Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks (1 Viewer)

[Shortround6]

The system sounds sort of the same but may have been very different in practice. The British assigned, as you say, two CS tanks per squadron. which means 6-8 per battalion? The Germans originally grouped the MK IVs into one company in the battalion, This company may have had one platoon of light tanks? so 12 or more support tanks per battalion. While platoons might be parceled out to the regular tank companies the support company could be held together and used in mass against important points of resistance. In the desert war with both sides chronically below full strength I would imagine the Germans really held an advantage here as even a couple of Breakdowns/non-replacements would seriously impact the British close support effort.
The Early 3.7 was sometimes described as a mortar and fired a light projectile for it's size, going to the 3" actually didn't change effectiveness. Sources also differ as to wither the 3.7 actually could fire HE or was smoke only or could fire HE but very little (if any in some cases) was supplied. In any case it was only used in the A9, A10 and A13 series of cruiser tanks so the numbers used in North Africa would be rather small.
The 3" is the close support weapon of the North African Campaign for all practical purposes against the Germans.

 

[parsifal]

be careful quoting numbers of tanks on the basis of establishment stengths for both sides, but in particular for the Germans. the germans in April 1941 had less than 20 MkIvs at their disposal. In May 1942, they could call upon 36 mkIvs, and in October just 18. This generates significantly less HE firepower than the CS components of a full strength brit armoured Div, but here too field strengths seldom measured up to paper strengths

 

[davebender]

I wouldn't quite go that far.

1935 Germany started without tanks, tank plants or engineers trained to build tanks. Consequently the next 6 years (through 1941) was a period of experimentation to determine what works. During this time frame the Panzer IV CS tank (7.5cm howitzer) was produced in small quantities to meet an immediate wartime need.

From 1942 onward Germany employed a main battle tank (either Panzer IV or Panzer V) armed with a 7.5cm main gun that was effective against both armored targets and soft targets. Infantry were supported by a battalion of 18 inexpensive StuGIII assault guns. The Tiger tank was manufactured concurrently in small quantities for use against fortifications.

At least that was the theory. Germany never had enough armored vehicles to meet wartime demands so all sorts of war emergency measures were implemented. The Panzer III tank remained in production through mid 1943 until the Panther tank entered mass production. Tiger tanks and StugIIIGs were employed as main battle tanks because nothing else was available. Inexpensive Marder and Hetzer SP AT guns were employed to provide additional anti-tank defense ILO main battle tanks and StuGIIIGs.

 

[parsifal]

I don't believe I have said much, if anything, about the reliability of the MK VI light tank.

It appears we may have gotten crossed lines on this. I thought you were referring to the Mk VI light. its somewhat ironic that the brits achieved their greatest victories in the Desert using the least capable tank

I don't want this to turn into a "my country is better than yours" argument.

neither do I, but if you think about it, I am not exactly giving the brits a ringing endorsement. If anything i am indicting them worse than anybody. I am saying they suffered such heavy losses because of german efficiency, and poor doctrine and leadeership. i am discounting the tank quality issue to the point of nothingness, for a number of reasons


"But I am willing to bet the reliability of the m-2, which the Americans were planning to build in quantity in 1940, before the M-3 was designed at british request, would have been diabolical."

If you are referring to the M-2 medium tank you do realize that it used the same engine/transmission as the M-3 medium and Ram tanks and used, if not the same parts, the same design suspension? Why should it have been less reliable seeing as how it was a lighter tank? "

perhaps a little overstated in retrospect, but please note this is not stated as a fact, elsewhere in that post i did say, we dont have any hard data about the m-2 in combat conditions. Perhaps it is sufficient to say it was a poorly designed tank. There were differences between the m-2 and the m-3, as i understand it, a revised and strengtened suspension, I believe also the engine layout and cooling system was different....but perhaps not either.


Compared to this the early marks of cruisers, even the mkVI, were light years ahead."
not the smartest thing ive ever said, i admit.....

Really?.........Then I guess your Idea of using the Ram tank doesn't hold water.

I dont think because i dont think much of the m-2, that necessarily means the Ram or the m-3 were bad tanks. It is not necessarily a logical progression to say that


Now the armament layout/tactical concept left a lot to be desired, being firmly rooted in 1918 but then that is not what we are taking about.

actually they can have an effect, which is why modern tanks have a lot of time and effort used up getting the layout right. It can afect things like armement stowage, wiring, transmission.....


Trying to get back on subject, yes the 2pdr had better penetration than than the German short 50. the large margin is debatable. yes 15-25% (depending on who you believe) can be considered a large margin, on the other hand we are sometimes talking about the difference between 50mm and 42 mm or less at even longer ranges. While the 2pdr worked in the infantry tanks with their heavy armor it didn't work so good in the Cruiser tanks. Some of the German tanks having thicker armor in places than the cruisers may mean that the practical firing distance for each side was almost the same.

The problem with the 2 pdr was not its armour penetration, it was its lack of HE capability that damned it. This could have been amply compensated for by better support (Infantry and Artillery) but inexplicably the brits never got around to this


I will cheerfully concede that the Germans used much better combined arms tactics but will reserve judgment on the MK IVs with the short 75. It did give the Germans capabilities the British did not possess.
As far as integrating towed AT guns with tank units like the Germans did rather successfully, there wasn't much point for the British. A 2pdr towed gun (which just as hard, if not harder to dig-in than the German 50mm) gives no more range or punch to the unit that the guns already mounted in the tanks. Maybe if the towed 6pdrs had showed a bit earlier something could have been worked out?
Better artillery co-ordination would have been a big plus for the British, but in one famous case the battery tasked with supporting one attack got bogged down while shifting fire positions and reached it's second fire site late. It then proceeded to fire it's schedule of missions in order but delayed instead of skipping the 1st mission after the bogging incident and keeping up with the flow of the battle. If a significant number of the tanks had 75mm shell firing guns they might have been able to silence the German AT guns on their own or at least screened themselves with smoke shells and withdrawn.

This is in fact at the heart of the problem. whilst you are saying that you are prepared to concede the germans had better combined arms application, i sense you dont believe it to be the main problem. Not so deep under the surfacce, you believe the quality issue to be the central issue to the british failure. This is the old chestnut "the germans could have won by superior quality" when in fact superior quality is a periperal issue to winning . If we look at the operations of the 7th armoured septemeber -december 1940, we find the inferrior mk VI lights getting the better of the superior M11s and M-13s. Both tanks parks are pretty poor, but in theory the mk vis should have been trounced, but they werent. Not that infereior quality is avirtue, its not, its just that concentating on quality at the expense of quantity will lose a battle.

Its not just artillery co-ordination that gives you all arms ability. You need a mix of supporting arms and good leadership as well as good training to achieve that. at battleaxe, for example, the germans used a combination oif minefields to channel the british armour, they also used their tanks to lure the british armour (crusaders) onto the AT screean, which in turn was well protected by both Infantry and artillery. german armour did very little of the killing, which was consistent with german training at the time.


As for
"With regard to your comments about the Mk VI, all I can say is thank the lord you werent in charge of the british army in 1938. Those so-called stupid tanks, defeated a vastly more numerous enemy, pushed them back over 700 miles, then faced an enemy qualitatively far superior, doing a credible job."

I don't believe I called the tanks "stupid". The decision to build 1000 of them while building 300 cruiser and infantry tanks was stupid.

I dont think you did either, but by not having 1000 mk vis you reduce the british tank availability from 1300 to 300, and rob the british of their greatest early war land victory That doesnt maqke good sense in my view

Just which "enemy qualitatively far superior" was this?

I was referring to DAK. Sorry for the mix up


If was the Italian Army in 1940 then I think we can see just how "qualitatively far superior" they were. The only army to put even more emphasis on numbers vs actual combat capability. 2500-3000 L3/33 tankettes?
Armor vulnerable to the 12.7mm in the MK VI light but for the most part it's own guns won't penetrate the British tank? 72 11/39 tanks on strength in 1940 in the desert. How many were runners? when do the 13/40s show up in any numbers? If the Italians had built another 100 11/39s instead of 300 of those tankettes things might have gone better for them. Of course they might need a lot better leadership on the tactical level too.


Just a correction on the numbers, and a comment on the alleged lack of quality in the italian Army. The italians are just as bad as the british in trying to blame their own failures on the quality of their gear. Their equipment was slightly less capable than british and german equipment, but it was not the main course of their defeat. In fact their training and tactical concepts, coupled with an attrocious logistic system were the main course of their defeat. The australian 9 div used captured Italian equipment very extensively in their defense of Tobruk. most of the defending artillery, including their ATGs were captured italian equipment. they used M13s quite successfully (incidentally the germans had no problems using british equipment either, which suggests they were not too phased by the alleged poor quality british equipment. The numbers involved were incidentally 46 M11s in September, along with 197 CV 33s. 42 m-13s arrived in December, but were captured at tobruk and Derna. They were attached to the 'M' bn, which i think later was named Gruppo babini

 

[Glider]

I have just read an interesting piece on an alternative gun for British Tanks at the start of WW2. The solution was based on the WW1 6pd as fitted to the British WW1 tanks. Using modern metals and design it would have resulted in a gun with an AT capability not far off the 2pd plus of course a decent HE shell. An interesting thought.

 

[davebender]

Combat experience going back to WWI shows that an effective HE shell should be at least 75mm in size. 105mm is about perfect for general use, which is why it has been the most common size army light howitzer for 100 years.

Early 1940s automotive technology isn't advanced enough to carry the excellent L7 105mm/52 cannon. However Britain can scale it down to 75mm, producing something similiar to the German 75mm/48 cannon. The historical British 17 pounder was in the ball park but it was too large and heavy for general use. Britain needs to scale it down a bit as they finally did to produce the lighter and more compact 77mm HV cannon which armed the Comet tank. This same weapon can be mated to a light weight artillery carriage to produce the standard British anti tank gun ILO the historical 6 pounder / 57mm.

 

[tomo pauk]

Woah, the L7 in WW2 talk

I'd go for smooth bore gun all the way 8)

 

[Glider]

I admit I was taken aback by talk of the 105. If you want a British, cheap, easily available gun then the large number of WW1 13pd guns might be of use. The M3 75mm was a French WW1 75 and this was its equivalent

 

[Freebird]

Combat experience going back to WWI shows that an effective HE shell should be at least 75mm in size. 105mm is about perfect for general use, which is why it has been the most common size army light howitzer for 100 years.

Early 1940s automotive technology isn't advanced enough to carry the excellent L7 105mm/52 cannon. However Britain can scale it down to 75mm, producing something similiar to the German 75mm/48 cannon. The historical British 17 pounder was in the ball park but it was too large and heavy for general use. Britain needs to scale it down a bit as they finally did to produce the lighter and more compact 77mm HV cannon which armed the Comet tank.

Given the critical shortage of production and delays in carriages etc, I don't see the British scaling down or manufacturing anything new in 40/41. If they are going to use a field gun, it should be the British made 18 or 25 pounder, otherwise import the the US made 3" gun.

 

[parsifal]

The australian AC-2/3 introdued a cut down 25 pounder in a turret in 1942. Only 65 were ever made, but the conversion was considered quite successful. Armour penetration was reportedly as good or better than a 2 pounder, and possessed significant HE capacity. The intention was to use the type in the Jungle to take out japanese strongpoints, in the finish Australians used converted Matildas and Valentines for the purpose, along with Stuart Light Tanks.

I dont think it necessary to put such a great effort into solving this problem and agree with FB, always look for the cheapest and easiest, least disruptive option

 

[Shortround6]

The 13pdr is a total non-starter for a number of reasons.
There are major differences between tank cannon and field guns even if they use the same ammo. There was darn little on the M3 tank gun that was interchangeable with the French 75 except the ammo. Different breech assembly, different recoil cylinders, different exterior barrel shape.

As far as the 13pdr goes, there was no vast number available at the start of WW II. The number left over was certainly less than a few hundred if that, maybe only a few dozen. Production had stopped early in WW I in favor of the 18pdr.
It had a velocity several hundred fps less than the French 75 let alone the more modern versions and a slightly lighter projectile. For conversion to a decent tank gun you need a new breech and new recoil cylinders/cradle.
About all you can use is the rifled tube and that is probably worn.
Seeing as how they haven't been made for about 23-24 years you might as well build something else as there is no left over tooling to speak of either.

 

[davebender]

Entirely possible but not during 1942.

Leopard 1 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Leopard I tank weighed 43 tons and was armed with a 105mm main gun. Late WWII tanks such as the Panther, Centurion, M26 and Stalin were as large as the Leopard I.

 

[Shortround6]

perhaps a little overstated in retrospect, but please note this is not stated as a fact, elsewhere in that post i did say, we dont have any hard data about the m-2 in combat conditions. Perhaps it is sufficient to say it was a poorly designed tank. There were differences between the m-2 and the m-3, as i understand it, a revised and strengtened suspension, I believe also the engine layout and cooling system was different....but perhaps not either.

we don't have any information on the M-2 in combat conditions and perhaps it did have some engine, drive line problems, I tend to think they were minor or easily straightened out as the drive line lasted well into the M4 production. As far as the M3 using a "a revised and strengthened suspension" I would hope so, the M2 weighed 38,000lbs, the M2A1 weighed 47,000lbs and the M3 started at 60,000lbs (Ram 65,000lbs). The fact that the suspension had to be strengthened to handle a 58% increase in weight is hardly surprising or a reflection on the design/ability of the original suspension. The fact that the M4 (66,000-70,000lbs?)used the same basic design suspension (suitably beefed up) until the HVSS began to be introduced in 1943 should tell us what we need to know.
from the middle of the hull down the M2 was probably in with the world leaders, from the middle of the hull up it was a disaster (although it did have a sloped hull front

The problem with the 2 pdr was not its armour penetration, it was its lack of HE capability that damned it. This could have been amply compensated for by better support (Infantry and Artillery) but inexplicably the brits never got around to this

The Armour penetration was just fine until some point in 1942. Aiming was bit of problem in the tanks and while HE rounds would have helped they would have had about 1/4 the explosive effect of the German 50mm guns. While better cooperation would certainly have helped, "amply" is perhaps too strong a word. Given the radio performance of the day and having to go through channels means that artillery support is usually going to be bit late, or insufficient or lacking in some way. Germans helped insure fire support in part by distributing fire support guns at lower levels than other armies despite, in the early war years, using radios at least as effectively as anybody else.

This is in fact at the heart of the problem. whilst you are saying that you are prepared to concede the germans had better combined arms application, i sense you dont believe it to be the main problem. Not so deep under the surfacce, you believe the quality issue to be the central issue to the british failure. This is the old chestnut "the germans could have won by superior quality" when in fact superior quality is a periperal issue to winning . If we look at the operations of the 7th armoured septemeber -december 1940, we find the inferrior mk VI lights getting the better of the superior M11s and M-13s. Both tanks parks are pretty poor, but in theory the mk vis should have been trounced, but they werent. Not that infereior quality is avirtue, its not, its just that concentating on quality at the expense of quantity will lose a battle.

I believe you need a bit of both. I also believe that 'quality' needs to be all round. The best gun in the world and the thickest armor won't win if you can't get it to battle. Neither will it win the battle if a handful of super tanks control part of the battle field while enemy units go around them in areas were there are no tanks (or super AT guns) and get into the rear areas. On the other hand, trading 4 or 5 tanks (and crews) for every enemy tank destroyed is a very expensive way to gain victory.
You have read more than I about the early desert campaign, did those MK VI lights win on their own or were there a few Cruisers in the mix to take out some of those Italian medium (cough,cough) tanks?

I dont think you did either, but by not having 1000 mk vis you reduce the british tank availability from 1300 to 300, and rob the british of their greatest early war land victory That doesnt maqke good sense in my view

I don't believe I ever said don't build any, infact I think in an earlier post I said 300-400-500 would have been fine. Call it 600 and use the money/ man hours/ material from the other 400 to build another 100-150 A13 cruisers. 1000-1050 tanks not 300, but 400-450 tanks with cannon, not machine guns.

Just a correction on the numbers, and a comment on the alleged lack of quality in the italian Army. The italians are just as bad as the british in trying to blame their own failures on the quality of their gear. Their equipment was slightly less capable than british and german equipment, but it was not the main course of their defeat. In fact their training and tactical concepts, coupled with an attrocious logistic system were the main course of their defeat. The australian 9 div used captured Italian equipment very extensively in their defense of Tobruk. most of the defending artillery, including their ATGs were captured italian equipment. they used M13s quite successfully (incidentally the germans had no problems using british equipment either, which suggests they were not too phased by the alleged poor quality british equipment. The numbers involved were incidentally 46 M11s in September, along with 197 CV 33s. 42 m-13s arrived in December, but were captured at tobruk and Derna. They were attached to the 'M' bn, which i think later was named Gruppo babini

The Italians have more justification in blaming their gear. In an Infantry battalion they had 2 weapons that were the equal or better than the British equivalent. Their Beretta submachine guns and their 81 mm mortars. Every other weapon was substandard or lacking in numbers or both. Modern Italian artillery was few in numbers. Left over or refurbished WW I artillery has some serious short comings. The Italian 47mm "AT" gun was not as powerful as many other guns of it's caliber (it was lighter and easier to move without vehicles). When it comes to AFV perhaps some of their armoured cars were world standard, Until the M13/40 tank shows up the less said the better.
why don't you tell us how many British Cruisers were in these early battles in 1940 and if there were any Maltida's engaged before all the credit goes to the MK VI light tanks.

Both sides made extensive use of captured equipment. Perhaps more so than in any other theater. with supplies and reinforcements so short on both sides any, weapon (tank, AT gun, AA gun, mortar) was better than no weapon at all.

 

[Shortround6]

Entirely NOT possible during 1942.

Unless you believe that there no advances in barrel forging technology, metallurgy, and propellant technology in the 15 years or so between 1942 and the coming of the 105 L7 gun. The fact that the L7 didn't fire full bore AP rounds might have something to do with it being successful from a 43 ton tank without a muzzle brake.

 

[parsifal]

I believe you need a bit of both. I also believe that 'quality' needs to be all round. The best gun in the world and the thickest armor won't win if you can't get it to battle. Neither will it win the battle if a handful of super tanks control part of the battle field while enemy units go around them in areas were there are no tanks (or super AT guns) and get into the rear areas. On the other hand, trading 4 or 5 tanks (and crews) for every enemy tank destroyed is a very expensive way to gain victory.

I think that sums it up pretty well....the question is, were the brit tanks so inferior as to be labelled "responsible" for the defeats suffered in the desert. I say they werent. i say the culprit lies in the poor tactical handling of the material. Sure, having better tanks would have made it a lot easier, and sure, British tanks did leave a lot to be desired, but was it that poor as to receive the lions share of the blame....I am very doubtful of that, and suspect a good deal of blame shifting postwar. I smell monty in there somewhere......


You have read more than I about the early desert campaign, did those MK VI lights win on their own or were there a few Cruisers in the mix to take out some of those Italian medium (cough,cough) tanks?


why don't you tell us how many British Cruisers were in these early battles in 1940 and if there were any Maltida's engaged before all the credit goes to the MK VI light tanks.


There were no Matildas until December. No Cruiser tanks were committed until that time either.
7th Armoured had on strength a total of 105 tanks (give or take), of which 48 were A9s and A-10s (21 and 27 respectively) at the time of the italian offensive (September)...this represented the total armoured strength available to the british at that time AFAIK. However many of these tanks were not working. i believe the main problem was excessive track wear, and in any case they seem to have been engaged in training. There were no Matildas until December, when 1st Army Tank Regiment (I think...am not at home again...will double check tonite and confirm) arrived in theatre.

During the December counteroffensive the matildas were a superweapon used very much in the manner you are describing. It dismayed the Italians to see that their ATGs were totally inneffective against the matildas. However, the matildas were a wasting asset. I know they were used in support at bardia, but thereafter I dont see any reports of their use until after the offensive was over. I suspect lack of maintenance was the problem, and there were very few spare parts or maintenence crews that knew how to service these monsters.

Mk VIs (and armoured cars) of 11 hussars remained at the cutting edge of the offensive throughout. they were there from the beginning, during the italian offensive ( September-November) right through to Beda Fomm. They were reliable and mobile, with radio comms, and good support to keep them going. This is what made them critical to the british victory. Put it this way, the brits would still have won without the matildas, but i doubt they would even have held egypt without the lowly mk VI on station.

 

[parsifal]

Fitting a 105mm gun to any brit tank prior to the centurion (and then only with significant redesign) is beyond the realm of reasonable possibility. As a generalization, the turret rings of brit tanks were simply not big enough to even contemplate this. Both the germans and the Russians fitted large calibre weapons (128 and 122 mm, as well as 152mm) but these were in AFVs well beyond anything the brits were building at that time. You would have to contemplate the building of the Tortoise to think about this, and thisas 1944 as i recall, and totally against the numbes game i keep harping aboutn

 

[Juha]

Hello Davebender
in fact German tank doctrine in early part of the WWII called for both Pz III armed with light gun with good penetration power but also capable to fire HE shells and a support tank with heavier gun for more powerful HE (Pz IV). What killed this was the impact of Soviet T-34s and KVs, turret ring of Pz III didn't allow installation of bigger long barrel gun than the long 50mm, so the German MBT Pz III became obsolete. But the CS doctrine was so deeply dug in that the last Pz III version (N) was armed with the same short 75mm L/24 gun as the early Pz IVs, so when Pz III became incapable to function as an effective MBT its last version was modified to function as a CS tank. And even as late as in July 43 at Kursk Pz III was the 2nd most numerous tank in present in German panzer divs. So in 42 the MBT plus CS doctrine was still in force in panzer units. In Sept 39 WM had almost as many Pz IVs (IIRC 211 vehicles) as Pz IIIs because Pz III development took so long.

Juha

 

[tomo pauk]

I do enjoy the discussion, regarding both the real issues of early-WW2 armored warfare, and the attitude of contributors.

 

[parsifal]

There were no Matildas until December. No Cruiser tanks were committed until that time either.
7th Armoured had on strength a total of 105 tanks (give or take), of which 48 were A9s and A-10s (21 and 27 respectively) at the time of the italian offensive (September)...this represented the total armoured strength available to the british at that time AFAIK. However many of these tanks were not working. i believe the main problem was excessive track wear, and in any case they seem to have been engaged in training. There were no Matildas until December, when 1st Army Tank Regiment (I think...am not at home again...will double check tonite and confirm) arrived in theatre.

During the December counteroffensive the matildas were a superweapon used very much in the manner you are describing. It dismayed the Italians to see that their ATGs were totally inneffective against the matildas. However, the matildas were a wasting asset. I know they were used in support at bardia, but thereafter I dont see any reports of their use until after the offensive was over. I suspect lack of maintenance was the problem, and there were very few spare parts or maintenence crews that knew how to service these monsters.

Mk VIs (and armoured cars) of 11 hussars remained at the cutting edge of the offensive throughout. they were there from the beginning, during the italian offensive ( September-November) right through to Beda Fomm. They were reliable and mobile, with radio comms, and good support to keep them going. This is what made them critical to the british victory. Put it this way, the brits would still have won without the matildas, but i doubt they would even have held egypt without the lowly mk VI on station.

I have to correct this, i am afraid, because i have made a lot of errors. initial numbers were correct, more or less, but there was a lot of shifting about of equipment, as reinforcements arrived.

Western Desert Force had been reinforced, when on 24th September 1940, three new Armoured Regiments, plus other forces, arrived at Port Said. These were, 2nd RTR with Cruiser tanks (mainly A13, but with some A9 and A10s) and 7th RTR with 48 Matilda tanks and the 3rd Hussars which still had MKVI light tanks only. In October 2nd RTR joined 4th Armoured Brigade, while 3rd Hussars joined 7th Armoured Brigade. The Divisional Commander, Major-General O'Moore-Creagh, decided to transfer 'B' Squadron of 2nd RTR to 3rd Hussars and visa versa, which meant that each tank Regiment was able to have at least one Cruiser tank Squadron on its strength.


7 RTR (matildas)started training with various infantry brigades, in their infantry support roll. The 11th Hussars were also strengthened by the addition of No.2 Armoured Car Company RAF with ten Fordson Armoured cars, who became 'D' Squadron

O'Connor was ordered to attack in the area of Sidi Barrani, Sofafi and the saltpans of Buq-Buq, making use of the heavily armoured Matildas. However, the Italians had not been idle for the last three month, with a string of fortified camps now protecting Sidi Barrani. Three of these, Nibeiwa, Tummar East and Tummar West, lay to the south of the main position at Sidi Barrani and were manned by infantry, heavy artillery and tanks. An estimated 75,000 men were in or around Sidi Barrani, with about 120 tanks and 200 guns, with O'Connor having the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions. The British force consisted of 25,000 men and a total of 275 light, Cruiser and Matilda tanks.

contrary to the popular myth, the italian armour was unable to effectively resist because it was caught completely by surprise, not so much because of its obvius inferiority . The Italian armour was caught unmanned, for the most part, and destroyed by the Matildas of 7 RTR, before it even had a chance to engage properly. its commander, col Malletti died heroically, resisting the matildas, with an LMG firing from his hip.

The cruisers and the mkVIs were used mostly as mobile forces to outflank and isolate the successive italian formations on that day. The armoured battles wewre mostly fought by the matildas of 7RTR

 

[Shortround6]

According to one account there were Eight A9 cruisers with the 7th hussars at the battle of Battle of Girba on the the 16th of June 1940. I am not going to claim that they won the battle by themselves but the 7th apparently only had 4 MK VI s at this battle. the 7th claimed 9 L3's destroyed in a later stage of the battle (tank claims may be like aircraft claims, it's easier to count wrecks after the battle but who killed what?) and with the A9s out numbering the MK VIs two to one (in the 7th hussars) I doubt it was the MK VI's that did the majority of the tank killing. 11th Hussars claimed 8 L3's at this stage and there were some 2pdr at guns on the scene.