RAF Fighter Pilots Wounded/Injured Compared to US Pilots

The 8th Air Force records 3 separate deployments of its B-24 groups to the Mediterranean.

Torch Project, 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943 by the 93rd Bomb Group, 23 days of operations, 237 sorties, 224 effective, 530.2 tons of bombs on target, 4 aircraft MIA. (93rd to North Africa on 7 December 1942, less 329th squadron, returned 25 February 1943)

Husky, Ploesti, Post Husky, 2 July to 21 August 1943, by the 44th, 93rd and 389th Bomb Groups, 20 days of operations, 989 sorties, 892 effective, 2,428.2 tons of bombs on target, 54 aircraft MIA, personnel, 28 KIA, 88 Wounded, 420 MIA, (depart: 44th on 27 June, 93rd on 26 June, 389th on 2 July, the 389th flew its first combat mission on 9 July, return 44th on 25 August, on 93rd 24 August, 389th on 25 August) As of 25 June the USAAF reports the 44th had 43 B-24, the 93rd 49 B-24 while the 389th was non operational.

5th Army Support, 21 September to 1 October 1943, by the 44th, 93rd and 389th Bomb Groups, 4 days of operations, 191 sorties, 172 effective, 406.6 tons of bombs on target, 11 aircraft MIA, personnel 4 wounded, 89 MIA. (depart: 44th on 19 September, 93rd on 17 September, 389th on 19 September, return 44th on 4 October, 93rd on 2 October, 389th on 3 October). Despite the title it included a raid on Austria on 1 October.

There was a B-24 mission in the ETO on 29 May 1943, next mission 7 September, then 9 and 15 September. The 392nd Group, first mission on 9 September, was left in Britain during the second 1943 deployment, flew diversions on 23, 26 and 27 September then a mission on 2 October, another diversion on 4 October, then 3 B-24 groups to Vegesack on 8 October (55/43 sorties), then all 4 groups sent to Danzig/Gdynia on 9 October (51/41 sorties), the B-24s flew further diversions on 10 and 14 October, before the next bombing mission on 3 November.

According to the figures supplied to the RAF, 8th AF B-24 on hand/serviceable in 1943 (weekly report), 17 August 21/9, 24 August 41/4, 31 August 103/16, 7 September 117/66, 10 September 105/80, 17 September 50/40, 24 September 74/50, 1 October 82/64, 8 October 149/112, 15 October 136/97, but figures may include overseas deployments. No B-24 groups operational in Europe on 17 August, then to 4 operational on 7 September, to 1 group 24 September, back to 4 groups on 8 October.

According to the USAAF as of 20 August 1943 the 44th in Britain had none, the 93rd 7, the 389th none and the 392nd 3 B-24 in the units, similar figures on 27 August, on 3 September it was up to 68 aircraft in the 4 groups.

The 389th group did fly the Ploesti mission. Roger Freeman lists the 14 October 1943 diversion as 15 from the 93rd and 14 from the 389th.

PAT303 said:

I'm also not cherry picking as the policies regarding pilot protection changed dramatically especially after the Battle of France, as for late in the war when you have less than 100 defending fighters against swarms of escort fighters I'm pretty sure most of the later wouldn't see an attacking fighter let alone engage in combat further diluting the results.

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You start this point by typing "I'm not cherry-picking", and then proceed to do exactly that. Here, I'll help you out:

Cherry picking, suppressing evidence, or the fallacy of incomplete evidence is the act of pointing to individual cases or data that seem to confirm a particular position while ignoring a significant portion of related and similar cases or data that may contradict that position. Cherry picking may be committed intentionally or unintentionally.[2]​

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Thumpalumpacus said:

You start this point by typing "I'm not cherry-picking", and then proceed to do exactly that. Here, I'll help

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Perhaps a bit of:




Bit over spending words.

Thumpalumpacus said:

You start this point by typing "I'm not cherry-picking", and then proceed to do exactly that. Here, I'll help you out:

Cherry picking - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

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Okay, it's obvious your interested in arguing instead of having a conversation so I'll tap out.

PAT303 said:

Okay, it's obvious your interested in arguing instead of having a conversation so I'll tap out.

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I'm interested in discussing, but will point out fallacious thinking when I see it.

That is not a me problem.

MIflyer said:

Without having any data at hand, it seems to me that I have read of a great many more cases of RAF fighter pilots being wounded or injured in combat than I have read of US fighter pilots being wounded or injured in combat. By this I mean injuries that occurred in combat in flight and not injuries sustained as a result of the ground rising up to smite the aircraft.

About the only case of a US pilot being wounded in air combat that I can think of is when Robert S. Johnson ran that FW-190 out of ammo and still made it home.

Does this reflect US fighter aircraft being tougher than RAF fighter aircraft? Certainly the P-40, P-38, P-47, F4F. F4U, F6F and even the P-39 seemed to have greater reputation for toughness than the Hurricane or Spitfire. Or does it reflect that US pilots were more likely to be much further from home and thus less able to sustain wounds and still make it back?

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Hi

Returning to the original question and continuing on from my previous post of data from 'RAF Fighter Command War Diaries' by John Foreman, here follows the remaining months of the war from July 1943 to May 1945 (This is the period when USAAF fighters become more heavily involved in the fighting, the details include USAAF casualties with the known wounded totals at the time so they can be compared with the RAF known wounded. These are not post war research but what was known at the time):




MIke

MikeMeech said:

Hi

Returning to the original question and continuing on from my previous post of data from 'RAF Fighter Command War Diaries' by John Foreman, here follows the remaining months of the war from July 1943 to May 1945 (This is the period when USAAF fighters become more heavily involved in the fighting, the details include USAAF casualties with the known wounded totals at the time so they can be compared with the RAF known wounded. These are not post war research but what was known at the time):
View attachment 790484
View attachment 790485
View attachment 790486
View attachment 790487
MIke

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This is great stuff, Mike. Thanks for sharing.

If my maths is correct, RAF Fighter Command lost 3014 missing and killed compared to 3649 USAAF missing/killed during this period. However, the earlier period (in Mike's post #50) adds 1968 RAF KIA/MIA and 27 for the USAAF. That gives overall totals of 4962 for the RAF and 3676 for the USAAF. The RAF figures include some Mossies from 100 Gp which may bolster those numbers slightly but only by 151 MIA/KIA.

Fighter Command suffered a LOT of losses given that "there was not a hell of a lot for them to do" (sarcasm intentional).

Further info on USAAF bomber casualties
From Rand Paper RM-402
"Aircraft Vulnerability In World War II
II - Damage Causing Loss of Aircraft"
European Theater of Operation"

"1. In the first 8 months of 1944
a. For every 100 aircraft hit by flak, there were
6.5 men wounded
0.6 men killed
b. For every 100 aircraft hit by fighters, there were
29.3 men wounded
5.6 men killed

2. In this eight month period
a. In the first 4 months for every 100 casualties on returning aircraft, there were
62 wounded by flak 29 wounded by fighters
4 killed by flak 5 killed by fighters
66 casualties from flak 34 casualties from fighters

b. In the second 4 months of 1944, for every 100 casualties on returning aircraft, there were
81 wounded by flak 9 wounded by fighters
8 killed by flak 2 killed by fighters
89 casualties from flak 11 casualties from fighters"

My guess the p-47 thunderbolt was one of the safest planes in the world given the massive radial engine and all the armor

But what they did at the end of the war when they were called upon to be mobile aircraft. Artillery must have been one of the dangerous jobs in the world akin to being in a u-boat

So my hats off to those guys who must be heroes and I watched the program and they were getting wiped out pretty much daily

tyrodtom said:

The British were at war for 15 months longer than the USA.
Even if all other factors were even, they would of course have more wounded pilots.

They were also in it from the almost beginning of WW2, so pilot survival , armor, self sealing fuel tanks, etc. were not as developed as they were by the time the USA entered the war.

Then too there's the factor that early war Luftwaffe bombers, were almost all armed with rifle caliber guns, and the fighters too were mostly armed with rifle caliber cowl guns, so that gave you a little better odds you might survive being wounded.
But by midwar most Luftwaffe fighters had switched to heavier cowl guns, and like the original poster stated the missions were of much longer duration for the USAAF.1939

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1939. 4 months
1940 12 Months
1941. 11 months, 7 days

I get 27 months. What am I missing here?

JDCAVE said:

1939. 4 months
1940 12 Months
1941. 11 months, 7 days

I get 27 months. What am I missing here?

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I missed it by a whole year, and math USED to be my strongest subject.

tyrodtom said:

I missed it by a whole year, and math USED to be my strongest subject.

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I have "senior's moments all the time! It's a right of passage!

Jim

tyrodtom said:

I missed it by a whole year, and math USED to be my strongest subject.

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Don't feel bad. Computer Zero misplaced the entire 13th Century!

"Pity . . . poor old 13th Century."

A mix of design defects and pilot habits created one particularly gruesome problem with Hurricanes. At first, the aircraft did not have armour around the fuel tanks, and nor did the tanks "self-seal" if they were punctured, something which became standard during World War Two. The doped fuselage and wooden frame could catch fire quite easily. Fuel would flow from damaged tanks in the wings to an empty space under the cockpit, but a bigger problem was the main fuel tank which sat directly in front of the cockpit. If it was ignited, it shot a jet of super-heated flame straight into the pilot's face.

Another factor compounded this. Some of the more experienced pilots at the start of the Battle of Britain had originally flown biplane fighters in the 1930s and tended to fly with the canopy open. Also, early Hurricanes had a problem with carbon monoxide fumes leaking into the cockpit, so an open canopy meant they could take their oxygen mask off (it was an incredibly uncomfortable thing to have on your face for the whole mission). "All they did by having the canopy open was the temperature would go up to several thousand degrees in about three or four seconds – it was like turning the cockpit into a blast furnace." Hurricane pilots often had only a few seconds to get out of the cockpit or face life-changing injuries, or worse.
So many pilots suffered such very similar injuries – severe burns around the eyes, and on their hands as they tried to shield their face – that British surgeons came up with a nickname for it: "Hurricane Burns". The open canopy, the unarmoured fuel tank in front of the cockpit, the tendency for Hurricane pilots to fly with an unfastened mask, all combined with agonising, disfiguring effect.

The severity of these burns cases was a huge challenge for doctors. A leading reconstructive surgeon, New Zealander Archibald McIndoe, set up a special surgical unit at East Grinstead in West Sussex to treat them. McIndoe used experimental techniques – pioneering plastic surgery – on pilots with severe burns. McIndoe's groundbreaking programme revolutionised burns care. He discovered saline water treatment helped burned skin heal more quickly after noticing shot down pilots who had been rescued from the English Channel tended to recover quicker than those who went down over land.

From a BBC page that I lost the link to.

US types typically didn't have a tank up front like that, except the F4U, so one less worry- but did have the oil tank, and that could ignite, rare but did happen

marathag said:

US types typically didn't have a tank up front like that, except the F4U

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And partly in P-47, although its L-shaped main fuel tank did not reach up to the cowling plane.
All the Spitfires retained this stupid main fuel tank location. In the Hawker Typhoon it was removed, to be introduced back in the Tempest !

Timppa said:

And partly in P-47, although its L-shaped main fuel tank did not reach up to the cowling plane.
All the Spitfires retained this stupid main fuel tank location. In the Hawker Typhoon it was removed, to be introduced back in the Tempest !

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Its not a stupid location. The problem was specific to the Hurricane not the Spitfire or the Tempest or the P47 or the F4U. It was the poor detailed design of the Hurricane. In fact in fighter vs fighter combat most kills are from behind. If the fuel tank is struck by bullets it most likely has passed through the pilot rendering a fire moot.

Some designs dictated fuel tank locations being close to the cockpit.

The P-39's was beneath the cockpit, the Me262's tanks were ahead and behind the cockpit, etc.

GrauGeist said:

the Me262's tanks were ahead and behind the cockpit, etc.

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The near Kerosene that they used, was not near as likely to blowtorch like Gasoline did.
Not that anybody wants to be near any burning fuel of any type

Germans were probably happy not being in the Komet, the worst for any pilot

Reluctant Poster said:

Its not a stupid location. The problem was specific to the Hurricane not the Spitfire or the Tempest or the P47 or the F4U. It was the poor detailed design of the Hurricane. In fact in fighter vs fighter combat most kills are from behind. If the fuel tank is struck by bullets it most likely has passed through the pilot rendering a fire moot.

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But Hurricanes were tasked more to go after the Bombers, while the Spitfires would tangle with the German Fighters.

marathag said:

The near Kerosene that they used, was not near as likely to blowtorch like Gasoline did.
Not that anybody wants to be near any burning fuel of any type

Germans were probably happy not being in the Komet, the worst for any pilot

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The He280's HeS8 engines ran on Kerosene, the Jump 004 engines ran on a less refined diesel or "coal oil" - both of which were flammable, but certainly not as volatile as gasoline.