cheap Philosophy: Don't start a war unless you can't afford not to win. Don't start a war you can't afford to lose.
Perhaps this train of thought shaped decisions at the time.

Greetings MadPenguin,

I appreciate your reply. A couple thoughts:

1. The shipping routes to Murmansk/Arkhangeslk were notorious during the war for the impact weather had on the ability to keep supplies flowing. Supporting a large amphibious force, creating a beachhead, and then maintaining that beachhead would be no small feat.
4. Agree that a flanking attack would divert Soviet forces, but the landscape between Murmansk and Moscow is also very difficult for military maneuvering. Lots of swampy terrain and uninterrupted forest. A landing and then drive to Moscow from the north seems impractical. Additionally, weather would impact the western allies who had less experience maintaining functional operations than the Soviets. Seems like a lot of effort for minimal gains. If a second front is required it seems that there would be other locations that could be established sooner and on more favorable terms.
3. Agree, however, I am less inclined to believe that naval operations could be conducted at will until full control of the air. The entirety of the Baltic would be reachable by the VVS until air supremacy was achieved.

Under Advantages:
A. One thing that I believe you are overlooking is the longstanding enmity between the U.S. and the USSR that predates the war. Until Germany's invasion of Poland, Stalin and the USSR were seen as the real threat to America. Whats telling about American opposition to the Soviets is how quickly they turned on their former ally immediately after the war.
B. If I recall correctly, the motivations for the USSR holding on to Eastern Europe were more complex. First, the USSR was determined to establish an expanded boundary to prevent another invasion. While the USSR had emerged victorious in the second war, it was disastrous overall for the country. Given that this was the second such calamity in thirty years moving the border west several hundred miles was as an existential action. Second, the USSR was committed to the concept of Germany "never again" rising up and threatening the people of the Soviet Union. One of the most telling experiences of this mindset was how Berlin was treated by the Soviets in the post war. Until the wall fell and reunification, the heart of Berlin, the museums and government buildings were left pretty much as they were on May 8th. As a reminder to the German people of what had been.
C. The allies (UK/USSR/US) established a demarcation line for their forces to stop. All sides adhered to this agreement and there was no additional land grabbing. The Soviets were given the "honor" of capturing Berlin even though American forces had a reasonable chance of taking it first. American leadership rightly felt that while German forces seemed to be largely letting American forces advance there would be more fanatical resistance in Berlin. American leadership was also concerned about overextending their supply lines and a further east advance would hinder the Army's ability to fight. The agreement between the Soviet Union included a commitment from the USSR to join the conflict against Japan which they did.

 

[TheMadPenguin]

Greetings MadPenguin,
I appreciate your reply. A couple thoughts:

1. The shipping routes to Murmansk/Arkhangeslk were notorious during the war for the impact weather had on the ability to keep supplies flowing. Supporting a large amphibious force, creating a beachhead, and then maintaining that beachhead would be no small feat.

Northern Lend/Lease shipments would be to support our forces rather than the red army, perhaps this would be with Finnish help. I'm also thinking along the lines of Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War - Wikipedia and North Russia intervention - Wikipedia along WWII scale.
A credible threat would divert some forces.

4. Agree that a flanking attack would divert Soviet forces, but weather would impact the western allies

Field Marshal Winter has not retired.

3. Agree, however, I am less inclined to believe that naval operations could be conducted at will until full control of the air. The entirety of the Baltic would be reachable by the VVS until air supremacy was achieved.

Here I'm of the impression (from the magnitude of allied air operations over Germany) that the VVS (army air force) and PVO (air defense forces) over the Baltic would last a month, maybe 2.

Under Advantages:
A. One thing that I believe you are overlooking is the longstanding enmity between the U.S. and the USSR that predates the war.

True. I have no way to quantify and include in "what would happen" scenarios like this.

I agree with the rest of your analysis.

 

[davparlr]

A lot this depends on the exact timing.
If the conflict breaks out in May-June of 1945 it is one situation entirely. If it breaks out in the historic summer of 1946 with little or no warning it is a vastly different situation. If it breaks out in the summer of 1946 after 9 months of escalating tension it is rather different 3rd situation.

A lot the attack from the flanks of the Soviet Union schemes would take months to implement. Even getting a really large force of bombers to Iran would take quite a while, the planes can get there fairly quickly but the ground crews, support, fuel, and so on would take quite a bit longer.

Do the forces in Europe have months? How fast was the draw down after V-E day? Soviets drew down slower than the west?

Actual state of supplies for both armies/air forces in late May of 1945?

Goal/s of the Western forces?
1. Keep what they have in western Europe?
2. Kick the Soviets out of Eastern Europe?
3. Establish new "border" and where?
4. Drive to Moscow?
5. Get rid of Stalin and negotiate with new Soviet leader?

Stalin may not have cared about the blood of his own people but according to some reports he was running out of that blood. Soviet army in the last months of the war was running into a manpower shortage, just not as bad as the Germans, British too had a manpower shortage, maybe the Americans but they were running out slower?

Excellent summation of the situation up to and immediately after V-E day and the variables that would affect a Russian confrontation. The situation was very dynamic. Especially since America was still at war in the Pacific. I don't think that, in America, there was any enthusiasm for continuing war.

If you are at all interested in the situation in Germany right after the war and and the politics of relations with Russia up through the Berlin Airlift, I would highly recommend "The Candy Bombers" by Andrei Cherny. It is a well written, informative, non-fiction book that reads like an interesting novel.

 

[Dimlee]

Sail to the black sea.

Turkey should be persuaded to join Allies in that war.

 

[Snautzer01]

Turkey should be persuaded to join Allies in that war.

You think? Persuaded... hmmm i think they had carriers full of persuasive stuff. And a skilled army of diplomats.

 

[Kevin J]

It's worth noting that the Germans failed to reach Murmansk , no more than 30 to 40 miles from the Norwegian border. The Russians got a bloody nose when they tried to take Finland. I don't rate your taking Arkangelsk idea to start a drive from the North.

 

[Dimlee]

You think? Persuaded... hmmm i think they had carriers full of persuasive stuff. And a skilled army of diplomats.

We should not simplify. Turkey did not bend under the USSR pressure in the 1930s and in 1940 (and Moscow pressed hard) and managed to stay away from the war, fending off "invitations" from both sides until it was beneficial to join the winners.

 

[Dimlee]

one only need look at the statements of the Whites to see how they would have treated Finland, the Baltics, etc, and it wasn't a heck of a lot different than how the Bolsheviks did. Do you really think the Whites would have treated the country that originated the Latvian Rifles would be treated kindly?

It is "yes and no". The attitude towards new states was very complex within the White Movement. There were factions and leaders with different views. Basically, until the end of 1919, the "imperial" attitude dominated, indeed. It changed in 1920 when Pyotr Wrangel took the helm in the South and worked hard to repair the relationships with other anti-communist forces. Too late.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Just some remarks.
1 and 3 - VVS airfields would be under threat both day and night. Attrition will be in the air and on the ground. Night bombing could be bigger threat, probably. If Luftwaffe could disable Poltava airbase in 1944 in just one air raid, Bomber Command with all their experience and equipment would certainly be able to do something similar.
2 - and VVS has no means to stop air-recon operations, neither over occupied territory nor over the USSR. It's like the 1950s without MiG-15/17.
5 - probably it would be this "CAS contest" which will be the most difficult for Allies to win. Equipment and communication are probably better on the Allied side, but the Soviets have an overwhelming advantage in numbers at the start.

First move on the Wallies part is atomic bomb strikes on Moscow, Leningrad and wherever the largest Soviet aircraft factories were. After the above, the Soviet air forces are politically leaderless and in disarray.

 

[swampyankee]

It is "yes and no". The attitude towards new states was very complex within the White Movement. There were factions and leaders with different views. Basically, until the end of 1919, the "imperial" attitude dominated, indeed. It changed in 1920 when Pyotr Wrangel took the helm in the South and worked hard to repair the relationships with other anti-communist forces. Too late.

I suspect that the Whites were frequently their own worst enemies; the czarist regime had failed the one basic requirement of a government: maintaining the confidence of the populace. The problems leading to this loss of confidence predated 1917 or even Nicholas II, although his personal failings would have been far less problematic had Russia had a constitutional monarchy, on the order of the UK. The simple fact is that the absolutist monarchy of Russia destroyed itself by its refusal to catch up with any of the then-modern ideas of government.

 

[NevadaK]

First move on the Wallies part is atomic bomb strikes on Moscow, Leningrad and wherever the largest Soviet aircraft factories were. After the above, the Soviet air forces are politically leaderless and in disarray.

The atomic bomb strategy at the end of WW2 and for the next 48 months or so is overrated as an approach for dealing with the USSR. In August 1945, the US had exactly three nuclear weapons. Production could have been ramped up to three in September and then 1 every 10-14 days thereafter. It doesn't really set up well for an overwhelming strike using the Bomb. At that pace, it also allows greater dispersion of Soviet leadership and assets minimizing the bomb as anything other than a terror weapon.

All of this was known to Stalin and Soviet leadership due to the success of Soviet spies such as Klaus Fuchs.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The atomic bomb strategy at the end of WW2 and for the next 48 months or so is overrated as an approach for dealing with the USSR. In August 1945, the US had exactly three nuclear weapons.

And until 1949-50 the USSR had none. Regardless of the predicted efficacy, if war breaks out between the Wallies and the USSR you can bet that the bombs will be dropped.

 

[ARTESH]

According to What i know about Iranian Air Force, We lost 2 planes in direct engagement by Soviet Air Force, 2 dead, 2 captured later freed, one of them was American. one RF-4E and one F-4E.

we lost at least 5 planes to puppets, 3 in Oman, there is no info about 2 other planes.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Nice thread.

Western Allies sure would have the technoligical edge in aircraft, but VVS would be far of been sitting ducks and don't think if TAFs could smash the soviet armour quickly enough. Beside that, overconfidence could have nasty effects early in the battle in western squadrons.

USA and Commonwealth soldiers would not run at the first shoot but they would have to endure attacks that they weren't used to, with heavy artillery and massed air attacks. By the way, Western Allies tactical air forces would meet an enemy with more planes and AAA than the germans by that stage of the war, with privates shooting at them with everything at hand.

Someone (sorry, can recall who) mentioned Western Allies would enroll german soldiers. Pretty much agree with that, it could be a good reinforcement, but, it would be done it a short amount of time to make it count?

It has been mentioned the doubious loyalty of the diferent peoples of the USSR to the cause. I agree with those that think that the war has galvanized them around the flag in such a fanatical way that don't expect the Red Army to get problems with it (not to talk about NKVD shoting traitors on the spot). But beside that, nobody has mentioned the communists inspired resistance movements in western Europe. Don't forget that Communists Parties were on the rise, specially in France and Italy and could have and impact in the supply chain throught strikes and sabotage.

I also agree that the cut in the lend-lease material wouldn't be notice in a short timeframe.

 

[SaparotRob]

Would/could the Allies in the PTO use troops slated for the invasion of Japan? The Allies had a "Germany first" policy. The Soviet Union would be a bigger, meaner, scarier "Germany". Under carrier aircraft protection, Allied forces might invade the CCCP from the other direction. Although there must have been Soviet forces there to counter Japanese adventurism, a massive landing on the other side of the country might divert a lot of troops. Imagine using B-29's and a few B-32's from airfields in Soviet territory. Japan would become another Truk or Rabaul left to wither on the vine.

 

[davparlr]

A. One thing that I believe you are overlooking is the longstanding enmity between the U.S. and the USSR that predates the war. Until Germany's invasion of Poland, Stalin and the USSR were seen as the real threat to America.

I do not think this is true for U.S. We were just pulling out of a severe depression, thanks to European war clouds and not Roosevelt, and there were quite a few adherents to Communism and to Naxism, which Roosevelt did help keep down. I think most Americans wanted just wanted a job be left alone.

Assuming that the British and Americans were not deliberately running down their ammunition stocks as the war ended (they were slowing down aircraft production as they could see the writing on the wall) they have a large advantage over the Russians in artillery, especially compared to the Germans. The Germans were in an almost chronic state of ammunition shortages.
The British and Americans were rather generous with their ammunition allocations.

I think the western allies (America) had stockpiled massive amounts of materiel by the end of the war. If I remember correctly, we were still using up our stockpile of WW2 bombs during the Vietnam war.

Also, attrition rate of weapons in modern warfare is underestimated. I flew the first US support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war on a secret mission flying 40,000 lbs of Shrike missiles (missiles used against anti-aircraft sites) to Oceana NAS for transfer to an El Al Boeing 707 (which had the fuselage completely covered in wrapping paper!). That tells you of the seriousness of Israeli aircraft losses. I also heard we had depleted most of our Western Europe tanks to keep Israel in the fight (this is strictly hearsay). This attrition occurred in only couple of weeks into the war. My mission occurred only four days after the war started. (see Operation Nickel Grass - Wikipedia). So any resupply problems will occur almost immediately in any major conflict.

 

[Glider]

Taking the points one at a time

Nice thread.

Western Allies sure would have the technoligical edge in aircraft, but VVS would be far of been sitting ducks and don't think if TAFs could smash the soviet armour quickly enough. Beside that, overconfidence could have nasty effects early in the battle in western squadrons.

Overconfidence could easily cut both ways. Russia had retaken a huge amount of ground and would have a lot of confidence about their ability but that as you point out, could easily get out of hand. The TAF wouldn't smash Russian armour, the weapons were too inaccurate, but they would devastate the supporting troops and structure. Russian armour would be slowed down by the impact of losses to their supporting infrastructure and the terrain.

USA and Commonwealth soldiers would not run at the first shoot but they would have to endure attacks that they weren't used to, with heavy artillery and massed air attacks. By the way, Western Allies tactical air forces would meet an enemy with more planes and AAA than the germans by that stage of the war, with privates shooting at them with everything at hand.

Russian anti aircraft weapons were effective in particular the 25mm and 37mm but my understanding is that they were few and far between. Heavy aa guns without proximity fuses or radar direction would be more impressive than effective. Right until the end the machine gun played an important part in their defences and these were outdated by the end of the war but morale would have been helped by everyone letting fly with what they had.

The observation that the allies would have been exposed to heavy artillery bombardments like they had never experienced is correct, but and its a big but, that assumes that the Russians could muster such a force without being seen. It's something that I would doubt. British and USA artillery were very effective and I have read more than one report that has stated that the British Artillery units were the most effective in the army. The number of weapons available to an ordinary division was considerably more than it's Russian equivalent, they were very effective and the command and control flexible, effective and comprehensive. It would be a major assumption to believe that the Russians would have had it all there own way

As for the Russians mounting massed air attacks, I agree they might but the Russian GA aircraft in particular the IL2 would almost be a one shot weapon. As I have mentioned in other threads the number of fighters available to the British and USA were vastly more than was available to the Germans and the Russian forces would have faced considerable losses.

[/QUOTE]

 

[Shortround6]

It may depend on where stockpiles were.
Stockpiles in Europe or Stockpiles in the US waiting to go to the Far East?

In any case the Soviets might have been in the same situation. Stock piles for the final push into/past Berlin or stockpiles for the Attack on Japanese territory?
Do the Soviets have 30 day supply or 90 days or something in between? Or longer?

Once lend lease slams shut the Soviets are in deep trouble when it comes to aviation fuel and ammunition (propellants and shell fillings). Once the stock piles are gone their ability to keep up with the British and Americans are significantly reduced. They have to win soon or not at all, much like the Japanese in 1942.

 

[Shortround6]

The observation that the allies would have been exposed to heavy artillery bombardments like they had never experienced is correct, but and its a big but, that assumes that the Russians could muster such a force without being seen.

I agree but it goes both ways, the Russians would also be exposed to heavy artillery bombardments like they had never seen, at least in the last 2-3 years of the war.

 

[Glider]

I agree but it goes both ways, the Russians would also be exposed to heavy artillery bombardments like they had never seen, at least in the last 2-3 years of the war.

I totally agree. I don't know the numbers for the USA but a British Infantry division had 72 x 25pd guns organically and those in the front line normally had at least another 24 x 25pd and 32 x 5.5in dedicated to them. By any standards that is a formidable line up