Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44 (1 Viewer)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

There have been plenty of well-informed people that haven't, even Nimitz, himself suspecting over-claiming while the war was still ongoing, claimed in March 1944, before the so-called "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot", that even if the ratio of victories-to-losses for US aircraft "is 3 times as high as the full facts would justify, the superiority of our planes, pilots and tactics is apparent."

I have a real problem with single quotes after seeing how selection of quotes can make a leader look like a genius or an idiot, just chose the quotes according to the preferred conclusion. The most obvious question, what data was used in drawing the conclusion, the first 3 months of 1944? All of 1943? The grinding down and withdrawal of the IJN aircraft from Rabaul in February 1944? The Truk raid? The areas under his command or all theatres versus Japan? How much from code breaking? By end 1943 everyone agrees the allies had opened up a quality gap between them and the Japanese, in both average aircrew and average aircraft performance, allied tactics had improved and greater efforts could be sustained. It also did not help the Japanese that medical care was not as good as allied and in places like Rabaul rations were cut.

The Marianas Turkey shoot, in particular the reports of Japanese aircraft tactics, would support the Nimitz conclusions. Add the reports the fighter pilots defending the IJN carriers in the battle seemed to be the more experienced.

John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, published in 1995, noted 5th Air Force claims for operations against Rabaul at the end of 1943 were something like 4 times the actual Japanese strength present.

As a general rule allied superiority grew as the war went on while awarded claims became more accurate as things like gun cameras became standard features. The Kamikaze pilots had very little training.

When it comes to the P-38 you need to deduct 13 YP-38, 29 P-38, 36 P-38D and 13 P-322 as non combat worthy from the 1940/41 totals and another 130 P-322 from the 1942 totals.

The USAAF fighter situation overall, Far East and India, end of month, including reserves. At the time nominally 25 aircraft per combat squadron, 75 per group.

Unit

USAAF

USAAF

USAAF

USAAF

USAAF

USAAF

FEAF

FEAF

FEAF

FEAF

CBI

CBI

CBI

Type

P-38

P-39

P-40

P-47

P-51

A-36

P-38

P-39

P-40

P-47

P-38

P-40

P-51/A-36

Nov-41​

69​

325​

755​

13​

141​

Dec-41​

96​

609​

938​

1​

18​

Jan-42​

132​

684​

1,080​

1​

2​

25​

139​

Feb-42​

181​

755​

1,143​

1​

2​

150​

273​

Mar-42​

309​

807​

1,192​

3​

2​

271​

108​

8​

Apr-42​

387​

803​

1,227​

3​

2​

369​

90​

5​

May-42​

469​

883​

1,100​

5​

2​

267​

129​

44​

Jun-42​

550​

922​

1,162​

30​

2​

238​

131​

55​

Jul-42​

706​

996​

1,320​

59​

6​

188​

137​

94​

Aug-42​

797​

1,005​

1,601​

120​

43​

30​

233​

118​

112​

Sep-42​

881​

1,033​

1,776​

177​

60​

65​

250​

117​

129​

Oct-42​

997​

1,200​

1,909​

226​

58​

31​

72​

314​

155​

129​

Nov-42​

1,046​

1,143​

1,951​

326​

57​

29​

68​

299​

142​

131​

Dec-42​

1,123​

1,116​

2,133​

442​

57​

111​

94​

291​

131​

180​

Jan-43​

871​

1,137​

2,017​

378​

56​

226​

135​

255​

150​

197​

Feb-43​

1,001​

1,162​

2,072​

528​

56​

445​

134​

262​

156​

192​

Mar-43​

1,086​

1,343​

2,226​

678​

87​

442​

132​

251​

145​

283​

Apr-43​

1,183​

1,581​

2,295​

913​

184​

452​

117​

223​

139​

250​

May-43​

1,213​

1,800​

2,287​

1,118​

286​

436​

115​

253​

135​

206​

Jun-43​

1,267​

1,898​

2,371​

1,272​

298​

419​

144​

314​

124​

59​

175​

Jul-43​

1,421​

1,984​

2,365​

1,716​

327​

391​

211​

323​

148​

114​

23​

201​

Aug-43​

1,315​

2,050​

2,352​

1,975​

438​

347​

291​

309​

186​

107​

19​

276​

70​

Sep-43​

1,270​

1,981​

2,388​

2,381​

560​

305​

279​

287​

213​

149​

21​

296​

77​

Oct-43​

1,525​

1,913​

2,267​

2,796​

720​

277​

263​

250​

160​

175​

58​

277​

82​

Nov-43​

1,712​

1,975​

2,195​

3,235​

924​

237​

269​

210​

147​

293​

52​

315​

95​

Dec-43​

1,805​

2,019​

2,245​

3,765​

1,165​

226​

279​

126​

131​

308​

42​

280​

100​

The USAAF received 2 NA-73/mark I as XP-51, 2 P-51/mark IA as XP-51B, plus 55 P-51 while Britain received 92. Production Mustang deliveries to the USAAF began in March 1943, all up 260 P-51A (another 50 to Britain), between the P-51 and P-51A came 500 A-36. The Mediterranean Theatre reports its first P-51/A-36 in March 1943, 51 at end of month, build up to 298 end May, down to 116 end January 1944, which neatly accounts for the two A-36 fighter bomber groups plus reserves.

The P-51 was supposed to do this, and it's a myth that the early ones all went to Britain. There were multiple P-51A squadrons (and some A-36) operating in Burma / India.

The P-51 remained outside the US fighter program for much of 1942, hence the A-36 version. Mustang production began in August 1941, the USAAF received its first non experimental versions in March 1943 and this is still early? The P-51 sent to India were meant as ground attack, what they were used for is another matter, partly to cope with the fact there were no more A-36, partly as the P-51A were a small anomaly in the USAAF fighter pool, a sort of better P-40 or a renamed A-36 rather than a new air superiority fighter.

311th Bombardment Group (Light) constituted on 28 Jan 1942. Activated on 2 Mar 1942. Redesignated 311th Bombardment Group (Dive) in Jul 1942, 311th Fighter-Bomber Group in Sep 1943, and 311th Fighter Group in May 1944. Stations. Will Rogers Field, Okla, 2 Mar 1942; Hunter Field, Ga, 4 Jul 1942; Waycross, Ga, 22 Oct 1942-18 Jul 1943; Nawadih, India, 14 Sep 1943;

Anyway, the P-38 did offer the range, and at least some promise as a fighter. But the limits were rather narrow. In North Africa and the Med they mostly used them to escort B-24s on long range and relatively high altitude strikes.

Ignoring for the moment the temporary B-24 unit transfers to the Mediterranean the B-17 groups outnumbered the B-24 groups by around 2 to 1 for most of 1943.

Most of the fighting against the Luftwaffe and Regia in North Africa was done by the P-40s, especially the merlin-engined ones, and the Spitfire Mk Vs and by the end of 1943, some Mark IXs. But those were still quite limited in range. They only got a handful of the longer ranged Mk VIII in North Africa, but some fought in Italy.

A start date would be useful, Hurricanes and P-40 were the main Desert Air Force fighters 1941 and 1942, the first Merlin engined P-40 were accepted in January 1942, the 57th Fighter group in Egypt flew 4 combat sorties in August 1942. The group claimed its first kills and dropped its first bombs in October 1942. The 79th and 324th groups first missions in March 1943.

As for the Spitfires the problems in North Africa caused a rush shipment of Spitfire IX and the formation of the Polish Fighter Flight, as of end February 1943, 3 mark IX in the Middle East, 87 on way, end May 102 in Middle East 140 on way plus 77 mark VIII. (End May Fighter Command had 132 mark IX) Also as of end May 80 Spitfire V transferred to USAAF.

9 September 1943, RAF overseas, 1,034 Spitfire V in Middle East/Malta/North Africa/Casablanca, 64 India, 298 mark VIII Middle East etc., 11 India, 410 mark IX Middle East.

I think with the P-38 the improvements also came more piecemeal, but each one helped. The H had a better intercooler which fixed some of the engine issues, and the ability to carry heavier drop tanks. The J which came in 1943 brought the boosted ailerons, again more fuel, and better turbos with more power. The L was the ultimate model but it came later.

The P-38J began full production in August 1943, it was fitted with more internal fuel in the J-15 block from December and received boosted ailerons along with dive flaps in the block 25 aircraft being the final 210 J models built starting in June 1944, also in the L models also starting in June 1944. Kits were available to retrofit the flaps and internal fuel tanks.

For the Empire, Burma and India were tertiary, and North Africa may have been treated that way to some extent, but it was really the main show in 1942 in the West.

Actually no. It was for the army, it was not for the navy and the supply limitations on operations meant it was second for the air forces versus those in Britain (It was first for the USAAF in 1942 and 1943.) From 1945 Jane's

	Sorties	Tonnage	Losses
Bomber	36,426​	51,928​	1,543​
Fighter	147,047​	207​	688​
Coastal	31,676​	629​	302​
ME Ftr	79,849​
ME Bmb	19,896​
ME CC	11,116​
ME Tactical	2,638​

Middle east air force dropped 22,551 tons of bombs, lost 1,189 aircraft in 1942. In the period June 1940 to December 1942 how many days of ground combat involving at least a divisional sized unit occurred? How about Brigade/Regiment? You could say the truck was the supreme weapon in the desert.

With the shortage of shipping the extra costs of supporting a unit in the Pacific or India or for that matter Egypt was an important factor, opening up the Mediterranean was strategically useful.

That is how it was defined at one level of command. But this is not how things precisely played out in reality.

It never does but the allocations were largely adhered to.

Most of the US heavy bomber force for example was shifted south from England to support Torch and other Allied campaigns in North Africa for several months (thereby delaying the strategic bombing campaign).

No. What was shifted was most of the US fighter and transport strength in Britain. In mid September 1942 the 8th Air Force had 7 B-17 and 1 B-24 groups, of which 3 B-17 groups were operational, then to North Africa,

late October 1942, 31st, 52nd FG

mid November 14th Fighter Group, 1st Fighter Group aircraft, 15th Light Bombardment sqn, 97th BG

late November 301st BG

early December 93rd BG, leaving 329 sqn behind for Moling trials, group returned late February 1942

End December 82nd FG, no missions flown from UK

Early January 1943, 350th FG

The 8th had managed to have 5 operational heavy bomber groups on 9 October 1942, down to 3 by the end of the month, up to 6 mid November. One group spent an extended period as a training unit.

By the time of the invasions of Sicily and Italy enormous resources were being shifted in the Med to support those campaigns (including, tragically, stocks of poisonous gas which really didn't need to be there and ended up causing a nightmarish catastrophe). Many of the latest aircraft types and other assets were deployed there by that time.

What does enormous mean? The Luftwaffe in particular tried to oppose the Sicily operations in force. As far as the USAAF was concerned the latest types were meant for British bases, the reduction in Luftwaffe operations also reduced the need for modern types in the Mediterranean.

Many resources and assets including aircraft, ships, troops, fuel, ammunition and other logistic assets were also shifted to the Pacific to support various campaigns going on there.

In 1942 Pacific theatre was containment, Mediterranean was a first attempt at advancing.

All of which is pretty well known.

Yes, including by people who note the theatre priorities and what that meant.

But my point is more really that the Med / North Africa was really the main Theater of fighting for the Anglo-Americans in that hemisphere for almost two years (a lot of 1942 and most of 1943) and probably should have received even higher priority than it did in fact get.

Again, for the army definitely, for the navy more in 1943 than 1942, for the air forces the bigger efforts were from Britain. Also the more resources in the Mediterranean in late 1943 the later or weaker Overlord is.

The US had cut ammunition production in 1943, even closing plants in the winter of 1943/44, in response to the accumulation of excess stocks in North Africa in early 1943, it would take time to wind the production system back up again. In January 1944 the watchwords were retrenchment and no over production. Ammunition plants were shut down or switched to things like fertiliser, synthetic rubber and avgas production. In March 1944 increases in 240 mm howitzer ammunition were authorised, in April this was extended to the 8 inch and 155mm gun and howitzers and the 4.5 inch gun. In May the War Department authorised expansions in medium artillery production, guns and ammunition and assigned the highest priority to additional ammunition manufacturing capability, but this would for the most part take until 1945 to increase production. Heavy artillery ammunition production was to be doubled in 7 months and tripled in 13 months. In June and July substantial increases in bomb production were added to the expansion plan, later including Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs. Plants that had been shut down a few months or even weeks before had to be reopened. Positions in plants were opened to women for the first time to overcome the labour shortages. The heavy artillery expansion program required new facilities costing around $203,000,000.

Almost no heavy artillery ammunition was shipped to Europe between October 1943 and June 1944, despite the theatre being around 20% below authorised levels in May. Light and Medium artillery ammunition shipments had also been effectively stopped between January and May 1944, despite the theatre having 75% or authorised levels in May.

Lots of ammunition limits placed on the armies in France as a result. it did not help that in November 1944 The US forces in Europe are using in 10 days the ammunition expected to last 35 days, and more mortar shells in a day than used in a month in North Africa.

Order of Battle, Sept 1942
224 Group Calcutta - One squadron Mohawk (5 Sqn), Six squadrons Hurricane (67, 136, 607, 135, 146, 615)
222 Group Colombo / Ceylon- Three squadrons Hurricane (30, 258, 261), one squadron Fulmar (273)

(I think these Hurricanes are still Mk 1)

Nice lists, Move to Hurricane II, 67 sqn Feb 42, 136 sqn Apr 42, 607 sqn Jun 42, 135 sqn Feb 42, 146 sqn May 42, 615 sqn Jul 42, 30 sqn Aug 42 (from Blenheim), 258 sqn Mar 42 but some I until Jan 43, 261 sqn Mar 42

An inherent issue in the early fighting against Japan is the severe supply problems on both sides, in November 1942 the USAAF Far East Air Forces report they had 970 fighter combat sorties airborne, or 32.33 per day on average, from the 541 fighter aircraft on strength end October, as a result a single encounter can make a big difference.

The 1945 USAAF Statistical Digest was declassified in August 1978, it gave a lot of numbers all collated in the one place. US government policy is government documents are freely copyable, the British have other ideas. There have been a number of statistics published on RAF activities but not a comprehensive one like the USAAF Statistical Digest.

P-40 and US Merlin production,

Month	P-40F	P-40L	M28	M29	M31	M33	M38	US 1 stage	US 2 stage
Aug-41​			2​					2​
Sep-41​			3​					1​
Oct-41​			3​					2​
Nov-41​			7​					3​
Dec-41​			17​					9​
Jan-42​	5​		74​					35​
Feb-42​	42​		22​	79​				48​
Mar-42​	55​		57​	160​	1​			115​
Apr-42​	104​		334​	1​	2​			168​
May-42​	104​		406​		2​			194​
Jun-42​	130​		458​		2​			242​
Jul-42​	135​		528​	36​	13​			224​
Aug-42​	130​		505​	82​	23​			190​
Sep-42​	130​		476​	71​	63​			190​
Oct-42​	153​		502​	20​	43​			235​
Nov-42​	136​		418​	28​	105​			245​	4​
Dec-42​	160​		430​	3​	135​			281​	1​
Jan-43​	27​	131​	439​		128​			283​
Feb-43​		158​	519​		43​			302​
Mar-43​		270​					568​	44​	3​
Apr-43​		141​				119​	487​		1​
Total	1311​	700​	5200​	480​	560​	119​	1055​	2813​	9​

150 P-40F to RAF, delivered in US April to July 1942, plus 100 P-40L January to March 1943, all to Middle East except 2 F to UK and 21 lost at sea. First arrivals in Middle East August 1942.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

There are also consequences to rushing things. The Brits did pretty well with the Tomahawks especially vs Bf 109E7, Bf 110, and the Italian MC 200 and G.50 etc., so they doubled down on the Kittyhawks which they got a lot of pretty quickly and rapidly equipped several squadrons with them. Pilots got pretty abbreviated training on the new type (often transitioning from Hurricanes or even Gladiators) and the heavier plane did not turn out to be "Tomahawk, but better" as they had hoped. At least initially, according to many of the pilots (and the operational histories / losses) they were worse. For example the climb rate went from close to 3,000 fpm initial for the Tomahawk to more like 1,500 fpm in the early days with the Kittys.

It didn't help that the Germans were also increasing the number of the superb Bf 109F-4 and the Italians were getting larger and larger numbers of the (also excellent) MC.202 fighters into the Theater, partly due to the initial success of the Tomahawks.

It took about 3-4 months before the DAF started to make a variety of adjustments, from things like ad-hoc gunnery training, to adjusting the ammunition storage, to using higher power settings (and I guess different / better fuel though I'm not sure of the timeline on that) and gradually introducing better fighting tactics after a lot of back and forth, until the Kittyhawks started holding their own as well as the Tomahawks did.

EDIT: On the other hand, the Kittyhawks were much better than Tomahawks (or Hurricanes) as fighter bombers, which was really the top priority for the DAF in those days. I am not sure Tomahawks could carry any bombs at all (?), maybe some small ones on the wings? And Hurricanes had a limited bomb load and limited range, and were also slower and more vulnerable to fighters. Kittys also had more ammunition for strafing.

Kittyhawks were carrying 250 or 500 lbs bomb initially on the centerline, and that went up to 1,000 (one 500 in the centerline and two 250 lb on the wings) and then 1,500 (three 500 lbs), even 2,000 lbs (two 1,000 lb or one 1,000 and two 500 lb) for short flights, and they could 'dive bomb' at a fairly high angle and with a reasonable degree of accuracy. This was figured out 'in the field', incidentally, by very brave pilots. Mostly Aussies. They even sunk a few ships with Kittyhawks. So it was a game changer for the DAF right away in that sense, as it represented a vast increase in their bomber force, with a much lower attrition rate per strike than the Blenheims (and much better bombing outcomes. Blenheim IV carried a 1,200 lb bomb load max - often less- and could only do level bombing and had marginal strafing ability. Blenheim cruising speed was less than 180 mph - some reports say closer to 120 mph. Kittyhawk cruising speed was around 240-300 mph which means get to targets much more quickly, get in and out of AAA and enemy fighter zone much more quickly etc.).

Part of why it took so long (and cost so many lives) before they improved the fighter vs fighter / air superiority situation in North Africa was it was a lower priority for the commanders, the main goal was to try to stop the Axis ground armies. The German fighter force was mainly just the JG.27, who were attacking with tactics optimized for maximum success but not necessarily maximum disruption of Allied air attacks, and the Italians were very limited by how much fuel they had so they operated on fewer days. So the DAF kind of ignored rather tragic (but i guess sustainable) losses in early 1942.

 

[beers]

Rene Francillion, John Lundstrom, Masanobu Tsuji, Henry Sakaida, Ikuhiko Hata and others kind of started this process for the Pacific Theater back in the 20th and earlier 21st Century, and it's getting easier now. The Senshi Sosho (official Japanese history of the Pacific War) is now partly accessible online, at least some of it translated into English. NHK has published thousands of war interviews with Japanese soldiers, sailors, pilots and aircrew, as well as newsreel clips and so on. There are now several score memoirs published by Japanese officers, many now translated into English. Several Universities in the US and Australia now have publicly accessible archives of primary source data for Japanese units*.

I will add that in decades before, it was VERY difficult to research anything japanese. The language itself went through huge changes around the 50s, and so it's not like you can ask anyone who happens to know japanese to translate things. Copying the characters themselves is obviously difficult with how intricate they are and you're likely to make a mistake you didn't even notice. Machine translation wouldn't be a thing until relatively recently and you still had the challenge of inputting the proper characters AND the challenge of how japanese works as a language. For anyone without significant resources, it was effectively impossible to find anything on your own.

But now, google translate can handle images with text on them fairly easily even for 'old japanese' and even if the wording comes out a bit clunky, IF the scan isn't so bad that the lines in the characters start mixing together you can definitely understand what a document says. The barrier to entry has moved a lot further down than it once was, now it's pretty much just "get documents in an acceptable quality". I know FineMolds found previously unknown documentation about the O-I superheavy tank in the archives not so long ago, there must be plenty of things in there that haven't seen the light of day since WW2.

We just don't actually get to see real ones flying very often...

Could be worse. Try to find a Ki-44...

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I will add that in decades before, it was VERY difficult to research anything japanese. The language itself went through huge changes around the 50s, and so it's not like you can ask anyone who happens to know japanese to translate things. Copying the characters themselves is obviously difficult with how intricate they are and you're likely to make a mistake you didn't even notice. Machine translation wouldn't be a thing until relatively recently and you still had the challenge of inputting the proper characters AND the challenge of how japanese works as a language. For anyone without significant resources, it was effectively impossible to find anything on your own.

But now, google translate can handle images with text on them fairly easily even for 'old japanese' and even if the wording comes out a bit clunky, IF the scan isn't so bad that the lines in the characters start mixing together you can definitely understand what a document says. The barrier to entry has moved a lot further down than it once was, now it's pretty much just "get documents in an acceptable quality". I know FineMolds found previously unknown documentation about the O-I superheavy tank in the archives not so long ago, there must be plenty of things in there that haven't seen the light of day since WW2.

Could be worse. Try to find a Ki-44...

Totally agree with all that. I'm not a huge AI fan in general but as a historian in another field (even harder to translate for us) I'm shocked by how good LLMs can be at translating really hard documents in quite archaic languages, and they don't even need text to be digitized (transcribed) any more.

 

[Shortround6]

I think the fighters were there basically by mid-year as I noted, with the 57th FG showing up first.

I believe you are somewhat correct and I am rather wrong.
Going by

57th Fighter Group

Yes the 57th was put aboard the Ranger on July 1st 1942 and flown off on July 19th 1943. it took about 4 hours to launch all the aircraft and they circled while all were launched and flew in mass formation to the Land airfield/s.
It took until Sept 16th for all (?) of the planes and men to be collected at A.F. 174 near El Alamein although some pilots and a few planes had flown with the British on some earlier missions. Which accounts for the Aug 9th claim/s. By Sept 13th the 57th had flown 158 sorties. Sept 16th sees the 57th begin independent operations as a reserve unit. On Oct 7th they are fully operational. By Oct 25th the group had flown 550 sorties or about 400 more in 42 days. and then they fought in the El Alamein battle. So earlier than I thought but not mid year.
One of the pages describes splitting the unit into two elements of ground personnel so one group could keep maintaining the aircraft as the other group moved forward to the next air base to expand their reach. Often air bases were assigned to specific units before they were captured to prevent confusion/congestion. And then the rear unit would pack up and move to rejoin or sometimes leap frog to another captured air field if the pursuit was moving fast.

the P-38s

Were flown down from England on the 8th-11th (?) day of the invasion while some of the ground crew had gone ashore with the ground troops to begin setting up the airfields on the 8th Aside from some F-4/F5 (?) recon planes there were no P-38s in North Africa before this movement of planes from England.

In Nov 1942 the US did not have a good idea of how to use the P-38. They had few (no) encounters in England. The few that were at Guadalcanal had only arrived about two weeks before the P-38s showed up in Algeria. It was faster and climbed better than the P-39/P-40 and had more range but they didn't really know what it could and could not do. The Same can be said of the P-40F. The British had real good idea of what the P-40E can do and the P-40K is not much different. But US experience with either is lacking or bad. Just about all US experience with P-40s prior to Nov 1942 is against the Japanese and many of those did not go well or were conducted while retreating through the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.
Planning on using the P-38s for high altitude work is understandable. Using them for other things within a few weeks or months in NA is also understandable as the Germans were not fighting at the altitudes they fought at in Europe (for get the B-17s, what were the Germans doing against the British "lean into France" raids.

The US got the British to equip 2 P-39 groups with Spitfires in the summer of 1942 and flew them from Gibraltar to North Africa.
The two P-39 groups that the US had in Torch were very quickly assigned ground attack and coastal patrol duties.

 

[Shortround6]

Kittyhawks were carrying 250 or 500 lbs bomb initially on the centerline, and that went up to 1,000 (one 500 in the centerline and two 250 lb on the wings) and then 1,500 (three 500 lbs), even 2,000 lbs (two 1,000 lb or one 1,000 and two 500 lb) for short flights

I believe they had to wait for the P-40Ns to handle the larger bomb loads?
Granted some pilots/squadrons did not follow the manuals recommendations. On the other had, it is North Africa, when did they even get 1000lb bombs to experiment with? Probably not in 1942. The famous raid using two 1000lbs was done about 1/2 way Italy?
The later P-40Ns were mentioned in the manual as being able to carry 2500lbs. A 500lb under the fuselage and a 1000lb under each wing. Just fitting a 100lb under fuselage might have been a problem or depends on runway.

 

[Shortround6]

The P-38J began full production in August 1943, it was fitted with more internal fuel in the J-15 block from December and received boosted ailerons along with dive flaps in the block 25 aircraft being the final 210 J models built starting in June 1944,

There was a several month overlap with the end of Hs and the start if Js? Engines were the same but the intercoolers used in Js were in short supply (vendor problem?)

going back to

I think with the P-38 the improvements also came more piecemeal, but each one helped. The H had a better intercooler which fixed some of the engine issues, and the ability to carry heavier drop tanks. The J which came in 1943 brought the boosted ailerons, again more fuel, and better turbos with more power. The L was the ultimate model but it came later.

The H's had some real problems with the intercooler. Just to be complete I will include the engines in the D & E but they are not relevant due to low numbers (210 Es built) but show the progression.
Model.......................take-off...............................................................Military power...............................War Eemergency
D&E...................1150hp at 40.3in to 25,000ft...............1150hp / 40.3in to 25,000ft............................doesn't exist
F..........................1240hp at 44.5in to 21,000ft w/r........1325hp / 47.0in to 15,000ft w/r...................doesn't exist
G..........................1240hp at 44.5in to 21,000ft w/r.......1425hp / 51.0in to 15,000ft w/r...................doesn't exist
H.........................1425hp at 54.0in to 22,000fr n/r........1425hp / 54.0in to 24.900fr w/r...................1600hp /60in to 7000ft w/r
J..........................1425hp at 54.0in to 26,600fr n/r........1425hp / 54.0in to 29,900fr w/r....................1600hp /60in to 25,8000ft w/r
L....................................same.........................................................same..........................................................................same.

W/r means with ram and n/r means without.
The F and G got the B-13 turbo instead of the B-2
The H and J/L got a newer turbo, the B-33.
The J & L either got new radiators or had the existing radiators moved out from the center line into deeper ducts.
J & L got new propellers.

The Gs didn't get much of a power jump. The H got some power boost is certain areas. less in others. The J really got a performance high up.

Drop tank situation is a bit confusing. P-38G-10s were supposed to get upgraded bomb capacity to 3200lbs and the last 200 built were supposed to be able to carry 300 gal drop tanks. However a 1944 manual lists P-38F-1-LO and later as being able to carry either two 150 gal tanks or two 300 gal tanks in the load/balance charts. More than a simple typo as they devote an entire column to the weight with the 300 gal tanks. and they list 1900lbs in the take-off and climb charts. Not saying there wasn't a mistake and they calculated things they shouldn't have or back dated some older airplanes on paper ? but it not just one entry being off by one number.
I will note that for many operations the ability to use a pair of 300 gal tanks on the older planes with only 300 gal of internal fuel doesn't buy any extra operational radius over the 150 gal tanks. Once the tanks are gone it is the remaining fuel in the internal tanks that says whither you get home or not.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

Most people look at WWII losses against enemy airplanes versus combat victories, so the F6F has a ratio of 19.1 : 1.

But, depending on how you lump losses together, it could be as bad as 2.1 : 1.

One thing people seem to forget is that wartime aerial victory claim figures should never be taken at face value. I rarely ever see anyone question them when quoting how X aircraft supposedly destroyed so and so many hundreds or thousands of enemy aircraft. All air forces in WW2 overclaimed, some more than others. I've done some research on kill claims in WW2, particularly in the Finnish theatre of the war, and have discovered that Soviet airmen in 1939-40 overclaimed by a factor of 12. It's higher if we include aircraft they claimed to have destroyed on the ground, but I don't currently have numbers for that. The Finns conversely barely overclaimed in that time period, but did so probably by a factor of 2 or 3 in 1941-44. It's always tougher to verify kills over water than it is over land, and the aerial battles over the Gulf of Finland particularly in 1942-43 played a significant part in the increased overclaiming. One can see the same effect in WW2 air battles over other bodies of water as well.

I'm curious, how much cross-checking of Allied aerial victory claims with Japanese records has been done?

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

Well, GregP , if you're still interested, here's a non-exhaustive list of primary(-ish?) sources on admitted Japanese losses, particularly those sustained against 2nd generation US fighter aircraft:

Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu cho): 201 Kōkūtai Kodochosho; 204 Kōkūtai Kodochosho; 251 Kōkūtai
Kodochosho; 252 Kōkūtai Kodochosho; 253 Kōkūtai Kodochosho; 582 Kōkūtai Kodochosho

These were taken from the bibliography of Claringbould's Osprey-published "Duel" book on the Corsair and Reisen, which is why it's non-exhaustive. There are numerous references to various Kodochosho throughout Pacific Wrecks as well, such as 705 Kōkūtai Kodochosho, for instance. The "Japanese Monographs", though post-war and technically secondary sources, were written by former IJN and IJA officers. Dunn, who has made much use of these documents, both in his contributions to Pacific Wrecks, his book on the "South Pacific Air War", and elsewhere, has admitted in said book that they are of uneven quality due to the varying degrees of access the authors had to official records or notes of direct participants of combat, though he claims that "the best examples are of immense value to non-Japanese speakers", a sentiment shared by other academics, like, for instance, Steve Phillips of Towson University. They also underwent many revisions in the 1950s, and many were almost entirely rewritten, with many corrections to errors in translation to English or in alignment with facts. At least some of them can be found here and here, though they seem to be missing some particularly relevant monographs, like Monograph 142, for example.

I have a real problem with single quotes after seeing how selection of quotes can make a leader look like a genius or an idiot, just chose the quotes according to the preferred conclusion. The most obvious question, what data was used in drawing the conclusion,

Admittedly, upon re-reading that section of Dunn's article, which is where I found the quote, it was contained in Nimitz's monthly report for 1944, in a discussion of the tactical ratio of kills to losses in three particular carrier actions that took place in February and March. Admittedly, the Hellcat had been racking up kills against the Reisen by this time, and, outside of the Rabaul-Solomons Area, Japanese casualties were finally beginning to approach US claims, shockingly. From what I've read, it appears that there is a major disparity between Japanese losses in the West Pacific and in the South Pacific, and I'm not entirely sure why, even if there exist established factors like reduced training and shortages in experienced and trained pilots. For instance, in a raid on Truk on February 17, 1944, a sizeable number of Reisens, around 40-80(?), engaged 72 Hellcats. The Hellcats claimed 62 "Zekes" with paltry losses. At least 18 pilots of the 204th Kōkūtai alone were reported killed, and 45 Reisens and 20 other Japanese aircraft, in total, didn't return from flight operations. No raid on Rabaul that I know of inflicted losses that severe on the Reisen, never mind Japanese aircraft, and there were numerous engagements where Reisen numbers approached those in that particular Truk raid. Some of the Reisens at the Truk raid were loaded with bombs, but nevertheless, it remains a slaughter. Other questions arise, including the effectiveness of the Corsair versus that of the Hellcat, given that the former hadn't inflicted such losses on the Reisen up to this point, and so on.

The Marianas Turkey shoot, in particular the reports of Japanese aircraft tactics, would support the Nimitz conclusions. Add the reports the fighter pilots defending the IJN carriers in the battle seemed to be the more experienced.

Are you sure? I find that hard to believe. Discussions and sources here and elsewhere suggest otherwise...

By end 1943 everyone agrees the allies had opened up a quality gap between them and the Japanese, in both average aircrew and average aircraft performance, allied tactics had improved and greater efforts could be sustained

That's true, I suppose, especially for the conflict as a whole, but the exact specifics are where disagreement lies. I've been mulling over posting claims and losses from what I have of Claringbould's and Dunn's works (along with other sources, like Pacific Wrecks, as points of comparison), particularly for each 2nd generation Allied aircraft, and I believe that their findings will stir much discussion here. This is certainly no open-and-shut case.

while awarded claims became more accurate as things like gun cameras became standard features

Never close to accurate, however, if Dunn's article on this issue is anything to go by. According to a formula from Commodore Bates' Leyte study, USN victory claims around mid-1944 were approximately 64% correct.

Thinking back to your point of the fighter-bomber capabilities of the Corsair, S Steamed_Banana , I still wonder if the Corsair could have been more specialised for this purpose, something vaguely similar to the F2G, or replaced with a hypothetical design with that role in mind. I believe that the Lightning, the Thunderbolt, and later P-40 models were also designed with high-altitude combat in mind, so this applies to them too, at least to some degree. I'm thinking that the optimal US fighter line-up might have been to have low-altitude, slower but more manoeuvrable, dedicated fighter-bombers, supplemented by fast, high-altitude escort fighters, if they were truly needed for the Pacific and CBI. This does depend on how much agreement there is over the combat performance of these fighter aircraft; Dunn claims that the Lightning was the second-worst performing aircraft in the South Pacific, for instance. I may begin posting his record of the Lightning soon, for the sake of further discussion. I will provide his article on the P-38 here, if you want to read through it.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

There were 3 P-38J-1 42-12867/12869 accepted in September 1942, 7 more 42-13560/13566 accepted in June 1943, they have been called experimental shop jobs, P-38F production was February to October 1942, P-38G June 1942 to April 1943, P-38H was 1 in March then May to August 1943, P-38J-5 in August. P-38J production ran until June 1944 (plus 1 in November, 44-23561, the P-38L mock up), P-38L June 1944 to August 1945. The following late P-38J-25 are marked modified to F-5 44-23602/23611, 23687, 23689/23718, 23720/23768

so they doubled down on the Kittyhawks which they got a lot of pretty quickly and rapidly equipped several squadrons with them.

One problem when assessing Middle east aircraft strength is Takoradi was Middle East for reporting purposes, aircraft just arrived there were added to those in Egypt as far as London/Churchill was concerned. When it comes to Tomahawks a pair were sent from Britain end December 1940 and arrived in Takoradi month later, 100 arrived from the US week ending 14 February 1941, another 120 from the US weeks ending 11 April to 30 May. Fly outs started week ending 13 March. Egypt did not always report arrivals but noted 96 by week ending 4 July and 190 by week ending 17 October, Takoradi says it flew out 212. In July 1941 Britain sent another 22 Tomahawks to Egypt, while as of early July the US had sent 231 of which 45 had arrived, by mid August US shipments totalled 296 of which 211 had arrived. The UK shipment arrived late September/early October, same as the last of the US shipments. All up 540 but not all made it to Egypt.

The RAF import reports do not usually give Kittyhawk versions until September 1943, with the same problems as above, the Middle East started receiving Kittyhawk I in October 1941, 42 by the end of the year and 30 more by end March, total 72. Kittyhawk (no mark) imports started in February 1942, 291 by end June, 515 by end August thereby exceeding the number of Tomahawks, and 712 by end 1942.

On the other hand, the Kittyhawks were much better than Tomahawks (or Hurricanes) as fighter bombers, which was really the top priority for the DAF in those days.

The RAF started a trial project factory fitting around 100 Hurricane IIB with bomb racks, September to December 1941, Fighter Command first fighter bomber sortie 30 October 1941, number 607 squadron, attacking Tingray transformer station. Meantime using converted Hurricane I and light bombs Western Desert first fighter bomber sortie 20 November 1941, number 80 squadron, attacking vehicles. All up 230 IIB and 40 IIC with racks built to end October 1942. Few other IIB were converted and they took time to arrive in the Middle East, while most IIC had the bomb racks fitted. The aircraft census as of June 1944 reports only a nett (that is conversions to less conversions from) sixty six to IIBB but three thousand one hundred and thirty two conversions to IICB, the trailing B standing for bomber. Cleared to 500 pound bombs.

As built the P-40C was the first to have an under fuselage rack, but not the RAF Tomahawk II, the P-40D had provision for wing racks for 40 pound bombs, a capacity that stayed through to the M model. In the quest for performance the March 1943 P-40N-1 dropped the wing racks, 2 machine guns, some internal fuel capacity etc. then the May 1943 N-5 went the other way restoring the guns etc. while introducing wing racks apparently initially rated to 100lb then 250lb. Given the US system once there was a rack it could carry US bombs or fuel and easy enough to fit British bombs, though apparently the P-40C model was only rated to carry under fuselage fuel. The N-5 introduced the 27 inch wheels, which stayed until the N-40 went back to 30 inch wheels, the smaller wheels had problems with increased weights. The N-20 had a bomb sight added. Given the ranges involved in the desert fighting, P-40 performance issues and drop tank supply it seems a lot of RAF Kittyhawks had the under fuselage rack removed until they started carrying bombs.

Kittyhawks were carrying 250 or 500 lbs bomb initially on the centerline, and that went up to 1,000 (one 500 in the centerline and two 250 lb on the wings) and then 1,500 (three 500 lbs), even 2,000 lbs (two 1,000 lb or one 1,000 and two 500 lb) for short flights, and they could 'dive bomb' at a fairly high angle and with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

As noted above beyond 500 pounds arrives in mid 1943 unless you count creative uses of the under fuselage rack (6x250 pound anyone?). In March 1942 112 Squadron with Kittyhawk IA/P-40E-1 started experimenting with bombs, by May the squadron was doing bombing operations training, first mission on 16 May.

Blenheim IV carried a 1,200 lb bomb load max - often less- and could only do level bombing and had marginal strafing ability. Blenheim cruising speed was less than 180 mph - some reports say closer to 120 mph. Kittyhawk cruising speed was around 240-300 mph which means get to targets much more quickly, get in and out of AAA and enemy fighter zone much more quickly etc.).

The RAF performance charts list the Blenheim as having a maximum bomb load of 1,000 pounds, the mark I top speed as 265 mph and range as 678 miles at 230 mph with 1,000 pounds of bombs, the mark IV top speed as 266 mph and range as 1,169 miles at 225 mph with 1,000 pounds of bombs, at economic cruise of 170 mph with 1,000 pounds of bombs range becomes 1,457 miles. Looking at the Bomber Command raid reports no mention of 1,200 pound loads, while the nominal 1,000 pound of bombs Fairey Battles used their wing racks for 1,500 pound loads. The early Tomahawk top speed is reported as 345 mph, no capacity for bombs, range at 278 mph with 85 gallons of fuel 485 miles, with 107 gallons 615 miles, at 185 mph with 107 gallons 800 miles.

So when did Blenheims carry 1,200 pound loads, what does often and much less mean, after all P-40 ended up rated at 1,500 pounds or more but often, in fact usually, carried much less. Also compare likes, either economic or fast cruise speeds.

Part of why it took so long (and cost so many lives) before they improved the fighter vs fighter / air superiority situation in North Africa was it was a lower priority for the commanders, the main goal was to try to stop the Axis ground armies.

The armies were about the only targets in the desert apart from the one sealed road and the rather small ports, however the RAF was painfully aware how good and plentiful German light flak was, plus how difficult it was to attack dug in/dispersed troops, so its fighters were mostly tasked with air superiority, including strafing enemy airfields, instead of attacking enemy troops. The Mediterranean was where the lower performance fighters predominated. Also 1941/42 is when the RAF reached peak inefficiency with the loss of so many pre war personnel and training program times cut to produce the numbers needed to compensate for performance. As the Germans only maintained small fighter forces in the west and south it was possible to give them the latest versions and well trained pilots, the use of altitude performance in the desert resulted in escorted RAF bombers not being heavily exposed to fighter attack, rather than risk being caught below the escorts the Luftwaffe went after the fighters, not the bombers. A situation allowed for as bombing raids against troops rarely did much damage unless the troops were on the move, in which case strafing became dangerous.

The German fighter force was mainly just the JG.27, who were attacking with tactics optimized for maximum success but not necessarily maximum disruption of Allied air attacks, and the Italians were very limited by how much fuel they had so they operated on fewer days. So the DAF kind of ignored rather tragic (but i guess sustainable) losses in early 1942.

The desert was only one part of the RAF in the Middle East, from June 1940 to end October 1941 RAF aircraft casualties in Egypt are listed as 379 destroyed and 258 damaged, Malta 156 and 68, Palestine/Syria 32 and 29, Greece/Crete 115 and 93, East Africa (Kenya, Sudan, Italian East Africa, Aden, Madagascar) 150 and 86, Iraq 21 and 11, figures from AIR 22/401. Apart from Malta the other campaigns were over as far as the RAF was concerned.

18 November 1941, Operation Crusader starts, 17 January 1942 axis garrisons at Sollum and Halfaya surrender, 21 January axis counter attack, 7 February Gazala line consolidates, 26 May Axis attack the Gazala line, 21 June Tobruk surrenders, 1 July Germans arrive at Alamein line, 22 July first axis attempt to break the line is called off, 30 August second axis attempt to break line, 23 October 8th Army attack, 8 November Torch landings.

RAF Egypt aircraft casualties, November 1941, 131 destroyed, 74 damaged (up until then 53 lost in June was the biggest monthly loss), in December 169/55. For 1942 73/11, 69/17, 54/27, 70/34, 103/44 (Gazala), 187/117, 186/114 (1st Alamein), 106/49, 106/62, 139/83 (2nd Alamein), 114/49, 45/24. US losses August to December 1942 put at 2/0, 5/1, 6/7, 8/1, 10/8.

Meantime operation Torch forces, November 1942 RAF 47/11, USAAF 20/17, December 60/13 and 46/23.

To end December 1942 what the RAF calls Egypt forces 1,931 aircraft lost, 1,046 damaged, to end 1943 2,337/1,224, North West Africa to end December 1942 combined losses 173/64, to end 1943 1,948/1,689.

By the way the RAF thinks the USAAF North West Africa lost 2 P-38 to enemy action in November 1942, then 28 in December, then 46 in January 1943.

In November 1941 the RAF in Egypt lost 47+4 (enemy + not enemy action) Hurricane, 29+2 Tomahawk, 4+0 Beaufighter, 13+9 Wellington, 19+7 Blenheim, 12+0 Maryland, 4+0 Boston, 2+0 Beaufort.

Nimitz quote

Admittedly, upon re-reading that section of Dunn's article, which is where I found the quote, it was contained in Nimitz's monthly report for 1944, in a discussion of the tactical ratio of kills to losses in three particular carrier actions that took place in February and March.

So the tactic of sending the fighters in first, low approach, climbing at the last moment to avoid radar, was successful, the combat reports noting the decline in enemy pilot quality, the reports the Hellcat etc. had a performance edge all added up to Nimitz concluding even if the number of claims were exaggerated by 3 the allies were pulling ahead, when the post war figures indicates overclaims were under 2 to 1. This is claimed proof Nimitz was another person who hadn't considered things well enough, perhaps it is the other way around.

In the west Pacific the US was hitting largely untested defences with more power than the defences had. Also those defences had little warning about what was coming. The Japanese could distinguish between Halsey and Spruance commanding and that something was going to happen at fleet level, but exactly where and when remained elusive, then comes the actual timing of the strikes themselves.

Rabaul was very experienced, had more area to hide/disperse and a well tested warning system, including outposts to call in sightings, add it looks like the allied raids tended to come in at altitude, like they wanted the Japanese to know they were coming, something like the 8th Air Force from the second half of 1944.

Other questions arise, including the effectiveness of the Corsair versus that of the Hellcat, given that the former hadn't inflicted such losses on the Reisen up to this point, and so on.

Perhaps the Corsairs had not been in a situation where they had the numbers and the defending fighters were largely caught unaware but still tried to get into the air. Truk and its ships were classified more important than the bases around Rabaul.

The average better quality of the fighters defending the IJN fleet in June 1944 are reported widely, including in the Y'Blood book Red Sun Setting. Think the more experienced pilots were likely to survive strikes on the USN fleet, before any being held back for the crucial defence role, add the USN defences were well warned and ended up having more interceptors than targets while the strike on the IJN fleet was hasty giving the defenders more chances.

"while awarded claims became more accurate as things like gun cameras became standard features "

Never close to accurate, however, if Dunn's article on this issue is anything to go by. According to a formula from Commodore Bates' Leyte study, USN victory claims around mid-1944 were approximately 64% correct.

Thanks for letting people know the discussion is probably going to be pointless since a 3 to 2 overclaim is still not good enough, particularly if it includes comments like those for Nimitz. In British intelligence in the Second World War by Hinsley, F. H. (Francis Harry) he notes with the help of Ultra RAF Fighter Command early 1943 fighter versus fighter combat awarded kills were almost exactly the number of Luftwaffe losses and that seems to be the standard required. Sort of like the Luftwaffe night fighter force claims until the change in tactics after the introduction of Window. In Six Months to Oblivion by Werner Gerbig, published in 1973, he only had the Luftwaffe pilot casualties. Comparing them to USAAF fighter claims gives an idea of accuracy, which was below 2 to 1 overall and close to 1 to 1 on some days, later studies include Luftwaffe aircraft losses. In 1940 Dowding/Fighter Command thought it prudent to check pilot's claims by doing things like counting Luftwaffe wrecks, they came to the quite accurate conclusion the overclaiming was about 2 to 1.

Luftwaffe claims for 8th Air Force B-17 are remarkably consistent from month to month, 2 awarded for every 1 shot down, a study of Luftwaffe gun camera footage noted the most predictable variable about whether a claim was awarded was not the apparent amount of damage but the rank of the pilot.

I still wonder if the Corsair could have been more specialised for this purpose, something vaguely similar to the F2G, or replaced with a hypothetical design with that role in mind.

Any of the fighter designs could have traded some performance for bomb carrying capacity. In 1942/43 the US needed fighters, in addition the ranges between friendly airbases and enemy targets in places like the Solomons made bomb carrying a problem, the heavy bombers are a more efficient way of delivering tonnage. The fighter bombers more survivable in disputed airspace.

The USN rates the F5F-3 1,500 feet economic cruise range with a 150 gallon drop tank as 1,340 statute miles, combat radius 335 nautical miles, dropping to 1,170 statute miles adding a 1,000 pound bomb, combat radius 310 nautical miles, and 1,175 statute miles with 6x5 inch HVAR rockets, combat radius 305 nautical miles. The F4U-1D with 150 gallon drop tank 1,510 statute miles, combat radius 345 nautical miles, add a 1,000 pound bomb range 1,360 statute miles, combat radius 330 nautical miles or with 8 rockets 1,350 statute miles, combat radius 315 nautical miles. A pair of 1,000 pound bombs means no drop tank, range 805 statute miles, combat radius 85 nautical miles.

I believe that the Lightning, the Thunderbolt, and later P-40 models were also designed with high-altitude combat in mind, so this applies to them too, at least to some degree.

Not the P-40, it was never rated as good at altitude, even the Merlin versions, the later versions boosted its fighter bomber capacity.

I'm thinking that the optimal US fighter line-up might have been to have low-altitude, slower but more manoeuvrable, dedicated fighter-bombers, supplemented by fast, high-altitude escort fighters,

Low altitude strike aircraft need medium level escorts as your escorts have to be far enough away they can be at speed but close enough to intercept the interceptors.

In building turbo supercharged fighters and bombers the USAAF optimised its performance in the 20 to 30,000 foot range, which it used with quite good effect against the medium level Fw190A in particular. The Japanese built a good medium level force which caused them problems with the B-29 and some problems with the B-17 and B-24. Without strong Japanese AA defences the allied bombers could go in lower and be more accurate which in turn dragged the escorts lower, towards the medium altitudes, cancelling out some of their performance advantages. In any case lots of the allied bombers did not have the altitude performance of the heavies. The various articles being referenced indicate the P-38 problems at medium altitudes even though that eased the dive speed problems. The Luftwaffe pilots worried more about a P-38 below them, thanks to acceleration and climbing abilities, than one above them.

Navies generally do not need high altitude performance, hitting moving ships is hard enough from low altitude, dive bombers do not need the problems associated with diving from above 20,000 feet. Even so the F4U and F6F best speed was around 23 to 24,000 feet, about 5,000 feet above the F4F while the TBF best speed was around 12,000 feet, the early SB2C 13,400 feet, later 16,000 feet, the SBD-5 15,700 feet. The weights of superchargers add to the take off distances as they provide little to no extra power at sea level.

The slower dedicated fighter bombers could be purpose built bombers. However the RAAF built up a dedicated dive bomber force that was retired soon after entering combat, they were not economical in a situation where airfield space was limited. The fighters and level bombers were a better use of space. The ideal fighter bomber is also capable of helping achieve air superiority as well as bombing, also the more types in service the less overall numbers thanks to the supply requirements. In France in 1944 there were all those P-38, P-47, P-51 and Spitfires optimised for 20,000 feet or higher doing missions where 10,000 feet was high altitude, that was the reality of taking years between framing the requirement and having the numbers, after planning for strong opposition.

if they were truly needed for the Pacific and CBI. This does depend on how much agreement there is over the combat performance of these fighter aircraft;

No actually, what was needed varied over time and location, what was on hand had to be adapted.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

So the tactic of sending the fighters in first, low approach, climbing at the last moment to avoid radar, was successful, the combat reports noting the decline in enemy pilot quality, the reports the Hellcat etc. had a performance edge all added up to Nimitz concluding even if the number of claims were exaggerated by 3 the allies were pulling ahead, when the post war figures indicates overclaims were under 2 to 1. This is claimed proof Nimitz was another person who hadn't considered things well enough, perhaps it is the other way around.

In the west Pacific the US was hitting largely untested defences with more power than the defences had. Also those defences had little warning about what was coming. The Japanese could distinguish between Halsey and Spruance commanding and that something was going to happen at fleet level, but exactly where and when remained elusive, then comes the actual timing of the strikes themselves.

Rabaul was very experienced, had more area to hide/disperse and a well tested warning system, including outposts to call in sightings, add it looks like the allied raids tended to come in at altitude, like they wanted the Japanese to know they were coming, something like the 8th Air Force from the second half of 1944.


Perhaps the Corsairs had not been in a situation where they had the numbers and the defending fighters were largely caught unaware but still tried to get into the air. Truk and its ships were classified more important than the bases around Rabaul.

Makes sense. I am still left wondering just how much of a force multiplier the Corsair's performance and firepower were, especially in light of Claringbould's and Dunn's research. Would the Corsair have needed the numbers if it was as good as many people, both officially, online and in literature, have claimed it was? The same goes for any other 2nd-generation US/Allied fighter aircraft. Either way, if everything proceeds smoothly, I will go through both authors' works on this thread at some point in the near future. This should shed further light on my concerns for these aircraft.

The average better quality of the fighters defending the IJN fleet in June 1944 are reported widely, including in the Y'Blood book Red Sun Setting. Think the more experienced pilots were likely to survive strikes on the USN fleet, before any being held back for the crucial defence role, add the USN defences were well warned and ended up having more interceptors than targets while the strike on the IJN fleet was hasty giving the defenders more chances.


"while awarded claims became more accurate as things like gun cameras became standard features "

I see. I do wonder about the composition of experienced and trained IJN pilots, both in that battle and elsewhere, the February 17 Truk raid in particular, as apparently, there was a mixture of combat veterans and fresher replacements on the island around that time. From pilot reports, inexperienced pilots were less likely to coordinate effectively, so I wonder how much they dragged down their seasoned counterparts, and how the various encounters of 1944 and beyond might have played out if there were more experienced Japanese pilots participating in them.

Thanks for letting people know the discussion is probably going to be pointless since a 3 to 2 overclaim is still not good enough, particularly if it includes comments like those for Nimitz.

I admit, I got a bit carried away there...I should have added somewhere in my post that I acknowledge a decrease in over-claiming. Dunn does, himself, claim that over-claiming could be quite high in certain encounters through mid-to-late 1944, even. He states, for instance, that fighters of Task Force 38 claimed more than twice the Japanese losses on October 24, 1944. He does note that claims against bombers were fairly accurate, though some of these aircraft were also claimed by ship AA fire, but claims against Japanese fighters were apparently much higher than Japanese losses, over two-fold even. He wording suggests that it is just one particular example out of many such cases.

Any of the fighter designs could have traded some performance for bomb carrying capacity. In 1942/43 the US needed fighters, in addition the ranges between friendly airbases and enemy targets in places like the Solomons made bomb carrying a problem, the heavy bombers are a more efficient way of delivering tonnage. The fighter bombers more survivable in disputed airspace.

The USN rates the F5F-3 1,500 feet economic cruise range with a 150 gallon drop tank as 1,340 statute miles, combat radius 335 nautical miles, dropping to 1,170 statute miles adding a 1,000 pound bomb, combat radius 310 nautical miles, and 1,175 statute miles with 6x5 inch HVAR rockets, combat radius 305 nautical miles. The F4U-1D with 150 gallon drop tank 1,510 statute miles, combat radius 345 nautical miles, add a 1,000 pound bomb range 1,360 statute miles, combat radius 330 nautical miles or with 8 rockets 1,350 statute miles, combat radius 315 nautical miles. A pair of 1,000 pound bombs means no drop tank, range 805 statute miles, combat radius 85 nautical miles.


Not the P-40, it was never rated as good at altitude, even the Merlin versions, the later versions boosted its fighter bomber capacity.


Low altitude strike aircraft need medium level escorts as your escorts have to be far enough away they can be at speed but close enough to intercept the interceptors.

In building turbo supercharged fighters and bombers the USAAF optimised its performance in the 20 to 30,000 foot range, which it used with quite good effect against the medium level Fw190A in particular. The Japanese built a good medium level force which caused them problems with the B-29 and some problems with the B-17 and B-24. Without strong Japanese AA defences the allied bombers could go in lower and be more accurate which in turn dragged the escorts lower, towards the medium altitudes, cancelling out some of their performance advantages. In any case lots of the allied bombers did not have the altitude performance of the heavies. The various articles being referenced indicate the P-38 problems at medium altitudes even though that eased the dive speed problems. The Luftwaffe pilots worried more about a P-38 below them, thanks to acceleration and climbing abilities, than one above them.

Navies generally do not need high altitude performance, hitting moving ships is hard enough from low altitude, dive bombers do not need the problems associated with diving from above 20,000 feet. Even so the F4U and F6F best speed was around 23 to 24,000 feet, about 5,000 feet above the F4F while the TBF best speed was around 12,000 feet, the early SB2C 13,400 feet, later 16,000 feet, the SBD-5 15,700 feet. The weights of superchargers add to the take off distances as they provide little to no extra power at sea level.

The slower dedicated fighter bombers could be purpose built bombers. However the RAAF built up a dedicated dive bomber force that was retired soon after entering combat, they were not economical in a situation where airfield space was limited. The fighters and level bombers were a better use of space. The ideal fighter bomber is also capable of helping achieve air superiority as well as bombing, also the more types in service the less overall numbers thanks to the supply requirements. In France in 1944 there were all those P-38, P-47, P-51 and Spitfires optimised for 20,000 feet or higher doing missions where 10,000 feet was high altitude, that was the reality of taking years between framing the requirement and having the numbers, after planning for strong opposition.


No actually, what was needed varied over time and location, what was on hand had to be adapted.

Well, at the end of the day, my main concern, in light of research from revisionist authors like Claringbould and Dunn, is whether or not the Lightning, and other 2nd generation US (and Allied) aircraft like the Corsair, Thunderbolt and Hellcat, were truly effective against seemingly lesser aircraft like the Reisen and the Hayabusa. Whether or not the strengths the Allied aircraft possessed were actual advantages, or even force multipliers like their oft-mentioned, and unreliably high, claim-to-loss ratios, would seem to suggest. How much factors external—with little direct relation, if at all—to aircraft design contributed to later successes, whether or not the 2nd-generation of Allied aircraft truly succeeded on their individual merits. How much their performance advantage actually was. Whether or not they, struggling against simpler designs, were extravagant and over-engineered, unfit for purpose. Whether or not these Allied aircraft were truly an improvement over their predecessors, especially in combat. Whether or not the design philosophy behind the Reisen and its army counterpart was wiser, more cost-effective and, dare I say, superior, especially with its primary theatres in mind. Whether or not this whole affair is an example of advanced technology failing, and what this means for technological advancement as a whole. From what I've read, the facts do not appear to favour the superiority of the 2nd-generation Allied aircraft all that much, and I may share at least some of them in the near future. We can discuss the validity of these findings and the sources that were used to come to them, but until then, I must agree to disagree. I cannot respect planes driven by wild fantasies and hot air.

 

[Shortround6]

A few notes.

Blenheim IV carried a 1,200 lb bomb load max - often less- and could only do level bombing and had marginal strafing ability.

Post war (?) the capacity of the Blenheim seems to have grown.

There was rack (or two) that could be fitted under the rear of fuselage behind the bomb bay that could hold four 20lb or 40lb bombs in each rack.
There are photos of a few planes carrying two racks, one behind the other. Very popular in model box cover art
In practical use there could be some problems. External racks caused drag, either with bombs or without.
Which airfields actually had the racks or the 40lb bombs (more common type).
40lb bombs are going to follow a different trajectory than either the 500lb or 250lb bombs complicating bomb aiming.
Did the under fuselage bomb racks need to be compensated by using less fuel or by not carrying four 250lbs in the bomb bay? like only 3 bombs?

It was quite possible to carry 40lbs (or smaller) bombs inside the bomb bay but you needed a standard British small bomb carrier to do that. That metal box thing that hung on a standard bomb rack and stayed with plane.
This website has a lot of good information although the above foto shows that the ML IVs did carry the external LBC under fuselage and not under the wing/s.
Not saying they never did, but try to to find a foto.

Blenheim armament

This also supports the problems the British had with getting good bombs to the planes/crews in 1939-42.
If the plane was fitted with 2 external racks the plane had a theoretical capacity of 1320lbs (four 250lb and eight 40lb bombs) but we don't know if they ever filled every rack space.

later P-40 models were also designed with high-altitude combat in mind,

The only P-40 model designed for high-altitude combat was the P-40Q (3 built, no two the same).
The P-40M & N got the Allison engines with different supercharger gear and a 15,000-15,500ft rating for the engine instead of the 11,500ft rating of the previous model Allison but by Jan 1943 that altitude rating was not considered "high".
Depending on when even the the P-40F and L would not be considered as being designed for high-altitude combat in the way the P-38 and P-47 were. With only about 800-850 hp at 15,000 compared to even the 1100hp (estimated ) of the P-38G we can see that even the P-40F was going to be in trouble at "high" altitude.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

The only P-40 model designed for high-altitude combat was the P-40Q (3 built, no two the same).
The P-40M & N got the Allison engines with different supercharger gear and a 15,000-15,500ft rating for the engine instead of the 11,500ft rating of the previous model Allison but by Jan 1943 that altitude rating was not considered "high".
Depending on when even the the P-40F and L would not be considered as being designed for high-altitude combat in the way the P-38 and P-47 were. With only about 800-850 hp at 15,000 compared to even the 1100hp (estimated ) of the P-38G we can see that even the P-40F was going to be in trouble at "high" altitude.

My wording was off, admittedly. Still, the P-40F was, according to Dunn, designed with better high altitude performance in mind, and US aircraft designs in general were trending towards better high altitude performance for high altitude combat, weren't they? That forms a part of my main point.

 

[Shortround6]

My wording was off, admittedly. Still, the P-40F was, according to Dunn, designed with better high altitude performance in mind, and US aircraft designs in general were trending towards better high altitude performance for high altitude combat, weren't they? That forms a part of my main point.

I can certainly agree with "better".

Allison had tried to use the 9.60 supercharger gears at the end of 1941 but the increased load (power needed to drive the supercharger) caused them to fail and they went back to the 8.80 gears for most/all of 1942 while they redesigned the gears and the gear housing (they needed wider gears to spread the load out).
US was supposed to get 1/3 of Packard's production of the the first 9,000 Merlin production so they needed to figure out what they were going to use them and the P-39 was off the table.
There was no time to design a completely new airplane ( Mustang was British) and that leave you with either a P-38 with Merlin XX engines and no turbos and with two engines turning in the same direction or you stuff them into P-40s. Prototype P-40F flew in the summer of 1941.
If Allison had gotten the 9.60 gears to work it would have about split the difference between the P-40E/K and the P-40F as far as altitude performance went. The USSAC was aiming for 25,000ft for high altitude performance was was getting it, sort of, in the not quite up to snuff P-43s.
For context the USAAC gave an order for 733 P-47B&C aircraft in Sept 1940, tail end of the BoB in the same month that Packard got the contract to tool up a production line for the Merlin and in same month that Ford got a contract to build a factory for P & W R-2800s at 800 engines per month. A lot of stuff going on in the fall of 1940.
The P-40D/E and British equivalent were ordered in May/June of 1940 with the first flying almost a year later.

Does Dunn have any documents saying what was planned when?

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

Blenheim IV carried a 1,200 lb bomb load max - often less- and could only do level bombing and had marginal strafing ability.

On a loosely related note, sources on Finnish Blenheims (Mk. I & IV) give them a bomb load of 600-1,000 kg (1,323-2,205 lb), although because of the short Finnish runways this was often limited in practice to 600 kg (1,323 lb) or even below it. The VL-built Mk. Is differed from the British-built Mk. Is to the point that Bristol called them Mk. IIs (not to be confused with the British Mk. II reconnaissance variant). The VL-built Mk. IVs (the VI series of FAF Blenheims) likewise differed I believe a fair bit from British-built Mk. IVs.

According to some rough math, looks like Finnish Blenheims dropped shy of 1,500,000 kg (3,306,934 lb), or 1,500 tonnes (1,653 short tons) of bombs during 1939-1945. Any idea how many tonnes of bombs the British dropped with their Blenheims in that time period?

 

[SaparotRob]

On a loosely related note, sources on Finnish Blenheims (Mk. I & IV) give them a bomb load of 600-1,000 kg (1,323-2,205 lb), although because of the short Finnish runways this was often limited in practice to 600 kg (1,323 lb) or even below it. The VL-built Mk. Is differed from the British-built Mk. Is to the point that Bristol called them Mk. IIs (not to be confused with the British Mk. II reconnaissance variant). The VL-built Mk. IVs (the VI series of FAF Blenheims) likewise differed I believe a fair bit from British-built Mk. IVs.

According to some rough math, looks like Finnish Blenheims dropped shy of 1,500,000 kg (3,306,934 lb), or 1,500 tonnes (1,653 short tons) of bombs during 1939-1945. Any idea how many tonnes of bombs the British dropped with their Blenheims in that time period?

I have no idea but your avatar is really cool.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Geoffrey's numbers for P-40 bomb load are laughable. The Hawk 87 / Kittyhawk types were routinely carrying multiple 250, 300, and 500 lb bombs and (when available) 1,000 lb bombs in the Med, in the South Pacific, in China, and in Burma from early 1942. As I noted previously, the actual limits of capacity were figured out at the squadron level, in the field, partly because they were so desperate in this very same units to stop escorting Blenheims, which they considered extremely hazardous due to the slow speed they had to maintain. I'm not even going to bother to debate that. It's easy to find this out from any source which includes this type of plane as the ordinance is mentioned in the mission descriptions and is often literally shown in photos.

So what if the Blenheim carried 1,000 or 1,200 or 1,350 lbs bombs? It was a dud by that same period (1942). It carried less bombs than a Kittyhawk, was much slower, had shorter range, and was vastly more vulnerable to both enemy fighters and enemy flak. This is why it was quickly phased out from front line duties and replaced by much faster Bostons, Marylands, Baltimores, and yes, Kittyhawks (and Hurricanes)

I bought the specific book Jobin the Goblin was referring to, I think, or one of them, and I have thoughts. But I'll get into that in some detail tomorrow when I have the book in front of me. I've only read parts of it so far. But I will say this at the outset here - In this book, Claringbould is very bothered by overclaiming, bothered much more by Allied overclaiming than by Japanese (which he often mentions as an afterthought), and based on his own data I think clearly has his thumb on the scale in a few specific cases that I've read through so far.

I have to check publication dates to see if there is a timeline factor here, but I'm a little surprised. I have been reading his other series (South Pacific Air War and Solomons Air War) for a couple of years now and while he does sometimes wax very excited about overclaiming by wide margins which happened sometimes, he seemed to overall be much more sober and balanced, even prosaic, in his writing in those books than in this Pacific Profiles thing. But more on all that tomorrow.

 

[Pale Runner]

On a loosely related note, sources on Finnish Blenheims (Mk. I & IV) give them a bomb load of 600-1,000 kg (1,323-2,205 lb), although because of the short Finnish runways this was often limited in practice to 600 kg (1,323 lb) or even below it. The VL-built Mk. Is differed from the British-built Mk. Is to the point that Bristol called them Mk. IIs (not to be confused with the British Mk. II reconnaissance variant). The VL-built Mk. IVs (the VI series of FAF Blenheims) likewise differed I believe a fair bit from British-built Mk. IVs.

According to some rough math, looks like Finnish Blenheims dropped shy of 1,500,000 kg (3,306,934 lb), or 1,500 tonnes (1,653 short tons) of bombs during 1939-1945. Any idea how many tonnes of bombs the British dropped with their Blenheims in that time period?

In practice the max bomb load for Blenheim in finnish service was 800kg.

 

[ColFord]

Most books/articles on the Mustang say that there were 620 Mustang Is built for the British starting in April 1941 but production starts off slow and shipping takes around 2 months. They don't go operational until April 1942.
The P-51 (Mustang IA), 150 planes was ordered by the British but the US grabs 57 of them after Pearl Harbor (actually summer of 1942).
A-36 was next off the production lines, starting in Oct 1942. British get 1.
The P-51A followed the A-36s in March 1943 and the British get 50 as repayment for the 57 P-51s with cannon that the US grabbed.

Now where is the Myth that all of the early ones went to to Britain? Yes P-51As did go China-Burma-India but they don't start showing up in theater until Sept-Oct 1943.
Some A-36s are sent from Italy to the CBI theater.
What is "early"?
Allison powered Mustangs go into action in the CBI within 1-2 months of Merlin P-51s starting to operate from Britain getting ready for the Bomber escort missions.

First NA-73 Mustang I arrive in UK November 1941, with first aircraft issued to Squadrons. A&AEE and AFDU in limited numbers in December 1941 thru January 1942.

Large scale re-equipment of RAF ACC Squadrons commences mid-March 1942, with eight Squadrons in the process of re-equipping with Mustang I by end of April 1942 and one Squadron 26, operational by end of April 1942 - they fly first official recorded operational sortie on a RAF Mustang I in UK on 10 May 1942. Ten further RAF/RCAF ACC Squadrons either re-equip or form on Mustang I by end of December 1942 . Two more RAF/RCAF ACC Squadrons form or convert on Mustang I first quarter 1943. NA-73 Mustang I, 320 ordered, less losses (approx 20) during shipping and one retained by NAA for trials and development use AG345. NA-83, 300 ordered. Five NA-83 allocated to Rolls-Royce Hucknall for Mustang X Merlin engine conversion program, one Mustang X to USAAF 8th FC UK. All the RAF Mustang I received in UK operate in ETO, none sent outside ETO eg MTO or CBI.

NA-91 P-51 Mustang IA - 150 ordered under Lend Lease. 92 delivered to RAF in UK. 55 retained and allocated to USAAF. 2 retained and allocated to NAA for XP-51B program. 1 retained and allocated to USN - used for various trials. Bulk of USAAF ones modified for Tactical/Photo Reconnaissance and mainly used in MTO.

NA-97 A-36A Mustang 500 ordered. One provided to RAF for trials in UK, returned to USAAF UK at conclusion of trials. SIx A-36A in theatre transfer to RAF in MTO allocated to No.1437 Strategic Reconnaissance Flight.

NA-99 P-51A Mustang/Mustang II 1200 ordered, balance of order switched to P-51B production after 310 built. 50 to RAF in part replacement for NA-91 P-51. A number of modified P-51A went to UK for Tactical Reconnaissance with US 9th AF - around 24+. They started showing up in UK end of 1943 thru early 1944. Number retained in CONUS with training units. Balance to CBI.

That's the quick high level version.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

It probably pays to note there is no definition of altitude bands, I tend to go 0 to 10,000 feet low, 10 to 20,000 feet medium and over 20,000 feet high but that is opinion and it leaves open very low or very high etc. Next is when the air forces fought each other the average altitude went up, a situation enhanced by the USAAF choices of heavy bombers, but when the army or navy became involved altitudes went down, complicating that is the more ground defences the higher altitudes became. Post Battle of Britain, with Bf109 fighter bombers coming over at 30,000 or so feet the RAF was serious about finding out how to fight at over 30,000 feet as that was the future, enter the B-17 raids in 1941, the higher you fly the harder interception becomes, it costs a lot of time and fuel to get to 30,000 feet and the radical pressure changes cause problems for the crew.

"Sailor" Milan, 10 rules of air combat, number 4, Height gives you the initiative. Something known in WWI.

Bombers wanted to come in low and slow as it gave the best accuracy and the least chance of clouds obscuring the target, commanders had to trade off more accurate bombing against loss rates. In the Pacific the USAAF commanders chose to normally use medium rather than high altitudes, giving up some of the advantages their fighters had, the more over claims were believed the more that decision looked to be working. The B-29 of course initially went the other way, then reduced day altitudes as fighter opposition declined.

The USAAF next generation of fighters, P-38, P-47 and heavy bombers B-17, B-24 and finally B-29 (pressure cabin to enable greater heights) went for altitude performance, but not its medium and light bomber force. The USN wanted better fighter altitude performance per rule 4, but not as much as the USAAF, the USN light bomber force best performance altitudes went up with later versions, war experience says that was worth any complications. The same was happening to the IJN, the A6M2 top speed was reported at 15,000 feet, the A6M3 and later 20,000 feet. Meantime the Ki-43-I top speed was at 13,000 feet the Ki-43-III 22,000 feet, the Ki-84 20,000 feet.

Next general rule is the bigger the fight the bigger the overclaiming, while in percentage terms being safer for the aircraft involved.

Then comes the idea the 1942 versions were really the same as the 1945 ones is wrong, plenty of modifications were done to improve performance. To use one of the bigger changes the Lancaster I was being built 1941 to 1945, in January 1942 its tare weight was 33,700 pounds, maximum weight 60,000 pounds, in November 35,404 and 63,000 pounds, in May 1944 it was 36,811 and 65,000 pounds.

Other changes also matter, G-suits and gyroscopic gunsights made fighters more lethal. It was the usual ever changing move and counter move, new versus old etc. Depending on the trade offs better altitude performance can help or hinder lower down, perhaps accelerating the climb times, perhaps being unused weight slowing climb. Japanese radios were less reliable than allied ones, radios are very useful in air combat.

Would the Corsair have needed the numbers if it was as good as many people, both officially, online and in literature, have claimed it was? The same goes for any other 2nd-generation US/Allied fighter aircraft.

What are the numbers, produced? On Hand? In the mission? To counter the 10,500 A6M, then add the floatplane versions? In August 1943 the 8th Air Force finally had the ability to send 300 heavy bombers on a mission from the 895 first line B-17 and B-24 in Britain, it was still 300 in October out of 1,104 in Britain.

Either way, if everything proceeds smoothly, I will go through both authors' works on this thread at some point in the near future. This should shed further light on my concerns for these aircraft.

Actually it is coming across as your conclusions, not concerns.

I do wonder about the composition of experienced and trained IJN pilots, both in that battle and elsewhere, the February 17 Truk raid in particular, as apparently, there was a mixture of combat veterans and fresher replacements on the island around that time. From pilot reports, inexperienced pilots were less likely to coordinate effectively, so I wonder how much they dragged down their seasoned counterparts, and how the various encounters of 1944 and beyond might have played out if there were more experienced Japanese pilots participating in them.

The basic history holds, the IJNAF was an elite force in 1941, but even the light losses in early 1942 saw, in Japanese eyes, a dilution of quality. It took mostly the fighting in the Solomons from the invasion of Guadalcanal to sometime in 1943 to reduce the IJNAF to a similar state as the Luftwaffe in 1944, a segment of very experienced and dangerous aircrew with the rest having troubles just flying. Going defensive and having good warning of allied raids helped disguise the decline for a time. Arthur Harris at his most cynical noted "fringe merchants" who dropped their bombs away from the target against the ones who tried and hit the target, the fringe merchants helped keep the good crew losses down. Though the usual rule in a dangerous situation is the less experienced your teammates are the more risk you are in. We know from late 1943 on allied pilots were willing to take more risks because of the decline in Japanese air power, then found themselves in trouble if it was a veteran opponent.

Training is a continuous thing, the 9th Air Force in Europe was the beneficiary of the extended training hours done in the US, even so it reports flying 820,117 non operational hours and 1,070,904 operational hours. If you are not being attacked very often and have the supplies you can bring partially trained personnel up to standard, if you do not fly regularly it is remarkable how quickly you can lose your "edge", Japanese bases were not noted for having lots of supplies.

The USN noted the first combat mission was the most dangerous and made special arrangements to keep the losses down.

There is no doubt more better trained Japanese aircrew would have upped allied losses, the other way for the allies especially in 1942.

I admit, I got a bit carried away there...

It is more than carried away, it is announcing conclusions and telling the rest of us not to question it.

Dunn does, himself, claim that over-claiming could be quite high in certain encounters through mid-to-late 1944, even.

See above, that is known, but what was the average? It is easy to record every encounter in 1942 and into 1943 given the numbers of missions, that keeps getting harder as the missions go up.

He states, for instance, that fighters of Task Force 38 claimed more than twice the Japanese losses on October 24, 1944. He does note that claims against bombers were fairly accurate, though some of these aircraft were also claimed by ship AA fire, but claims against Japanese fighters were apparently much higher than Japanese losses, over two-fold even. He wording suggests that it is just one particular example out of many such cases.

24 October saw Japanese land and carrier based strikes on the USN fleet, USN strikes on the IJN fleet (including from the escort carriers)plus USN, USAAF and Japanese strikes/combats on land targets in and around the Philippines. Lots going on, the cloud over the USN fleet made it hard to keep track of things. What follows is a reason I have reservations.

If you want to see how accurate the book JG26 by Caldwell is I recommend comparing it to the Fighter Command Losses. It is clear Caldwell is writing a general history and wants the good stories as well as to express his opinion that JG26 were very good and had the measure of the RAF but ultimately humbled by the USAAF. It is clear he has consulted RAF records and does compare losses and kill claims for selected engagements, rather than a day by day diary. The trouble is when the loss figures he is basing the opinions on are wrong or he does not mention the comparison with RAF records.

One of the good stories is when Galland after picking up food and drink for a party detours via England where he shoots at three Spitfires, one "explodes", one "goes down in flames" and for the third the results are not clear, Galland then flies back to France to present the food. Looking at the RAF records indicates all three aircraft were hit, landed, and were repaired. (15 April 1941)

The book gives the RAF as having lost 80 aircraft 14 June 1941 to 4 July 1941 versus 48 Luftwaffe fighters "nearly two to one" according to the book, 5 to 3 in my book. It looks like the Luftwaffe losses are supposed to be combat. The RAF records indicate 78 losses, 7 repairable, 2 to flak, 1 to an accident and 1 unknown but in the North Sea. making the ratio 48 to 67 in fighter combat.

On 2nd June 1942 JG26 claimed 8 Spitfires with the text "Only one pilot out of 7 shot down in the channel was rescued". Six Spitfires were shot down, one damaged with 1 pilot killed and 4 POW, the text should read "rescued by RAF, 4 pilots were rescued by German Air Sea rescue".

On 23 December 1944 JG26 hit a Lancaster formation, claiming 5 Lancasters and one Mosquito, and Caldwell states "The RAF raid was a complete disaster" Bomber Command war diaries confirms the claims tally but 2 were the result of a collision before the French coast, and flak played a hand in at least three of the other losses. The cloud had cleared so Oboe with its long straight bomb run could not be used, one Lancaster did not receive the message and used Oboe, with predictable results. JG26 is over credited here.

All in all if Caldwell mentions RAF losses he is usually right as far as numbers are concerned but not always right in attributing them by cause of loss, then there are the omissions and where only the JG26 claims are given.

Clay Blair on the merchant ship sinkings off the US east coast in 1942, the USN did nothing wrong, it was everyone else including the British who were at fault.

Well, at the end of the day, my main concern, in light of research from revisionist authors like Claringbould and Dunn,

In WWII revisionist is a term largely appropriated by those who think Hitler and the Nazis were the good guys.

is whether or not the Lightning, and other 2nd generation US (and Allied) aircraft like the Corsair, Thunderbolt and Hellcat, were truly effective against seemingly lesser aircraft like the Reisen and the Hayabusa.

Start with how much lesser in the situations, like altitude, where the fights occurred and what lesser means, for example what was the pilot death rate for shot down A6M versus F4F or F6F? Not just the aircraft loss ratios. In the Battle of Britain a higher percentage of shot down Spitfire pilots survived and survived unharmed than Hurricane pilots. How about the ratio of lost to damaged aircraft? Usually easier to repair than build a new aircraft.

Whether or not the strengths the Allied aircraft possessed were actual advantages, or even force multipliers like their oft-mentioned, and unreliably high, claim-to-loss ratios, would seem to suggest.

Actually claims were reliably high, we know they were almost always an exaggeration. We also know competent commanders, like Nimitz and Dowding understood this. Better performing aircraft are force multipliers, ask pilots whether they want to be in air combat with an F4F instead of an F6F or F4U, a P-40 or a P-47. Meantime adjectives like oft mentioned and unreliably high indicate conclusions that are fixed.

How much factors external—with little direct relation, if at all—to aircraft design contributed to later successes,

External = ? Supply situation, health care, working radios, numbers, force posture, location, weather, air traffic control, airbase quality, other?

whether or not the 2nd-generation of Allied aircraft truly succeeded on their individual merits.

Success = ? better than 1 to 1 fighter versus fighter? Being more reliable? Other?

How much their performance advantage actually was.

That is well known from flight tests.

Whether or not they, struggling against simpler designs, were extravagant and over-engineered, unfit for purpose.

So how much simpler was the A6M than the F6F? What does simpler mean? Aircraft were state of the art engineering complex things in 1940.

Whether or not these Allied aircraft were truly an improvement over their predecessors, especially in combat.

The answer is yes, the amount is complicated by overclaiming but in particular the decline of Japanese aircrew quality, the thousands of Kamikaze pilots that could barely fly straight and level for example.

Whether or not the design philosophy behind the Reisen and its army counterpart was wiser, more cost-effective and, dare I say, superior, especially with its primary theatres in mind.

What is the design philosophy difference between the Japanese and allied fighters? Especially the naval ones, start with the wiser and cost effective bits. What theatres, the ones envisaged in the only real IJN pre war plan, fight the US in the Central Pacific? Tropics, Arctic, China?

Whether or not this whole affair is an example of advanced technology failing, and what this means for technological advancement as a whole.

No problems, I look forward to the changing evidence supporting the fixed conclusion.

From what I've read, the facts do not appear to favour the superiority of the 2nd-generation Allied aircraft all that much, and I may share at least some of them in the near future.

I doubt they will be any different to what as already been presented.

We can discuss the validity of these findings and the sources that were used to come to them, but until then, I must agree to disagree.

No, we must agree your conclusions are rigid.

I cannot respect planes driven by wild fantasies and hot air.

Few people do. The examples being used for allied aircraft are fighter versus fighter, what about improvements needed to catch the latest model bombers?

Now regarding your how much questions, please provide an analysis of Japanese air combat to say end July 1942, whether the A6M and Ki-43, "against simpler designs [Buffalo, Hurricane, CW-21, early P-40], were extravagant and over-engineered, unfit for purpose", "were truly an improvement over their predecessors [Ki-27 and A5M], especially in combat", "Whether or not the design philosophy behind the A5M and Ki-27 was wiser, more cost-effective and, dare I say, superior, especially with its primary theatres in mind", "How much their performance advantage actually was." "How much factors external—with little direct relation, if at all—to aircraft design contributed to successes", say the Midway A6M versus Buffalo fight. "Whether or not this whole affair is an example of advanced technology failing, and what this means for technological advancement as a whole." Given "their oft-mentioned, and unreliably high, claim-to-loss ratios" After all the Chinese air force was small and usually poorly trained.

It is great there are now more detailed Japanese loss reports in English, this will enable better appreciations on topics like when and where the IJNAF loss of trained aircrew really hit, what tactics worked best, which command structures had the better understanding of the situation and yes, how much better/worse the fighters being used were or became as they and the opposition and situation changed and so on. All within a level of uncertainty given how much is unknown and will remain that way.

The pre 1941 ideas the Japanese were copiers and could not make anything good tends to linger in the attitude the A6M in particular had usually unspecified unfair advantages in early 1942, fixed by the superior allies that year, making all Japanese aircraft from 1943 onwards largely gunnery practice.

Geoffrey's numbers for P-40 bomb load are laughable. The Hawk 87 / Kittyhawk types were routinely carrying multiple 250, 300, and 500 lb bombs and (when available) 1,000 lb bombs in the Med, in the South Pacific, in China, and in Burma from early 1942.

Good to know but so far they are the only figures provided with evidence. Takoradi received its first P-40E meant for the AVG week ending 20 February 1942 and managed to fly 4 out in the next week. So which units in the theatre were dropping bombs in early 1942? The US had P-40E in Australia once they erected the 18 with the Pensacola convoy which arrived on 22 December 1941, further shipments followed but many were exported to South East Asia, the Australians received their first Kittyhawk mid March. So when did they start dropping bombs? The first fighter bomber sortie in the Middle East is documented as 16 May 1942.

As I noted previously, the actual limits of capacity were figured out at the squadron level, in the field,

Without giving dates and bomb loads.

partly because they were so desperate in this very same units to stop escorting Blenheims, which they considered extremely hazardous due to the slow speed they had to maintain.

No Blenheims in Australia or China. The Baltimore could carry twice the bomb load with better defensive armament and was about 40 mph faster then the Blenheim, which meant its fast cruise was in the 260mph zone.

I'm not even going to bother to debate that. It's easy to find this out from any source which includes this type of plane as the ordinance is mentioned in the mission descriptions and is often literally shown in photos.

It matters to people who want to know what happened as the responses here indicate. A tip, when none of my text makes the reply, when the reply is an editorial of who is right with no evidence provided lots of people conclude I am the one who is more correct.

So what if the Blenheim carried 1,000 or 1,200 or 1,350 lbs bombs?

It matters to people who want to know what happened as the responses here indicate.

It was a dud by that same period (1942). It carried less bombs than a Kittyhawk, was much slower, had shorter range, and was vastly more vulnerable to both enemy fighters and enemy flak.

From above Blenheim IV range as 1,169 miles at 225 mph with 1,000 pounds of bombs, at economic cruise of 170 mph with 1,000 pounds of bombs range becomes 1,457 miles. So list the Kittyhawk missions carrying over 1,000 pounds of bombs in 1942, while having greater than Blenheim range. Or one or the other.

This is why it was quickly phased out from front line duties and replaced by much faster Bostons, Marylands, Baltimores, and yes, Kittyhawks (and Hurricanes)

Unfortunately the problem was obtaining enough of the later types, end May 1942 15 SAAF with Blenheim was still part of the Western Desert Air Force but kept out of the land fighting.

The Blenheim was a sort of universal RAF aircraft, where the RAF was there was Blenheim, all commands etc. no one has collated the numbers from all the operations and published them. Bomber Command says 1939 to August 1942 its Blenheim dropped HE: 6x500lb MC, 386x500lb GP, 316x500lb SAP, 17,780x250lb GP, 1,153x250lb SAP, 34,022x40lb GP, 1,869x20lb GP, 504x9lb GP, 432x9lb AT, incendiary: 8x250lb, 748x30lb, 3,507x25lb, 62,932x4lb, or 3,016.3 long tons of bombs. 11,332 sorties sent, 6,708 attacking, 426 aircraft lost, 31 write off due to enemy action another 58 not enemy action, average bomb load dropped 995 pounds. The 7,302 day sorties had a loss rate to enemy action of 5.1%, the 4,030 night sorties 2.1%.

While this is not a good measure given all the differences, like pre war losses and training unit locations, as of end June 1944 Blenheim I losses 681 in Britain, 225 overseas, Blenheim IV 1,780 home, 882 overseas, Blenheim V 40 home (plus 1 to USAAF), 352 overseas. There were still 43 I in Britain, 189 in the Mediterranean and 1 in India, mark IV 113 Britain, 115 Mediterranean, 1 West Africa, 106 India, mark V 90 Britain, 267 Mediterranean, 132 India