I find that hard to understand when BC dropped 93,691 tons while the 8th AF dropped 66,497 tons of bombs on the Petro industry.
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you are correct in the sense that the USAAF always insisted that there must be a military target as opposed to BC but the fact being neither BC nor USAAF were very accurate so for all intense purposes they both area bombed , Harris IMHO was a jerk who really dragged his feet on the objectives of hitting the Petro industry
The day-bombing USAAF wore down the Luftwaffe´s fighters, at the same time BC was getting it´s butt kicked by the nightfighters. Which ended only because Göring was sending night fighter pilots to bring day fighter units up to strenght.
you are correct in the sense that the USAAF always insisted that there must be a military target as opposed to BC but the fact being neither BC nor USAAF were very accurate so for all intense purposes they both area bombed , Harris IMHO was a jerk who really dragged his feet on the objectives of hitting the Petro industry
I wonder how many tons of 96000 BC bomb tons were dropped prior to late 43 , Thats when the USAAF started throwing their weight around amd BC started to get accurateI find that hard to understand when BC dropped 93,691 tons while the 8th AF dropped 66,497 tons of bombs on the Petro industry.
I wonder how many tons of 96000 BC bomb tons were dropped prior to late 43 , Thats when the USAAF started throwing their weight around amd BC started to get accurate
I wonder how many tons of 96000 BC bomb tons were dropped prior to late 43 , Thats when the USAAF started throwing their weight around amd BC started to get accurate
you are correct in the sense that the USAAF always insisted that there must be a military target as opposed to BC
No towns or cities in Germany will be attacked
as secondary or last resort targets, targets of
opportunity, or otherwise, unless such towns contain
or have immediately adjacent to them, one (1)
or more military objectives. Military objectives
include railway lines; junctions; marshalling yards;
railway or road bridges, or other communications
networks; any industrial plant; and such obvious
military objectives as oil storage tanks, military
camps and barracks, troop concentrations, motor
transport or AFV parks, ordnance or supply
depots, ammunition depots; airfields; etc.
It has been determined that towns and cities
large enough to produce an identifiable return on
the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion
of the military objectives listed above. These centers,
therefore, may be attacked as secondary or
last resort targets through the overcast bombing
technique
so for all intense purposes they both area bombed
I wonder how many tons of 96000 BC bomb tons were dropped prior to late 43 , Thats when the USAAF started throwing their weight around amd BC started to get accurate
Attacks on cities 53%
attacks on RR and canals 15%
attcks on oil 14%
attacks on troops and fortifications 13%
attacks on naval or other objectives 5%
oil does not seem to be a priority
I dont know what a member of the 8th involved in an unescorted raid in 1943 would have called it but I doubt it would be "wearing down the Luftwaffe".
you are correct in the sense that the USAAF always insisted that there must be a military target as opposed to BC but the fact being neither BC nor USAAF were very accurate so for all intense purposes they both area bombed , ...
That is 285.4 tons/attack for the 8th AF and 468.5 tons/attack for BC. Since BC dropped larger bombs there was more permanent damage done to the facilities. The Americans had to keep going back to finish the job.
Hind sight is always 20:20 isn't it ......
To argue that Germany should have "surrendered" or sued for Peace is specious. After Versailles in 1918, there was NOT going to be any end to WW2 short of the TOTAL DESTRUCTION of Germany and the DISCREDITATION of the NAZIS idealogy. To the extent that "innocent" Germans went along with Nazism, they suffered. This was no accident. This was strategy ... and it worked. Look no further than modern Germany for proof of that.
MM
Proud Canadian
My point exactly. They had orders to drop their bombs on factories ect. but in the pre laser-bomb age a lot of the bomb hit the surrounding residential areas by accident and not on purpose. That is a big difference.
I was (very obviously) refering to escorted raids in 1944.
My point exactly. They had orders to drop their bombs on factories ect. but in the pre laser-bomb age a lot of the bomb hit the surrounding residential areas by accident and not on purpose. That is a big difference.
My point exactly. They had orders to drop their bombs on factories ect. but in the pre laser-bomb age a lot of the bomb hit the surrounding residential areas by accident and not on purpose. That is a big difference.
Facilities.
More examples and this is just one BG, 303rd BGA Combat Missions and Reports
facilities = refineries
I noticed something. In all three cases the target was obsucred by clouds or smoke. Then I noticed the attacks were flown during the winter, when the weather is generally poor. Hence I picked some dates in the summer and viola, specific targets were attacked. Just once or twice a city area was the target but the report stated it was a "last resort" target due to low clouds. Fit´s into the orders Hop quoted, whenever possible aim visually at individual targets.
Hind sight is always 20:20 isn't it ......
To argue that Germany should have "surrendered" or sued for Peace is specious. After Versailles in 1918, there was NOT going to be any end to WW2 short of the TOTAL DESTRUCTION of Germany and the DISCREDITATION of the NAZIS idealogy. To the extent that "innocent" Germans went along with Nazism, they suffered. This was no accident. This was strategy ... and it worked. Look no further than modern Germany for proof of that.
MM
Proud Canadian
The first area raid noted in Eighth Air Force
records occurred on August 12, 1943, when 106
bombers attacked the city of Bonn, visually, as a
target of opportunity.
The Eighth's first ordered
city or area raid occurred on September 27 1943
when it dropped, through complete overcast, 506
tons on an objective specified as the 'city of
Emden.' This was also the first raid in which the
Eighth employed radar-bombing techniques
Within a span of
two weeks after the introduction of a mere six sets
of radar for the entire force, the Eighth went from
a command that had never authorized a city area
raid to one that would launch more than one such
raid a week, on average, until the end of the war.
On October 10 the Eighth, employing visual sight-
ing struck the city of Munster as a primary target
and the German city of Coesfeld and the Dutch
city of Enschede as targets of last resort.
The day
after this raid the Commander of VIII Bomber
Command, General Anderson, outlined American
target priorities, 'first destruction of the Luftwaffe,
its factories and planes; second essential German
industries, and third, the cities themselves.'
Anderson also introduced another change in
Eighth Air Force policy. It began to take effect at
the same time as the introduction of H2S - a large
increase in use of incendiary bombs. Anderson
had begun to encourage greater use of firebombs,
in July 1943.
The September 27 Emden mission
was the first of the Eighth's mission to load more
than 20% incendiaries, while the October 2 mission
against Emden was the Eighth's first strike to
deliver more than 100 tons of fire bombs on a sin-
gle target. Henceforth, the Eighth would not only
conduct intentional area bombing, it would do so
using area bombing techniques.
After the Second Battle of Schweinfurt bombing
policy changed. On the next mission, October 18,
the Eighth instructed its bombers to hit as their
primary 'Duren, Center of City,' and as their sec-
ondary 'Any German city which may be bombed
using visual methods without disrupting fighter
support.'
On October 30 the Eighth amended the
bombing instructions for secondary targets to,
'Any German city which may be bombed without
disrupting the Fighter Support.'
On November
30, 1943 the formulation became 'Any industrial
city positively identified in Germany.' The term
'industrial' tended to be a distinction without dif-
ference as almost any city in Germany qualified as
such. By the end of Lt. General Ira C. Eaker's
tenure with the Eighth, the formulation for sec-
ondary city targets had reverted to 'Any city posi-
tively identified as being in Germany which can be
attacked without disrupting fighter support.'
The
exact wording of the field orders may have
changed from mission to mission, but the Eighth's
intent to authorize area bombing in a broad range
of circumstances remained constant.
Just once or twice a city area was the target but the report stated it was a "last resort" target due to low clouds. Fit´s into the orders Hop quoted, whenever possible aim visually at individual targets.
Rail yards as such, however, were poor targets for
incendiaries. If the fire bombs landed directly on or near rail cars, they destroyed
or damaged them; otherwise, they could do little harm to the heavy equipment or
trackage. The Eighth realized this. Of the 9,042 tons of bombs dropped on
French rail yards, mostly during the pre-OVERLORD transportation bombing
phase, when the Americans took scrupulous care to avoid French civilian casual-
ties, 90 percent were visually sighted and only 33 tons were incendiaries.
Even over Germany itself, during Operation CLARION, when the Eighth bombed
dozens of small yards and junctions in lesser German towns, it dropped, over a
two-day period of visual conditions, 7,164 tons of bombs in all, but less than 3
tons of fire bombs.
In contrast, using H2X, the Eighth pummeled marshaling yards and rail sta-
tions in large German cities with high percentages of incendiary bombs. For
example, rail targets in at least four major cities garnered the following percent-
ages of fire bombs out of all bombs dropped on them: Cologne, 27 percent;
Nuremberg, 30 percent; Berlin, 37 percent; and Munich, 41 percent.
"Marshaling yards" undoubtedly served as a euphemism for city areas. Because
the yards themselves were not good targets for incendiaries, the prime purpose
in employing such weapons was to take advantage of the known inaccuracy of
H2X bombing in order to maximize the destruction of warehouses, commercial
buildings, and residences in the general vicinity of the target. Large numbers of
planes scattering their bombs around their mostly unseen and unverifiable aim-
ing points surely would cause great collateral damage to any soft structures
located nearby.
The target category "marshaling yards" received more of the Eighth's bomb
tonnage than any other, somewhere between 175,000 and 200,000 tons of bombs.
At least 25 percent of all the Eighth Air Force bombs dropped over Europe fell on
"marshaling yards." One-third of the American incendiary bombs dropped over
Germany fell on the same system.