RAF starts early with 4-engined bombers: feasibility, plausability, consequences?

[Aozora]

Oops, I said thought of providing an escort; that should have been no thought of providing escort.



Wellington replacement. Although the Warwick was intended initially as a Wellington replacement; it never served as such in Bomber Command as a result of its performance not being able to match the bigger four engined bombers that first flew at the same time as it did. The RAF struggled to find a suitable use for it as it was considered a failure as a bomber.

The Windsor was built to B.3/42, which was a merger of B.5/41 and the Wellington replacement project. B.5/41 was for a pressurised heavy bomber to which the Warwick III was projected; this was a pressurised four engined version of the Warwick that was never built. B.3/42 was more accurately referred to as a Lancaster replacement, which it did not do.

The Windsor was the bomber Wallis designed to carry the Tallboy and Grand Slam "earthquake" bombs to higher altitudes over longer distances than the Lancasters. Had the Windsor gotten into production in large numbers there was a likelihood the RAF would have attempted high altitude daylight strategic bombing and probably run into the same problems as the USAAF did with the B-29s over Japan: without escorts they would have faced better fighter opposition than the B-29s faced over Japan.

 

[Hop]

I agree with much of your post but not this. It isn't how the British aircraft industry was organised, nor how it worked.

Fair enough. I meant that buying aircraft from different suppliers didn't mean a delay to Spitfire production. I wasn't aware Castle Bromwich was ever in line to build the Whirlwind.

Where might one divert the USAF fighters elsewhere??

Fighters that were intended for one role might be diverted to long range escort. In the end it didn't matter much because by the time the US built long range escorts the allies pretty much had enough aircraft to do that as well as all the other tasks, but that wasn't the case in 1941.

Maybe we could agree that an addition of the, say, 30 gal rear fuselage tank would impose negligible delays to the production of Spit VIII/IX, while providing the Allies with a far more capable fighter?

Not in 1941/42. A rear fuselage tank was of no use if the fuel had to be used first. In 1944 30 gallons in the rear tank didn't cause too many problems, but that probably wouldn't be the case earlier. A lot of work went in to improving stability.

A 30 gallon rear tank that has to be drained before combat was of no use to the Spitfire IX when a 90 gallon drop tank was available.

 

[Hop]

That's enough to escort British bombers to do in the U-Boat pens .. before they hardened them

You are simply ignoring the fact that some of the pens were in escort range anyway, and all could have been hit at night. They simply weren't a priority, for reason that had nothing to do with how much fuel the Spitfire carried.

while wiping out the rump of the Luftwaffe left in France.

Tried that. The "rump" of the Luftwaffe that was left in France was simply too well equipped and supplied. RAF losses show the Luftwaffe was perfectly prepared to fight.

In the first 6 months of 1942 the "rump" of the Luftwaffe fighter force in France flew 15,400 sorties. To put that in perspective, Luftflotte Reich flew 23,400 fighter sorties in the first 6 months of 1944.

The RAF simply didn't have the numbers to overcome that sort of defence in 1942.

 

[tomo pauk]

...
Fighters that were intended for one role might be diverted to long range escort. In the end it didn't matter much because by the time the US built long range escorts the allies pretty much had enough aircraft to do that as well as all the other tasks, but that wasn't the case in 1941.

Long range escort fighter concept runs against current (1941) USAF mantra, and it's far better for a senior officer to adhere to the mantra, rather than to go against it. Hence the order, despite what was known to the USAF once BoB ended.

Not in 1941/42. A rear fuselage tank was of no use if the fuel had to be used first. In 1944 30 gallons in the rear tank didn't cause too many problems, but that probably wouldn't be the case earlier. A lot of work went in to improving stability.
A 30 gallon rear tank that has to be drained before combat was of no use to the Spitfire IX when a 90 gallon drop tank was available.

Fair points. However, we can see that Spit IX used 24 imp gals, or more than 25% (from the fuselage tank) for warm up, take off and climb to 20000 ft. So - use the rear fuselage tank to do that and at 20-25000 ft you have full internal fuel. Or, install the feed from rear to the one of fuselage tanks, so one can top off the fuel into those from rear tanks.

As for this (I know that you were answering to the another member):

Tried that. The "rump" of the Luftwaffe that was left in France was simply too well equipped and supplied. RAF losses show the Luftwaffe was perfectly prepared to fight.
The RAF simply didn't have the numbers to overcome that sort of defence in 1942.

It was more that RAF was trying to kill the LW while employing wrong tactics. Actually, it was the Fighter Command trying to do that, while Bomber Command was trying to do something else, vs. the Germany proper. BC was also flying it's planes in the part of the 24 hours that were incompatible with the part of the 24 hrs the FC was attempting it's tasks. As if those Commands were from different countries.
The part of LW was maybe well supplied and equipped, but I'd really love to see how many fighters the RAF did have in the UK proper. We can add, for example for July 1941, 750 BC bombers, too.

In the first 6 months of 1942 the "rump" of the Luftwaffe fighter force in France flew 15,400 sorties. To put that in perspective, Luftflotte Reich flew 23,400 fighter sorties in the first 6 months of 1944.

15400 sorties in 6 months gives 84 sorties per day. Less than FAA?

 

[stona]

I can give the number of single seat fighter squadrons based in the UK in June 1942, which will give an idea of the number of aircraft. Obviously many where not based in the South.

Spitfire 50
Hurricane 11
Mustang 7
Typhoon 4
Whirlwind 2
Tomahawk/Kittyhawk 6

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks. Should we multiply those numbers with 16 to arrive at total?
Obviously, Spitfire, Mustang and Typhoon should be used for tasks that might involve LW fighters as opposition. 60 squadrons - 960 front-line fighters. LW have had total of some 950 single engined fighters, better part deployed in Russia and MTO. Two JGs are in West (274 S/E fighters on hand), while the immediate help can arrive from Germany proper (JG1, 148 S/E ftrs on hand) and Norway (61 Fw-190, 35 Bf-109F-2 on hand; the 109Es being deployed vs. USSR from Finland?).

 

[stona]

The problem is that the operations across the Channel would be carried out mostly by 11 Group. I can't put my hand on its order of battle at this time.

Some of those aircraft, like the older US types, would not be considered front line fighters in 1942. The Hurricanes would be doing something else too. The Whirlwinds were at 10 Group to keep them out of harm's way, trying to intercept Luftwaffe maritime reconnaissance flights. The Typhoon was new and I know that the three Duxford based squadrons struggled to maintain even a semblance of operational capability at this time.

Raw figures can be misleading. The only capable fighters are the Spitfires and maybe some of the Mustangs (depending on type).

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

I haven't included older types, in 60 squadron count there are only Spits, Mustangs and Typhoons. 1000 fighters and a similar number of bombers would've been a horrific sight to see above Europe. And quite a task for the LW, even with reinforcements from Germany, Denmark and Norway.

 

[stona]

Yes, but many of the squadrons, particularly in 12 and 13 Groups may have had limited operational capabilities, like the Typhoon squadrons. Some may not have been operational at all. The same would apply to squadrons in 10 Group.
By 1942 the much disliked "stabilisation system" had been abandoned and entire squadrons were again rotated to and from the front, meaning 11 Group. Squadrons which rotated out of 11 Group did so for a reason and cannot be considered fully operational as they recuperated.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the additional info. We might take a look here, the serviceability rates for the LW S/E fighters were betwen 65 and 75% - instead of 400+ fighters, that would mean only ~300 would be able to take off when needed, between Atlantic and Berlin.

 

[stona]

Serviceability for the RAF in the UK was usually a fair bit higher than that which is not surprising as the aircraft were at well equipped bases and had good maintenance support. Squadrons would also have a good supply of pilots though many would be finishing their training at a squadron and might not be considered operational. As I understand it that was the squadron CO's call.

The only way to get an idea of how many fighter aircraft the RAF could commit to cross Channel operations is to find 11 Group's strength during mid 1942. Obviously units from other Groups could and did cross the Channel but it would give a good idea. I probably have the information somewhere, but where ?

Cheers

Steve

 

[Hop]

I believe 11 Group had 24 squadrons of Spitfires in June 1942.

Including fighters based in Scotland or Northern Ireland, but excluding fighters based in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany seems to me to be cherry picking data.

Fair points. However, we can see that Spit IX used 24 imp gals, or more than 25% (from the fuselage tank) for warm up, take off and climb to 20000 ft. So - use the rear fuselage tank to do that and at 20-25000 ft you have full internal fuel. Or, install the feed from rear to the one of fuselage tanks, so one can top off the fuel into those from rear tanks.

There's no point having fuel to fly further on the outward leg than on the return leg. If a 1942 Spitfire had 85 gallons of fuel usable in combat, and combat itself would take say 20 gallons, and a reserve required 10 gallons, then it had 55 gallons to cruise home. A 90 gallon drop tank would allow enough fuel to take off, climb etc, and cruise to the target, and still have fuel to spare. So what's the point of a rear fuselage tank as well?

The Spitfire VIII had 123 gallons of fuel ahead of the CoG, so that would have benefited from a small rear tank in addition to the 90 gallon drop tank (or a larger drop tank). But the quick fix of a small rear tank for the Spitfire IX wouldn't really have helped in 1942.

It was more that RAF was trying to kill the LW while employing wrong tactics.

I don't think they were so ambitious they intended to "kill" the Luftwaffe. The intention was simply to tie down a proportion of the Luftwaffe.

15400 sorties in 6 months gives 84 sorties per day. Less than FAA?

I wouldn't have thought so. The point is though to show how the RAF didn't have anything like the strength to destroy this "rump" of the Luftwaffe.

In the same period Luftflotte 3 flew 15,400 fighter sorties, the RAF flew 22,700 offensive day fighter sorties. That's a ratio of just under 1.5 to 1.

In the first 6 months of 1944 when Luftflotte Reich flew 23,400 day fighter sorties the USAAF flew 147,300 fighter sorties in the ETO, a ratio of 6.3 to 1.

The idea of Fighter Command having the strength to drive the Luftwaffe from France in 1941 and 1942 is a fantasy.

 

[stona]

Why "cherry picking"? A Spitfire based at Ayr is hardly relevant to the cross Channel battles of 1942. Squadrons were withdrawn from 11 Group to the other Groups precisely to avoid combat, allow time to recuperate and train replacement pilots. How are they directly relevant to attempts of the RAF to defeat the Luftwaffe? You wouldn't count Luftwaffe units based in the Balkans in the equation, or would you?
Just because there were maybe 900+ fighters in the UK doesn't mean that the same number were confronting the Luftwaffe in North West Europe, that's ridiculous.

If 11 Group did indeed have 24 squadrons of Spitfires in June 1942 then they could probably field a maximum of less than 300 aircraft on a given day. The idea that the whole lot would go tear arsing across the Channel is also a bit far fetched.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

I believe 11 Group had 24 squadrons of Spitfires in June 1942.

Thanks. That would be 24 x 16 airplanes?

Including fighters based in Scotland or Northern Ireland, but excluding fighters based in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany seems to me to be cherry picking data.

Not sure that I can be blamed for that?

There's no point having fuel to fly further on the outward leg than on the return leg. If a 1942 Spitfire had 85 gallons of fuel usable in combat, and combat itself would take say 20 gallons, and a reserve required 10 gallons, then it had 55 gallons to cruise home. A 90 gallon drop tank would allow enough fuel to take off, climb etc, and cruise to the target, and still have fuel to spare. So what's the point of a rear fuselage tank as well?

Point of rear fuselage tank installed should be to fight and/or return with it. Like it was done with, say, P-40s as early as 1941.

The Spitfire VIII had 123 gallons of fuel ahead of the CoG, so that would have benefited from a small rear tank in addition to the 90 gallon drop tank (or a larger drop tank). But the quick fix of a small rear tank for the Spitfire IX wouldn't really have helped in 1942.

Here we disagree, it should've helped with Mk.IX.

I don't think they were so ambitious they intended to "kill" the Luftwaffe. The intention was simply to tie down a proportion of the Luftwaffe.

RAF has, in the UK, almost 1000 fighters (single engined, plus Whirlwind). LW has, west of Berlin, just above 400 fighters. When should the RAF attack with intention to kill the LW, once the ratio is 3.5:1?

I wouldn't have thought so. The point is though to show how the RAF didn't have anything like the strength to destroy this "rump" of the Luftwaffe.

I'm sorry, but that point is not a visible one. Even if we discount half of the days as the ones with awful weather, that's still less than 170 sorties per day, for a force of 200 serviceable aircraft.

In the same period Luftflotte 3 flew 15,400 fighter sorties, the RAF flew 22,700 offensive day fighter sorties. That's a ratio of just under 1.5 to 1.

In the first 6 months of 1944 when Luftflotte Reich flew 23,400 day fighter sorties the USAAF flew 147,300 fighter sorties in the ETO, a ratio of 6.3 to 1.

22700 fighter sorties, divided by 90 days of good weather in 1st half of 1942 makes 252 sorties a day. Or about 10 sorties per each squadron of 11 Group, per day of good weather (they were mostly flying vs. LW in Continent?). That would leave 700 RAF fighters doing what?

The idea of Fighter Command having the strength to drive the Luftwaffe from France in 1941 and 1942 is a fantasy.

There lays the problem. Until Metropolitan RAF does not commit it's Bomber Command (along with better part of the Fighter Command, not just a group) to the task of ousting the LW from France Low Countries, they will not succeed. Bombers are needed to hammer the air bases (plus whatever worthwhile target they can hit west of Rhine), and as a bait for the LW to scramble, so FC can get them. Otherwise, LW will pick it's fights (leave alone the fighter sweeps, attack only when situation permits) and win them, as they did historically.

 

[OldSkeptic]

Sorry Hop you are not thinking it through. It is not about how many the RAF could put over France on a given day, but (as per all the air battles) how long can you handle a war of attrition.

The issue the RAF had to do, which Leigh Mallory and Douglas could never grasp, was to pin the Luftwaffe in France. That is pick targets they HAD to come up to defend, Then inflict attrition on them over time, that is over a whole series of attacks the Luftwaffe in France (not much) were destroyed. The RAF had the numbers and could rotate squadrons though from other areas in Britain.

Where they went wrong, and got totally thumped was they had no clear strategy and poor tactics (big wing nonsense and all that). Their strategy was wrong in that the Luftwaffe could and did pick when they would fight, which of course was always on their own terms. The RAF never hit anything that the Luftwaffe HAD to come up to fight for, so they just made lots of Luftwaffe aces and got lots of them their 'throat ache' medals.

Now you might get away with a bad strategy but with very good tactics you might (just might) still win. When both are wrong you are in for a big loss, which is what happened.

So the RAF threw away, to no gain whatsoever, about a 1,000 planes and pilots. All of which could have been far more effectively employed in North Africa and Malta. In simple terms it was a complete waste of time, lives and resources.

Now, say if Keith Park was in charge, then a proper strategy, with correct tactics could have won air supremacy over most of France quite quickly.
They had the tools, they had the far bigger resources, they had the targets that mattered.
The fact that they never did ANY of them shows just how how much a bunch of clowns Portal, LM and Douglas were.

 

[stona]

Now, say if Keith Park was in charge, then a proper strategy, with correct tactics could have won air supremacy over most of France quite quickly.
They had the tools, they had the far bigger resources, they had the targets that mattered.
The fact that they never did ANY of them shows just how how much a bunch of clowns Portal, LM and Douglas were.

Isn't hindsight a wonderful thing. I'd be interested to know how Park would achieve air supremacy over most of France in 1942, bearing in mind that "most of France" was beyond the range of UK based fighters. London to Paris is 212 miles as the crow flies. Whatever Wikipedia and the like may say the RAF set radius of action limits for its aircraft. In August 1941 these were 100 miles for a standard Spitfire, 120 miles for a standard Hurricane and Whirlwind. Long range (not specified exactly what this means) Spitfires and Hurricanes 130 miles with an exemption for "special targets" (again not specified) to allow 150 miles.
This is roughly the official radius of action for a Manston based standard Spitfire.

The RAF faced a similar problem to the Luftwaffe two years earlier. First how to get the Germans to come up and fight and secondly how to get them to commit to fight in the very limited area in which the RAF could compete. That was not "most of France".

It also suffered all the other disadvantages of fighting over the enemies territory. Damaged aircraft were often lost. Pilots who made a forced landing or who successfully abandoned their stricken aircraft were also lost. The reverse was true for the Luftwaffe.

I'm no fan of Leigh Mallory, in fact I think he got hundreds of RAF pilots killed needlessly, but I'm not sure that the objectives set for the RAF were achievable given the tools they had, whoever was in charge. Park fought successful defensive battles in southern England and later Malta using the RAF's short range interceptors which were designed for precisely that kind of campaign. They were not designed for an offensive campaign at the limits of their range and Leigh Mallory should have conceded this far sooner than he did.

The number of aircraft that the RAF could put up over France on a given day is relevant as that is the number it could commit to any given battle. It would want to over match the opposition. The reserves which the RAF effectively maintained in other Groups are relevant in the long term, but not on any given day.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for additional data, Steve. The 'long range' Spitfire and Hurri would've been the ones with drop tanks fitted (it's 1941 - up to 45 gals)?

The RAF faced a similar problem to the Luftwaffe two years earlier. First how to get the Germans to come up and fight and secondly how to get them to commit to fight in the very limited area in which the RAF could compete. That was not "most of France".

Unless/until RAF commits the Bomber command's assets in day light, the LW will leave the RAF's fighter sweeps alone. The use of better part of 10 and 12 Group should put also the pressure against LW bases at Netherlands, Belgium and Brittany/Normandy. In order to cover a greater part of 'west of Germany' area, fighters do need increased fuel tankage indeed, both drop tanks (90 gals for the Spit) and possibly internal.

 

[OldSkeptic]

Thanks for additional data, Steve. The 'long range' Spitfire and Hurri would've been the ones with drop tanks fitted (it's 1941 - up to 45 gals)?



Unless/until RAF commits the Bomber command's assets in day light, the LW will leave the RAF's fighter sweeps alone. The use of better part of 10 and 12 Group should put also the pressure against LW bases at Netherlands, Belgium and Brittany/Normandy. In order to cover a greater part of 'west of Germany' area, fighters do need increased fuel tankage indeed, both drop tanks (90 gals for the Spit) and possibly internal.

Disagree. There was several targets the Luftwaffe HAD to come up defend. The U-Boat pens, before they were hardened. The key one was Lorient, just 178 miles from Cornwall. That meant tricking up a Spit V to have a 350 mile combat radius, which was quite possible. That, along with daylight bombing meant the RAF would (1) delay the U-boat pens being built (2) Bring the Luftwaffe in France (all 2 groups of them JG26 and JG2) up to fight.

In July 1941 they had a whopping 186 109s...In July 1942 a massive 218 FW-190As.

Basically, if they could be brought fight then even if the RAF suffered a 4:1 loss ratio they could inflict 100% losses on the Luftwaffe.

Alternatively , the RAF could just put 500 Spits on a one way mission to fly to the Luftwaffe airfields, land (or parachute in) and beat the German pilots to death with clubs.

As for the Spit range issue, as I always say. There was no issue. PR Spits were, from 1940 onwards doing first MR missions then LR mission.
Everybody gets the logic the wrong way around. It is not about increasing the range of a fighter Spit, it is about fitting guns to already existing, tried and tested LR Spit designs.

The reason why that 41/42 period was a total waste was a clear lack of a strategy, very poor tactics and Portal's god given word 'that long range fighters are impossible'.
Worse, because the losses were so great both Malta and North Africa were starved of Spits, which they needed desperately.
The RAF had the simple choice of just doing nothing over France, and put a lot of resources into the key theatres of battle (ie NA and Malta) where they could make a great difference (and inflict attrition on the Luftwaffe).

Instead what they chose at that time was the worst of all possible worlds. Meaningless and very expensive operations over France, starving of the other key theatres of war.

If you add up the losses over France, plus the slaughtering of the P-40s and Hurricanes in North Africa (plus the outnumbered fighters in Malta), Portal, Douglas and Leigh Mallory probably threw away at least 1,500 fighter pilots in 2 years. Admittedly small beer by the standards of losses by Bomber Command then and later, but still a very significant proportion of its force.

And that links back to the point of this thread. Having 4 engined bombers earlier would have made no difference, except in increasing the losses of crews (the 4 boys had larger crews).
The strategy was wrong, the tactics poor, the accuracy abysmal, the results non-existent in that 41/42 period.
Changing the equipment means nothing if those other factors are not dealt with first.

To use them properly you need important targets that you can hit AND make a meaningful difference to the outcome of the war.
There were only those U-Boat bases in 41 and early 42, before they were hardened.

Your strategy would be to hit them repeatedly to prevent the hardened pens being built and disrupt U-boats operating from them.
Your tactics would be escorted daylight bombers. That requires increased range from the only fighter the RAF had that was competitive at the time, the Spitfire.
Rapid tests of rear (and under seat) tanks, learn from the experience from the PR boys, training and good tactical plans (ie a layered escort and proper training in fuel usage).
Even with the introduction of the 190s, high flying MK V Spits will still have an advantage, with a forward sweep, a close escort and a 'loose' escort covering the bombers (as the USAAF finally did).

Now this is a theory, my theory. But from all I have read about them, IF Dowding had been promoted, ideally to CAS and Park made head of Fighter Command, this is pretty much what I would have expected them to do.
And in that, as well as disrupt the U-boats, would have actually achieved a stated strategic goal of the LM (etc) 'leaning towards the enemy' nonsense. Draw Luftwaffe resources away from the Soviet front.

Park, after he finished the Battle of Malta (very quickly too I might add) showed he was just as good at the offence. His attacks on Italy were masterful and (until recently I didn't know this) he was the first to bombs on Spits (cleverly too, the racks dropped away too, therefore giving the Spits their full performance as a fighter), this was to 'force the Luftwaffe to fight', succeeded too.

 

[tomo pauk]

Disagree. There was several targets the Luftwaffe HAD to come up defend. The U-Boat pens, before they were hardened. The key one was Lorient, just 178 miles from Cornwall. That meant tricking up a Spit V to have a 350 mile combat radius, which was quite possible. That, along with daylight bombing meant the RAF would (1) delay the U-boat pens being built (2) Bring the Luftwaffe in France (all 2 groups of them JG26 and JG2) up to fight.

In July 1941 they had a whopping 186 109s...In July 1942 a massive 218 FW-190As.
.....

Think you've misunderstand me. LW will react indeed if RAF attacks those targets, but the targets need to be attacked with hundreds of bombers, not by a handful of them, along with fighters' strafing runs.

 

[stona]

As for Spitfire (or other fighters range) your argument was that the RAF had the tools to do the job in hand. It did not. I fail to see any connection between the range of a PR Spitfire (which was virtually unflyable at take-off) and a combat version.
The idea that Bomber Command was going to launch large scale day time raids, even escorted, in 1942 is a complete fantasy. It was a tactic already abandoned by the bulk of Bomber Command which was in the process of converting itself from a daytime scalpel (which it had discovered that it was not) to a night time sledge hammer. The famous (or infamous) area bombing directive had been sent to Bomber Command on 14th February 1942 and with the departure of first Peirse and then his stop gap replacement Baldwin as C-in-C Bomber Command the way was open for a man who had very firm ideas about how his bombers would operate. Harris took up the reigns on 22nd February.
Your strategy has the benefit of many years of hindsight and analysis by armchair Air Marshalls. It is pure fantasy, I don't thing it was doable and it probably wouldn't have worked anyway. The one factor you consistently underestimate is the Luftwaffe and its aircraft. When Faber kindly delivered a brand new FW 190, an aircraft which had been flying rings around the Spitfire, it is not difficult to imagine the consternation when it was discovered to have a de-regulated engine. The RAF had been screwing the bollocks out of their Merlins (45s..can't remember).
The real campaign was fought with the tools available at the time, they were not adequate for the job.
The one thing we do agree on is that it was a very poorly conceived and executed campaign and it cost a lot of lives for little result. Leigh Mallory must bear some responsibility for this. I don't blame him for attempting the campaign but to push on regardless in the face of such losses for no significant return did not show great leadership in my opinion. The fanciful Luftwaffe losses his pilots were reporting didn't help much either. There are echoes of the Luftwaffe's failure two years earlier there too.
Cheers
Steve