RAF flying 109E during 1940

[Kurfürst]

Don't forget the fuel. The RAF 109s would have 100 octane available and presumably that availability would have led them to have the Db601s approved for it. Ditto for the 110.

They did have and used 100 octane fuel, in fact it seems that something like half the 110s were running on it by the time of the Battle; 100 octane fuel doesn`t appear to be particularly news to the LW, given that the 100 octane aero engine, the DB 601N went into series production towards the end of 1939, according the engine`s datasheet.
.
Kurfrst - DB 601, 603, 605 datasheets - DB 601 N

Check the fuel triangle instructing to use '100' (octane fuel).

IMHO the biggest difference of such 'swap' that the RAF`s 'new' fighters in our hypothetical scenario would have reliable cannon armament making them much more effective against their main targets, ie. LW bombers.

 

[smg]

the british wood had a good chanse because of there pailots the RAF has allways made good pilots so it wood be an interesting dogfight

 

[claidemore]

Kurfurst:

If the Luftwaffe was operating some engines with 100 octane, why didn't it continue with that and use it on all, or nearly all fighters for the rest of the war? Was it a supply problem? I thought they had the technology and refineries to make the higher octane fuel? Or did it just burn up engines too fast?
Thanks for any enlightenment you can share.
Claidemore

 

[The Basket]

I disagree that the 'Destroyer' concept was flawed.

Big twins like the Mosquito Ju 88 and P-38 were the most versatile and useful machines of the war.

The 110 was a good aircraft by any standard and as long as it could avoid dogfights and use its cannon and speed it was very capable.

 

[smg]

well i dont tikn so the only way the Luftwaffe wod had won is if they had 4 angens bommers to do a good hit on england and the 109 flown by the raf'spilots they wod have a good shanse

 

[kool kitty89]

I disagree that the 'Destroyer' concept was flawed.

Big twins like the Mosquito Ju 88 and P-38 were the most versatile and useful machines of the war.

The 110 was a good aircraft by any standard and as long as it could avoid dogfights and use its cannon and speed it was very capable.

I meant in the sence of the RLM's 'Zerstörer' concept with a rear gunner etc.

The Bf 110 was a decent a/c but it was most useful as a night fighter and even there the Ju 88 was probably a better choice.

The Mossie, Ju 88, and P-38 were all good versitile a/c and I'd bet the Fw 187 and a redesigned Whirlwind would have proven likewise. But the Mossie and Ju 88 were not really fit for the day fighter role while the others on the list were.

And I don't think the Bf 110 was a useful or versitle an a/c as any of these.


The Bf lacked the performance to make a useful Bomber destroyer, while the P-38, Whirlwind, and Fw 187 (with proper engines) could match or exceed contemporary single engine fighters in all but agility. (particularly in rolling, as they were pretty good in actual turns, particularly with the 187's lower wing loading and all had the twin prop wash to aid in turning)


The only problems with versitility of the P-38, 187, and Whirlwind, was that all were somewhat difficult to adapt to the Nightfighter role, but since there were good craft avialable for this already or better adapable this wan't necessary. Assuming the 110 was dropped entirely the LW had the Ju 88 (a much better all around a/c imo) and the RAF had the Mossie (both remarkably similar and versitile a/c, granted the Ju 88 was a bit older). While the USAAF hadn't really needed a night fighter as much. (though the eventually adapted some planes an developed the P-61)

 

[The Basket]

Well...the concept was good when it was first flown in 1936.

Plenty of Biplanes in that era and in 1940 only the Spitfire could catch it in full throttle and it proved itself in other roles not imagined such as nightfighter and recon.

The concept was sound but the aircraft itself quickly became obsolete.

 

[timshatz]

Well...the concept was good when it was first flown in 1936.
QUOTE]

Concept was probably pretty sound before and after WW2. If you look at the Bristol Fighter and F4 Phantom/F14 Tomcat, all were successful fighters with two crewmen.

The question comes up as why the concept failed during WW2. The Germans weren't the only people who tried it, the Japanese, French and Russians had similar aircraft that tended to get whacked by single engine fighters.

It's a good question to ask, why did the the two seat fighter fail in the 40s when it succeeded before and after?

 

[kool kitty89]

The reason for the second crewman on the F-4 or F-14 is completely different from that of the Bf 110. (the 3rd crewman of the NF version would be more comparable)

Since the 2nd crewman of the Mossie (Fighter-bomber/Night fighter) was navigator/radio/radar operator and in the altered Fw 187 with similar navigator/radio operator these were much closer to the role of the 2nd crewman of the F-4 and F-14.

 

[SoD Stitch]

More or less agree with Plan D HoHun; it came down to the strategy of the Battle, as opposed to the tactics. Overall, the British German pilots were very evenly matched, both in terms of their experience and their hardware; the -109 had some advantages over the Spit the Hurricane, and vice-versa. What it really came down to was the startegic decisions that were made (or not made) by the High Command; specifically, the decision by Goring to switch the tactics from bombing RAF bases and air defenses, to "morale" bombing of England's cities (London in particular). The RAF was, supposedly, literally days away from ceasing to exist as an effective fighter force, when Goring snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by changing tactics. This gave the RAF the necessary breathing room to rebuild their fighter force, and defeat the Luftwaffe in the BoB.

 

[timshatz]

The reason for the second crewman on the F-4 or F-14 is completely different from that of the Bf 110. (the 3rd crewman of the NF version would be more comparable)
QUOTE]

Granted. But that was an evolutionary step brought on by increased technical demands.

 

[The Basket]

If the twin is as fast as the singles then it can do well.

Odd thing with the Bf 109 and 110 is that they were designed by the same company but were totally different in concept. Even contradictary.

The 109 was as small and light as possible around a powerful engine for maximum performance.

The 110 was big and heavy so it could have decent range. It was also designed for 3 crew which was dropped in day fighter but returned in night fighter.

 

[kool kitty89]

Yes, but there were better alternatives in the Fw 187 (exceptional performance, at 30-40 mph faster than the 109 with the same engine and over 2x the range, and 50-60 mph faster than the Bf 110 with the same engine. The Ju 88 was also a better choice for many of the roles the Bf 110 was used in (particularly night fighter) and was being built as well. (unlike the 187, which we can only speculate on its development and sucess)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Stitch,

>The RAF was, supposedly, literally days away from ceasing to exist as an effective fighter force, when Goring snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by changing tactics.

That's the "traditional" view on the Battle of Britain, but I think the Germans did in fact recognize that the Royal Navy would defeat any invasion attempt, and purposefully switched from tactical to strategical targets in order to bring the British to the negotiation table by bombing London and keeping up a credible invasion threat for as long as possible.

Even Hitler's infamous "Sea Lion" directive ordered "to prepare and, if necessary, to carry out an invasion". Due to the exaggerated expectations regarding the effect of bombing attacks on major cities (an illusion shared by the RAF), it was expected that the British morale would break down under strategic bombing attacks so that the invasion would not be "necessary".

The Battle of Britain could be seen as the first attempt ever to defeat an entire nation by the exclusive use of air power. Based on the pre-war doctrine shared by all European air forces, the target switch to London should have ensured a German victory.

Fortunately for the British, this pre-war doctrine turned out to be erroneous ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Basket,

>Odd thing with the Bf 109 and 110 is that they were designed by the same company but were totally different in concept. Even contradictary.

>The 110 was big and heavy so it could have decent range.

Hm, if you look at the Me 110's competitors, you'll actually find that it was the smallest, lightest and best-performing of the breed. The Henschel and Focke-Wulf entries could fairly be described as medium bombers.

It was not recognized at the time of its inception that a destroyer would have to have true fighter qualities to be able to match the expectations.

The Me 110 was actually designed to the same light-weight concept as the Me 109, boldly ignoring many of the RLM's clearly stated requirements in order to come up with a high-performance aircraft as Willy Messerschmitt thought necessary for modern air warfare.

No contradiction to the Me 109 in my opinion ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tim,

>Back to the 110. The more I think of it, the more I think it just wasn't going to live long up there. Manuverability and climb were just insufficient. Firepower was excellent, speed was acceptable. Not enough going for it in the rough and tumble of 1940 England.

Well, it's difficult to prove anything about alternative scenarios, so I think your opinion is just as well justified as mine even if I disagree.

It might be interesting to try and stage the "reversed types" scenario in an online flight simulation to see which results that would give. The problem with concluding anything from such a scenario is that typically, the players would risk much more than in real life and gladly get shot down (or run out of fuel) if that brings them into the middle of a big fight. Still, even with survival in the mind, I'd feel confident to take on the enemy in the Me 110 if I'd be given an altitude advantage, a good wingman and free choice of tactics.

>To illustrate my point further, look at when the two sides reversed almost exactly a year later. Then, you had British bombers being escorted by Spits and Hurricanes and attacked by 109s. 110s were nowhere to be seen.

Hm, good idea to contrast the situations, but the comparison is not entirely symmetrical. The RAF was using only a few bombers as decoys, it didn't require a maximum effort by the Luftwaffe to counter these raids. The Luftwaffe focus was on avoiding losses, not on inflicting them. In the Battle of Britain however, the RAF operated much closer to the maximum effort (remember Churchill's question for the reserves, and the negative answer he received), and inflicting losses had a much higher priority (as the Big Wing controversy shows).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[The Basket]

Well the Bf 110 first flew in 1936 so it would take a very clever visionary to see that the aircraft will do badly in 4 years time! Also the fact it turned out to be a good night fighter was due to the fact it was designed to carry 3 crew.

The Focke Wulf competitor was the Fw 187 which was a much lighter smaller tight as a drum machine. It was a proper build the smallest lightest machine around two engines. The Bf was bigger as it was designed for more crew.

The contradictary nature of the 109 and 110 is that it must have been obvious to Messerschmitt is that if a 110 met a 109 or a same performance aircraft...it would be in trouble....so its dogfighter days were flawed early doors...the 110 could not be used for air superiority against a capable opponent. A mock dogfight between a 109E and 110C would show this.

Reminds me of the Bristol Blenheim. In 1934 the Blenheim prototype was as fast as lightning and quickly put into production. By 1939 and 1940 the bombers were getting creamed by Spitfires and Hurricanes in mock dogfights. It was pretty obvious that the 109E was going to have target practice but their was a war on and their was nothing else and so the Blenhiems were sent unescorted into a world of hurt.

If only someone could go back to 1934 and say that this idea won't work...but it seemed a good idea at the time.

 

[kool kitty89]

The Fw 187 flew a year later. And it wasn't that much smaller. By those standards the P-38 was a fairly tight design as well, though it was found to be quite adaptable. (though the P-38 was originaly designed somwhere between the interceptor and destroyer concepts, best described as a heavy interceptor)

The Fw 187 wasn't designed as a competitor to the Bf 110's specification, but as a private project to develop high performance, fighter, using a 2 engine design to improve performance, load, and range; it wasn't until later. Anything the Fw 187 was lacking in the Ju 88 made up for in its capabilities, and together these could do anything the 110 could and more as well as better.


The P-38 wasn't good for a second seat either, but the P-38M managed, and the 187 showed that it could carry a second crew member more effectively. (and the 187 probably could have been a decent night fighter with externally mounted radar)

 

[Graeme]

The P-38 wasn't good for a second seat either, but the P-38M managed

Lockheed also converted one P-38E into a very nice looking two seater for aerodynamic test work and used in conjunction with the XF-90 model tests...

 

[SoD Stitch]

Hi Stitch,

>The RAF was, supposedly, literally days away from ceasing to exist as an effective fighter force, when Goring snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by changing tactics.

That's the "traditional" view on the Battle of Britain, but I think the Germans did in fact recognize that the Royal Navy would defeat any invasion attempt, and purposefully switched from tactical to strategical targets in order to bring the British to the negotiation table by bombing London and keeping up a credible invasion threat for as long as possible.

Even Hitler's infamous "Sea Lion" directive ordered "to prepare and, if necessary, to carry out an invasion". Due to the exaggerated expectations regarding the effect of bombing attacks on major cities (an illusion shared by the RAF), it was expected that the British morale would break down under strategic bombing attacks so that the invasion would not be "necessary".

The Battle of Britain could be seen as the first attempt ever to defeat an entire nation by the exclusive use of air power. Based on the pre-war doctrine shared by all European air forces, the target switch to London should have ensured a German victory.

Fortunately for the British, this pre-war doctrine turned out to be erroneous ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Thank you, HoHun; you are quite correct in that this is (was?) the "traditional" view as to why the Luftwaffe "lost" the BoB. I have also read several studies of supposed "morale" bombing (most notably the book "Firestorm: Allied Airpower and the Destruction of Dresden", by Marshall De Bruhl) and, in every case, "morale" bombing has actually had the opposite effect, particularly in Britain's case. Even the massive Allied strategic bombing campaign during the latter half of WWII failed to "de-moralize" the German population, as it was hoped; yes, much material destruction was achieved, but the so-called morale of the average German citizen was not that muchaffected.