Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44 (2 Viewers)

[Steamed_Banana]

Just to give you an idea of the overclaiming, in Claringbould's accounts in New Guinea and the Solomons, it was not unusual for there to be air battles with half a dozen or more claims by both sides, in which neither side actually lost any aircraft. Then there were also some cases were one or both sides lost a lot. Sometimes this seems to be due to weather, or the size of the battles, the duration and number of different units etc.

Bomber crews seemed to overclaim at a much higher rate, but in some engagements the bombers did shoot down a few Japanese fighters.

There were also clearly one-sided battles on both sides here and there. Through 1942 it was the Japanese coming out on top a lot of the time, except in the Guadalcanal campaign. By 1943 it seems to be shifting toward the Allies favor.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I'd also point out, in Bloody Shambles Vol III, there are very few cases where Hurricane pilots shot down more Ki-43s than they lost. There were one or two, but compared to maybe 10 or 15 that went the other way. If surprise was the main factor, I guess they were constantly getting surprised.

Pretty similar, if not quite as drastic, for P-39 units in the Solomons and New Guinea. Which does seem to indicate that aircraft types matter.

 

[Shortround6]

1) Pilots, especially on the Allied side, were often inexperienced and untrained

Sometimes they trained but not experienced. I don't know what the USAAC did but for the British in 1930s they often only fired their guns on special week long training camps. Squadrons would leave their regular bases and fly to airfields at/near the area/s they could live fire at. This in some years was twice a year. This sounds bad enough but it was actually worse. The target tug would tow the sleeve target and a number of pilots would make attack runs (usually only 1/2) using bullets with paint or coloring. Squadron may have been split into groups(?). At any rate the target tug would land and the target would be examined by counting the number of holes with the appropriate color scores would be determined and perhaps instruction would be given by instructors based on observation (and/or tracers?).
However in the BoB some accounts claim that new pilots were showing up in Squadrons with 200 hours or more (?) of flight time but NO air to air gunnery training/firing.
Some German accounts say the same thing.
Combat training was did not always line up with hours flown.

2) Allied pilots in many Theaters were not flying with Wingmen and / or in Finger-Four formations.

This is very important. Many air forces did not use wingmen. They used a 3 plane Vic formation (looked pretty in air shows) and two 3 plane formations were often a 'flight' and two flights were a squadron. Problem here was that the leader did most of looking out. The No 2 & 3 were trying to fly tight formation on the leader and not crash into him or each other. Time available to scan the sky for threats was not great. If the squadron leader (or air force) thought that flying a bit looser formation was OK, this helped. Looked a little sloppier but gave the No 2 & 3 more time to look around. As noted by Steamed_Banana it took around 2 years for the British and Americans to catch on to the Finger-Four formation in most cases.
USN Thach was not using the 3 plane formation in 1941. He had come up with his "weave" so that wingmen could cover each other and trying to use 3 planes was very cumbersome.
You could also use two pairs of planes in the weave.

I think that 70%-90% ratio is overstated, (I think it comes from a statement by Erik Hartmann?) and is more applicable in the early war when:

Again, thinking that 70%-90% were tootling along fat, dumb and happy in straight lines may well be overestimating.
In the early part of the war many of the 3 plane Vic formations broke up early in the combats/fights and with dozen or more planes on each side spreading out over wider and wider areas (see accounts of pilots making a firing pass and then trying to avoid something (diving away) then looking around not seeing any other planes, from either side.
Many pilots/planes were shot down by planes they didn't see. Doesn't always mean they weren't in a fight and didn't see other enemy planes.
A number of pilots got fixed (tunnel vision) on pursuing an enemy or two and didn't see No 3 or even No 7&8 of the enemy formation coming in from behind until they had bullets hitting the rear armor plate or going through the wings.
That was supposed to be the wingman's job. No 1 takes the shot/s in the attack while No2 tries to stay close and looks around to see is getting behind them.
Things could vary. When attacking bombers and with few/no enemy fighters around No2 could add his firepower to the attack.

Japanese stayed with the 3 plane formation for quite awhile. In some cases the leader would pick a target and attack and No 2 & 3 would follow and attack the same plane until they saw results. Ki-43s did shoot down B-24s, but often they not only did a plane pass, they circled around for 2nd or even 3rd firing pass at the same target aircraft. Some they got on the first pass. One wonders if a plane with twice the firepower would have shot down more American planes if given the same firing opportunities.

 

[GregP]

Not too sure overclaiming was nearly as rampant as everyone who supports that notion in here believes.

It is only true if you are a believer that a victory can only be awarded if the aricraft is totally destroyed and if the other side admits the loss. I do NOT subscribe to that notion at all, and never will.

There are numerous ways a plane can be shot down out of a fight (the basic definition of an aerial victory ... at least to me) and come back to fight another day, even in the form of undamaged parts like wings and tailplanes. My definition is that when a plane gets shot out of a fight and blows up, goes down and crashes, or is last seen on fire while going down not to return to the fray, then the pilot who accomplished this feat gets a victory.

I do not care even a small bit if the enemy admits the loss or if the enemy finds the downed plane, repairs it, and flies it again. The fact remains it was shot out of a fight not to return in that fight. That does NOT include pilots who turned and ran from a fight. It includes aircraft that were involved in the combat and sustained enough combat damage to go down and crash or force-land, either from engine destruction or from a wounded pilot, etc. Combat reasons, not for reaswon of running away.

The loss report for a nation may be accurate for total losses, but MANY times a plane was lost on the way home AFTER a fight, and the loss was set down as an operational loss when the real reason was damage from combat. That is simple misrepresentation in politically-correct speech, otherwise kinown as a lie. Also, many damaged aircraft were returned to fight again, but were shot down out of a fight. Sorry, they were someone's victories when tghey were shot down, whether they were resurrected or not.

Of course, this argument has been hit back and forth ever since airplanes went to war and has never been put to bed for good yet, so I don't expect it will be now.

Illegitimi non carborundum!

Cheers!

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Not too sure overclaiming was nearly as rampant as everyone who supports that notion in here believes.

It is only true if you are a believer that a victory can only be awarded if the aricraft is totally destroyed and if the other side admits the loss. I do NOT subscribe to that notion at all, and never will.

There are numerous ways a plane can be shot down out of a fight (the basic definition of an aerial victory ... at least to me) and come back to fight another day, even in the form of undamaged parts like wings and tailplanes. My definition is that when a plane gets shot out of a fight and blows up, goes down and crashes, or is last seen on fire while going down not to return to the fray, then the pilot who accomplished this feat gets a victory.

I do not care even a small bit if the enemy admits the loss or if the enemy finds the downed plane, repairs it, and flies it again. The fact remains it was shot out of a fight not to return in that fight. That does NOT include pilots who turned and ran from a fight. It includes aircraft that were involved in the combat and sustained enough combat damage to go down and crash or force-land, either from engine destruction or from a wounded pilot, etc. Combat reasons, not for reaswon of running away.

Yeah Ok, but I really don't think that is what people are really talking about here for the most part. Yes there is an issue with counting forced landings or planes that crashed between the battle area and home base, but in most cases those are actually listed, it's just a matter of how they are tallied to totals. You can include these in your own count, in other words.

But it's also routinely the case that for example, Side A claims 7 'confirmed' victories, later confirmed by their chain of command. Size B in the same engagement claims 6 'confirmed' victories. Turns out Side A had one aircraft damaged, but it made it back to base and landed. There was no other actual damage on either side.

There were a lot of cases like this. I can cite let's say, six specific examples within one month period, in fact I'll transcribe some later when I have time.

As someone interested in WW2 aviation and air combat, wouldn't you want to know that?

The loss report for a nation may be accurate for total losses, but MANY times a plane was lost on the way home AFTER a fight, and the loss was set down as an operational loss when the real reaosn was damage from combat. That is simple misrepresentation in politically-correct speech, otherwise kinown as a lie. Also. many damaghed aircraft were returned to fight again, but were shot down out of a fight. Sorry, they were someone's victories when tghey were shot down, whether they were resurrected or not.

If the aircraft made it back to base and landed at it's own or some other friendly base, it can be counted as 'damaged', but it was not shot down.

Of course, this argument has been hit back and forth ever since airplanes went to war and has never been put to bed for good yet, so I don't expect it will be now.

Illegitimi non carborundum!

Cheers!

I think you are talking about something that isn't the case. You should read one of these books, IMO, it might change your perspective.

 

[GregP]

Yeah Ok, but I really don't think that is what people are really talking about here for the most part. Yes there is an issue with counting forced landings or planes that crashed between the battle area and home base, but in most cases those are actually listed, it's just a matter of how they are tallied to totals. You can include these in your own count, in other words.

But it's also routinely the case that for example, Side A claims 7 'confirmed' victories, later confirmed by their chain of command. Size B in the same engagement claims 6 'confirmed' victories. Turns out Side A had one aircraft damaged, but it made it back to base and landed. There was no other actual damage on either side.

There were a lot of cases like this. I can cite let's say, six specific examples within one month period, in fact I'll transcribe some later when I have time.

As someone interested in WW2 aviation and air combat, wouldn't you want to know that?



If the aircraft made it back to base and landed at it's own or some other friendly base, it can be counted as 'damaged', but it was not shot down.



I think you are talking about something that isn't the case. You should read one of these books, IMO, it might change your perspective.

I've pretty much read all of them. That's why I HAVE my own opinions.

 

[Juha3]

The fact is that at least many air forces had set rigorous guidelines on what was an aerial victory and these were based on the destruction of the enemy aircraft and so there was certain conditions to be met for an acceptable air victory. At least the LW, the Finnish AF and IIRC the RAF and the Commonwealth AFs have those. Soviet AFs too. Higher HQs were interesting in the real losses. That was important for future planning. That was the situation during the WWII. During the WWI British also had a category "out of control" but that was dropped out after that war.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The fact is that at least many air forces had set rigorous guidelines on what was an aerial victory and these were based on the destruction of the enemy aircraft and so there was certain conditions to be met for an acceptable air victory. At least the LW, the Finnish AF and IIRC the RAF and the Commonwealth AFs have those. Soviet AFs too. Higher HQs were interesting in the real losses. That was important for future planning. That was the situation during the WWII. During the WWI British also had a category "out of control" but that was dropped out after that war.

And the undeniable fact is that in spite of these theoretically high standards for proof of a victory, all of those air forces overclaimed by wide margins, just like the Americans and Japanese did.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I've pretty much read all of them. That's why I HAVE my own opinions.

That's... really an incredible statement to me. Taking you at face value, I don't know how you get from the data in those books to the statements you made. I'll transcribe some passages later and post them so we can discuss those if you care to do so.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Sometimes they trained but not experienced. I don't know what the USAAC did but for the British in 1930s they often only fired their guns on special week long training camps. Squadrons would leave their regular bases and fly to airfields at/near the area/s they could live fire at. This in some years was twice a year. This sounds bad enough but it was actually worse. The target tug would tow the sleeve target and a number of pilots would make attack runs (usually only 1/2) using bullets with paint or coloring. Squadron may have been split into groups(?). At any rate the target tug would land and the target would be examined by counting the number of holes with the appropriate color scores would be determined and perhaps instruction would be given by instructors based on observation (and/or tracers?).
However in the BoB some accounts claim that new pilots were showing up in Squadrons with 200 hours or more (?) of flight time but NO air to air gunnery training/firing.
Some German accounts say the same thing.
Combat training was did not always line up with hours flown.

One of the things that happened in North Africa was a pilot, the Australian ace Clive Caldwell, devised a system of shooting at shadows, since they didn't have target tugs, and eventually this was widely adopted. One pilot would fly along and another would fire shots at their shadow on the desert floor. I guess it helped.

This is very important. Many air forces did not use wingmen. They used a 3 plane Vic formation (looked pretty in air shows) and two 3 plane formations were often a 'flight' and two flights were a squadron. Problem here was that the leader did most of looking out. The No 2 & 3 were trying to fly tight formation on the leader and not crash into him or each other. Time available to scan the sky for threats was not great. If the squadron leader (or air force) thought that flying a bit looser formation was OK, this helped. Looked a little sloppier but gave the No 2 & 3 more time to look around. As noted by Steamed_Banana it took around 2 years for the British and Americans to catch on to the Finger-Four formation in most cases.
USN Thach was not using the 3 plane formation in 1941. He had come up with his "weave" so that wingmen could cover each other and trying to use 3 planes was very cumbersome.
You could also use two pairs of planes in the weave.

All the US fighter pilots that showed up in North Africa starting in mid-1942 were flying in finger fours with wingmen, the British, who had already adopted this in the Battle of Britain, had not exported the doctrine to the Mediterranean Theater for some reason until around around the same time (July of 1942 IIRC). Given the German strategy (more on that in a second) the change made an immediate difference in outcomes, which is apparent in the loss data in Shores Mediterranean Air War.

In detailed accounts of the 49th FG's first engagement over Darwin in 1942, they were also flying in finger-four formations and this actually became a major part of their strategy to defeat high-flying Japanese bomb raids, which they did.

Again, thinking that 70%-90% were tootling along fat, dumb and happy in straight lines may well be overestimating.
In the early part of the war many of the 3 plane Vic formations broke up early in the combats/fights and with dozen or more planes on each side spreading out over wider and wider areas (see accounts of pilots making a firing pass and then trying to avoid something (diving away) then looking around not seeing any other planes, from either side.
Many pilots/planes were shot down by planes they didn't see. Doesn't always mean they weren't in a fight and didn't see other enemy planes.
A number of pilots got fixed (tunnel vision) on pursuing an enemy or two and didn't see No 3 or even No 7&8 of the enemy formation coming in from behind until they had bullets hitting the rear armor plate or going through the wings.
That was supposed to be the wingman's job. No 1 takes the shot/s in the attack while No2 tries to stay close and looks around to see is getting behind them.
Things could vary. When attacking bombers and with few/no enemy fighters around No2 could add his firepower to the attack.

This is true, I agree, but I think it was also a lot more prevalent in the early years. Standard German tactics in WW2 was for one pair in a finger four to do a climbing turn to the left, another to the right as they encountered enemy aircraft. Enemy pilots would often chase one of the pairs and ignore the other... which then circled around to come right up on their tail(s). All of which dovetailed with the Bf 109s advantages in climb and power. It worked to devastating results, repeatedly, for a long time. But this tactic was eventually recognized and countered.

Rearview mirrors, as simple and crude as that sounds, and improved radio procedures, plus wingmen, really made a big difference from what I've read. It did become doctrine not to fly strait and level for any length of time, to maintain a 'rubber neck' and etc. Hard learned lessons with a great cost.

Japanese stayed with the 3 plane formation for quite awhile. In some cases the leader would pick a target and attack and No 2 & 3 would follow and attack the same plane until they saw results. Ki-43s did shoot down B-24s, but often they not only did a plane pass, they circled around for 2nd or even 3rd firing pass at the same target aircraft. Some they got on the first pass. One wonders if a plane with twice the firepower would have shot down more American planes if given the same firing opportunities.

Very true, I often wonder what a 20mm cannon armed Ki-43 would have been like. Maybe a bit like a Ki-100. but the additional agility of the Ki-43 did seem to really matter a lot.

 

[GregP]

And the undeniable fact is that in spite of these theoretically high standards for proof of a victory, all of those air forces overclaimed by wide margins, just like the Americans and Japanese did.

So you say, without much in the way of justification other than opinion.

Again, are you reading books where the author states a victory is only valid if it shows up as a loss in the enemy records?

If so, I very strongly disagree, as do a LOT of people.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

So you say, without much in the way of justification other than opinion.

Like I said, I'll be glad to post examples. In fact I'm going to do just that tomorrow.

Again, are you reading books where the author states a victory is only valid if it shows up as a loss in the enemy records?

If so, I very strongly disagree, as do a LOT of people.

Ok. Here's the thing. There are records for both sides. Both sides have lists of pilots, aircraft etc., in both cases with serial numbers. We know which units were active in a particular area.

If unit A, with 12 aircraft, engages unit B, with 12 aircraft, both sides make claims, but neither side actually lost any pilots or lost any machines, then the claims weren't actually real because no enemy aircraft were shot down.

That is really, really simple.

Does this mean we have to go back and invalidate records of aces etc.? No I'm certainly not saying that. These pilots and aircrew were credited with victories according to the standards of the time and the service they were in.

But does it mean that unit B did not in fact shoot down the 7 aircraft they claimed that they shot down on that particular day? Yes, it actually does mean that. Denying it is like saying the earth is flat.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And the undeniable fact is that in spite of these theoretically high standards for proof of a victory, all of those air forces overclaimed by wide margins, just like the Americans and Japanese did.

To be fair to the airmen involved, it's entirely understandable. A swirling dogfight where situational awareness is touch and go happening at 250mph+ while other people in other planes are trying to kill you is not conducive to accurate counting of scalps.

It's why I wrote upthread that anyone who takes combat claims at face-value is a fool.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

To be fair to the airmen involved, it's entirely understandable. A swirling dogfight where situational awareness is touch and go happening at 250mph+ while other people in other planes are trying to kill you is not conducive to accurate counting of scalps.

It's why I wrote upthread that anyone who takes combat claims at face-value is a fool.

Yes I agree 100%, as I myself also said upthread. If you shoot at a plane and see it smoking and spinning down toward the ground, and later maybe even see burning wrecks on the same ground, it's hardly shocking that you guessed wrong as to what happened to it.

And I understand that it's a bit jarring to realize that actual combat losses are not what we really thought they were- for any side. I've read a lot of the Luftwaffe claims vs Anglo-American and Soviet losses and they overclaimed a lot too, no doubt to the acute horror of some of their fans.

It seems to be fairly rare that this was ever intentional. It's actually a rather vexing problem, even today it can take quite a while to figure out what really happened in a military engagement in the air, such as pretty recently between Pakistan and India, although modern problems in this realm take on different aspects.

 

[Shortround6]

Yes I agree 100%, as I myself also said upthread. If you shoot at a plane and see it smoking and spinning down toward the ground, and later maybe even see burning wrecks on the same ground, it's hardly shocking that you guessed wrong as to what happened to it.

And I understand that it's a bit jarring to realize that actual combat losses are not what we really thought they were- for any side. I've read a lot of the Luftwaffe claims vs Anglo-American and Soviet losses and they overclaimed a lot too, no doubt to the acute horror of some of their fans.

It seems to be fairly rare that this was ever intentional. It's actually a rather vexing problem, even today it can take quite a while to figure out what really happened in a military engagement in the air, such as pretty recently between Pakistan and India, although modern problems in this realm take on different aspects.

The overclaiming bit many air forces in the butt and badly.
Everybody thought they could estimate the enemy's production and they tried to calculate, based on losses, when the enemy would run out of aircraft. BoB was the famous example of this and overclaiming by the Luftwaffe. Americans thought for months that the B-17s and B-24s were shooting down many more fighters than the were and soon the Luftwaffe would run out of fighters and the losses of the unescorted B-17s and B-24s would drop to acceptable levels without escort fighters.
I don't know what was going on in the Pacific but it might have been WW I all over again. One more push and the enemy will collapse and victory will be ours!
Overclaiming was not limited to aircraft. Japanese Navy thought they had destroyed over 400 Allied subs so they were overclaiming by 8 or 9 to 1.
Now when you are sinking allied/American subs so easily why improve your anti-sub sensors, weapons or tactics?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's actually a rather vexing problem, even today it can take quite a while to figure out what really happened in a military engagement in the air, such as pretty recently between Pakistan and India, although modern problems in this realm take on different aspects.

While modern digital aids may well help sort modern combats out for future historians, I'm of the opinion that regarding the air wars from WWI to Vietnam, we will always have a level of murk and imprecision. I don't get vexed about it because "I don't know" is a very simple and honest statement. I wish people were willing to admit as much.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

Boy, there sure is quite a bit to go through here. Activity's certainly picked up. Spoke too soon.

Joblin, the above tells me that a thread should be started to look at what is considered a victory / kill and what is considered a loss.

I might have to agree. It seems that it could sustain an entire discussion on its own, especially since it will likely be concerned with all theatres of WWII, if not other wars entirely. Personally, I'm quite lazy, but I might go ahead and start it myself sometime tomorrow, or the day after, if no one else does.

Basic to the issue is whether the losses were reported truthfully. Telling the truth in the Soviet Union could get you killed if Stalin didn't want to hear it just then and the same can be said for a few cases in Japan.

I have had a similar thought running through my head as I went through Claringbould's Osprey books and Dunn's articles. Both authors appear to view the Japanese records they do have on hand as fairly reliable in terms of losses, Claringbould especially, who has gone as far as to describe them as "reliable" and "hard data", among other similar terms. In the case of the Corsair, he has gone on record as stating that IJNAF operational records aligned closely with Corsair unit mission logs when compared. S Steamed_Banana has raised some good points regarding the quality of Japanese records, namely, their focus on deaths as opposed to airframes lost or written off, but still, Claringbould's and Dunn's claims regarding such records will need to be addressed first before any conclusive statements can be made on their reliability. This also applies to your objections concerning Japanese documents and their availability, comprehensiveness, and reliability, Thumpalumpacus .

I have read a great deal of Claringbould's Work, (notably several volumes each from both South Pacific Air War series and Solomons Air War series). I've also read several other similar books which cover the same and other Theaters with the same approach of using both-sides loss data rather than just claims, notably but not limited to Christopher Shores now sadly out of print three volume "Bloody Shambles" series about Burma and India, and his five volume Mediterranean Air War Series. Also Christer Bergsrom's "Black Cross / Red Star" series (which I don't 100% rate) and The First Team, Into the Endless Mist, Volume 2 (on the Aleutian War) and some others.

I have my ways of tracking down out-of-print books. I will check all these titles out later.

I think you will find that these and some others are actually known here, and many here own these books and have read many of them, but I would somewhat agree on your take that the implications of the data they show has really not been taken seriously into consideration. I agree with several of your points, namely:

Overclaiming was much worse than we assumed - (On every side). This definitely varied by Theater, with the South Pacific being one of the most chaotic and difficult to verify, but it was certainly much greater than I think people have realized. I should also note that overclaiming is often not intentional. Air combat is confusing, precisely who shot down an aircraft that was clearly destroyed (blew up, pilot bailed out etc.) isn't always obvious, and it turns out enemy aircraft may look destroyed but survive to limp home. Including Japanese aircraft, to wit ...

Japanese Aircraft were much more formidable than the postwar legend has it - I agree with you that A6M and Ki-43 were far more effective fighters (and for much longer) than seems to be the consensus in the Anglophone sphere, both around here where people really could know better, and more generally.

Japanese Fighters were nowhere near as flimsy and disposable as the legend has it - Part of the reason for overclaiming is that it's quite clear that Japanese fighters often took heavy battle damage and still managed to limp home.

I generally agree with all these points. Indeed, it's most likely the case that over-claiming often wasn't intentional, though that didn't prevent it from being convenient for those in charge, especially in more repressive countries like Japan and the USSR.

Some Allied Fighters were not as superior as claimed - This is a tricky one, because I think you are overstating it a little (and such claims tend to be overblown in both directions), but it's clear that Japanese fighters were not instantly overwhelmed by the second generation US (and British) fighters. Largely, I think, it's as Shortround6 said, many of them had long teething periods and the early versions were nowhere near as good as the later ones. But the later ones did eventually arrive...

Claringbould largely attributes the gradual and non-dramatic increase in success of the Corsair in combat against the A6M to a decline in skilled and experienced Japanese pilots as a result of attrition, and the consequent shortening and slackening of training to compensate for these losses; general consensus would already agree with this explanation to some degree. This almost certainly applies to other Allied and Japanese fighter aircraft, the F6F in particular. Indeed, a handful of aerial battles covered at the end of Claringbould's book on the matter appear to have ended with Zeros sustaining increasing losses against the Corsair. The question now concerns the extent to which inexperience a factor in Japanese losses, and the composition of veterans and fresh replacements, especially in later engagements with aircraft like the Hellcat, some of which looked to have been appallingly lopsided in the latter's favour, even factoring in losses recorded by the Japanese.

...These kinds of sources are really changing perception of the air war in WW2. You would think in a place like this that would be more welcome, but it's kind of hard to get your head around. In fact you yourself seem to be struggling with the revelations.

WWII aviation, if not WWII as a whole, is often hyped up as this intense technological arms race, with terms like "horsepower race" being thrown around quite commonly. Later generation WWII fighters—with the exception of novel, and rather experimental, jet and rocket fighters—are often treated as being significantly (i.e. to a noticeable, non-negligible degree) better, with any issues they may experienced attributed to such things as "operational losses", "teething issues", and some combination of "inexperience" and 'incorrect tactics'. Sometimes the merits of the earlier aircraft of the war are acknowledged, but they are still often treated as considerably inferior; the constant references to dubious and excessive "victory"-to-loss ratios are emblematic of this problem.

And I think you are also overstating some issues.

In Claringbould's Solomon Air War and South Pacific Air War series, it's already clear that there were some lop-sided victories for the Allies. I just finished reading South Pacific Air War Volume 6 which came out in August, and covers Jan-March 1943. And it's quite clear in that volume that Richard Bong for example did already shoot down a few Japanese fighters, and the Battle of the Bismark Sea was a very lopsided Allied victory. In the appendix of that book he lists losses for each side in each volume, it's pretty clear that the Guadalcanal Campaign was also a catastrophe for the Japanese. In Oct 42 they lost 225 aircraft vs 203 for the US (including 85 A6M, vs 77 F4F lost) and much more telling, the Japanese lost 428 aircrew killed vs. 104 for the US.

Volume 6 also shows a lot of action for the P-38s, which did seem to do a bit better than the Japanese fighters, but they had some limitations. They were picking off Japanese fighters from altitude, often not lingering long to defend the bombers, (for very good reasons as these were the early P-38s, as Shortround6 noted.) But it does look like Bong already figured out how to make them work.

Another thing worth noting, for reasons I'm not really sure of, the US lost almost twice as many aircraft to accidents, mechanical problems and weather as the Japanese did, but by the end of this volume (Vol III) the Japanese had lost significantly more fighters than the US did. Mostly to P-38s, P-40s, and heavy bombers like B-17s and B-24s.

All this makes me wonder, how well did the P-38 (and P-47) compare to the P-40 (and P-39), and likewise, the F6F and F4U to the F4F, especially when Japanese reports are considered? The 2nd-generation Allied (in this case, US) would have to perform noticeably better than their older counterparts, say, 1.5:1 against 1.1:1 or similar, otherwise, I don't think that they succeeded in justifying themselves, given their likely higher costs and technical complexity.

I also remain sceptical about the performance of the P-38; the first part of Rick Dunn's examination of the P-38's record doesn't seem too negative, though the P-38 does not appear too dominant, with the enemy losing perhaps one additional airframe (which could potentially have been recovered later) in encounters with it, if even that. Both the second part of this examination and Claringbould's book on the Bougainville air campaign are harrowing in comparison, with numerous engagements where it seems that Zeros were able to shoot down P-38s with only moderate damage at best, certainly no losses. The most shocking encounter, and it did legitimately shock me when I read it, took place on November 7, with four P-38s shot down by defending A6Ms over Rabaul without any loss to their own despite massive over-claiming on the part of the P-38 pilots. Even if the P-38 was unable to exercise its advantages in the Rabaul-Solomons area as it could over New Guinea, and it should be noted that it was frequently utilised in low-altitude strafing runs in the former, given its superior speed, especially its climb, and its superior firepower, this remains a grisly result for the famed Lightning. The information Claringbould's Pacific Profiles book on the P-38 supposedly suggests a 1:1 loss ratio against Japanese aircraft (overall?) if that Modelling Madness review is to be believed.

Some other things to keep in mind:

It's still basically the first generation of these new types of Operational Histories, - and they do have errors. This new approach is really exciting and promising, but it's not perfect yet. One thing to note, as an example, when Christopher Shores first attempted his first book on the Mediterranean - "Fighters over the Desert" way back in 1969, he checked the German records but forgot to check the Italian (and also, it was a lot harder to do). He concluded that most DAF aces had overclaimed by enormous amounts, which turned out to be a kind of overcorrection. Another researcher from Australia challenged him with his own book pointing out several omissions by Shores, who then eventually went back, made an alliance with an Italian researcher and was then able to include the Italian losses ... or at least some of them... plus more of the German losses (including forced landings etc.) and a lot more detail in general, in his new Mediterranean Air War series, and this was much more successful.

I think we are going to need to see a couple more rounds of checking these initial attempts to be real sure that we know, as best we can know, what really happened. But we can already at this point start to see some new and to me interesting patterns emerging.

I would agree with you here, though I will that add that it's to be expected, but still quite annoying nonetheless, that the ETO and MTO were the very first to receive this level of attention, and that's not to speak of the amount of attention late-war German aircraft receive compared to late-war Japanese fighters, especially in terms of specifications, and correcting them for any wartime deficiencies in resources and in manufacturing. The late-war Japanese fighters usually have the same, tired Francillon figures ascribed to them, often with little to no context behind them.

The second / third generations of "uber" fighters did actually take a toll - In Shores "Bloody Shambles" Volume III, it's quite clear that the P-51B/C/D and the Spitfire Mk VIII did in fact take a significantly unequal toll of the Ki-43s. By this point these were Ki-43-II and also some III (I don't know the exact number of these flying but I think Shortround6 is wrong about the numbers, there were definitely more than ten because there were whole units flying them). It was clear in the data and the Japanese pilots were complaining about it. They specifically noted that Spit VIII could outclimb them and that both Spit VIII and P-51B/C/D could extend away at will and come back to attack again.

Dunn's article claims otherwise, at least in the case of the Spitfire VIII. He actually states that the Merlin-powered P-51s (and the P-38s) performed better in fighter sweeps than the Spitfire over Burma and India, but I currently don't have any sources on hand comparing Merlin P-51 and Ki-43 losses in a similarly fair and comprehensive approach to that of Claringbould's and Dunn's works.

My understanding about the F6F and the F4U is that initial successes were not as dramatic as some people think or thought, in fact as you noted the Corsairs initially were about equal, but they did actually start taking a heavy toll as they improved technical problems and developed tactics to suit the new aircraft. Claringbould's month by month operational history books haven't really got to this point yet, but probably the next volumes will see some Corsair data which should be very interesting. I think there were Corsairs in combat over the Solomons in April 1943.

According to Claringbould, the A6M was still quite competent in combat against the Corsair around the Rabaul-Solomons area in 1943, with a roughly 1.5:1 loss-to-loss ratio in a particular engagement over the Russell Islands on May 13, 1943, in the former's favour, with three pilots lost and one force-landing, against two pilots missing, two ditched air-frames and two force-landings. It is not a favourable picture for the Corsair here.

What the exact ratios were I don't know for sure, but as someone already noted upthread, you don't need 7-1 to make a big difference. If there are frequent air clashes, 2-1 or even 1.5-1 in losses is actually a pretty big deal.

From what I've read, many engagements through 1943-44 suggest roughly even ratios for the fighter aircraft involved, sometimes even in the Zero's or Oscar's favour, though this balance had noticeably shifted by mid-1944. The increasing influx of fresher, less experienced pilots did contribute to this change in circumstances, however, perhaps more than most people would think or would like.

In Bloody Shambles Vol 3, Ki-43-I and II were dominant over Hurricane Mk I and IIb and IIcs, about equal with Spitfire Mk V, P-38s and P-47s in this Theater, and seemed to have an edge over the early P-51A mustangs as well. On the other hand the RAF Mohawks seemed to hold their own against them, US P-40s clearly had an edge, and the Beaufighters and Vengeances rarely got shot down, but on the other hand Ki-43s shot down a lot of B-24s, C-47s, Blenheims and other Allied bombers. It's noteworthy that even at this stage (say 1942-43), it clearly wasn't a cakewalk for the IJA. They were taking steady losses, and the Ki-43 Sentai leaders were already being killed at an alarming rate, being replaced every few months. But it seems to be when the merlin powered P-51B and C started arriving, and the Spit VIII, they were having serious problems. The Spit VIII were brought in after an RAF officer finally made a big stink about the unsuitability of the Hurricane in this Theater. Once the new Mustang and the Spit VIII arrived, the Japanese pilots talked about it and the Ki-43 units started being used as close air support / fighter bombers, with the Ki-84 taking over most of the air to air (and according to some Japanese fighter pilots, using their speed to flee the battle area more often than not).

The Spitfire VIII did appear to have a marginal advantage to some degree, perhaps 1.5:1 to 2:1 in terms of losses, at least according to Dunn. Not terrible, but not crushing either. I suppose that, at the very least, this Spitfire model had proven itself as a marked improvement over the Ki-43. Still, the Ki-43 wasn't completely outclassed at altitudes below 20,000 feet (~6000m), where much of the fighting took place. Accounts from both sides, as provided by Dunn, speak of this. Supposedly, however, the Spitfire VIII's claims/victory(?)-to-loss ratio was only >1:1 in the theatre, at least according to a US Navy report from June 1944, though this ratio is inclusive of all Japanese aircraft types besides just fighters alone. Taking into consideration over-claiming, Dunn asserts that the Spitfire actually had a negative ratio until then. I'm not entirely sure if that's the case, and the engagements between the Spitfire and the Ki-43, as he describes, don't suggest such an appalling record...

The big question though, for me, is Why would this turn you off to WW2 Aviation History?

The old consensus was wrong. We now have an opportunity to develop a new one. To me it's fascinating. I don't know if people in this particular venue will really welcome the news, but it's certainly an exciting time if you are interested in this subject, as far as I can tell. Yes it's perhaps a bit shocking to find out that all that 11-1 stuff was B.S. But these old legends never fully rang true for me. Now we are starting to see something closer to the truth, not just in WW2 but also in the Korean War, Vietnam, many others. I think it's fascinating stuff. I wait for new releases of these operational histories with baited breath. The story wasn't nearly as simple as we thought. There was more than one way for a fighter to be effective, it seems. There is a lot to learn. Isn't that a good thing?

I'm coming around to your perspective, though I remain of the opinion that such a path is murky, unclear, and, at this stage, still rather disappointing, especially given that so many relevant records have been lost to time, and so many misconceptions and speculation are, and will remain, abound.

Since the discussion has expanded beyond Claringbould's and Dunn's books and articles, it would be fair to say that you're relevant to the discussion now, Thumpalumpacus . You have also provided potentially interesting recommendations for authors, but unless they have any new, profound and relevant information, especially that which takes into account actual losses as recorded by Japanese sources, I'm unsure how they would put to rest any of Claringbould's or Dunn's claims, which I have been echoing throughout this thread.

Are you asking my opinion? If so, I say "yes".

Force-landings do usually come about as a result of damage sustained during combat, normally by enemy fire, correct? Operational losses would more so apply to things like engine troubles, faulty landing gear preventing a smooth, convenient landing, which could have been brought about by such things as faulty manufacturing, design problems, non-combat related causes in general, wouldn't they? Wouldn't force-landings not be operational losses, then, especially if they result from damage sustained in combat? Can operational losses arise, directly and unambiguously, from damage in combat? Do you consider ditching as a result of combat damage to also be operational losses?

A separate thread on this topic might just come in handy. And regardless, force-landings still suggest that said aircraft were outfought by their opponents in the air.

No one is arguing that American pilots did not overclaim. Please put that red herring to bed for once and for all.

The problem here is that GregP and G Geoffrey Sinclair , especially the former, have previously cited the same, profligate victory-to-loss ratios for US aircraft. G Geoffrey Sinclair is more willing to admit to over-claiming, but he, funnily enough, echoes the sentiments of US High Command, that even if over-claiming exaggerated the ratio by 3-to-1—and according to Dunn, it could have been as high as 4.4-to-1—that the Allied aircraft would still have been breaking even (which is what Claringbould and Dunn both suggest to some degree), if not performing better either way...

I'm sure they were aware of the problem, probably during the war, and certainly after the war.

Like G Geoffrey Sinclair , the US High Command did not realise the full extent of the problem, given how they both guess(ed) an upper limit of a 3-to-1 over-claiming ratio, when it was arguably worse than expected. Take, for example, the period 1-15 January 1944. Japanese messages intercepted by Allied intelligence stated that 44 aircraft were lost in combat. American claims during that same period reached a figure of 193, around 4.5 times greater. Similarly high ratios like the 4.9-to-1 combat ratio yielded by Nimitz's monthly report for December 1943, and the nearly 5:1 ratio claimed by the three Hellcat squadrons over the Solomons, are likely similarly suspect, especially the latter, as Dunn went through their record in great length in his article on the F6F.

The fact that you seem to think that additional weight only affects speed is not encouraging. Weight doesn't affect straight-line speed as much as it does climb rate and horizontal maneuverability, which I'm sure we agree are very important in air combat. This doesn't mean that speed is not important, though. It means that if you don't increase power as you increase weight, you're decreasing performance parameters vital to combat.

Fact? Where did I state that additional weight only affects speed? I don't disagree with your point that more power is needed with additional weight, given that I mentioned the A7M in my little hypothetical. It's just that aircraft, especially manoeuvrable aircraft with relatively lower wing loadings like the A6M, A7M, Ki-43 and the Ki-61 to some degree, need not have firepower, climb, and level speed equivalent or superior to their opponents to hold their own against them in combat. The A6M's record against the Corsair and F6F, especially in 1943, when experienced Japanese pilots were still in sizable numbers, is evidence of this. This implies less weight, and consequently, less horsepower required.

There is an over looked aspect of Allied pilot quality. For the US the Navy entered the war with some vey experienced pilots, not in combat but overall they had some high time pilots. Thach for instance became an aviator in 1930. O'Hare finished his aviator training on May 2nd 1940. He had been flying for just about 22 months when he made his famous intercept on the Japanese bombers. We can argue about the exact score but the point is that Thach was pulled from combat after Midway and O'Hare was pulled from combat after that one fight and did not return to combat until 1943.
Much of the combat the US engaged in the 2nd part of 1942 and a lot of 1943 was with lower time pilots than they had in first part of 1942. This is on average. It took a while to get the average experience back up and while the US pilots got a more than average number of flight hours it still was not enough for combat. US did lengthen the training as the war went on and using a number of combat veterans helped increase the quality of training.
Japanese had the problems of using fewer flight hours in training as the war went on and they didn't rotate their pilots back to the training schools as often so the new pilot quality really took a hit. Where they crossed over is certainly subject to question.
The American aircraft helped more of their pilots survive and return to action. which certainly helped in the long run. The US effort put into aircrew rescue is often overlooked.
But that starts at the beginning. Using the parachute, having a decent radio to make a mayday call (or mayday call by wingman). Having armor/BP glass, decent protection on fuel tanks. Having the crashboats/PT boats/ Submarines that can be assigned to the right areas.

Interesting, but it does make comparisons between the A6M and Ki-43, and the 2nd-generation Allied aircraft of the war, much harder, as this information suggests that there was rarely an engagement in 1943-44 involving similar numbers of experienced Japanese and US pilots.

Claringbould's book on the A6M and F4U, for instance, suggests a loss ratio slightly in favour of the former earlier on in 1943, this balance shifting slightly to the F4U into 1944. With the increase in US experience and concurrent decrease in Japanese experience, I'm thinking that this still implies that a more evenly matched battle would result in a roughly one-to-one loss ratio, like Claringbould and Dunn would lean towards, with the F4U having little to no advantage over what should have been an inferior opponent. This could similarly apply to other engagements between Allied and Japanese aircraft, and we would return to square one, essentially. This is just speculation on my part, however.

I think that 70%-90% ratio is overstated, (I think it comes from a statement by Erik Hartmann?) and is more applicable in the early war when:

1) Pilots, especially on the Allied side, were often inexperienced and untrained.
2) Allied pilots in many Theaters were not flying with Wingmen and / or in Finger-Four formations.
3) Most fighters were turtleback type rather than bubble canopy. (Malcolm hood was a partial solution to this, but I don't know the exact dates these became available to various fighter types, the RAF had it first...)
4) Many fighters (notably Russian and Japanese, and I think Italian too) either didn't have radios or had radios that were barely working
5) and it took a while for these to be fitted with rearview mirrors
6) Even once they got radios, it took a while before these to be truly reliable and good procedures for their use had been worked out.

In the Middle East and Burma, even in 1942 through early 1943 the Anglo-Americans were still having some problems with radio communication (for example between squadrons and between fighters and bombers), but by then all the fighters at least had rearview mirrors and squadron radio coms at relatively short range (a few miles) were usually at least partly functional.

In the Middle East they worked out, by around mid-1942, standard procedure for entire squadrons turning into enemy attacks from above, coordinated with the radio. This made a huge difference in outcomes, as the Axis fighters (Bf 109F and G, MC 202) usually had the altitude advantage. They also started using Finger-Four / Two pairs of Wingmen formations at this time.

It's noteworthy that Japanese fighters had better canopies for situational awareness from the get-go.

View attachment 849497'
Ki-43

View attachment 849498
A6M

On the other hand radios were often lacking.

Whether fighters saw or noticed the enemy before being attacked depended partly on this, and partly on the size of the engagement, and partly on how the engagement started (were they bounced etc.) but it was quite common for small engagements to take place where both sides saw the other long before they engaged. It depends on altitude, on the mission (flying escort? intercepting enemy bombers? fighter sweep? Recon? fighter bomber attack), the weather, functional radios?)

Ah, radios. I had forgotten that crucial aspect of aerial warfare. The fact that Japanese aircraft often had to make do without them due to a variety of issues makes their performance against 2nd-generation Allied aircraft all the more commendable, and conversely, dampens my enthusiasm for the latter.

As for your post, T ThomasP , I think that I, or S Steamed_Banana , since he's mentioned transcribing and posting passages, will have to go through the works of Claringbould, Dunn, and similar authors, in great detail on this forum, in this thread or another dedicated to them solely, to address sufficiently the points you have raised. Something similar to Wild_Bill_Kelso 's thread on the Ki-43's combat history.

In Shores Bloody Shambles Vol III, Ki-43s routinely shot down, and sometimes pursued and caught P-51A and P-38s after a long chase, which I assume may be due to the latter having to maneuver around mountainous terrain, or for other reasons I haven't thought of. But it's clear that at least sometimes other factors trumped the effects of speed, because these planes are all 30-60 mph faster than a Ki-43, depending on the specific models and load-outs, altitude etc.

Bottom line, it's a more complex story than we thought.

I've heard numerous sources, here, maybe, and across the internet, speak of Japanese aircraft, even earlier examples like the A6M, having a kind of emergency boost, though it would be difficult to sustain such a boost depending on the length of a given chase. The figures given for Japanese aircraft speeds, from what I can gather, were often achieved with some equivalent to 'normal' or 'military', as opposed to take-off, or 'full', power. The Japanese apparently tended not to list the maximum effective speed for their aircraft, basically. The Allied aircraft could also have been underperforming, if only slightly, as a result of wartime conditions. But I do agree with you otherwise.

Edit: This is the second time that someone has quoted a post of mine without saying anything whatsoever. F Flylo B Bob W Do you have anything at all to add to this discussion?

 

[Juha3]

And the undeniable fact is that in spite of these theoretically high standards for proof of a victory, all of those air forces overclaimed by wide margins, just like the Americans and Japanese did.

Overclaiming varied between air forces but also inside a specific air force, Commands, formations and units. In the end it was up to an individual pilot. At least up to 1942 the LW claims were generally more accurate than those of British Commonwealth. But sometimes LW pilots overclaimed wildy, one example was on 27 Sept 1940 over SW England. The LW lost 10 Bf 110s plus one 40 % damages, JG 2, which is one of the JGs with reputation of overclaiming more than the average within the Jagdfliegerverbände, claimed 3 Spitfires and ZG 26 8 Spitfires. No Spitfires were shot down, one Hurricane crash landed but the plane repairable. One Spit was hit by a couple mg bullets which were noticed only after landing, another by a 20 mm shell into a mainplane, landed safely to its base. The pilot did not see the attacker but that happened after he had a combat with several Bf 109s very late in the combat so the attacker was probably a Bf 109 pilot. One Spitfire was lost in a head-on collision with a Bf 110 but its pilot made no claim because he became a PoW.

The main reason why the Intelligence Service of the LW was so out of the touch of reality during the BoB was that it badly underestimated the fighter production in the UK and the effectiveness of the British a/c repair organisation. Of course the overclaiming of LW pilots made things even worse.

The differences in the accuracy of claims between different units became apparent, for example, in a study by a US researcher of the P-38 losses, an exceptionally easily identifiable aircraft, in North Africa. The results did not surprise me too much. The claims of the pilots of JG 51 were the most accurate at 76% and those of JG 2 the least accurate at 22.5%. JG 27, JG 53 and JG 77 were in the middle in that order, between 66.7 - 63.6%. So generally German claims were accurate, those of JG 51 very accurate but but those of JG 2 rather lousy.

 

[special ed]

May I ask who gets credit for the victory today when a wreck is found downed in the jungle or in the sea? Was the pilot at the time posted as missing?

 

[Juha3]

...Basic to the issue is whether the losses were reported truthfully. Telling the truth in the Soviet Union could get you killed if Stalin didn't want to hear it just then and the same can be said for a few cases in Japan...

The SU was a very bureaucratic state and produced an immense amount of documents. There are gaps in the wartime documentary collections, but mostly from the summer of 1941 to autumn and the summer of 1942.

The VVS, like all military organizations, kept records of their assets, such as airplanes and their engines, and new ones could not be gotten simply by asking that the higher authority would send X new planes, you also had to tell what had happened to the previous ones. And you couldn't put a lot of combat losses to the account of accidents, because then it was easy to be accused of sabotage, which could have fatal consequences, or of assigning pilots to tasks that were too demanding compared to their training or experience. Indeed, the Soviet unit commander had to give that kind of assurance when informing losses to higher level at least since 1943, probably earlier.

So it did not work to inform that your unit lost 3 planes and two pilots during a combat mission and then ask 12 planes and 10 pilots as replacements. And if you asked too few replacements and when you were ordered to sent 12 fighters to escort an Il-2 strike and you had only four fighters left, that is a situation that has grave consequences for you, maybe it would be best to shoot yourself in the head or try to defect to the enemy. The result would not be a nice chat over a cup of tea with the interrogators.