RAF post BoB

[EwenS]

Britain has lots to keep the design, procurement and testing expertise honed and intact whilst still dumping the late war and early postwar dead-end projects. For example, Fairey has the Gannet "commenced in response to the issuing of requirement GR.17/45 in 1945, under which the Admiralty sought a new twin-seat aircraft capable of performing both anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and strike missions." Fairey Gannet - Wikipedia

I have never found out why the "strike" element keeps getting included in the origins of the Gannet. In WW2 terms it suggests an aircraft like a dive or torpedo bomber used in an offensive capacity.

GR.17/45 called for a 2 seat anti-submarine aircraft for use in the RN for "use in the functions of anti-submarine duties and reconnaissance in areas where enemy fighters are unlikely to be met."

When you look at the weapon loads required there were no guns, and with the possible exception of the 8/16 RP with 60/25lb warheads, everything else was very much AS orientated i.e. AS homing torpedoes, depth charges, AS bombs, sonobuoys, smoke floats & flares.

It was intended as a replacement for the Barracuda TR.III then used in the AS role, and to operate from future escort or trade protection carriers. Both Fairey & Blackburn competed for the contract. The project was delayed first by engine choices then by the realisation that a third crew member would be required to operate the sonobuoy equipment to reduce the expected workload on the Observer. Eventually Fairey's offering was chosen. To cap it all off weight grew making operation from an austere escort carrier type of vessel impossible. The latter problem led to the development of Short Seamew in the 1950s.

 

[pbehn]

The Firecrest didn't even fly until 1947, and lumbered along in flight testing until 1949. Despite the fact that by 1946, it was clear that nobody wanted the airplane. It seems like a "make work" project to me

Usually with prototypes they are paid for anyway, why not keep everyone busy taking a project to conclusion, they may have made some screw up that a design team needs to know about.

 

[EwenS]

A few other ideas post BoB into the early postwar era.

1) Do not share jet engine designs or tech with the Soviets
2) Read the late war and early postwar room. Cancel the Spiteful, Firebrand, Firecrest and Spearfish. Focus on improving the performance, reliability and timelines for the Swift, Attacker, Vampire and Sea Hawk programs. Including swept wing and transonic research.

1) Agreed
2) With the exception of the Firebrand, I'm not sure there was much opportunity to cancel the aircraft mentioned, or a few others, any earlier.

Firebrand
The time to have cancelled this was in 1942 when the prototype demonstrated that its performance was not up to its 400mph expectation when ordered in 1940. By the time it flew in March 1942 the Spitfire had already been decklanded and production was being set aside for the Seafire. But by then, the Firebrand having been ordered from the drawing board, there was a commitment for 3 prototypes and the first 50 on order and the money had already been sunk into the tooling etc. So I can understand the desire to get something out of the money already sunk into the project, So after 3xprototype (one of which was rebuilt as a prototype TF.II after a crash) and 9xF.I, there came 12xTF.II. The final pair of F.I airframes were converted as TF.III prototypes to be followed by 27 production TF.III. That made up the initial order.

The TF.III first flew in Dec 1943 but had numerous problems that required time to sort out. By that time there was no successor to the Barracuda torpedo bomber on the horizon that would be able to operate from existing carriers like the Illustrious and Colossus / Majestic classes (I'll come back to this point). So placing orders for 102 TF.IV to be increased to 250 and then cut back to 180 does make some sense, given the timescale that these decisions were being made in. The definitive version became the TF.IV that first flew in May 1945 and entered squadron service in Sept 1945. Had the war gone on into 1946, two of the light fleet carriers were due to be equipped with them. Production was stretched out postwar with the last being delivered in March 1947.

Firecrest
The Firecrest design began life in 1943 as a thin wing Firebrand with improved pilot view. It never went beyond orders for a few prototypes (2 in Jan 1944 with Centaurus 59 only one of which was completed). In April 1945 another was ordered and was used in the development of power boosted ailerons that proved so essential for postwar aircraft. A further 3 Napier E.122 (a 3,500hp Sabre development that was cancelled) powered prototypes were ordered in May 1945 and later cancelled. There were no production contracts. By the time the first prototype flew in 1947 it was clear to everyone that the design would not go anywhere, especially considering that a new spec for an aircraft with higher performance for the same role was issued to Westland in Jan 1945 (N.11/44 leading to the Westland Wyvern).

Availibility of Lend Lease aircraft
In 1942, while the Admiralty realised that it would remain dependent on US carrier aircraft for some time, it faced the problem that it could not rely on deliveries of enough US aircraft to meet all its needs in the short term and would need to develop its own new generation of British designed aircraft in the longer term. For example, in 1943 the agreed delivery schedule was not always being met with regard to aircraft like the F6F Hellcat and SBW Helldiver.

Admiralty Future Building Committee
From late 1942 the FBC got to work to set out the shape of RN of the future. Out of this came the decision expressed in their interim report of 18 Nov 1942, that the carrier would form the core of the fleet and from that came the design the next generation of carriers and following up with a new generation of aircraft to fly from them. That saw the further relaxation of some of the limitations that were placed on FAA aircraft to that point. And so development of various types began.

Fairey Spearfish
New Torpedo Dive Bomber to Spec O.5/43. & prototypes ordered 1943/44 but only 4 flown and another used for spares. First flown 5 July 1945. At one point some 204 TD.I aircraft were on order but all were cancelled before production could begin.

Short Sturgeon
Originally part of the same spec as the Spearfish, a new Spec, S.11/43, was written for it as a twin engined naval reconnaissance bomber. 3 prototypes were ordered in Oct 1943 and the first flew in June 1946. In Oct 1944 an initial order for 30 S.1 was placed but was cancelled in Aug 1946. By that point it was decided to transfer any parts to a new contract for a target tug version. 2 prototypes of the TT.2 and 23 production aircraft were produced from 1947. Delays occurred due to the decision to transfer all production from Rochester to Belfast.

Both the Sturgeon & the Spearfish were designed with operations from the Audacious (3 ordered), Centaur (8 ordered) & Malta (4 ordered) classes of carrier. The original plans would have seen these ships enter service between about mid-1946 and the late 1940s. Between Oct & Dec 1945 decsions were taken by the Admiralty to cancel all but 2 Audacious and 4 Centaur class. On top of that the designs needed to be altered in the light of late war experience. So Eagle, Centaur, Albion & Bulwark were completed up to a stage where they could be launched to clear the slips and allow the builders to get on with merchant ships, after which they were laid up. Ark Royal & Hermes remained mothballed on the slips until the 1950s. Without the ships there was no need for the aircraft designed to fly from them.

Fighters
It would have been a very brave man that would have decided not to begin to develop the final generation of piston engined aircraft in 1943. Jets were very much in the future. Meteor only flew in March 1943 and while service entry was in July 1944, only 1 squadron saw operational service, while another 4 received them between April & Oct 1945 (this ignores the squadron renumbering that took place in the latter part of that year). While the Vampire first flew in Sept 1943 it was April 1946 before the first operational squadrom received them.

The first jet fighter to land in a controlled manner on a carrier deck anywhere in the world was a Vampire on 3 Dec 1945. And they early jets were not at all well suited to the limited take off and landing areas on carrier decks.

Spiteful / Seafang
Ultimately the performance of this aircraft was disappointing. As noted above a few production Spitefuls were produced. But the rest of the order was cancelled on 2 May 1945 as by then it was becomng clear that the future was in jets, at least so far as the RAF was concerned.

As for the RN, because of delays in producing the final generation of Searfires (F.56/46/47), the Seafang found itself as a direct competitor. 2 prototypes were ordered in March 1945 and 150 production aircraft in May 1945. 16 production Seafangs only 9 were delivered as complete aircraft, the last in Jan 1947. By then the FAA had decided that the last generation of Seafires offered better handling around the carrier deck. Once all the cancellations had occurred Supermarine were left with orders for Seafire 47 aircraft placed in April & Sept 1946.

Attacker
Originally rejected by the RAF it wasn't offered to the RN until 1946. As noted above early jets had problems operating from carriers. While jets operated off various carriers in the late 1940s on a trial basis, the first ship that was really suitable for them was the Eagle completed in 1951, which coincided with the service entry of the Attacker.

From an RN perspective, it is all very well saying speed up development of swept wing and transonic research, but that still leaves the question of finding the money to have suitable ships for them to operate from. The RN performed its first swept wing landing on the trials carrier Illustrious in Nov 1950 with the Suermarine Type 517 which, via the Type 510, was effectively an Attacker with swept wings and tail. That new generation of carrier only began to appear in 1951 with Eagle and then the development of the 3 critical things for carrier aviation, the steam catapult, angled deck & mirror landing sight between 1950 & 1953.

And finally as noted, some of these aircraft played useful roles developing some of the kit that went into later generations of aircraft, both military & civil.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Firecrest didn't even fly until 1947, and lumbered along in flight testing until 1949. Despite the fact that by 1946, it was clear that nobody wanted the airplane. It seems like a "make work" project to me

Agreed. Blackburn should have been rolled up and its staff and kit merged into Hawker Siddeley in 1943 instead of 1963. We might not get the superlative Buccaneer, but we can avoid the waste of time and resources spent on the Firebrand, Firecrest and their other rubbish, go no where ideas.

 

[EwenS]

Harsh. And demonstrates how little you know about Blackburn history.

Blackburn is unfortunately most remembered for its failures in aircraft like the Botha, Roc and the Firebrand. These tend to overshadow what went before in terms of aircraft produced inter-war for the FAA. It was also responsible for some flying boat design innovation as shown in the B.20 with its retractable lower hull to reduce drag while airborne. While it lost out to the Saro Lerwick, it was thought promising enough for the RAF to request a prototype. The concept was pursued in the wartime B.44 design for a flying boat fighter that was dropped by the RAF (a flying boat fighter eventually emerged in 1947 in the shape of the jet powered Saro SR.A/1)

The story of the Blackburn B20 flying boat project

dingeraviation.net

But despite all this Blackburn proved highly successful in building and modifying other companies aircraft during WW2.

Swordfish - in 1940 it became the sole manufacturer of this type at a shadow factory at Sherburn-in-Elmet. building more than Fairey itself - 1,699 v 692.
Sunderland - between Oct 1941 & Oct 1945 they built nearly one third of all Sunderlands - 241 Mark I/II/III/V out of 749, at their Dumbarton factory on the Clyde as a successor to the Botha being built there. That factory was also involved with work for the Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment that had been evacuated to nearby Helensburgh.
Barracuda - 700 built in the Brough factory out of the total of 2,602 produced

During WW2 British aircraft companies were paired up US aircraft companies to undertake assembly of aircraft on arrival, or modifications to meet British requirements. Over 4,000 of these passed through Blackburn sites. These included the Grumman Avenger where Blackburn became responsible for the wartime modifications necessary to this aircraft to suit RN needs and practices, with most of the work taking place in the USA.

Immediately postwar they designed a competitor to the Fairey design that became the Gannet.

Blackburn B-54 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Who else would have been around in 1949 to merge with GAL who needed a partner to produce the GAL.60 Universal Freighter that became the Blackburn Beverley.

The Buccaneer emerged from an RN requirement of 1952, with Blackburn starting work on the project immediately. Given the long service life of that aircraft, keeping Blackburn alive in that late war / postwar period seems entirely worthwhile to me.

If ever there was a target for rationalisation of British aircraft design groups it was within the likes of Hawker Siddeley Group itself, where individual companies were often competing against each other to build aircraft to the same specifications. From 1935 HS included Hawker, Gloster, Avro and Armstrong Whitworth.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Harsh. And demonstrates how little you know about Blackburn history.

Blackburn is unfortunately most remembered for its failures in aircraft like the Botha, Roc and the Firebrand. These tend to overshadow what went before in terms of aircraft produced inter-war for the FAA. It was also responsible for some flying boat design innovation as shown in the B.20 with its retractable lower hull to reduce drag while airborne. While it lost out to the Saro Lerwick, it was thought promising enough for the RAF to request a prototype. The concept was pursued in the wartime B.44 design for a flying boat fighter that was dropped by the RAF (a flying boat fighter eventually emerged in 1947 in the shape of the jet powered Saro SR.A/1)

The story of the Blackburn B20 flying boat project

dingeraviation.net

But despite all this Blackburn proved highly successful in building and modifying other companies aircraft during WW2.

Swordfish - in 1940 it became the sole manufacturer of this type at a shadow factory at Sherburn-in-Elmet. building more than Fairey itself - 1,699 v 692.
Sunderland - between Oct 1941 & Oct 1945 they built nearly one third of all Sunderlands - 241 Mark I/II/III/V out of 749, at their Dumbarton factory on the Clyde as a successor to the Botha being built there. That factory was also involved with work for the Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment that had been evacuated to nearby Helensburgh.
Barracuda - 700 built in the Brough factory out of the total of 2,602 produced

During WW2 British aircraft companies were paired up US aircraft companies to undertake assembly of aircraft on arrival, or modifications to meet British requirements. Over 4,000 of these passed through Blackburn sites. These included the Grumman Avenger where Blackburn became responsible for the wartime modifications necessary to this aircraft to suit RN needs and practices, with most of the work taking place in the USA.

Immediately postwar they designed a competitor to the Fairey design that became the Gannet.

Blackburn B-54 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Who else would have been around in 1949 to merge with GAL who needed a partner to produce the GAL.60 Universal Freighter that became the Blackburn Beverley.

The Buccaneer emerged from an RN requirement of 1952, with Blackburn starting work on the project immediately. Given the long service life of that aircraft, keeping Blackburn alive in that late war / postwar period seems entirely worthwhile to me.

If ever there was a target for rationalisation of British aircraft design groups it was within the likes of Hawker Siddeley Group itself, where individual companies were often competing against each other to build aircraft to the same specifications. From 1935 HS included Hawker, Gloster, Avro and Armstrong Whitworth.

So Blackburn built some prototypes that were rejected, and had an interesting innovation in flying boats that was a dead end, but managed to keep the doors open by building or assembling thousands of non-Blackburn aircraft. Noted.
The Beverly was a useful aircraft for a while, but it wasn't even a Blackburn design. And was something of an anachronism considering that the C-130 entered service one year later

 

[Shortround6]

The Beverly was a useful aircraft for a while, but it wasn't even a Blackburn design. And was something of an anachronism considering that the C-130 entered service one year later

Unfortunately that was symptomatic of most of the British Aero-industry in the late 40s and 50s.

The British did not have the engineering manpower or the budgets to move projects along as fast as the US.
Lockheed also had a huge advantage In that the USAF had 3 transports in service with ramp loading and had the C-82/C-119.
Beverly also had and huge fuselage, cargo bay was 10ft wide and 15ft 6in high.

The Prototype Beverly was flying before the USAF even issued the requirement for the C-130.
The Prototype Beverly was flying 4 years before the C-130 which rather restricted the choice for engines and sub systems.
Like many late 40s and early 50s projects timing was everything and slightly newer designs with turboprops and Jets quickly eclipsed piston engines.
Gas turbine engines (jet and turbo props) made large strides in fuel economy (much higher pressure ratios) in the early 50s which changed the engine weight/fuel load requirements for desired ranges.

 

[tomo pauk]

Some musings about the engines and whatnot.
Water-alcohol injection would've come in handy.
The 2-stage supercharged Hercules (Mk. VIII) was an interesting project, but it came to naught - press on with that in the alt history.
Making a good 'integral' S/C & intake for the Hercules by 1942-ish (instead of the late 1944 with Hercules 100 series) would've netted the lower attrition rates for the heavies powered by historical Hercules engines due to the higher cruising altitudes, as well as better power overall.
Merlin 60 series were great engines, these should've been powering the Spitfires from early 1942 instead from late summer of 1942.
By all means make the Mustang X in hundreds, while asking from Americans as much of the basic Mustangs, engine-less need-be, even the A-36s and more of P-51As/Mustang IIs.
Make far more Mosquitoes, start early.
Drop tanks are not devil's work, neither is a long-range fighter.
See whether the F4Us can be had from the USA once the production starts for the RAF's needs. P-47 can be a good addition to the RAF arsenal, see whether more can be shipped to the RAF.

 

[SaparotRob]

Regarding the drop tanks, you are right. Perhaps the power of bureaucracy might exceed that of Mephistopheles.

 

[tomo pauk]

Some more:
Ge the better mileage of the Griffon engines' series. Even the engine with a 1-stage S/C with a nice, big impeller (historically the Griffon II was with a smaller impeller than what the usual Merlins had) mated to the Spitfire will be a tough enemy for the German opposition at all altitudes, tougher than the Spitfire XII was.
Mandatory 25-30 imp gal tank behind the pilot on all Spitfires starting from Spitfire III, that absolutely has to be produced.
Both Tempest and Spitfire XIV really need to start out with 180+- imp gals of internal fuel from day one, introducing yet another tool to hurt the Luftwaffe above Germany proper.

Jet power needs much more love from the AM/RAF higher ups.

 

[Shortround6]

The jet seems to be a favorite of these discussions.
However it needs a huge change in the time line.
Would 500 jets in the Spring of 1945 actually made any real difference in the outcome compared to 500 Tempests?
Probably not.
500 Jets in the Spring of 1944 would affect things much more, but you need jets that operated like 1946 jets, not early 1945 jets.
You need the 1946 (or later) levels of reliability and engine life for group/ wing deployments over enemy territory.

Jets did not work well for long range in the early years.

 

[ThomasP]

I do not know that much about the airwar in between the BoB and the start of the escorted bomber offensive. I wonder how much a longer range Spitfire (or other mid-range escort capable fighter) being available on the Western Front would have affected the Eastern Front equation in terms of drawing Luftwaffe resources to the West?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Would 500 jets in the Spring of 1945 actually made any real difference in the outcome compared to 500 Tempests?
Probably not.

Neither made a difference. The war was all but won. Any advances introduced to RAF service in 1945 is looking more to Britain's postwar world.

 

[z42]

Neither made a difference. The war was all but won. Any advances introduced to RAF service in 1945 is looking more to Britain's postwar world.

True. One could even take that argument a step further and say stuff like the Sabre (and Vulture) were, in retrospect, not needed. They could have comfortably won the war with Merlins, Griffons, and Hercules (+ obviously a smattering of lower power engines), and those would have been good enough even in the post-war years until jets took over (well, maybe Centaurus was still useful e.g. in the Sea Fury). Of course that would have required quite a lot of foresight back in the day wrt. the development of jets, and had jets been delayed they would have been caught with their pants down their ankles, so from that perspective projects like the Sabre were definitely justified.

As for jets in the early post-war years, the biggest thing they could have done wasn't technical, but not giving them to the Soviets. A true WTF moment.

 

[wuzak]

True. One could even take that argument a step further and say stuff like the Sabre (and Vulture) were, in retrospect, not needed. They could have comfortably won the war with Merlins, Griffons, and Hercules (+ obviously a smattering of lower power engines), and those would have been good enough even in the post-war years until jets took over (well, maybe Centaurus was still useful e.g. in the Sea Fury). Of course that would have required quite a lot of foresight back in the day wrt. the development of jets, and had jets been delayed they would have been caught with their pants down their ankles, so from that perspective projects like the Sabre were definitely justified.

Yes, it would have taken a lot of foresight to see improved fuels would enable the Merlin to produce similar power to the Vulture by the mid to late war period.

By the same token, it would have been expected that a developed Vulture would be able to benefit from the improved fuels as well.

 

[z42]

Yes, it would have taken a lot of foresight to see improved fuels would enable the Merlin to produce similar power to the Vulture by the mid to late war period.

By the same token, it would have been expected that a developed Vulture would be able to benefit from the improved fuels as well.

True. But even if the Allies would have been limited to no better than the 100 octane fuel they got relatively early in the war, the Griffon with a 2S2S supercharger would arguably be competitive if not superior to any aero piston engine the Germans managed to field, considering the massive problems the Germans had in producing C3 as well as the engine reliability problems they suffered. Particularly if, in this alternative scenario, Vulture/Exa/Crecy/etc. would have been cancelled and RR would instead have focused on developing the Griffon to the same extent they developed the Merlin.

But of course this is with the benefit of hindsight. And it's not how R&D works; you need to explore in a lot of directions before picking the paths to focus on.

 

[pbehn]

Yes, it would have taken a lot of foresight to see improved fuels would enable the Merlin to produce similar power to the Vulture by the mid to late war period.

By the same token, it would have been expected that a developed Vulture would be able to benefit from the improved fuels as well.

I think many could foresee the benefits of high Octane fuel, the issue was mainly producing it in thousands of tons. In the early 1930s filling up a squadron of Spitfires (if they existed) would have cost the price of of a Spitfire.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yes, it would have taken a lot of foresight to see improved fuels would enable the Merlin to produce similar power to the Vulture by the mid to late war period.

I wonder how a Vulture retuned for high octane fuel would have performed. At least Napier Sabre territory?

 

[Shortround6]

I wonder how a Vulture retuned for high octane fuel would have performed. At least Napier Sabre territory?

The problem in the service engines was not the fuel.
It was connecting rods.
RR never again designed an engine that used 4 cylinders on one connecting rod.
They made several 24 cylinder engines but always with just 2 cylinder per rod assembly.

 

[wuzak]

The problem in the service engines was not the fuel.
It was connecting rods.
RR never again designed an engine that used 4 cylinders on one connecting rod.
They made several 24 cylinder engines but always with just 2 cylinder per rod assembly.

Pennine.

2750 cubic inches, 2800hp.

Abandoned in favour of jet engines.

That had a single piece master rod and built up crank, like several radials, including R-2800.