RAF Bomber Command summer 1940, How to bomb Auschwitz?

[Admiral Beez]

I've just listened to this fascinating podcast, The Auschwitz Volunteer. From about 12:20 onwards the 1940 insider report of atrocities reaching the British government and the RAF's contemplation and rejection of bombing the camp in late 1940 or early 1941 is discussed. Mentioned is that Auschwitz is at the outer reaches of RAF bombers of the time and that the bombing accuracy necessary to cause any meaningful damage was not possible. The Poles we're not asking for miracle hits on the gates or walls, instead they wanted the camp sufficiently destroyed so to put it out of action, of course also giving the inmates a chance to flee.

So, it's February 1941 at Bomber Command HQ, you're given command of the mission to effectively bomb Auschwitz. The flight to Auschwitz, in the town of Oświęcim and back will be over 1,400 miles. I'd suggest that only a daylight raid or a night raid targeting a large fire or pathfinder flare stands any chance of achieving the necessary accuracy, but how do your bombers get through? And what is their armament, incendiary bombs?

Now, I have to admit that this post is catnip to our resident contrarians; the reasons why a raid on Auschwitz, let alone an effective one, couldn't, shouldn't or wouldn't have occurred are clear. But if we're ordered to give it a go, we need to present a plan to Bomber Command.

 

[nuuumannn]

I'm gonna make it slightly harder. In 1940, Auschwitz was confined to a former artillery barracks in the south of the town of Oświęcim. The massive extermination camp to the west of Brzezinka (Birkenau) did not exist and construction did not begin until late 1941. The target for such a raid in 1941 was small and difficult to pinpoint with RAF bomb sights (Mk.IX Course Correcting) and navigation techniques in vogue at that time, although from the air was distinguishable on a fine day.

There were eventually three Auschwitz sites, the third was the industrial camp at Dwory, some kilometres to the north east of the former barracks that became known as Auschwitz I, once Birkenau, Auschwitz II was completed. Auschwitz III was begun in late 1942 and was established with the building of a synthetics factory by IG Farben. The factory complex is still in operation.

 

[pinehilljoe]

Perhaps one of the most controversial questions of the War. And in Hindsight, there is no right answer. I do not think the technology existed 1941 to precisely bomb a relatively small target deep inside the Reich and in 1944 the technology did not improve significantly. Add to that there were other Camps. The facilities were low tech, and if one were damaged one of the other 4 camps could have been expanded. That said should the Allies have tried?

In his Lecture on CD, World War II: A Military and Social History , Thomas Childers discusses the question. He quotes I believe Eisenhower (its been a couple years since I listened to the CDs) that Ike felt in the end the quickest way to stop the killing was to put all efforts into defeating the German Army and bring the War to an end.

It is a very good set of CDs if anyone is interested in the history of the War, my local library has a copy. It covers from the Weimar Republic to the dropping of the Bomb.

 

[buffnut453]

Rather than the technical problem which, in 1941 was likely unsolvable, I think the far more interesting area to discuss is the potential ethics of such a raid. An attempt to shut down such a facility would inevitably kill and maim the inmates. It can be argued that being killed by a bomb is far more humane than being worked to death or gassed. However, attacking such a target won't, ultimately, help end the war and so such an attack would break a cardinal rule of warfare: selection and maintenance of the aim.

It's certainly an interesting conundrum.

 

[Admiral Beez]

That said should the Allies have tried?

In 1944 when so much was clearly understood, I'd have to say yes they should have. Some info on that debate here.

In 1941, bombing the camp, even if it failed, would have given precedent to try again in 1943-45 when the camps were well underway.

 

[nuuumannn]

Personally, I don't think carrying out such a raid would have achieved anything, except the needless loss of the inmates and aircrews' lives. In 1944, the Allies took recon images of the Auschwitz site, both I and II in one image - they knew what was going on there, but what, exactly would destroying Auschwitz I and II achieve?

This is the perennial question. Strategically it would have achieved nothing. Tactically, it would have been a difficult target even given the size of Auschwitz II, and how do you choose to do this raid? Do you carry out an Amiens Prison style low level attack? Auschwitz II's fences were barbed wire - and what would the half starved emaciated inmates be expected to do? Escape? They can barely walk. Or do you just flatten the lot in a mass conventional bombing raid at height? What do you target? The main admin block, where you might kill a few soldiers and civilian admin staff? The huts? Why? And how hard are they to destroy, being as spread out as they were? Even then, Auschwitz was one, albeit the most notorious of the Nazis' KL (Konzentrationslager) network - there were hundreds of camps and facilities around German occupied territories that were designated as KLs, even Tempelhof aerodrome in Berlin had a KL attached to it throughout the entirety of the war, for forced labour to build aircraft (Ju 87s and Fw 190s under the Weser Fluzeugbau). Yes, Auschwitz was a death camp, but again, so was Belsen, Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen, Dachau, Treblinka...

The only option was to press on with ending the war and to wait for the eventual liberation of the camps, at the expense of the lives of those taken in the meantime. Tough decisions.

 

[tyrodtom]

I don't know if it was possible at the extreme range most of these camps were from England or Italy later in the war, but a low level precision raid by Mosquitoes or such on the guard barracks, administration areas and living quarters might have done a little good.

Make those sorry SOBs sweat a little, put them at risk, let them know a day of reckoning was coming.

Might have helped the inmate's moral a little too.

 

[Kevin J]

Only distance figure I could find with Google was Luton - Auschwitz, 1383 km or about 1800 miles return So what plane are you going to use in 1940? What sort of bomb load? High or low altitude attack? The Whiteley is probably the only plane that can carry 4000 lbs of bombs over that distance. Bombing accuracy at that time, 5% of bomber attacks on cities got within 5 miles of their targets. Time to target and back at 150 mph is 12 hours. You've also got 6 Halifaxes, 13 Stirlings and 22 Manchesters by the end of the year. It's a no go for 1940.

 

[Milosh]

Kevin, I think your math is incorrect, 1800mi= 2896km, 1830km= 1137mi.

 

[Kevin J]

Kevin, I think your math is incorrect, 1800mi= 2896km, 1830km= 1137mi.

It was a quick calc. 1383 x 2 x. 621 equals 1717.686 miles and Luton is 200 miles south of Bomber Command's bases in Lincolnshire an Yorkshire then you've got to divert around enemy defences. You'd be lucky to get away with a less than 2000 mile round trip. A Wellington could do 1800 miles with 1500 lb of bombs IIRC. I read the link. Your only option is Summer 1944 from Foggia, Italy, 625 miles, so a daylight raid with Mustang escorts. Besides the Germans would have found another way to kill these people.

 

[buffnut453]

I don't know if it was possible at the extreme range most of these camps were from England or Italy later in the war, but a low level precision raid by Mosquitoes or such on the guard barracks, administration areas and living quarters might have done a little good.

Make those sorry SOBs sweat a little, put them at risk, let them know a day of reckoning was coming.

Might have helped the inmate's moral a little too.

Not sure it would have made the slightest difference. In order to stop the abomination that was the Nazi's "final solution", it would require a concerted effort against every concentration camp, labour camp and extermination camp. As noted by others, there were simply too many of them and some were just too hard to hit. Singling out Auschwitz wouldn't send much of a message to anyone because it could be passed of by Nazi propaganda as either mistaken target identification or, if bombs fell on the inmates, as evidence that the Allies equally didn't care about Jews, Roma or the disabled.

If the Allies wanted to send a message about a coming reckoning, then it should have dropped psyops leaflets letting the guards and locals know that the Allies were aware of the atrocities being conducted in the camps. But even then, Nazi propaganda never revealed to the general population just how badly the war was going until the very end when, frankly, it was self-evident. Thus the psyops campaign may not have achieved much, if anything. It's entirely possible that it could have had the exact opposite of the intended effect; it may have encouraged some camps to accelerate extermination efforts or to hide evidence.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If the Allies wanted to send a message about a coming reckoning, then it should have dropped psyops leaflets letting the guards and locals know that the Allies were aware of the atrocities being conducted in the camps.

As a young student of history I remember asking why, why would the victims of the Holocaust just surrender, get on the cattle trains and walk into the gas chambers. Why didn't they fight back, especially when often those directing the capture and transport were often few and lightly armed. The Jewish people are capable of fighting like lions, as shown at the Warsaw uprising and of course Israel's victory over everyone of its neighbours. The answer to my young self was of course, through subterfuge the people didn't know they were being rounded up and transported to be murdered.

So, maybe that's where Bomber Command, and the BBC can make the impact. Leaflets, broadcasts, etc. to Europe's Jewish people warning them. Of course we need to determine what the British knew and when.

 

[GrauGeist]

Not to be a "contrarian", but an aerial raid would have has little effect on the "final solution" for the cost.

Germany produced more aircraft in 1944 than during any other year of the war and this was during some of the heaviest Allied bombing raids.

So attacking the camp(s) would have ended up seeing the camp either rebuilt (using slave labor) or relocated out of range of Allied aircraft (for the time being).

It would seem that the most effective means of disrupting the camps would have been units on the ground that would have been able to sabotage the ovens, assassinate high ranking camp admins and so on. Then again, that sort of activity may have increased reprisals to civilians/prisoners, too.

 

[swampyankee]

Germans were civilized; no one believed they would do such a thing. Also, numerous Jews did resist. Numerous non-Jews (aka "Christians") in occupied Europe actively helped the nazis kill Jews. Some of these were simultaneously opposing the Germans. There were Christians who helped the Jews (and Rom, who were also being exterminated), but far too few.

 

[WARSPITER]

Germans were civilized; no one believed they would do such a thing. Also, numerous Jews did resist. Numerous non-Jews (aka "Christians") in occupied Europe actively helped the nazis kill Jews. Some of these were simultaneously opposing the Germans. There were Christians who helped the Jews (and Rom, who were also being exterminated), but far too few.

This is a good point to all this. The help provided to get Jews out of Europe saved hundreds of thousands which did more than bombing a concentration camp would. It is also
with noting that each time the plight of Jews was openly stated the Nazi's retaliated by stepping up operations against them.

 

[tyrodtom]

In eastern Europe the Nazis applied extreme measures against any resistance in their occupied territories.
Even to the extent of 100 hostages killed for each German soldier killed by the resistance.

You'd think that would have completely stopped any resistance, and increased the co-operation of the local population.
But instead in resulted in even more people joining the partisans, anything to get away from the possibility of being deported to Germany for forced labor, or sticking around and taking the risk of being picked up and shot as a hostage.

It easy to sit back later on and say nothing could have been done that would have made a difference, but there's no way to know for sure.
Sometimes doing anything is better than doing nothing.

 

[pbehn]

It would be a suicide mission with no chance of success, no one could even say what success would look like.

 

[stona]

Here are some facts.

The first time the British were asked to bomb Auschwitz was in January 1941. This was not the huge Auschwitz-Birkenau complex but the original camp, holding 20,000 Polish PoWs.
The request came, according to General Sikorski's Polish Army headquarters in Britain, from the prisoners themselves who intended to make an escape 'en masse'.
Peirse replied that this would be impossible. He was well aware that his aircraft were sometimes bombing the wrong country let alone the wrong city, and the chances of a deep raid all the way to Auschwitz succeeding were close to zero. The Poles were told that on clear nights every bomber was to be deployed against German industry and that a 'sporadic attack' against a target like Auschwitz would be inaccurate and at best would kill some of the prisoners.

The next time the RAF was asked to bomb Auschwitz was in July 1944, by which time the camp was what we tend to think of it being today. On 7th July, following a meeting with Chaim Weizmann, president of the Jewish Agency, Eden wrote to Sinclair asking whether it was possible to bomb the camp or the railways leading to it. Churchill through his weight behind the idea but Sinclair was unsympathetic. He told Eden that interrupting rail traffic in France had been difficult with the entire weight of Bomber Command behind the effort; to cut a single rail line in far away Poland was beyond the power of the bomber force. Sinclair also doubted that bombing the camp or, in another hairbrained scheme, dropping weapons in the camp 'would really help the victims'. He did think that the Americans might be in a better position to do something and promised to raise the issue with Spaatz. This he did. Spaatz was sympathetic but claimed that nothing could be done without extensive photo-reconnaissance of the target. There was plenty of material on Monowitz and other 'war-economic targets' but not the Birkenau complex. Spaatz did not know that the War Department in Washington had been lobbied several times in the summer of 1944 to bomb the rail lines leading to the camp but had deemed the plan 'impractical'. On 14th August and again in November the Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy, rejected the request. Spaatz himself was instructed on 1st September to take the matter no further.

There you have it. The Anglo-American bomber forces did not think that they could do it. There was another political issue. By 1944, appeals to help with civilian victims, whether refugees or those slated for genocide, were regarded as outside the remit of Allied military forces. Richard Overy wrote

'In the end, whether bombing Auschwitz-Birkenau would have had any impact on the genocide that had almost run its macabre course by August 1944 remains open to speculation.'

Contrarian? Maybe, but those are the facts.

 

[GrauGeist]

Additionally, bombing the rail lines leading to the camp meant the incoming prisoners would have to walk that extra distance while the rail lines were being repaired...

 

[pbehn]

Additionally, bombing the rail lines leading to the camp meant the incoming prisoners would have to walk that extra distance while the rail lines were being repaired...

The idea that transportation would be stopped on humanitarian reasons is fanciful.