Last Corsair order to Vought : 94 F4U-7 for the French Navy, last one delivered january 31, 1953. Last flight with the French Navy : september 1964.
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Last Corsair order to Vought : 94 F4U-7 for the French Navy, last one delivered january 31, 1953. Last flight with the French Navy : september 1964.I have a real problem with this statement.
The Japanese on built around 716 of the "1942 model" Ki-43s out of over 5700 versions. While the last Ki-43 I built rolled out of the factory in Feb 1943 they had been building Ki-43 IIs in November so there is some overlap. Ki-43 I's in frontline squadron service in 1944??? Training squadrons yes, 'home defense' squadrons yes. In 1944 just due to normal attrition "1942 model" Ki-43 was well under 10% of the of the strength.
Same pretty much goes for the A6M. While the Navy was a lot quicker to get the two speed supercharger into the A6M the "1942 models" actually cover at least 3 models of A6Ms. The A6M2 21 which is the classic Pearl Harbor, Midway, early Guadalcanal Zero with long wing and single stage supercharger. The A6M3 32 which got the new engine, shorter wing (tips removed). Production started in spring of 1942 and was first spotted by the Allies in Aug 1942, However the new engine meant that the fuselage tank was reduced in size and with the thirstier engine this reduced range. Field commanders requested additional fuel tankage to restore range and after testing the A6M3 22 (yes the numbers are reversed, earlier plane used the higher model number) entered in production in Dec 1942 with the old folding wings in addition to the new small tanks in each wing. So what was the "1942 model"? Also note that 1941-42 production of the A6Ms was about 17% of total production so again, numbers of 1942 production fighters in front line squadrons in 1944 would have been very small.
I would also note that many Allied and Axis pilots weren't much better at aircraft identification than they were at accurate score keeping. Japanese had an easier time of it as the 6 main US fighters were all rather different. Many allied pilots could not tell a Ki-43 from an A6M. They often could tell the A6M3 32 from the others due to the clipped, squared off wing tips.
The rate of attrition on both sides was huge. Many aircraft were written off as soon as they landed due to combat damage, as noted earlier, many were written off due to landing/taxing damage. In the Solomon's and New Guinea both sides lost numbers of planes due to bombing raids (or shell fire). "1942 model" planes, on both sides, were in 2nd line or 3rd line squadrons/areas of operation/duties in 1944.
I don't hold much stock in after WW II use. Too much depends on the actual air force and planes involved. As an example France was still using Hawk 75s (very few) as trainers into the early 50s. Any that had been built with Wright R-1820 engines had been repowered with P&WR-1830 engines. France had enough trouble paying for new combat jets, no money for training aircraft.
F4U was sort of a special case. P&W and Vaught had managed to shoe horn in new version of the R-2800 engine that gave much better performance at altitude than many of the early jets. This was at a time when they were still figuring out how to operate jets of carriers (Corsair was no picnic but the jets were really bad) and the new Corsairs were also easy to convert to night fighters (they already knew how to mount the radar). As a air frame already in production and a work force in place it was also easy to stick in an old model engine for a ground attack variant and there was also a French order (cheap aircraft?)
Vaught may also have been getting a pity contract or two. Their jets pretty much sucked. Not all due to Vaught, Navy insisted that Vaught use Westinghouse engines. Axial flow was just so much better than centrifugal (sarcasm) in 1944-47.
View attachment 848688
Took about 5 years to get this into service. Navy had to keep Vaught in business building something
The Navy did get a lot more use out of F4U-5 fighters than many of the early jets which were, effectively, little more than trainers for pilots, maintenance men and operations.
Will get a few tomorrow an PM them to you. Right now, the engine is off becasue we are working on a cylinder or two, discovered last Devcember when we went to fly it and didn't like the sound. The repairs are not general Museum knowledge and even if I knew the exact particulars, we aren't supposed to make detailed reports on Museum assets to the public. But, no reason not to get a shot or two.Tiny thread jack, as long as you were here. Do you have any current shots of the "Saipan Zero"?
Why the challenge?Joblin, disagreement without sound reasoning is worthless. Perhaps you should lay out your reasoning ... if you can.
Do forced landings from combat count as operational losses? Are holes in cockpits and hydraulics mere "teething issues"?Early versions of any plane often suffer teething issues that raise non-combat loss rates.
Why the excessively high kill ratios for the Allied aircraft of the PTO, then? From all accounts, they're largely based on claims or victories, "confirmed" or otherwise, without taking into account actual losses reported by the enemy. They would especially be inaccurate for late 1943 and early 1944; Dunn's article on the F6F goes into some detail on how its claims could have been over-inflated almost 5-fold. The Japanese did over-claim by a considerably larger margin, but that's beside the point; the overall picture is a roughly 1:1 ratio for this period, and the same applies to the F4U, maybe the P-47 and P-38 as well. I don't have much data on hand, especially for kill ratios by year as opposed to the entire war, and by theatre. The Pacific Profiles books may provide some information in this regard, but I'm currently unsure. I may have to purchase them myself, seeing as how no one here appears to have even read or touched them. It's also important to note that the higher-ups in the US military were already aware of over-claiming to some non-negligible degree, even making occasional comments on it, though they appeared to have been unaware of its full extent.No one with a lick of common sense takes aerial kill-claims at face value.
Speed alone, be it level, while diving, or in a climb, doesn't appear to have been the overriding factor in WWII-era aerial combat that you think it was, not from what I've read recently. The A6M was also more durable than you likely think, according to remarks from Corsair pilots themselves.You're gonna need a lot of improvements, improvements that will by necessity hamper their performance.
The Ki-43-II, especially against its later, more advanced opponents, was effectively a 1942 aircraft. In that sense, it could even be considered equivalent to the fighter aircraft that were engaged in combat over Britain and the Channel in 1940, two whole years earlier. Despite its disadvantages, it apparently managed to hold its own against supposedly superior aircraft into early 1944, as shown in its engagements with the 400+mph Spitfire VIII.The Japanese on built around 716 of the "1942 model" Ki-43s out of over 5700 versions. While the last Ki-43 I built rolled out of the factory in Feb 1943 they had been building Ki-43 IIs in November so there is some overlap.
I don't care. Either way, "outdated" A6Ms managed to keep up with 'state-of-the-art' enemy fighters into early 1944, both in kills and even in some cases, performance in the field. It matters not whether or not said A6Ms were manufactured in 1942 or in 1943/44.Same pretty much goes for the A6M. While the Navy was a lot quicker to get the two speed supercharger into the A6M the "1942 models" actually cover at least 3 models of A6Ms...what was the "1942 model"?
I suppose that Rabaul had largely lost its relevance as a naval base by 1944, but A6M2/3s still appear to have been operational around that area into February 1944, especially as Rabaul was reinforced by carrier-based A6Ms, many of which were A6M2s.Also note that 1941-42 production of the A6Ms was about 17% of total production so again, numbers of 1942 production fighters in front line squadrons in 1944 would have been very small...rate of attrition on both sides was huge. Many aircraft were written off as soon as they landed due to combat damage, as noted earlier, many were written off due to landing/taxing damage. In the Solomon's and New Guinea both sides lost numbers of planes due to bombing raids (or shell fire). "1942 model" planes, on both sides, were in 2nd line or 3rd line squadrons/areas of operation/duties in 1944.
Well, Claringbould and Dunn are both concerned with losses recorded by both sides, emphasis on both, as opposed to claims or "victories", which have been cited by nearly every historian, 'would-be' or otherwise, in Osprey titles and elsewhere, especially when discussing the WWII PTO.I would also note that many Allied and Axis pilots weren't much better at aircraft identification than they were at accurate score keeping.
Why the challenge?
Do forced landings from combat count as operational losses? Are holes in cockpits and hydraulics mere "teething issues"?
It's clear that most of you haven't read any of Claringbould's works, certainly not Pacific Profiles, never mind Dunn's readily available online articles related to these overrated Allied aircraft, and just how exactly they were overrated, referencing actual Japanese documents, as opposed to some form of statistical manipulation likeGregP seemingly implied in his previous post. You're practically irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
Why the excessively high kill ratios for the Allied aircraft of the PTO, then? From all accounts, they're largely based on claims or victories, "confirmed" or otherwise, without taking into account actual losses reported by the enemy. They would especially be inaccurate for late 1943 and early 1944; Dunn's article on the F6F goes into some detail on how its claims could have been over-inflated almost 5-fold. The Japanese did over-claim by a considerably larger margin, but that's beside the point; the overall picture is a roughly 1:1 ratio for this period, and the same applies to the F4U, maybe the P-47 and P-38 as well. I don't have much data on hand, especially for kill ratios by year as opposed to the entire war, and by theatre. The Pacific Profiles books may provide some information in this regard, but I'm currently unsure. I may have to purchase them myself, seeing as how no one here appears to have even read or touched them. It's also important to note that the higher-ups in the US military were already aware of over-claiming to some non-negligible degree, even making occasional comments on it, though they appeared to have been unaware of its full extent.
Speed alone, be it level, while diving, or in a climb, doesn't appear to have been the overriding factor in WWII-era aerial combat that you think it was, not from what I've read recently. The A6M was also more durable than you likely think, according to remarks from Corsair pilots themselves.
The Ki-43-II, especially against its later, more advanced opponents, was effectively a 1942 aircraft. In that sense, it could even be considered equivalent to the fighter aircraft that were engaged in combat over Britain and the Channel in 1940, two whole years earlier. Despite its disadvantages, it apparently managed to hold its own against supposedly superior aircraft into early 1944, as shown in its engagements with the 400+mph Spitfire VIII.
I don't care. Either way, "outdated" A6Ms managed to keep up with 'state-of-the-art' enemy fighters into early 1944, both in kills and even in some cases, performance in the field. It matters not whether or not said A6Ms were manufactured in 1942 or in 1943/44.
I suppose that Rabaul had largely lost its relevance as a naval base by 1944, but A6M2/3s still appear to have been operational around that area into February 1944, especially as Rabaul was reinforced by carrier-based A6Ms, many of which were A6M2s.
Well, Claringbould and Dunn are both concerned with losses recorded by both sides, emphasis on both, as opposed to claims or "victories", which have been cited by nearly every historian, 'would-be' or otherwise, in Osprey titles and elsewhere, especially when discussing the WWII PTO.
It seems that this discussion has largely run its course in its brief lifetime. We keep circling this drain of kill ratios deflated by operational losses, something that no reputable individual, certainly not Claringbould or Dunn, has set out to do, and you would know this if any of you had actually read any of their works. As it stands, both the A6M and Ki-43 withstood opponents that should have had all the significant advantages, up until attrition had worn them significantly enough that the latter could finally gain a truly decisive advantage over them. With that in mind, I feel like WWII aviation, if not WWII or military aviation as a whole, has largely run its course for me. It has lost much of its lustre. On that note, this forum appears to be less active recently; it's as much in decline as is its subject matter.
Why the challenge?
Do forced landings from combat count as operational losses?
Are holes in cockpits and hydraulics mere "teething issues"?
It's clear that most of you haven't read any of Claringbould's works, certainly not Pacific Profiles, never mind Dunn's readily available online articles related to these overrated Allied aircraft, and just how exactly they were overrated, referencing actual Japanese documents, as opposed to some form of statistical manipulation likeGregP seemingly implied in his previous post. You're practically irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
Why the excessively high kill ratios for the Allied aircraft of the PTO, then? From all accounts, they're largely based on claims or victories, "confirmed" or otherwise, without taking into account actual losses reported by the enemy.
They would especially be inaccurate for late 1943 and early 1944; Dunn's article on the F6F goes into some detail on how its claims could have been over-inflated almost 5-fold. The Japanese did over-claim by a considerably larger margin, but that's beside the point; the overall picture is a roughly 1:1 ratio for this period, and the same applies to the F4U, maybe the P-47 and P-38 as well. I don't have much data on hand, especially for kill ratios by year as opposed to the entire war, and by theatre.
The Pacific Profiles books may provide some information in this regard, but I'm currently unsure. I may have to purchase them myself, seeing as how no one here appears to have even read or touched them. It's also important to note that the higher-ups in the US military were already aware of over-claiming to some non-negligible degree, even making occasional comments on it, though they appeared to have been unaware of its full extent.
Speed alone, be it level, while diving, or in a climb, doesn't appear to have been the overriding factor in WWII-era aerial combat that you think it was, not from what I've read recently. The A6M was also more durable than you likely think, according to remarks from Corsair pilots themselves.
'' ...Volume 6 also shows a lot of action for the P-38s, which did seem to do a bit better than the Japanese fighters, but they had some limitations. They were picking off Japanese fighters from altitude, often not lingering long to defend the bombers, (for very good reasons as these were the early P-38s, as Shortround6 noted.) But it does look like Bong already figured out how to make them work. ...""
Or rather Lindbergh...
You and others may very well be correct. Most books (old ones) are rather confusing about the Ki-43 III with no firm numbers except the 10 (or 12) and those are often listed as prototypes, with no number given for production machines. We also have the confusion as to what is a Ki-43 III as there seems to have been the Ki-43 III-Ko and the Ki-43 III Otsu. Most old sources say only the Ki-43 III Otsu had the two 20mm guns and the Mitsubishi Ha-112 engine instead of the Nakajima Ha-115 engine.By this point these were Ki-43-II and also some III (I don't know the exact number of these flying but I think Shortround6 is wrong about the numbers, there were definitely more than ten because there were whole units flying them).
The question is when????Or rather Lindbergh...
You and others may very well be correct. Most books (old ones) are rather confusing about the Ki-43 III with no firm numbers except the 10 (or 12) and those are often listed as prototypes, with no number given for production machines. We also have the confusion as to what is a Ki-43 III as there seems to have been the Ki-43 III-Ko and the Ki-43 III Otsu. Most old sources say only the Ki-43 III Otsu had the two 20mm guns and the Mitsubishi Ha-112 engine instead of the Nakajima Ha-115 engine.
Is the Ki-43 III-Ko basically a Ki-43 II Kia with slightly more power and/or water injection?
There is an over looked aspect of Allied pilot quality. For the US the Navy entered the war with some vey experienced pilots, not in combat but overall they had some high time pilots. Thach for instance became an aviator in 1930. O'Hare finished his aviator training on May 2nd 1940. He had been flying for just about 22 months when he made his famous intercept on the Japanese bombers. We can argue about the exact score but the point is that Thach was pulled from combat after Midway and O'Hare was pulled from combat after that one fight and did not return to combat until 1943.
Much of the combat the US engaged in the 2nd part of 1942 and a lot of 1943 was with lower time pilots than they had in first part of 1942. This is on average. It took a while to get the average experience back up and while the US pilots got a more than average number of flight hours it still was not enough for combat. US did lengthen the training as the war went on and using a number of combat veterans helped increase the quality of training.
Japanese had the problems of using fewer flight hours in training as the war went on and they didn't rotate their pilots back to the training schools as often so the new pilot quality really took a hit. Where they crossed over is certainly subject to question.
The American aircraft helped more of their pilots survive and return to action. which certainly helped in the long run. The US effort put into aircrew rescue is often overlooked.
But that starts at the beginning. Using the parachute, having a decent radio to make a mayday call (or mayday call by wingman). Having armor/BP glass, decent protection on fuel tanks. Having the crashboats/PT boats/ Submarines that can be assigned to the right areas.
Like many types of warfare, it often came down to percentages. Not outright wins/losses. Like American major league baseball. Out of 162 games, all (almost) teams are going to win 60 games per season, all (almost) teams are going to loose 60 games per season. The difference between 1st place and last place is often the 42 games in middle.
Or rather Lindbergh...
You and others may very well be correct. Most books (old ones) are rather confusing about the Ki-43 III with no firm numbers except the 10 (or 12) and those are often listed as prototypes, with no number given for production machines. We also have the confusion as to what is a Ki-43 III as there seems to have been the Ki-43 III-Ko and the Ki-43 III Otsu. Most old sources say only the Ki-43 III Otsu had the two 20mm guns and the Mitsubishi Ha-112 engine instead of the Nakajima Ha-115 engine.
Is the Ki-43 III-Ko basically a Ki-43 II Kia with slightly more power and/or water injection?
There is an over looked aspect of Allied pilot quality. For the US the Navy entered the war with some vey experienced pilots, not in combat but overall they had some high time pilots. Thach for instance became an aviator in 1930. O'Hare finished his aviator training on May 2nd 1940. He had been flying for just about 22 months when he made his famous intercept on the Japanese bombers. We can argue about the exact score but the point is that Thach was pulled from combat after Midway and O'Hare was pulled from combat after that one fight and did not return to combat until 1943.
Much of the combat the US engaged in the 2nd part of 1942 and a lot of 1943 was with lower time pilots than they had in first part of 1942. This is on average. It took a while to get the average experience back up and while the US pilots got a more than average number of flight hours it still was not enough for combat. US did lengthen the training as the war went on and using a number of combat veterans helped increase the quality of training.
Japanese had the problems of using fewer flight hours in training as the war went on and they didn't rotate their pilots back to the training schools as often so the new pilot quality really took a hit. Where they crossed over is certainly subject to question.
The American aircraft helped more of their pilots survive and return to action. which certainly helped in the long run. The US effort put into aircrew rescue is often overlooked.
But that starts at the beginning. Using the parachute, having a decent radio to make a mayday call (or mayday call by wingman). Having armor/BP glass, decent protection on fuel tanks. Having the crashboats/PT boats/ Submarines that can be assigned to the right areas.
Like many types of warfare, it often came down to percentages. Not outright wins/losses. Like American major league baseball. Out of 162 games, all (almost) teams are going to win 60 games per season, all (almost) teams are going to loose 60 games per season. The difference between 1st place and last place is often the 42 games in middle.
| Sorties/Bombs | Grand | Totals | Heavy | Bomber | Medium/Light | Bomber | Fighter | Fighter | Bombs | Bombs | Bombs | Bombs | Strength | Strength | Strength | Strength |
| Month | Airborne | Effective | Airborne | Effective | Airborne | Effective | Airborne | Effective | Total | HB | M/LB | Fighter | P-38 | P-39 | P-40 | P-47 |
Dec-41 | 212 | n/a | 49 | n/a | 0 | 0 | 163 | n/a | 36 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | ||
Jan-42 | 341 | n/a | 39 | n/a | 10 | n/a | 292 | n/a | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 139 | ||
Feb-42 | 742 | n/a | 64 | n/a | 7 | n/a | 671 | n/a | 37 | 33 | 0 | 4 | 150 | 273 | ||
Mar-42 | 979 | n/a | 59 | n/a | 37 | n/a | 883 | n/a | 46 | 33 | 9 | 4 | 271 | 108 | ||
Apr-42 | 1,181 | n/a | 74 | n/a | 158 | n/a | 949 | n/a | 95 | 39 | 53 | 3 | 369 | 90 | ||
May-42 | 1,223 | n/a | 91 | n/a | 262 | n/a | 870 | n/a | 122 | 46 | 73 | 3 | 267 | 129 | ||
Jun-42 | 1,180 | n/a | 103 | n/a | 293 | n/a | 784 | n/a | 139 | 53 | 82 | 4 | 238 | 131 | ||
Jul-42 | 1,172 | n/a | 136 | n/a | 313 | n/a | 723 | n/a | 155 | 63 | 89 | 3 | 188 | 137 | ||
Aug-42 | 1,197 | n/a | 195 | n/a | 325 | n/a | 677 | n/a | 250 | 152 | 95 | 3 | 30 | 233 | 118 | |
Sep-42 | 1,352 | n/a | 201 | n/a | 372 | n/a | 779 | n/a | 279 | 153 | 121 | 5 | 65 | 250 | 117 | |
Oct-42 | 1,604 | n/a | 232 | n/a | 412 | n/a | 960 | n/a | 386 | 249 | 131 | 6 | 72 | 314 | 155 | |
Nov-42 | 1,663 | n/a | 289 | n/a | 404 | n/a | 970 | n/a | 547 | 438 | 102 | 7 | 68 | 299 | 142 | |
Dec-42 | 1,677 | n/a | 314 | n/a | 376 | n/a | 987 | n/a | 557 | 470 | 79 | 8 | 94 | 291 | 131 | |
Jan-43 | 4,315 | 3,842 | 494 | 435 | 498 | 416 | 3,323 | 2,991 | 755 | 488 | 254 | 13 | 135 | 255 | 150 | |
Feb-43 | 2,816 | 2,465 | 415 | 382 | 302 | 257 | 2,099 | 1,826 | 591 | 494 | 96 | 1 | 134 | 262 | 156 | |
Mar-43 | 4,257 | 3,963 | 506 | 460 | 308 | 276 | 3,443 | 3,227 | 647 | 558 | 86 | 3 | 132 | 251 | 145 | |
Apr-43 | 5,023 | 4,652 | 431 | 366 | 239 | 229 | 4,353 | 4,057 | 540 | 477 | 63 | 0 | 117 | 223 | 139 | |
May-43 | 5,517 | 4,968 | 611 | 511 | 416 | 347 | 4,490 | 4,110 | 710 | 596 | 114 | 0 | 115 | 253 | 135 | |
Jun-43 | 5,874 | 5,236 | 715 | 594 | 619 | 532 | 4,540 | 4,110 | 1,015 | 857 | 158 | 0 | 144 | 314 | 124 | 59 |
Jul-43 | 8,826 | 7,755 | 1,148 | 945 | 1,474 | 1,297 | 6,204 | 5,513 | 2,708 | 1,762 | 946 | 0 | 211 | 323 | 148 | 114 |
Aug-43 | 11,472 | 9,905 | 1,355 | 1,158 | 1,184 | 974 | 8,933 | 7,773 | 2,910 | 2,300 | 609 | 1 | 291 | 309 | 186 | 107 |
Sep-43 | 12,777 | 11,437 | 1,302 | 1,157 | 1,198 | 1,080 | 10,277 | 9,200 | 3,025 | 2,267 | 749 | 9 | 279 | 287 | 213 | 149 |
Oct-43 | 12,149 | 10,595 | 1,381 | 1,117 | 1,334 | 991 | 9,434 | 8,487 | 3,269 | 2,578 | 685 | 6 | 263 | 250 | 160 | 175 |
Nov-43 | 13,073 | 11,627 | 1,669 | 1,390 | 2,051 | 1,620 | 9,353 | 8,617 | 4,354 | 3,063 | 1,280 | 11 | 269 | 210 | 147 | 293 |
Dec-43 | 17,048 | 15,670 | 2,583 | 2,306 | 3,605 | 3,148 | 10,860 | 10,216 | 9,181 | 6,140 | 2,994 | 47 | 279 | 126 | 131 | 308 |
| 1941/42 | 14,523 | 0 | 1,846 | 0 | 2,969 | 0 | 9,708 | 0 | 2,669 | 1,785 | 834 | 50 | ||||
1943 | 103,147 | 92,115 | 12,610 | 10,821 | 13,228 | 11,167 | 77,309 | 70,127 | 29,705 | 21,580 | 8,034 | 91 | ||||
| Total | 117,670 | 92,115 | 14,456 | 10,821 | 16,197 | 11,167 | 87,017 | 70,127 | 32,374 | 23,365 | 8,868 | 141 |
| Loss/claim | All Types | Losses | Heavy | Bomber | Medium/Light | Bomber | Fighter | Fighter | All Types | claims | Heavy | Bomber | Medium/Light | Bomber | Fighter | Fighter | Fighter |
| month | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | Enemy A/C | Total | In the air | Total | In the air | Total | In the air | Total | In the air | claim/loss |
Dec-41 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||||||
Jan-42 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||
Feb-42 | 46 | 45 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 44 | 44 | 27 | 27 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 20 | 20 | 0.45 | ||
Mar-42 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 25 | 19 | 11 | 7 | 0 | 14 | 12 | 1.00 | |||
Apr-42 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 18 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 9 | |||||
May-42 | 49 | 48 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 14 | 33 | 32 | 36 | 29 | 0 | 22 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 0.44 | |
Jun-42 | 32 | 32 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 28 | 28 | 33 | 30 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 20 | 20 | 0.71 |
Jul-42 | 16 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0.36 |
Aug-42 | 24 | 23 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 11 | 11 | 75 | 58 | 31 | 29 | 3 | 3 | 41 | 26 | 2.36 |
Sep-42 | 25 | 23 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 10 | 48 | 29 | 31 | 29 | 17 | 0 | 0.00 | ||
Oct-42 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 46 | 34 | 36 | 26 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 6 | ||
Nov-42 | 44 | 43 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 32 | 32 | 76 | 76 | 38 | 38 | 13 | 13 | 25 | 25 | 0.78 |
Dec-42 | 17 | 14 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 116 | 110 | 60 | 55 | 2 | 1 | 54 | 54 | 6.75 |
Jan-43 | 23 | 14 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 101 | 96 | 57 | 55 | 3 | 41 | 41 | 6.83 | |
Feb-43 | 22 | 19 | 10 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 9 | 72 | 67 | 26 | 23 | 2 | 44 | 44 | 4.89 | |
Mar-43 | 15 | 13 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 86 | 86 | 48 | 48 | 0 | 38 | 38 | 6.33 | |
Apr-43 | 28 | 27 | 11 | 11 | 1 | 16 | 16 | 50 | 44 | 23 | 23 | 7 | 1 | 20 | 20 | 1.25 | |
May-43 | 18 | 16 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 35 | 31 | 22 | 20 | 2 | 11 | 11 | 1.83 | |
Jun-43 | 36 | 23 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 16 | 12 | 108 | 106 | 21 | 21 | 1 | 86 | 85 | 7.08 | |
Jul-43 | 84 | 65 | 25 | 23 | 15 | 4 | 44 | 38 | 120 | 118 | 13 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 104 | 104 | 2.74 |
Aug-43 | 58 | 31 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 37 | 19 | 416 | 241 | 117 | 95 | 169 | 16 | 130 | 130 | 6.84 |
Sep-43 | 50 | 36 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 31 | 25 | 247 | 247 | 79 | 79 | 14 | 14 | 154 | 154 | 6.16 |
Oct-43 | 66 | 48 | 13 | 10 | 16 | 8 | 37 | 30 | 676 | 414 | 146 | 105 | 284 | 75 | 246 | 234 | 7.80 |
Nov-43 | 84 | 68 | 14 | 12 | 24 | 17 | 46 | 39 | 291 | 217 | 47 | 30 | 78 | 30 | 166 | 157 | 4.03 |
Dec-43 | 55 | 35 | 10 | 5 | 12 | 3 | 33 | 27 | 264 | 260 | 37 | 36 | 12 | 9 | 215 | 215 | 7.96 |
| 1941/42 | 276 | 264 | 45 | 37 | 41 | 39 | 190 | 188 | 518 | 439 | 231 | 205 | 75 | 44 | 212 | 190 | 1.01 |
1943 | 539 | 395 | 129 | 104 | 117 | 58 | 293 | 233 | 2,466 | 1,927 | 636 | 547 | 575 | 147 | 1,255 | 1,233 | 5.29 |
| Total | 815 | 659 | 174 | 141 | 158 | 97 | 483 | 421 | 2,984 | 2,366 | 867 | 752 | 650 | 191 | 1,467 | 1,423 | 3.38 |
| Type | Category | Accident | Air Combat | Anti Aircraft | Missing | Strafed | Bombed | Total Enemy Action | Total Loss |
| Airacobra | Fighter | 6 | 6 | ||||||
| Beaufighter | Fighter | 37 | 5 | 13 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 29 | 66 |
| Spitfire | Fighter | 35 | 23 | 16 | 39 | 74 | |||
| Boomerang | Fighter | 13 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 15 | |||
| Kittyhawk | Fighter | 70 | 15 | 20 | 3 | 38 | 108 | ||
| Buffalo | General Purpose | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | ||||
| Lancer | General Purpose | 2 | 2 | ||||||
| Wirraway | General Purpose | 68 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 18 | 2 | 31 | 99 |
| Vengeance | Dive Bomber | 13 | 13 | ||||||
| B-25 | Medium Bomber | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 10 | ||
| Beaufort | Medium Bomber | 77 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 19 | 96 | ||
| Boston | Medium Bomber | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 15 | |
| Hudson | Medium Bomber | 53 | 18 | 8 | 44 | 34 | 4 | 108 | 161 |
| CA-11 | Medium Bomber | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Anson | Reconnaissance | 9 | 1 | 1 | 10 | ||||
| Catalina | Reconnaissance | 11 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 14 | 25 | ||
| Lightning | Reconnaissance | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Seagull/Walrus | Reconnaissance | 6 | 4 | 4 | 10 | ||||
| Kingfisher | Reconnaissance | 2 | 2 | ||||||
| DC-2 | Transport | 4 | 1 | 1 | 5 | ||||
| DH84 | Transport | 16 | 1 | 1 | 17 | ||||
| Douglas Dolphin | Transport | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| C-47 | Transport | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Ford | Transport | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||||
| Empire Flying Boat | Transport | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ||||
| Anson | Trainer | 67 | 67 | ||||||
| Avro Trainer | Trainer | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Battle | Trainer | 42 | 42 | ||||||
| Demon | Trainer | 16 | 16 | ||||||
| Oxford | Trainer | 46 | 46 | ||||||
| Wackett | Trainer | 17 | 17 | ||||||
| Wirraway | Trainer | 66 | 66 | ||||||
| Tiger Moth | Trainer | 94 | 94 | ||||||
| Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | 18 | 18 | ||||||
| Total | Total | 811 | 74 | 32 | 122 | 64 | 11 | 303 | 1114 |
| Combat Total | Combat Total | 419 | 73 | 32 | 122 | 61 | 11 | 299 | 718 |
| Maker | Navy Dep | Mitsubishi | Nakajima | Nakajima | Mitsubishi | Nakajima | Mitsubishi | Navy Dep | Mitsubishi | Navy Dep | Kawanishi | Kawanishi | Kawanishi | Nakajima | Army Dep | Nakajima | Tachikawa | Nakajima | Kawasaki | Kawasaki | Kawasaki | Nakajima | Kawasaki | Kawasaki |
| Type | A5M4-k | A6M | A6M | A6M2N | A7M | J1N1-B | J2M | J2M | N1K | N1K | N1K1 | N1K1-J | N1K2-J | Ki-27 | Ki-43 | Ki-43 | Ki-43 | Ki-44 | Ki-45 (+N) | Ki-61-I | Ki-61-II | Ki-84 | Ki-100 | Ki-102 |
| Code | Claude | Zeke | Zeke | Rufe | Sam | Irving | Jack | Jack | George | George | Rex | George | George | Nate | Oscar | Oscar | Oscar | Tojo | Nick | Tony | Tony | Frank | Randy | |
1941 | 0 | 402 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 433 | 0 | 157 | 0 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1942 | 10 | 692 | 558 | 116 | 0 | 26 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 289 | 7 | 616 | 0 | 131 | 150 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1943 | 62 | 1029 | 1760 | 207 | 0 | 150 | 90 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 | 71 | 1 | 0 | 42 | 1347 | 199 | 519 | 563 | 710 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
1944 | 31 | 1356 | 2474 | 0 | 8 | 301 | 274 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 824 | 67 | 0 | 0 | 1070 | 1682 | 565 | 938 | 1891 | 239 | 1904 | 0 | 59 |
1945 | 0 | 299 | 1416 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 116 | 111 | 9 | 11 | 0 | 112 | 338 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 748 | 2 | 21 | 19 | 165 | 1485 | 378 | 169 |
I don't know about all that. From what I've read, it was mainly numbers and the wearing down of experienced Japanese pilots that were the key factors, not any particular advantage in performance. The Japanese had their ways of bringing those shiny, high-flying birds down to earth, or in this case, open waters. Against raids aimed at and near Bougainville in February of 1943, A6Ms savaged escort and bomber alike without loss, a defeat significant enough to have resulted in a hiatus in bombing raids lasting almost half a year. In the case of the F4U, it didn't appear to get off to a great start trying to shoot down Japanese dive-bombers. It just doesn't seem like newer US fighters of the PTO performed well enough against capable A6M pilots to justify themselves, given how expensive and complex they must have been. It was only due to the golden parachute in the form of the overwhelming US industrial-military complex and greater manpower that they managed to eventually gain any semblance of a true advantage over their IJNAF opponents.
At the very least, they may have performed somewhat better against IJAAF fighters, though from what I've heard, Army pilot quality may have lagged behind their counterparts in the Navy to some degree, not to mention that some older, slower Ki-43-Is were still in their ranks around that time.
Hey JoblinTheGoblin,
I think you may have overlooked the problem involved in situational awareness, which may be a(the?) majority factor in the apparent disconnect between the number of losses relative to the quality of aircraft discussion you have initiated. I may have missed it, but I do not remember it being mentioned upthread.
The basic fact is that somewhere between 70% and 90% of aircraft shot down from WWI through Korea happened without the victim being aware that the enemy aircraft was about to shoot him down. In at least a small majority of these cases this happened without the victim being aware that the enemy aircraft were in close proximity at all (ie he was caught totally by surprise), and in the rest it was a case of the victim knowing that he was in a combat but had never been aware of, or lost awareness of, 1 or more enemy aircraft involved in the engagement. In both situations the first warning of their impending doom tended to be seeing the tracers passing by and/or receiving hits on their aircraft.
It should be mentioned at this point that the above information is agreed upon in general by all belligerents - including the pilots involved and their country's operational research studies.
An example of what I am talking about can be realized from a simple though exercise.
If we assume 80% of aircraft are shot down without the pilot realizing he is about to get shot down, then only 20 our of 100 losses will have the opportunity to be caused by the superiority of one aircraft over another.
This is an obvious oversimplification of the problem, which involves:
1. Training (eg are the pilots flying with their "heads out of the cockpit" and "on a swivel"?, effective communication, tactics, etc)
2. Visibility from the cockpit (eg bubble canopy? armour plate in the way? cramped cockpit so not amenable to looking over one's shoulder easily?, etc)
3. Combat cruise speed (an aircraft cruising at 300 mph (eg P-51B-D) is less likely to be "jumped" by an enemy aircraft with a top speed of 331 mph (eg A6M2, Ki-43-I/II) than by an aircraft with a top speed of 370-400 mph (eg Ki-61, Ki-44, Ki-84)
4. Starting with a positional advantage (eg attacking from below and behind, or with an altitude advantage that can be traded for overtake speed, etc)
5. Numerical disparity (which self explanatory to a large degree where large disparity in numbers is the case, but can have significant impact even in relatively small differences depending on the situation.)
6. Mission type, eg Escort (where you are not allowed to just make one pass and go home), Strike (with fighter-bombers attacking enemy bases where you have a bombing mission to accomplish as well as surviving/shooting down enemy aircraft), CAP, Intruder, etc, or are you defending the target (with running away not being an option)?
Just to name a few factors, not necessarily in order of importance or numerical ocurrence.
In effect, I believe the current discussion relative to superior quality of aircraft revolves around at most a moderate minority of the kills.
If we assume only 20% of kills involve combat where the technically superiority of any particular aircraft may come into play, how does that affect your premise?
Another factor that may be slanting the appearance of aircraft superiority (or lack thereof) is that for the vast majority of missions where a kill was recorded the story is usually told from the view of the winner - in effect causing a form of survivor bias to creep into the equation.
Yes? No?
The above does not, of course, address the problem of inflated/exaggerated/falsified claims and/or lack of accurate post-war research by the various nation's agencies.