Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Combat experience going back to WWI shows that an effective HE shell should be at least 75mm in size. 105mm is about perfect for general use, which is why it has been the most common size army light howitzer for 100 years.
Early 1940s automotive technology isn't advanced enough to carry the excellent L7 105mm/52 cannon. However Britain can scale it down to 75mm, producing something similiar to the German 75mm/48 cannon. The historical British 17 pounder was in the ball park but it was too large and heavy for general use. Britain needs to scale it down a bit as they finally did to produce the lighter and more compact 77mm HV cannon which armed the Comet tank.
perhaps a little overstated in retrospect, but please note this is not stated as a fact, elsewhere in that post i did say, we dont have any hard data about the m-2 in combat conditions. Perhaps it is sufficient to say it was a poorly designed tank. There were differences between the m-2 and the m-3, as i understand it, a revised and strengtened suspension, I believe also the engine layout and cooling system was different....but perhaps not either.
The Armour penetration was just fine until some point in 1942. Aiming was bit of problem in the tanks and while HE rounds would have helped they would have had about 1/4 the explosive effect of the German 50mm guns. While better cooperation would certainly have helped, "amply" is perhaps too strong a word. Given the radio performance of the day and having to go through channels means that artillery support is usually going to be bit late, or insufficient or lacking in some way. Germans helped insure fire support in part by distributing fire support guns at lower levels than other armies despite, in the early war years, using radios at least as effectively as anybody else.The problem with the 2 pdr was not its armour penetration, it was its lack of HE capability that damned it. This could have been amply compensated for by better support (Infantry and Artillery) but inexplicably the brits never got around to this
This is in fact at the heart of the problem. whilst you are saying that you are prepared to concede the germans had better combined arms application, i sense you dont believe it to be the main problem. Not so deep under the surfacce, you believe the quality issue to be the central issue to the british failure. This is the old chestnut "the germans could have won by superior quality" when in fact superior quality is a periperal issue to winning . If we look at the operations of the 7th armoured septemeber -december 1940, we find the inferrior mk VI lights getting the better of the superior M11s and M-13s. Both tanks parks are pretty poor, but in theory the mk vis should have been trounced, but they werent. Not that infereior quality is avirtue, its not, its just that concentating on quality at the expense of quantity will lose a battle.
I dont think you did either, but by not having 1000 mk vis you reduce the british tank availability from 1300 to 300, and rob the british of their greatest early war land victory That doesnt maqke good sense in my view
Just a correction on the numbers, and a comment on the alleged lack of quality in the italian Army. The italians are just as bad as the british in trying to blame their own failures on the quality of their gear. Their equipment was slightly less capable than british and german equipment, but it was not the main course of their defeat. In fact their training and tactical concepts, coupled with an attrocious logistic system were the main course of their defeat. The australian 9 div used captured Italian equipment very extensively in their defense of Tobruk. most of the defending artillery, including their ATGs were captured italian equipment. they used M13s quite successfully (incidentally the germans had no problems using british equipment either, which suggests they were not too phased by the alleged poor quality british equipment. The numbers involved were incidentally 46 M11s in September, along with 197 CV 33s. 42 m-13s arrived in December, but were captured at tobruk and Derna. They were attached to the 'M' bn, which i think later was named Gruppo babini
There were no Matildas until December. No Cruiser tanks were committed until that time either.
7th Armoured had on strength a total of 105 tanks (give or take), of which 48 were A9s and A-10s (21 and 27 respectively) at the time of the italian offensive (September)...this represented the total armoured strength available to the british at that time AFAIK. However many of these tanks were not working. i believe the main problem was excessive track wear, and in any case they seem to have been engaged in training. There were no Matildas until December, when 1st Army Tank Regiment (I think...am not at home again...will double check tonite and confirm) arrived in theatre.
During the December counteroffensive the matildas were a superweapon used very much in the manner you are describing. It dismayed the Italians to see that their ATGs were totally inneffective against the matildas. However, the matildas were a wasting asset. I know they were used in support at bardia, but thereafter I dont see any reports of their use until after the offensive was over. I suspect lack of maintenance was the problem, and there were very few spare parts or maintenence crews that knew how to service these monsters.
Mk VIs (and armoured cars) of 11 hussars remained at the cutting edge of the offensive throughout. they were there from the beginning, during the italian offensive ( September-November) right through to Beda Fomm. They were reliable and mobile, with radio comms, and good support to keep them going. This is what made them critical to the british victory. Put it this way, the brits would still have won without the matildas, but i doubt they would even have held egypt without the lowly mk VI on station.