RAF Bomber Command....

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all you guys have to do is research the week in February 1945 about Dresden, Chemnitz and other cities that received the dual bombing of the Allies to know that the project was to break the will of the German people no matter how it was to be done, bomb and destroy everything in existence whether building or human, strafing by both Allies was at an all time high during the week so lets all admit the air war to the ground was not as clean as the text books have said for multiple years. the US as well as the British did a fine job in the air regardless the LW ever so puny in 45 trying as they might were creamed in the air and on the ground. The Fat one had no jurisdiction in 1945 to say one word or another upon transfer of LW air personell from the day fighters to the night fighters or vice versa, it was not in his power
 
On a documentary shown last night in UK (the unseen films) it said that part of the USAAF strategy was to attack targets that the LW must defend, I have heard this before on other documentaries but never seen it written.
 
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utter nonsense

the prime directive was to have the LW far and away from the target to engage re: for BC 100grp formation and it's spoof activities plus intruding over LW airfields upon landing if possible. 100th grp overall was incredibly effective in throwing off the LW in late 44 till wars end where the LW could not be more than at one target position at a time where BC could put up fighters/bombers in 4 areas to keep the Luftwaffe guessing......

E ~ the Lw NF force was only getting a 1 % kill return and many times not even that during 1945's operations.
 
from the people who took part, all copied from the Bomber Command website

Moral judgements Charles Patterson

'Bomber Command was the only weapon we possessed. Bomber Command was available and had to be used every day and every night, weather permitting. Had that force been available and Churchill had got up and said, in the House of Commons, "Well, we have this large bomber force available, but I'm afraid we mustn't use it because as it operates at night we can't be sure of hitting specific targets, and women and children may get killed", the British people would have been outraged and they would have said, "Not attack them because civilians might get killed? Have you gone mad? Hitler's been killing civilians all over Europe, including England." If Churchill had said that he wouldn't have survived as Prime Minister. Morality is a thing you can indulge in an environment of peace and security, but you can't make moral judgements in war, when it's a question of national survival.'

Charles Patterson,
Bomber Command pilot


The eternal dilemma Peter Hinchliffe OBE

'There was always at the briefing some military reason given for our attack. It was either a steel-producing town or there was a lot of small industry making precision instruments. But the policy was the destruction of towns. You destroy a town, you hinder the war effort in many ways, and that in itself was the justification. The big mistake was to think that by breaking German morale it would end the war. The morale of the German population was utterly and completely broken, but this had no effect on the hierarchy, the people who were actually directing the war. In the Third Reich the popular voice could not have any influence. Something we do have to remember is that from D-Day in June 1944 to the end of the war, the losses among Allied troops were less than for any one major battle of the First World War. When the Americans and British landed in France they were facing a continent that was completely softened up by the Allied bombing. Had that bombing not taken place, leaving aside the morality of it, God knows if we would have survived as an invading force. There are people who say if that had been done, or if this had been done, but you do what seems to be right at the time, and bombing Germany as we did seemed to be right at the time. In fact there was very little alternative .I personally have no regrets in having participated. I do think about these things. It was terrible, but everything you do in war is terrible. If you stick a bayonet into someone it's terrible; if you shoot someone it's terrible; if you put people in concentration camps, it's terrible. But what is the alternative? Should we not have used the force in the best way that seemed possible? Or run the risk of concentration camps in our country? It's the eternal dilemma of peace and war.'

Peter Hinchliffe OBE
Bomber Command

The point of the spear Lord Mackie of Benshie CBE DSO DFC

'We accepted the fact that as a necessary part of the prosecution of the war there were civilian deaths. It occurred in Britain, it occurred in Germany. One got used to the fact that civilians were suffering, and they were suffering all over the eastern front and the Jews in eastern Germany. Everyone accepted that this was total war. We were doing the job we were asked to do, and we thought it was essential under the circumstances we were in.

While I was in training France was conquered, and there was the Continent under the heel of Hitler. While I was in training we had the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. Without America in the war the only way we could hit at the Germans was through Bomber Command. The whole attitude of Bomber Command was that we were the point of the spear and we had a job to do. It was highly dangerous. We had to accept that in modern war civilians were killed. In our eyes we were in a desperate situation, and we knew it. The trials of the German nation did not worry us an awful lot.'

Lord Mackie of Benshie CBE DSO DFC
Bomber Command observer
 
utter nonsense

the prime directive was to have the LW far and away from the target to engage re: for BC 100grp formation and it's spoof activities plus intruding over LW airfields upon landing if possible. 100th grp overall was incredibly effective in throwing off the LW in late 44 till wars end where the LW could not be more than at one target position at a time where BC could put up fighters/bombers in 4 areas to keep the Luftwaffe guessing......

E ~ the Lw NF force was only getting a 1 % kill return and many times not even that during 1945's operations.

Oops, sorry erich I should have said the daylight strategy.
 
Markus

I dont know where you live but low cloud in North Europe is the norm for a major part of the year, your previous triumphal posts about the 8th seem to only refer to escorted missions on a nice summers day. Who is sugar coating history now.

And that was one of the reasons why the US bomber offensive went into high gear from spring 44 onwards; the weather had to improve sufficiently to actually see the targets or get into the air in the first place as the UK isn´t exactly known for it´s good weather.


well said MM

Most contributors here have an elected government, during 1940 the British government was concerned morale may crack and the government forced to sue for peace. This was not a consideration of Hitler he wasnt elected and would only be removed by a coup or assasination. If the assasination attempt in July 1940 or various other plots had succeeded then allied air bombing would have been completely vindicated.

1. IIRC The Blitz did not break the morale of the UK´s people. I even read it had the opposite effect.
2. Saying RAF air bombing would have been completely vindicated if Hitler had been killed in one of the many attempts on his life is just absurd. Those who plotted against him before the war did it as they were convinced Germany would loose the war and those who joined their ranks during the war were motivated by what was going on in the USSR, especially by the large scale war crimes.
 
deeper penetrations meant longer range escort fighters like the P-51B in December of 43 onward and the drop tanks on 38's and Jugs.

Tail end during 45 when BC went on the day offensive it did not matter any more there were only 8 or LW units to defend the Reich, the rest of the JG's were sent ot the Ost front.......one of these that stayed was the effective JG 7 with the Me 262. The LW had shot it's wad and was nil to effective anymore. Plenty of crews and A/C no fuel subsidies
 
Moral judgements Charles Patterson

'Bomber Command was the only weapon we possessed. Bomber Command was available and had to be used every day and every night, weather permitting. Had that force been available and Churchill had got up and said, in the House of Commons, "Well, we have this large bomber force available,...

Charles Patterson,
Bomber Command pilot

Now that has to be the biggest bit of nonsense so far! I´m fairly sure there were military organisations called the Royal Navy and the British Army. By the way, what is that sound? Must be Monty crawling from the grave to have a talk with Mr. Patterson. :twisted:

Furthermore what large bomber force is the man talking about? It wasn´t large in 1940 or 41, it grew large later, very much at the expense of anything else. So this is BS too.
 
let me issue a WARNING

respect the veterans of both sides and their statements even if you do not agree with them as you were not there. think first before you respond and how you respond. I hope this is easily understood .............
 
What were the RN and British Army supposed to do against Hitler? Particularily in 1940-41?

One word: Logistics!

Since the dawn of time no one could fight a war without supplies, from 39 to 45 the most important british supply line went across the Atlantic, specifically the North Atlantic. It´s security should have had the same priority as the UK´s security because without it´s SLOCs open the Empire could neither attack or defend itself. I guess that gives the RN something to do from day one of the war.

The Army is harder to get into the fight, though North Africa was a good start, also because of the positive effect an allied controlled Med eventually had on logistics. Than there were certain events in the Far East that shook the Empire´s foundations. Clearly the Army could have done a great deal for the British Empire.

And last but not least, what did BC do in 1940 and 41? Wasn´t that the time when it was numerically weakest and it´s accuracy was worst? They could have given the RN a hand instead and made the "happy time" a lot less happy for the U-boats.


@Erich: I do respect the veteran´s peronal courage but a statement that is not correct is not correct, no matter who makes it.
 
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And that was one of the reasons why the US bomber offensive went into high gear from spring 44 onwards; the weather had to improve sufficiently to actually see the targets or get into the air in the first place as the UK isn´t exactly known for it´s good weather.

I believe you are sugar coating hostory again, Big Week was in February ...hardly good spring weather but by then the USAAF had enough escorts to recommence operations. Unless of course you are saying that the Eight Airforce had ample bombers and escorts available but wouldnt use them because the sun wasnt shining?

1. IIRC The Blitz did not break the morale of the UK´s people. I even read it had the opposite effect.
2. Saying RAF air bombing would have been completely vindicated if Hitler had been killed in one of the many attempts on his life is just absurd. Those who plotted against him before the war did it as they were convinced Germany would loose the war and those who joined their ranks during the war were motivated by what was going on in the USSR, especially by the large scale war crimes.

Your point 1. I said "concerned" ...In 1940 no body really knew what bombardment a civilian population could withstand. There were many people theorised about mass panic and riot demanding peace AND the bomber will always get through theory that basically meant civilians were defenceless. There is no doubt at all civilians can be bombed into submission, even an army can as was shown in the eastern front, falaise and latterly with the revolutionary guards in Iraq.

Your point 2 Romell was one who plotted against Hitler not because of the Eastern fron but because he like many others including Goering knew Germany was going to lose, part of that is being unable to defend your cities by day or night. Please read my post I said ALLIED that is RAF and USAAF. I do not seek in anyway take away from the USAAF its achievements or sacrifices. But they did bomb cities and suffered heavy unnecessary losses due to decisions of their commanders, just as BC did.

Goering said "when I saw American fighters over Berlin I knew the gig was up" what is that apart from admission that you are beaten and he was not only head of the defence (Luftwaffe) but a senior Nazi leader.
 
Markus if you do respect them then do use internet etiquette if you will and do not call there statements BS but say that you disagree with their thoughts. again you and I both were not there we have texts of their courage only and can now compare with what we know and the continued knowledge and freedom of the net that will soon change too soon.
 
I think you misunderstood the question. I asked, what was the RN and British army supposed to do against Hitler? You mentioned "logistics", I'm sure your aware that Germany's import situation was quite different in WWII. There would be no strangling of Germany's economy or civilian population by distant blockade. There was no huge High Seas Fleet for the RN to square off against. As for keeping Britian in the fight and supplied....the RN was already doing that. But in terms of acting against Germany....now a continental power, there were few options. The British Army was too small and weak to fight Germany's Army....especially in 1940-41. North Africa occured because of Italian actions which forced Germany to send a limited force there to keep them afloat but ultimately it paled in comparison to the struggle that would emerge on the Russian steppes.

So what was Britian supposed to do? She can't invade Germany or Occupied France....she can't sail her Navy up the Helgoland Bight. Germany bombed the hell out of Britian during the BoB and then the Blitz. Britian's only weapon against Germany proper was........Bomber Command.
 
Again this is not about their courage during the war or something they said during the war. Mr. Patterson seems to have made this statement very recently. And it´s at least a huge oversimplyfication.
 
Markus you wernt there he was therefore your comments are quite plainly nonesense. The people who lived through the war, like my family, fully supported Bomber Command going out to bomb Hitlers big black heart out (aas one commander put it. If Churchill had suggested we dont strike back he would have been out of office. In fact one of Churchills many quotes was from 14 July 1941, I have put in bold the most relevant part, no doubt you think that is nonesense too.

quote
I must, however, admit that when the storm broke in September, I was for several weeks very anxious about the result. Sometimes the gas failed; sometimes the electricity. There were grievous complaints about the shelters and about conditions in them. Water was cut off, railways were cut or broken, large districts were destroyed, thousands were killed, and many more thousands were wounded. But there was one thing about which there was never any doubt. The courage, the unconquerable grit and stamina of our people, showed itself from the very outset. Without that all would have failed. Upon that rock, all stood unshakable. All the public services were carried on, and all the intricate arrangements, far-reaching details, involving the daily lives of so many millions, were carried out, improvised, elaborated, and perfected in the very teeth of the cruel and devastating storm.

We have to ask ourselves this question: Will the bombing attacks come back again? We have proceeded on the assumption that they will. Many new arrangements are being contrived as a result of the hard experience through which we have passed and the many mistakes which no doubt we have made - for success is the result of making many mistakes and learning from experience. If the lull is to end, if the storm is to renew itself, we will be ready, will will not flinch, we can take it again.

We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if tonight our people were asked to cast their vote whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of cities, the overwhelming majority would cry, "No, we will mete out to them the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us." The people with one voice would say: "You have committed every crime under the sun. Where you have been the least resisted there you have been the most brutal. It was you who began the indiscriminate bombing. We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst - and we will do our best." Perhaps it may be our turn soon; perhaps it may be our turn now.
We live in a terrible epoch of the human story, but we believe there is a broad and sure justice running through its theme. It is time that the enemy should be made to suffer in their own homelands something of the torment they have let loose upon their neighbours and upon the world. We believe it to be in our power to keep this process going, on a steadily rising tide, month after month, year after year, until they are either extirpated by us or, better still, torn to pieces by their own people.

It is for this reason that I must ask you to be prepared for vehement counter-action by the enemy. Our methods of dealing with them have steadily improved. They no longer relish their trips to our shores. I do not know why they do not come, but it is certainly not because they have begun to love us more. It may be because they are saving up, but even if that be so, the very fact that they have to save up should give us confidence by revealing the truth of our steady advance from an almost unarmed position to superiority. But all engaged in our defence forces must prepare themselves for further heavy assaults. Your organization, your vigilance, your devotion to duty, your zeal for the cause must be raised to the highest intensity.

We do not expect to hit without being hit back, and we intend with every week that passes to hit harder. Prepare yourselves, then, my friends and comrades, for this renewal of your exertions. We shall never turn from our purpose, however sombre the road, however grievous the cost, because we know that out of this time of trial and tribulation will be born a new freedom and glory for all mankind.
unquote
 
Again this is not about their courage during the war or something they said during the war. Mr. Patterson seems to have made this statement very recently. And it´s at least a huge oversimplyfication.

Markus


Below is the story of Charles Patterson I am sure after a brief meeting with you he would have realised you know everything and he was indeed speaking nonesense, sadly he died in 2008. My only question for you is how dare you?



Squadron Leader Charles Patterson, who has died aged 88, took part in many daylight low-level bombing raids, including three of the most audacious of the war, exploits which earned him a DSO and a DFC.

Patterson had already excelled at flying Blenheims and Mosquitos when his air officer commanding, Air Vice Marshal Basil Embry, selected him to fly a Mosquito specially modified to carry a cine camera in the nose of the aircraft. It was his task to follow the bomber force and to arrive over the target five minutes later to film their results as he dropped his own bombs.

Flying at very low level in broad daylight was always hazardous, but Patterson ran the additional risk of being shot down by the German flak batteries that had been alerted by the 20 or 30 bombers just ahead of him.

One of his first tasks with the camera was to fly alone down the Scheldt estuary as far as a German fighter airfield whilst taking a film of the route; this was used a few days later to brief crews for the attack on the Philips Radio and Valve factory at Eindhoven.

On the morning of December 6 1942 a large force of light bombers attacked the factory. Patterson was at the rear and filmed the heavy damage, and the success of this sortie led to his becoming the RAF Film Unit's official pilot with his own dedicated Mosquito "O for Orange".

By nature Patterson was a loner and an individualist, and thus well suited to fly these operations. To increase his chances of survival he devised unconventional tactics: he selected his own route to the target, not following that of the main force; and after filming and bombing the target, he returned by a devious and unlikely route.

On one occasion, after attacking a target in Holland, he turned due north and flew out over the Zuider Zee and between the Dutch Friesian Islands, thus avoiding the German fighter airfields and the anti-aircraft batteries on the coast. On another he came home from a French target by flying through the sparsely populated Ardennes before turning for England.

Following the success of the Eindhoven raid, Patterson was often selected to fly to a potential target to film the approaches, and his results were used to plan the subsequent attacks by a larger force of Mosquitos. Sometimes he would fly on ahead to check the weather and to report on enemy defences.

In late 1943 he was sent ahead of 40 Mosquitos attacking a V1 site in the Pas de Calais. The cloud base was at 200ft and Patterson, then a flight lieutenant, ordered the force to turn back. Piloting one of the Mosquitos was Embry, renowned for his press-on spirit - but he admired Patterson's expertise and fully approved. The target was successfully attacked the following day.

On landing after one attack Patterson was met by Embry who, at the end of the debriefing, asked to see his log book. A few weeks later it was announced that "for his outstanding devotion to duty and determination" Patterson had been awarded the DSO, a rare award to a junior officer, particularly since his was for a sustained period of gallantry rather than for a specific act.

Charles Elliott Sinclair Patterson was born in Edinburgh on November 27 1919 and educated at Canford School. He was learning about farming in Ireland when war was declared, and returned immediately to Britain to volunteer to be a pilot in the RAF.

During his training Patterson disliked aerobatics and flying inverted, so he volunteered to be a bomber pilot. After converting to the Blenheim light bomber he was posted to No 114 Squadron, which had just been detached to Coastal Command to enhance the capability against enemy shipping in the North Sea and English Channel.

By the summer of 1941, No 114 had reverted to its overland daylight-bombing role. Casualties had been so high that Patterson was promoted three times in the space of a few weeks, and by August was a 21-year-old acting squadron leader and flight commander.

On the afternoon of August 11 he and the other squadron executives were briefed confidentially on a raid against the power generating stations at Knapsack, on the outskirts of Cologne. At that stage of the war it was the most daring and hazardous daylight operation so far attempted, involving the deepest penetration into Germany without a fighter escort.

Patterson was a sensitive man who readily acknowledged that he felt fear when he flew. He was unable to sleep before this raid and accepted that his chances of returning were very slim. He wrote his will, a letter to his mother and tidied his room. In later years he commented in an interview: "Despite my constant fear, I flew because it was my duty to continue, and others relied on me." The raid was a success, but 12 aircraft were lost. After 40 operations Patterson was awarded the DFC and sent to be an instructor.

He returned to operational duties in August 1942, when he joined the first Mosquito squadron, No 105. Under Wing Commander Art Reynolds, he took part in the raid on the Zeiss optical factory at Jena, near Leipzig, the RAF's deepest-ever daylight low-level penetration of Germany from Britain.

After 69 operations Patterson was finally grounded, although he managed to fly three more sorties in O for Orange immediately after the D-Day landings. He spent the last 18 months of his service as an instructor before leaving for the Far East. He was released from the RAF in December 1945.

Patterson found it difficult to settle to civilian life but, with his great love of the countryside and of horses, he became a successful bloodstock dealer, spending much time in Ireland. He established close links with the racing fraternity in New Zealand and much of his business involved sales to that country. He also made many successful deals with Middle Eastern stables.

He was a fine horseman, and hunted with more than 40 packs in England and Ireland. He supported Gloucestershire County Cricket Club and greatly enjoyed his annual visits to the Cheltenham Festival.

A cultured, articulate and patriotic man who was fiercely loyal to his country and to his friends, Patterson could be outspoken and held strong views on world affairs and modern-day habits; but he tempered his observations with a keen sense of humour and a twinkle in his eye.

A staunch supporter of the Blenheim Society, he was always prepared to help aviation historians, and was particularly pleased to discover that his films are held at the Imperial War Museum.

Charles Patterson died on March 2. He was unmarried.
 
I think you misunderstood the question. I asked, what was the RN and British army supposed to do against Hitler?...

What could the BC do against Hitler? Drop some bombs on some town? That might have had the we-strike-back flair but helping to defeat German attacks on the UK would have been ten times more helpful to the UK´s war effort. Besides if the UK had limited BC´s size from 42 onwards we would not have this discussion in the first place.
 
<shrug> well you said the BC's comments were "nonsense" when he said BC was all the UK had.....that there were these two other big Orgs that Britian could have used.....the RN and British Army....hence my question.

That BC could do little to hurt Germany is not disputed....but something is better than nothing and the veteran's point was that they had no other real options at the time. 8AF's start did little to hurt Germany as well but in lieu of Allied plans, it was the only means to attack Germany directly as well.
 
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