Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks

[Freebird]

The Commonwealth troops managed to got trained on US tanks in no time (despite new guns, radios, engine, transmission, interior), so I'd say a month on a new tank of British origin would've been cool for a crew that has already seen some experience.
Saying that it would've took 8-10 weeks for tanks to arrive from UK to Egypt is way of the mark. Eg. it took RN ships 15 days to travel from Isles to Malta during Pedestal (granted, the transports used there were not the slowest available). That makes 20 days with same speed, perhaps 30 with regular transports. Two years to develop. 1st series shipped in August '42, Arriving in September, ready for Alamein in late October.

Sorry, no.
They didn't ship any convoys to Egypt in 1942, all of them went around the Cape, and had done so since "Tiger" in May 1941. Malta was so desparate for supplies in the summer of '42 that there was no way that they could trans-ship anything to Egypt, every ton that made it through to Malta from Gibratar was desperatley needed.
The problem was that with the italian capture of Cyrenecia in May '42, the convoys couldn't get by the Axis air forces

Feb 1942, convoy MF5, all sunk or disabled.
Mar 1942 convoy MG1 - Egypt to Malta, 4 transports, Two transports were sunk at sea, while the British 2 reached Malta. Both were sunk at anchor in Valetta harbour by German aircraft before unloading was completed.
June '42 Harpoon - Gibraltar to Malta, 6 transports, 4 sunk. Two arrived in Malta with desperately needed supplies.
June 42 Vigorous Vigorous was heavily attacked by aircraft, torpedo boats and submarines over four days, threatened by a strong Italian battlefleet, and eventually returned to Alexandria. No transports reached Malta, 2 sunk, several damaged.
August 1942 Pedestal 14 transports, 10 sunk (Ohio offloaded before sinking), 2 badly damaged (Rochester Castle brisbane Star) only two arrived safely at the cost of 7 RN ships sunk or badly damaged. Even with the Fuel supplies delivered Malta is still badly short of supplies

There was simply NO WAY that the admiralty was going to try to ship anything to Egypt via Malta in the second half of '42, nor could they have succeeded even if they had tried.
Your tanks for El alamein will arrive via the Cape - period. (sorry)

As for 'Brittsh scrapping the normal tank developing cycle', you'd have to be more specific on what tanks we're talking to. The best tank Brits produced prior Cromwell was Valentine, a private project. So the 'British normal tank developing cycle was far from flawless.
Because the tank design was featuring 2 pdr (ditching anti-personal anti-AT-gun capabilities- Brits knew about that already in June '40), because armor was of questionable thickness layout, because it was to use riveting to join the armour slabs, because it was based on premise that only tanks (out of all weapon systems) are not to be developed further, during a major war?

The normal British practice in the war was a 2.5 year development, with a 2 year cycle.
As I explained before, they took the Crusader "Off the drawing board" in mid '39, production begins mid 41. In the Summer of 1940 they started considering specifications for the replacement tank, issued the proposal in the fall of '40, proposal accepted early '41 and production begins at the end of '42.

That would be beyond this thread

Tomo, your scenario has to make sense. You can have have space aliens drop the designers through a time portal otherwise you will have a propoasal issued in the fall of 1940, and the tank delivered at the end of 1942, for use in 1943.

If you can see any logic for weapon systems to be equally efficient* in 1942 as they were in 1940, that's cool. Because I don't.
*The ability to attack soft targets still lacking for 2pdr - not all tank targets are other tanks
For reasons, see above. If you think Crusader I was that good, okay.

It's not what "I" think, it was the opinion of Churchill the British Chiefs, until there was some actual evidence to prove it wrong.

One of greatest sentences I've read in this forum
Despite that critical need, they continued development of tanks. The tanks were not perfect (nor were on other countries; most of them were buying Britsh ones pfe-war anyway), hence this thread.

Indeed they did, but they were not in urgent need to rush out a new designin June 1940

That makes 2 years and, say, 3 months before 1st tanks are rolled out? With specification issued in June 1940, 'my' tank force might just cut it for Alamein
(Not that those ones would be Cromwels)

Tomo, the proposal had to be discussed by the British tank board, which included Churchill the CIGS in the discussions. There is no way that they are going to be taking time off during Dunkirk France to have these discussions during June 1940.

But, despite all the reasons that I've given why it doesn't make sense, your proposal is issued on July 1 1940 (The Cavalier/Cromwell A23 proposal about 3 months early)
Therefore you could the tank to begin production in Oct 1942, (about 3 months early) and arrive in the desert in Dec 1942. (about 3 months early)

 

[Freebird]

fantastic discussion guys, i applaud you all. these are good ideas.

My two cents worth is that british technical failures in tank design are completely overblown. Their tanks in many respects were superior to german tanks of the period, with the two pounder argument one of the most overblown excuses for british tank failure that I have ever come acros. talk about the british army covering its tracks!!!!!!

The real failure in British armour, was in the failure of its doctrine and TO&E. The british Infantry Division underwent just two major changes prior to 1942, and by that year was being dubbed by both its users and its opponents as the "Queen Of the Battlefield". By 1942, the Germans had no answer to a British Infantry Division, properly handled it could defeat any comparable organization the Germans could throw at it. With one proviso. it had to be properly led and managed, something that did not always happen in the British Army. As hitler said....their leadership was abysmal, the materiel was magnificent (paraphrasing)

I largely agree with your points here, it was doctrine failure in the armour.

However there are a couple of points.
The Matilda II was a good tank for it's time
Cromwell was also a good tank

The Crusader Covenanter were poor tanks however, mainly as a result of trying to skip the trial test phase.

2. Although there were huge problems with doctrine, an excellent tank can sometimes prevent a disaster.
The British attack at Arras in France was one such case, where the British tanks conducted an unsupported attack against the SS motorized division. It could have resulted in a complete slaughter by German anti-tank guns, but the British were saved by the fact that the Matilda was almost completely immune to the German 37mm. Had they sent the Ram to the desert instead of the Crusader, it may well have saved the armour from the tactical mistakes, as except at short range the Ram was proof against almost everything other than the 88, while the Crusader was basically vulnerable to everything out to 1,500 or 2,000 yards.

3.) You are correct about the failure of British doctrine, except at Gazala. They did manage to gain the upper hand and trap the German armour in "The Cauldron", unfortunately the Germans managed to break out by overrunning the British armour. In this case the defeat was directly caused by the failure of the British tanks in a head to head match.



In any event, to sum up, Tomo's hypothetical seems to be this:
Suppose that the British put out the A23/A24 proposal about 3 months early.

Questions involved
1.) Would it arrive in time?
2.) Would it affect El Alamein if it did arrive before the battle?
3.) What would the tank look like?

IMO the answer to #1 is no, due to the reasons listed above.
#2 would also be no, due to the very limited numbers, and due to the reasons listed by parsifal.
For #3, would the tank be much different than the Cromwell?

Can anyone answer the points that I raised earlier?

Second, the Crusader is just too small at 18-19 tons to support future development.

Third, to redesign the Kestrel as a tank engine beginning in 1941 would be slower than using the Meteor which is already in the works.

Fourth, even with an improved engine in the Crusader, it's still has the problem of it's weak armour, and the chasis just won't support the weight of an upgunned uparmoured variant.

 

[tomo pauk]

I'll give a shot about:

Second, the Crusader is just too small at 18-19 tons to support future development.

Third, to redesign the Kestrel as a tank engine beginning in 1941 would be slower than using the Meteor which is already in the works.

Fourth, even with an improved engine in the Crusader, it's still has the problem of it's weak armour, and the chasis just won't support the weight of an upgunned uparmoured variant.

Don't think Crusader is a good base for anything; it's the infantry tanks that were shining during the 1st half of war, and they deserve the development.

There is no need to wait for 1941 for Kestrel-based tank engine. Kestrel was not of any importance for RAF even prior WW2, so the working tank engine was very much feasible as early as 1939. 350 HP to power 20-30 ton tanks - better than what Germans have had to offer back then.

 

[Shortround6]

A few points.

1. the Kestrel. It was giving over 400hp in aircraft form in the early 30s WITHOUT a supercharger and on less than 87 octane fuel. Not a lot of development needed. Over 8000 produced of all kinds?
The Kestrel, displacement wise, was within 200cc of the initial engines used to power the Tiger tank and only 10% smaller than the final versions of the Tiger and Panther engines. It may not have meet the official requirement of 20 hp per ton for 30 ton tank but it certainly offered enough power for practical purposes until 1944 or so.

2. Lets not confuse weight with size. The Crusader was 2 feet longer than a Valentine and about 1 inch shorter than a Cavalier or early Cromwell and the hull is about 4 inches shorter than a Comet. The suspension of 19 ton tank may not offer development to 30 ton tank but the actual hull size seems to have been OK, the later tanks did get a bit wider.

3. The infantry tanks Shined but due to circumstance and were a lousy basis for further development. They were physically smaller and much slower. Speed may not be every thing but 12-15mph limits options.

4. Sometimes tactics dictate weapons procurement and sometimes weapons procurement (or supply) dictate tactics. British tanks had NO HE ammo to silence dug in guns and Smoke was confined to just 2 tanks per company or squadron. Once an attack was started the tanks had two basic choices if fired upon by dug in guns. Withdraw and try to get the artillery fire plan modified to take in the change of threat or charge as quickly as possible until they were in effective MG range of the dug in guns and silence them with MG fire. If the British tanks had been supplied with HE ammunition for the 2pdr and 6pdr guns different tactics might have been employed at least some commanders.
2pdr armed Crusaders carried an amazing amount of ammo in theory. 130 rounds of 2pdr ammo (all AP) and up to 4950 rounds of ammo for a single Machine gun. Trading some of this storage capacity for HE rounds wouldn't have hurt things one bit.

5. The Crusader was not quite the tin clad some would have us Believe. That or the German guns weren't quite as good. The short German 50 is usually rated as penetrating 46mm at 500 meters and 36mm at 1000 meters. the long 50 adds about 500 meters to those ranges. The short 75mm is equally effective against ALL tanks over about 500meters because it is using HE shells to try to cripple suspensions as it has no hope of penetrating armor over 40mm at ranges much past 500 meters.
That leaves the 88s and the towed 75mm-76mm At guns and the few long barreled MK IVs. Since the 75mm long guns can penetrate about 72-75mm of armor at 1500 meters upping the armor of the Crusader from 40mm to even 64mm (Cavalier hull front) doesn't buy much. All penetration figures at 30 degrees.

 

[Glider]

The only observation I have on the above (which I agree with 100%) is the HE ammunition. HE did exist for the 2pd and the 6pd but for some stupid reason wasn't issued to the army for AT or tank guns until early 1944. I don't know when it was developed and its quite possible that it wasn't around in 1942 which is the period we are looking at.

 

[tomo pauk]

Re. infantry tanks being smaller slower, being bad basis for further development: While the Matilda Valentine were indeed smaller than Cruisers, Churchill was a hefty piece of machinery. Don't think that 30 ton infantry tank (size between Matilda Churchill, featuring 3in armour in front, 2in at sides back, 6pdr, 400 HP Kestrel-derivative engine) was out of scope of British tank industry for 1941. The power to weight ratio on par with Pz-IIIH and newer, and Pz-IVF1 and newer.

Re Crusader (not) being tinclad: in the 'threat list' we need to include 5cm pak, with Crusader being well within capabilities of that gun. OTOH, for a tank that weighted circa 20 tons, armor thickness was generous.

 

[Juha]

I think Tomo was speaking of this gun
The Vickers Model 1931
Produced 1931-39?
Weight 2,825 kilograms (6,230 lb)
Barrel length 3.225 metres (10.58 ft) L/43
Shell weight 6.5 kilograms (14 lb) (HE)
Caliber 75 millimetres
Carriage cruciform
Elevation 0° to +90°
Traverse 360°
Rate of fire 12 rpm
Muzzle velocity 750 metres per second (2,500 ft/s)

In Romania…The Vickers/Resita model 1936/39 75mm AA gun was used by almost all ten Romanian AA regiments, throughout the war, and was much appreciated for its qualities in the anti-aircraft and also anti-tank role (as it was used in some desperate situations at Stalingrad). It remained in service until the early 50s, when it was replaced by Soviet built models. Source of Romanian part: WorldWar2.ro - 75mm Vickers antiaircraft gun model 1936/39

So if British could have put the gun into a tank turret as a stop-gap measurement while waiting for 17pdr as the real answer to their A/T problems or even built an A/T Valentine like Archer with the Model 1931 and used it like Germans used Marders. Valentine was reliable and small, so even if not perfect it was passable platform for heavy A/T gun.
One basic problem for British was their early lead in industrialisation, specs demanded tanks to be rail transportable but narrow gauge and narrow rail tunnels meant rather narrow hulls to which it was very difficult to install adequate turret ring for effective 3" gun with adequate AP performance against late German tanks.

Juha

 

[Juha]

To those who don't know the Vickers Model 1931, here is a photo on it, Finns called it 76 ItK/34 Vickers, our were 76.2mm.

 

[tomo pauk]

Welcome back, Juha

 

[Shortround6]

Re. infantry tanks being smaller slower, being bad basis for further development: While the Matilda Valentine were indeed smaller than Cruisers, Churchill was a hefty piece of machinery. Don't think that 30 ton infantry tank (size between Matilda Churchill, featuring 3in armour in front, 2in at sides back, 6pdr, 400 HP Kestrel-derivative engine) was out of scope of British tank industry for 1941. The power to weight ratio on par with Pz-IIIH and newer, and Pz-IVF1 and newer.

Then you are not using them for "further development" but designing a whole new tank.

Re Crusader (not) being tinclad: in the 'threat list' we need to include 5cm pak, with Crusader being well within capabilities of that gun. OTOH, for a tank that weighted circa 20 tons, armor thickness was generous.

The 5cm pak had essentially the same performance as the 50mm/60 tank gun. For a good part of the dessert war it was the Germans primary tank killer. Small and easy to dig in and conceal.

 

[Shortround6]

That is the gun but but the main problems with using it in a "what if" is how far out to you take the "what if". Being out of production for a few years before the war started means the British didn't have that many to begin with. Several projects actually proposed In WW II to use them came to nothing when the "supposed" stock of old guns/barrels couldn't be found.
The gun tube was of WW I design and rather heavy for it's performance, 2250lbs for the barrel and Breech (not including recoil system) for 84mm of penetration at 1000yds at 30 degrees compared to the 17pdrs 1822lbs for 109mm penetration at 1000yds at 30 degrees.
To use it as a tank gun requires a new recoil mechanism to be designed and built. An Archer style mounting might be able to use the existing recoil system but since the Archer required the driver to be out of his seat when the gun fired (the recoiling gun would have decapitated the driver) it was best used from ambush and trying to use it in the dessert would have been difficult.
Better to use it's performance as a goal or bench mark and just build a new gun.

 

[Freebird]

All good points Shortround.
Obviously it would be better to have an improved Crusader with the 6pdr and HE ammo.

Since the 75mm long guns can penetrate about 72-75mm of armor at 1500 meters upping the armor of the Crusader from 40mm to even 64mm (Cavalier hull front) doesn't buy much. All penetration figures at 30 degrees.

Although it wouldn't penetrate the Ram's 87mm frontal armour, and would need to be within at 1,000 yards.

I'll give a shot about:
Don't think Crusader is a good base for anything; it's the infantry tanks that were shining during the 1st half of war, and they deserve the development.

Thera already is an infantry tank in development, the A20 prototype was found to be unsuitable in the summer of 1940, so Vauxhall is working on the A22 Churchill, which will be produced by the summer of 1941. If you wanted to change the engine on the A22, it would delay the project by 6 months or more, and what benefit would it bring?

There is no need to wait for 1941 for Kestrel-based tank engine. Kestrel was not of any importance for RAF even prior WW2, so the working tank engine was very much feasible as early as 1939. 350 HP to power 20-30 ton tanks - better than what Germans have had to offer back then.

The problem is that Rolls-Royce doesn't have any spare production capacity to build engines, they are already short on Merlins. That's why the Meteor was built at Rover. Any new engine plant is going to need to be set up first

Don't think that 30 ton infantry tank (size between Matilda Churchill, featuring 3in armour in front, 2in at sides back, 6pdr, 400 HP Kestrel-derivative engine) was out of scope of British tank industry for 1941. The power to weight ratio on par with Pz-IIIH and newer, and Pz-IVF1 and newer.

Actually it was, there are no 6 pdrs available until 1942, they didn't switch production from the 2 pdr until late in 1941.

So, bottom line, would it make any difference?
The Churchill A22 design is in the works, and while a 400hp kestrel might be a bit faster better than the 350hp Bedford, it would delay production while they waited for engines to be produced.

The A24/A27 project proposal that was put out in the fall of 1940 would proceed much along the same lines I don't see that there will be much improvement on that or that the Kestrel version could be produced any faster than the Meteor, as both involved taking an existing Aero engine and producing it at a new factory.

 

[Juha]

Hello Shortround
I don't have exact info on production of Model 1931 but Vickers delivered 12 to Finland in mid 1936 and 48 to Romania in March 1939. Because British armament industry worked at full capacity during the WWII, restart Model 1931 production as tank / AT gun would have meant reduction in some other gun production programs. But the gun would have been able to knock out all panzers the 8th Army met in 42 at least from 1000y and it had also HE round, something the other British tank / A/T guns were sorely lacking but the few CS tanks.
17pdr was clearly better gun but unavailable in 42.
On Archer, I'm well aware the decapitation risk to the driver, but I recall from photos on 17pdr on the 25pdr carriage that it had rather long recoil. I don't recall seeing any photos on Model 1931 at full recoil but the gun being rather low and still capable firing at full 90 deg elevation I guess that its recoil was clearly shorter, so it might have been possible to install it so on Valentine chassis that driver could have stayed on his place during firing.

Juha

 

[Freebird]

So if British could have put the gun into a tank turret as a stop-gap measurement while waiting for 17pdr as the real answer to their A/T problems or even built an A/T Valentine like Archer with the Model 1931 and used it like Germans used Marders.

We seem to be discussing two different considerations here.
A.) What the British can do for 1942 (before El Alamein)
B.) What designs can be put forward in the second half of 1940, which with normal development will be available only near the end of '42. (but not a big factor at El Alamein)

They don't really need a stopgap AT in 1942, at the 6 pdr is very effective against all German tanks.
The Tiger doesn't show up until the very end of '42, nor do any Pz IV's with more than 50mm armour.

The problem with our discussions here is that the British don't have any spare industrial capacity to build new guns or engines in 1940 or early 1941.
The 6 pdr is already ready to go, but due to the desparate shortage after France, they couldn't switch over any 2pdr production until the second half of '41.
If they had any available gun production it would be making the 6 pdr, not the 1931 3" gun.

Anyways, for part "A" (1942) it's unlikely that a new tank design would arrive in time. (as mentioned earlier)

Although the Churchill was in production in 1941, it wasn't deemed suitable for the desert, as there were only 3 present at El Alamein. The main need was for cruiser tanks, that's why I suggested to use Lend-Lease Canadian Ram tanks, to fill the gap between the Crusader and the Cromwell.
The Crusader could however be converted into an assault gun, as it would use the existing chassis, with either a 6 pdr or an 18 pdr, and be available for Gazala/El Alamein. However this would only be if the British did find some other tanks to use instead of the Crusader (such as the Ram)
This in my opinion would be the best option.

For Part "B", I don't see that that a new infantry tank design would be in any way justified, as it would only delay the Churchill program. I don't see that I would do much different in 1940 in any event. Now perhaps in the summer/fall of '41 the Churchill could be revisited, to eliminate the bow howitzer, and put in a larger turret to accomodate the 17 pdr or 25 pdr.

If you did put out the A24/A27 project a couple of months early, would it change much? I can't see how it would either, from what they know at that point.
The 17 pdr wasn't even designed at that point, so it would be planned to use the 6 pdr.
The problem with the Kestrel engine is that there isn't a manufacturer available, and the poject's design (Nuffield) would prefer to use their own Liberty engine, which was in manufacture at the time.
The choice of the Tank Board was the correct one IMO, they didn't put their eggs all in one basket, by ordering 3 prototypes of the Cromwell (Cavilier, Centaur Cromwell) with the Meadows, Liberty Meteor respectively. The Meadows had some issues (as the Covenanter did too) and the Liberty wasn't deemed powerful enough.
Since they had to build new production facilities for the RR tank engines, why would they build the Kestrel intead of the more powerful Meteor?

 

[parsifal]

I largely agree with your points here, it was doctrine failure in the armour.

However there are a couple of points.
The Matilda II was a good tank for it's time
Cromwell was also a good tank

The Crusader Covenanter were poor tanks however, mainly as a result of trying to skip the trial test phase.

2. Although there were huge problems with doctrine, an excellent tank can sometimes prevent a disaster.
The British attack at Arras in France was one such case, where the British tanks conducted an unsupported attack against the SS motorized division. It could have resulted in a complete slaughter by German anti-tank guns, but the British were saved by the fact that the Matilda was almost completely immune to the German 37mm. Had they sent the Ram to the desert instead of the Crusader, it may well have saved the armour from the tactical mistakes, as except at short range the Ram was proof against almost everything other than the 88, while the Crusader was basically vulnerable to everything out to 1,500 or 2,000 yards.

3.) You are correct about the failure of British doctrine, except at Gazala. They did manage to gain the upper hand and trap the German armour in "The Cauldron", unfortunately the Germans managed to break out by overrunning the British armour. In this case the defeat was directly caused by the failure of the British tanks in a head to head match.

A couple of minor points that are hardly even a different opinion. I agree that the Cruiser tank Ram was a superior tank to the Crusader, but I dont think the qualitative differences are as great as your post suggests, and I doubt it could have saved the British at Gazala. That last comment gives away my basic viewpoint on this crucial battle....I consider it to be a British defeat. I disagree that DAKs difficulties were the result of British initiatives. They were more the result of a breakdown in german C&C, and an overly ambitios plan by Rommel with the forces at his disposal. His continued reliance on a hook around the southern flank almost cost him the battle, as at certain key points like Bir Hacheim, he was held up and repulsed.

But, as usual, the British armour counterattacked in near feudal style, against prepared German defences. Unsupported this attack by the british armour was only ever going to achieve one result.

What concerns me in this debate, which really isnt a point you made FB, is this mania to align British tank development to what I call "the german disease". Scr*w the numbers, just go for quality. Wrong, wrong, so wrong!!!!! As the germans found out repeatedly, relying on quality at the expense of numbers is a sure way of being defeated. What was important in my view was finding ways of keeping the numbers up, and not worrying so much about getting the quality fixed. Quality is a "nice to have" element, bu far down in the list of priorities. To me the priorities are
1) Get the doctrine right
2) Adjust the TO&E to optimise the doctrine (all arms).
3) Ensure the numbers game remains in Allied hands. No tom foolery with the production lines
4) Once items (1), (2), (3) are under control, only then can quality issues be considered

To me, a worthy project is Valentine. It proved capable of up-gunning to 6 pdr, was heavily armoured and adequately armed. It was relatively easy to produce. To me, just what the brits needed

 

[Freebird]

What concerns me in this debate, which really isnt a point you made FB, is this mania to align British tank development to what I call "the german disease". Scr*w the numbers, just go for quality. Wrong, wrong, so wrong!!!!! As the germans found out repeatedly, relying on quality at the expense of numbers is a sure way of being defeated. What was important in my view was finding ways of keeping the numbers up, and not worrying so much about getting the quality fixed. Quality is a "nice to have" element, bu far down in the list of priorities. To me the priorities are
1) Get the doctrine right
2) Adjust the TO&E to optimise the doctrine (all arms).
3) Ensure the numbers game remains in Allied hands. No tom foolery with the production lines
4) Once items (1), (2), (3) are under control, only then can quality issues be considered

To me, a worthy project is Valentine. It proved capable of up-gunning to 6 pdr, was heavily armoured and adequately armed. It was relatively easy to produce. To me, just what the brits needed

Good points, I'd like to expand further on Gazala, although outside of the scope of this thread.
I've started a new "Western Desert" thread, so I'll invite your opinions there.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...t-british-tank-doctrine-28578.html#post774308

3) Ensure the numbers game remains in Allied hands. No tom foolery with the production lines

I agree with that, and that's why I have some major doubts that any new tank begun in 1940 would arrive before 1943.
I also doubt that given the crisis mode of the Battle of Britain that any firm decision on the A24/A27 would be taken earlier that actually happened, nor that it could have been improved upon at the time. (specification issued Oct 1940, proposal accepted jan 1941)

You are correct about doctrine faults, however given the properties of the 2pdr which equipped almost all the tanks, having no HE capability they were almost forced to try to seek out the German armour.
The Crusader was also shown to have serious faults, and to continue to produce 5,000 of them to keep having them slaughtered was pointless.
That's why I suggested it as I did, to send the Rams over instead, and convert the Crusader into an assault gun in late '41. Even if the 25 pdr was too heavy, mounting a 3" field gun would do the trick, giving the British a useful attacking weapon.

 

[Juha]

Hello Freebird
on development times, the development of Archer, from beginning to first production machine took appr. 20 months but Germans developed their first Marders in appr 5 months. So an ad-hoc A/T vehicle based on proven chassis could be developed fairly fast when there was an urgent need. Also a gun with good penetration power and with a good HE round was a very useful weapon, even if British had problem to see that.

Juha

 

[Freebird]

Hello Freebird
So an ad-hoc A/T vehicle based on proven chassis could be developed fairly fast when there was an urgent need. Also a gun with good penetration power and with a good HE round was a very useful weapon, even if British had problem to see that.
Juha

The Germans and the Americans did tend to get things done quicker.

But I do agree with you, that's what i was suggesting with a Crusader assault gun.
Although I can't see them doing this before mid-1941, as the UK urgently needs field guns for home defence, and you have to identify a need before trying to fix it.

 

[Shortround6]

From some point in the late thirties it seems the British had 3 tank engine programs going even before the Meteor. The Liberty (enough said) the Meadows flat 12 (also enough said) and Bedford twin six.If they could build a new factory (or retool one) to build a 1917 airplane engines it doesn't seem like too much of a stretch to plan for the factory to build a 1927 airplane engine. And/or Meadows to take up production of the Kestrel rather than the flat twelve.
A big problem in making large, high powered tanks is the transmission/steering gear. This may hold up development as much as anything else.

 

[parsifal]

I largely agree with FB on this. Essentially what he is saying is that messing around with production by introducing radically new types is a mistake. This is because the overwhelming determinant on successful tank operations is NOT quality, its numbers. The germans chose the quality pathway and basically lost the (tank) war as a result.

However within the parameters of the existing production program there were opportunities to shift things around a bit and not affect numbers. He is essentially advocating concentrating on the RAM tank, and putting less effort into the Crusader. Whilst I am not as critical about the Crusaders problems, there is no denying that the tank had its problems, and that as a design the RAM was a better overall package. What is attractive to FBs scenario, is that a changeover to RAM as the principal type in the desert could have been achieved with virtually no dispruption to output. Instead of constructing Crusaders, the factories devoted to this purpose could have converted to RAM production, with only minimal loss of output for a short period of time, IMO.

These other proposals have merits, in terms of getting a better product, however, they are all failing to sufficiently consider the the production bottlenecks they would cause. SRs comments about engine development are worthwhile, but it needs to be remembered that British tank engine development was the area where British AFV development started late, and showed all the signs of inadequate development. There simply was not a lot of time from when the british started to get back into the tank building game in a serious way (1939) and the time they were needed (1941-2). The British really had to make do with regard to engines. It is an attractive proposal also because it uses a better foreign produced engine (the Wright R-975 Whirlwind ) that was powerful, reliable, and available in virtually unlimited numbers

One word of caution I would say, however. In 1939 the canadians were an unknown force in AFV production. they had a pretty well established auto industry and a pretty strong proponent for armoured warfare (I apologise to the canadians, but ive forgotten his name). For the British to put their faith in the canadians, when they had no credentials to show that they could deliver, was asking a lot from the british army. The Ram tank was a development of the M3 and this in turn was a design resulting from British experiences at the front (given that the M3 was also a vast improvement of the M2, an observer in 1939 would have thought CIGS to be an utter madman to place greater faith on an untried colonial nation using an as yet unbuilt concept, based on an inferior design from a foreign power). For the brits to hang back on their evolution of the cruiser tank concept (which occurred in 1939, with the crusader its ultimate development) was asking a lot in terms of putting faith in an untried and unknown industrrial complex. as it turned out, the british need not have worried, the RAM was superior to the home grown designs in many respects. But that was not a known outcomee in 1939, which is when the decision to rely on the Canadians to that extent needed to be taken.