Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

[Dimlee]

Russia had a major problem in 1945-46.
It was the Western Allies that were supplying the fuel for the Western Lend Lease aircraft. It was also the Allies that were supplying a large part of the Tetra ethyl lead to allowed the Russian fuel to get into the 95 octane range. How much stuff they had stockpiled and how long it would last?

2nd problem is that it is only around 330-350 miles from Tehran to Baku. Given several months to deploy (like you would need to move a number of B-29s anywhere in the summer/fall of 1945) the Soviets were be facing heavy bombing from air bases in Iraq-Iran and given the amount of rail, road and barge infrastructure that that existed for the Lend Lease supply route/s building the bases would not be overly hard.

Russia had some very good scientists and engineers. They had a rather crappy/spotty infrastructure to supply certain materials in large quantities.

Soviet Union, not Russia...
Good point about the fuel. VVS experienced a shortage of gasoline regularly in early 1945. The war against Japan required another effort and moving the stocks to the Far East.

Tehran is close to Baku but the Soviet Army was still in Iran in 1945. Allies can use other bases in the region, of course.

 

[Dimlee]

In terms of intercepting B-29 raids the USSR air defence system had not been tested, radar coverage was limited and would be hit by the full suite of jamming the allies had developed.

Agree. The Soviet PVO (air defence) demonstrated a lack of ability to learn and adapt even after such disasters as German bombings of the industry and fuel stocks in May-June 1943 (Operation Carmen II of Luftwaffe).
One year later - the complete failure of PVO in Poltava:

The Poltava Debacle | Air & Space Forces Magazine

The US would stage B-17s in the Soviet Union, to strike targets deep in German territory. It sounded l

www.airandspaceforces.com

 

[NevadaK]

I posted a related thread a few years back, based on some of the scenarios that were being assessed in 1945. In general, the big question was if war did break out between the USSR and the West would the West be able to secure air superiority soon enough to prevent Soviet troops from overrunning western Europe. The timeline was something like 60-90 days assuming Soviet forces continued an all out offensive on the West. This was all based on the Soviet having a much larger ground force than the Allies in Europe.

For the Western Allies, a high altitude strategic campaign against Soviet stocks, rail capabilities, and the VVS was the surest path to achieving victory. It would not require B-29's and could be carried out by existing USAAF and RAF equipment. VVS fighters would be at a distinct disadvantage against western fighters at altitude and eventually would be ground down leaving Soviet ground forces exposed.

These scenarios discounted Soviet activities in other fronts as they would draw resources from the main point of combat. FWIW, a comparison of forces in 1945 would show that the US alone fielded a larger military than the USSR although spread throughout the globe. Add in the other allies and the USSR would be at a significant men and material disadvantage.

 

[NevadaK]

Some related threads worth reading:

What if? East Vs West 1945

Don't know if this has been asked before but here we go. It's June/July 1945 and after the Germans are defeated tensions rise between the western Allies and the Soviets. An incident sparks things off and all of a sudden there's another war started between east and west. How does the air...

ww2aircraft.net

USAAF/RAF vs VVS 1945

As a bit of framing for this scenario, A few years (decades) ago when I was in college, I came across a thesis paper that analyzed the possible outcomes of a conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The paper's position was that if a conflict were to break out it would happen...

ww2aircraft.net

 

[SaparotRob]

I posted a related thread a few years back, based on some of the scenarios that were being assessed in 1945. In general, the big question was if war did break out between the USSR and the West would the West be able to secure air superiority soon enough to prevent Soviet troops from overrunning western Europe. The timeline was something like 60-90 days assuming Soviet forces continued an all out offensive on the West. This was all based on the Soviet having a much larger ground force than the Allies in Europe.

For the Western Allies, a high altitude strategic campaign against Soviet stocks, rail capabilities, and the VVS was the surest path to achieving victory. It would not require B-29's and could be carried out by existing USAAF and RAF equipment. VVS fighters would be at a distinct disadvantage against western fighters at altitude and eventually would be ground down leaving Soviet ground forces exposed.

These scenarios discounted Soviet activities in other fronts as they would draw resources from the main point of combat. FWIW, a comparison of forces in 1945 would show that the US alone fielded a larger military than the USSR although spread throughout the globe. Add in the other allies and the USSR would be at a significant men and material disadvantage.

The Western Allies would also have to interdict the Lend-Lease convoys.

 

[bf109xxl]

The Soviet air defense demonstrated its weakness not only in repulsing the raids on Poltava, but also on Gorky, Yaroslavl and Saratov in 1943 - they led to a serious reduction in the manufacture of military production (the Saratov aircraft plant and the Yaroslavl tire plant were destroyed, the Gorky automobile plant and the Saratov oil refinery were badly damaged). The best the Soviets had was anti-aircraft artillery, which could be used against German bombers flying at altitudes of about 5000 meters. The efficiency depended on the concentration - indeed only enormous concentration of the Soviet AA provided satisfactory results, e.g., Moscow air defense during the war. It would be much less effective against the most Allied bombers, and absolutely useless against the B-29. Night operations of the Soviet AD aviation were completely ineffective. The B-24/B-17/Lancaster would be quite sufficient to destroy Baku. The Soviet air defense exercises in 1946 demonstrated that more than a third of the AA fire control systems were malfunctioning, and the training of about 40% of their crews was so poor that they were unable to track the target.
The closest to serial production (and in the absence of British jet engines they would be in serial production for sure) were high-altitude interceptors of Mikoyan/Gurevich (I-22X) and Tupolev's Tu-1 (63P), but they also had unfinished Mikulin engines, I highly doubt that in the circumstances of the continuation of the war these engines would be improved to the required reliability. The serial production of the piston-engined high-altitude interceptors mentioned above could not be started before the mid-1946. Soviet "Gneiss" radars allowed only to detect the target, while aiming was done visually, so they would not play a significant role, considering that their production was very limited. The main deliveries of the P-63s under Lend-Lease were in the summer of 1945, and they were the major AD interceptor of the Soviets! Generally, the USSR air defense aviation had ~5400 aircraft in service in 1946, about 3500 of which were obtained under Lend-Lease!
The further the war continues, the worse the situation for the Soviets - they will not be able to organize even the production of copies of German jet engines, and the lack of supplies of high-octane gasoline and/or its components from former allies results in a fuel crisis for the Soviet aviation. One or two raids a la Hamburg on Baku would be enough to make the fuel crisis catastrophic not only for the Soviet Air Force, but for the entire Soviet Army as well. Ploesti was an even more vulnerable target. Refineries supplied under lend-lease became operational later, moreover, some of them were within the B-29 range.
All that could help the Soviets to avoid an immediate defeat in this case would be a mighty rush of tank armies in the hope of capturing continental Europe before the logistical crisis begins - at least the Balkans, France, and Benelux. How far they could advance in the absence of air supremacy I cannot estimate, but I think hardly further than the Rhine. A catastrophic scenario for the USSR is inevitable in this case as well. But - most likely - Allied losses would also be very high. The Soviets clearly realized that any further expansion in Europe fails - no one wanted to continue the bloodshed indeed.
Operation "Unthinkable" had every chance of success in the long-term perspective, the only question was the price of victory, and the latter would hardly satisfy the Allies at that time.

 

[Howard Gibson]

The Soviet air defense demonstrated its weakness not only in repulsing the raids on Poltava, but also on Gorky, Yaroslavl and Saratov in 1943 - they led to a serious reduction in the manufacture of military production (the Saratov aircraft plant and the Yaroslavl tire plant were destroyed, the Gorky automobile plant and the Saratov oil refinery were badly damaged). ...

In 1942/43, the British and Americans started to supply aircraft with two-stage superchargers to their combat squadrons. Whether or not strategic bombing shut down German industry is controversial, but it was a disaster for the Luftwaffe. The Germans started to issue two-stage supercharged aircraft in early 1945, when it no longer mattered. Allied ground forces were inside Germany.

The VVS's job was to support Soviet forces on the ground, so they built low altitude aircraft. This allowed the Germans to fly in at higher altitudes and pounce on them using hit and run tactics. This is one of the explanations for the Luftwaffe's spectacular kill claims. Russia is a big place, the Soviet Union more so. Factories can be moved a very long way from enemy bomber bases. It takes two and a half years to build squadrons with two-stage supercharged aircraft that are fast at 30,000ft. The Soviets will need to re-think some doctrine. The Germans were unable to do effective strategic bombing over Great Britain. The USA and the Soviet Union were out of the question. Strategic bombing was not a problem for the Russians during WWII.

Long range escort fighters are effective only when you have technological superiority over the enemy. Mustangs had two-stage superchargers, high octane gasoline, and very slippery airframes. Given equal capability in design and manufacturing, a long range escort fighter will be bigger and heavier than its opposing interceptor. It will have lower acceleration and climb; it will be less manoeuverable; and it will a bit slower. This is how you lose air wars.

My point above is that the Russians need two or three years to re-think doctrine and develop new aircraft.

 

[bf109xxl]

Whether or not strategic bombing shut down German industry is controversial, but it was a disaster for the Luftwaffe.

It is uncontroversial at least with regard to the fuel production.

The VVS's job was to support Soviet forces on the ground, so they built low altitude aircraft. This allowed the Germans to fly in at higher altitudes and pounce on them using hit and run tactics.

The Germans on the Eastern Front flew at the same altitudes as the Soviets, which were determined by the flight altitude of German and Soviet bombers (4.5-5.5 km). Advantages due to altitude characteristics were not of great importance. Air battles were carried out at altitudes of up to 5 kilometers, with a proper formation of combat orders (echeloning of groups by altitude) the use of tactics "hit and run" was mutually difficult. The problem was not the altitude of the Soviet engines, but the poor training of the pilots, who had a miserable flight time after aviation schools (sometimes many times less than that of the Japanese kamikazes!).

This is one of the explanations for the Luftwaffe's spectacular kill claims.

The high scores of the German aces were primarily due to the problems of the Soviet pilot training system and the lack of flexibility in tactics and stupid planning (both at strategic and operational levels). The inadequate performance of Soviet aircraft only worsened the situation, but was not the main cause.

The Soviets will need to re-think some doctrine. The Germans were unable to do effective strategic bombing over Great Britain.

The Soviets were well aware of the need for high-altitude interceptors, but could not bring high-altitude engines up to the required performance parameters. There was a lack of qualified personnel and production capacity. The entire Soviet system was focused on the fulfillment of quantitative goals, which often led to a decrease in qualitative characteristics.

The USA and the Soviet Union were out of the question. Strategic bombing was not a problem for the Russians during WWII.

The Soviets were extremely lucky that the Germans had too few bombers and they were inadequate for strategic bombing. But even the available aircraft caused serious damage to the Soviets in 1943-1944, destroying facilities deep in the Soviet rear (the Volga region). Had the much better protected and higher altitude bombers of the Western Allies been used, the result for the Soviets would have been extremely sad.

Long range escort fighters are effective only when you have technological superiority over the enemy.

The Western Allies wouldn't need escort fighters. Soviet 85mm anti-aircraft artillery would not be effective enough against bombers, night interceptors would not be feared. I think even daytime bombing from altitudes of 7-8 km would not result in heavy losses of bombers.

My point above is that the Russians need two or three years to re-think doctrine and develop new aircraft.

The development of high-altitude interceptors continued in the USSR throughout the war and by 1945 at least one aircraft could be put into production (I-225). The limiting factor was the engines. My impression is that Mikulin rested on his laurels after the introduction of the AM-38/AM-42 into production and did not pay enough attention to the high-altitude engines, which had many troubles. As a result, the deadlines were pushed back by a year, and then came the era of jet engines - German and then British models were introduced in series.

 

[Howard Gibson]

The Germans on the Eastern Front flew at the same altitudes as the Soviets, which were determined by the flight altitude of German and Soviet bombers (4.5-5.5 km). Advantages due to altitude characteristics were not of great importance. Air battles were carried out at altitudes of up to 5 kilometers, with a proper formation of combat orders (echeloning of groups by altitude) the use of tactics "hit and run" was mutually difficult. The problem was not the altitude of the Soviet engines, but the poor training of the pilots, who had a miserable flight time after aviation schools (sometimes many times less than that of the Japanese kamikazes!).

The high scores of the German aces were primarily due to the problems of the Soviet pilot training system and the lack of flexibility in tactics and stupid planning (both at strategic and operational levels). The inadequate performance of Soviet aircraft only worsened the situation, but was not the main cause.

If I must engage you in air combat, I want to approach you at a higher altitude. The Germans were able to do this. The altitude is energy that I can convert to speed when we wind up at the same altitude. I can use my superior energy to hit and run and not give you an opportunity to shoot back at me.

I described this as one of the reasons the Germans ran up high kill claims. Yes, Soviet pilot training sucked. Particularly earlier in the war, their aircraft were inferior. In big, confusing battles, everybody over-claimed. Also, Soviet armament was not very good, and Germans tended to survive being shot down.

In the west, Thunderbolts shot them down once.

 

[SaparotRob]

Michelle Weitz shot me down once in junior high.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Michelle Weitz shot me down once in junior high.

It sounds like she did not use a P-47 Thunderbolt. Teenaged girls should not be allowed to own them.

 

[bf109xxl]

If I must engage you in air combat, I want to approach you at a higher altitude.

"Higher altitude" was achievable for the Soviets as well.

The Germans were able to do this. The altitude is energy that I can convert to speed when we wind up at the same altitude.

And the Mississippi flows into the Gulf of Mexico! Why do you have to cite platitudes here?

I described this as one of the reasons the Germans ran up high kill claims.

I described you that this factor was out of critical importance in the Eastern front.

Also, Soviet armament was not very good, and Germans tended to survive being shot down.

Which one? 37-mm guns on Yaks and Cobras?

In the west, Thunderbolts shot them down once.

Or not.

 

[Howard Gibson]

The Soviets were well aware of the need for high-altitude interceptors, but could not bring high-altitude engines up to the required performance parameters. There was a lack of qualified personnel and production capacity. The entire Soviet system was focused on the fulfillment of quantitative goals, which often led to a decrease in qualitative characteristics.

The Soviets were extremely lucky that the Germans had too few bombers and they were inadequate for strategic bombing. But even the available aircraft caused serious damage to the Soviets in 1943-1944, destroying facilities deep in the Soviet rear (the Volga region). Had the much better protected and higher altitude bombers of the Western Allies been used, the result for the Soviets would have been extremely sad.

The Western Allies wouldn't need escort fighters. Soviet 85mm anti-aircraft artillery would not be effective enough against bombers, night interceptors would not be feared. I think even daytime bombing from altitudes of 7-8 km would not result in heavy losses of bombers.

The development of high-altitude interceptors continued in the USSR throughout the war and by 1945 at least one aircraft could be put into production (I-225). The limiting factor was the engines. My impression is that Mikulin rested on his laurels after the introduction of the AM-38/AM-42 into production and did not pay enough attention to the high-altitude engines, which had many troubles. As a result, the deadlines were pushed back by a year, and then came the era of jet engines - German and then British models were introduced in series.

My comment about not being able to bomb Great Britain was sarcastic.

A thousand plane bombing mission by the RAF or USAAF over Germany put the personnel of an army division in the air over enemy territory. The people and resources supporting that air raid back in England were very much more substantial. Strategic bombing consumed massive resources and casualties. Was it worth the cost? Would it have been better to use these resources on more troops on the ground, or on a much bigger tactical airforce than they ultimately used?

If the Germans were going to strategically bomb anybody, they were going to have take resources away from somebody else. Maybe they don't need panzer divisions?

The RAF committed substantial forces for defence against air attack. Canada, the continental USA, and Russia were not seriously threatened. Resources were committed to things that were more useful. The Russians were sent Spitfire_IXs and P-39 Aircobras through lend-lease. They were the only people in WWII who preferred P-39s. The P-39s really were good at low altitude.

An important factor that limited new technology everywhere was everybody's determination to not shut down production lines. The production of Hawker Hurricanes was shut down in August 1944. All Stanley Hooker did at Rolls Royce was attach a second compressor to the supercharger drive, plus the intercooler. Two-stage supercharging is not that difficult, but if you don't think you need it...

 

[Alan Stevens]

Intended as a very long-range (VLR) escort fighter, the F-82 Twin Mustang was designed to escort Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers on missions exceeding 2,000 mi (3,200 km) from the Solomon Islands or Philippines to Tokyo, missions beyond the range of the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and conventional P-51 Mustangs.

If needed they could have gone into production in Jan. 1946.

 

[EwenS]

Intended as a very long-range (VLR) escort fighter, the F-82 Twin Mustang was designed to escort Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers on missions exceeding 2,000 mi (3,200 km) from the Solomon Islands or Philippines to Tokyo, missions beyond the range of the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and conventional P-51 Mustangs.

If needed they could have gone into production in Jan. 1946.

Hmmm Wiki again!

I've never come across any plans to base B-29 in the Solomons to strike Japan. Guadalcanal to Tokyo is about 3,400 miles ONE WAY. That exceeded the range of the B-29, hence the need for airfields in India, with forward basing in China, and the Marianas right from the start of the B-29 deployment programme to be able to reach Japan and cutting the distance to about 1,500 miles.

The P-82 programme began in late 1943, just as the US drive across the Pacific was beginning with the Gilbert Islands (Tarawa Nov 1943) before moving on to the Marshall Islands and then onto the Marianas (Saipan June 1944, followed by Guam & Tinian in July).

 

[Zmauky]

The development of high-altitude interceptors continued in the USSR throughout the war and by 1945 at least one aircraft could be put into production (I-225). The limiting factor was the engines. My impression is that Mikulin rested on his laurels after the introduction of the AM-38/AM-42 into production and did not pay enough attention to the high-altitude engines, which had many troubles. As a result, the deadlines were pushed back by a year, and then came the era of jet engines - German and then British models were introduced in series.

As I hinted at the beginning of the thread, the I-220 to I-225 series was developed as a continuation of the OKB MiG high-altitude fighters. In addition to engines with different superchargers from the Il-2 series, two or three models also had turbo compressors. We can discuss how good/lasting they were, but it doesn't mean that they had to be developed from scratch. And as primitive as they were, the Yak-9PD series was (albeit not very successfully) used to intercept Ju 86P/Rs that still flew a little higher than bomber formations. I am not saying that the USSR could successfully defend itself, but that some technical basis did exist.

 

[bf109xxl]

As I hinted at the beginning of the thread, the I-220 to I-225 series was developed as a continuation of the OKB MiG high-altitude fighters.

The MiG Design Bureau was created during Polikarpov's business trip to Germany by moving employees of Polikarpov's design bureau who worked on Project Kh (russian "Х"), which later became the I-200. The Project Kh was started by Polikarpov, who tried to avoid early publicity of the project. The I-200 was designed as a front-line fighter, not a high-altitude interceptor. But when it became clear that in this role it was useless, it was used to create a high-altitude interceptor.

In addition to engines with different superchargers from the Il-2 series,

Which superchargers exactly? There were modifications of MiG-3 with AM-38 and AM-38F, both - typical low-altitude front-line fighters. By 1943 Mikoyan realized that he could not compete with Yakovlev and Lavochkin on front-line fighters, so he switched exclusively to the development of high-altitude interceptors. Developed in 1942, the I-220 was not originally conceived as a high-altitude interceptor - it was supposed to be equipped the AM-37, but the finalization of the latter was abandoned. Installation of the AM-39 was a forced decision, but the engine was not completed by the deadline, so it was necessary to put the AM-38F, with which the I-220 demonstrated excellent performance. And only in 1943 it was decided to develop a high-altitude interceptor on its basis.

two or three models also had turbo compressors.

Stable operation of the turbochargers was not achieved. Additionally, there were serious troubles with engine's oil system.

And as primitive as they were, the Yak-9PD series was (albeit not very successfully) used to intercept Ju 86P/Rs that still flew a little higher than bomber formations. I am not saying that the USSR could successfully defend itself, but that some technical basis did exist.

The M-105PD installed on the Yak had a two-stage SC with a turbo coupling, developed under Dollezhal's supervision since 1940. It was by no means primitive, but the Soviets were not succeed to bring it to an acceptable condition by the end of the war.

The Soviets were unable to perfect the high-altitude piston engines to the required performance even under the most favorable conditions. I believe that under the conditions of war continuation with high casualties and destruction of industry by raids of hundreds of heavy bombers, the probability of accomplishing this task tends to zero.

 

[Howard Gibson]

The Soviets were unable to perfect the high-altitude piston engines to the required performance even under the most favorable conditions. I believe that under the conditions of war continuation with high casualties and destruction of industry by raids of hundreds of heavy bombers, the probability of accomplishing this task tends to zero.

Were the Russians desperate for high altitude performance. Ju86s were a nuisance, not an existential threat. They did have Spitfire_IXs. The Soviets were interested in low altitude ground support.

Did the Americans and British even know where Soviet factories were? Bombing would be destructive, and the Soviets would be motivated to develop two stage superchargers. It would take a couple of years, but the Soviet Union was a big place.

 

[Luft.4]

Technology aside, one thing could also be kept in mind here: the German's would have joined the Allies against the Soviets if given the chance. There are very many accounts where Luftwaffe pilots thought they would be joined together with the Allies to fight the VVS in April-May 1945.
That combo would indeed be very difficult to beat for the VVS.

Luftwaffe claims being super high are not an indication of VVS losses being super high, the inverse is likewise just as true.

 

[Luft.4]

Soviet fighters were indeed lightly armed comparatively. Commander of 2 IAK Gen.Lt Blagoveshchensky wrote directly to Lavochkin asking for a fighter with 3 but preferably 4 guns. This was partially realized beginning in January 1945 with a handful of 3 cannon La-7 produced, albeit with problems with the guns.