- Thread starter
- #21
As this thread has developed since first posting there are a few things that I hadn't initially considered that would I believe play into the course of such a conflict and affect how successful the western allies would be in gaining control of the air in the 60 day window. These are in no order. Kudos to the posters who originally made these points.
1. The VVS would have a significant range and endurance deficit and would be unable to operate outside of the air coverage of the western allies. Where the USAAF/RAF would be able to operate bases well outside of the VVS, the VVS bases would all be well within reach of USAAF/RAF forces. This would impact operation staging and recovery. As had happened with the LW in 1944/45 the endurance of western fighter aircraft would also be a factor given the ability to loiter over target until VVS aircraft had to return to base and becoming vulnerable during landing and on the ground.
2. Recon - At the start of such a conflict the USAAF/RAF would have a comprehensively detailed map and aerial photography record of the entirety of Europe extending from France to the eastern Polish border. Every railing and potential route for supplies would have been mapped giving the Western Allies a significant intelligence advantage of the USSR. Airbases, roads, bridges, rail lines, chokepoints, etc. It would be difficult for the USSR to develop a surprise route for any material moving towards the front.
3. Radar - This was brought up before, but in the context of air control and air defenses. We shouldn't overlook the role radar also played the accuracy of bomber navigation especially in night bombing. While its not precision bombing, it would have an impact on the ability to target larger things such as airfields, supply concentrations/depots, and coal bunkers.
4. Radar 2 - I mentioned this earlier, but I believe proximity fuzing is underrated in its impact on the war. If such a conflict had begun, certainly proximity fuzed AA would be a factor, but proximity fuzed artillery and bombs would be especially impactful. If one were bombing large troop concentrations, PF bombs would increase effectiveness by several factors. The tendency of the USSR armies to employ large concentrated masses of artillery/tanks/men to overwhelm points of attack would also make them vulnerable to carpet bombing and PF bombs would be especially effective.
5. Close Air Support - Not being very knowledgeable about this, but my understanding is that there had been significant advances in close air support technology and operations by the western allies by the end of the war. Would this be realizable against the USSR/VVS in contested air space, or does this require control of the air?
Just my additional thoughts. Take them for what they are worth.
1. The VVS would have a significant range and endurance deficit and would be unable to operate outside of the air coverage of the western allies. Where the USAAF/RAF would be able to operate bases well outside of the VVS, the VVS bases would all be well within reach of USAAF/RAF forces. This would impact operation staging and recovery. As had happened with the LW in 1944/45 the endurance of western fighter aircraft would also be a factor given the ability to loiter over target until VVS aircraft had to return to base and becoming vulnerable during landing and on the ground.
2. Recon - At the start of such a conflict the USAAF/RAF would have a comprehensively detailed map and aerial photography record of the entirety of Europe extending from France to the eastern Polish border. Every railing and potential route for supplies would have been mapped giving the Western Allies a significant intelligence advantage of the USSR. Airbases, roads, bridges, rail lines, chokepoints, etc. It would be difficult for the USSR to develop a surprise route for any material moving towards the front.
3. Radar - This was brought up before, but in the context of air control and air defenses. We shouldn't overlook the role radar also played the accuracy of bomber navigation especially in night bombing. While its not precision bombing, it would have an impact on the ability to target larger things such as airfields, supply concentrations/depots, and coal bunkers.
4. Radar 2 - I mentioned this earlier, but I believe proximity fuzing is underrated in its impact on the war. If such a conflict had begun, certainly proximity fuzed AA would be a factor, but proximity fuzed artillery and bombs would be especially impactful. If one were bombing large troop concentrations, PF bombs would increase effectiveness by several factors. The tendency of the USSR armies to employ large concentrated masses of artillery/tanks/men to overwhelm points of attack would also make them vulnerable to carpet bombing and PF bombs would be especially effective.
5. Close Air Support - Not being very knowledgeable about this, but my understanding is that there had been significant advances in close air support technology and operations by the western allies by the end of the war. Would this be realizable against the USSR/VVS in contested air space, or does this require control of the air?
Just my additional thoughts. Take them for what they are worth.