Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44 (1 Viewer)

[Frog]

'' basic history holds, the IJNAF was an elite force in 1941, but even the light losses in early 1942 saw, in Japanese eyes, a dilution of quality. It took mostly the fighting in the Solomons from the invasion of Guadalcanal to sometime in 1943 to reduce the IJNAF to a similar state as the Luftwaffe in 1944, a segment of very experienced and dangerous aircrew with the rest having troubles just flying. Going defensive and having good warning of allied raids helped disguise the decline for a time. Arthur Harris at his most cynical noted "fringe merchants" who dropped their bombs away from the target against the ones who tried and hit the target, the fringe merchants helped keep the good crew losses down. Though the usual rule in a dangerous situation is the less experienced your teammates are the more risk you are in. We know from late 1943 on allied pilots were willing to take more risks because of the decline in Japanese air power, then found themselves in trouble...''

The begining of the decline of the IJNAF carrier pilots force could be dating from the Santa Cruz Islands clash.
At Midway they had lost 4 flat tops but not yet so much as pilots and air specialists were concerned.
At Santa Cruz they technically won the battle but even if losing about as many planes as the USN, many US shot down pilots were rescued contrarily to the IJNAF that recovered very few of its downed crews and above all lost quite a numbers of well trained cadres and pilots.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

No Blenheims in Australia or China. The Baltimore could carry twice the bomb load with better defensive armament and was about 40 mph faster then the Blenheim, which meant its fast cruise was in the 260mph zone.

but plenty of Blenheims operating in Burma and India, and I believe in Malaya.

The Aussies didn't have any but they did operate Beauforts, to very mixed success. Beaufighters on the other hand proved useful in all of the Theaters.

It matters to people who want to know what happened as the responses here indicate. A tip, when none of my text makes the reply, when the reply is an editorial of who is right with no evidence provided lots of people conclude I am the one who is more correct.

Bask in your confidence in this regard, but I don't think it necessarily means anything. I'm not under any obligation to engage with anybody, and generally speaking, one can post tons of numbers and statistics and still not be misleading or missing important bits.

Blenheims were going on missions and routinely losing 25-50% of their force, whereas Kittyhawks had nowhere near that loss rate during any strikes that I've seen in Burma or the South Pacific. If and when I have the time I'll post some specific examples. They did sometimes lose a lot in the Middle East, incidentally, but by that time Blenheims were no longer even operating in daylight tactical strikes of that type.

I realize I'm saying something here that isn't backed up with any data I've posted in this thread here, but I also know that this is easy to verify by most people active in this thread because we all have sources we can check. It's hardly controversial.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Ok so I bought "Pacific Adversaries" Volume Four, by John Claringbould. Apparently on his own without a primary collaborator unlike the others of his that I've previously read.

I think this is one of the books Jobbin the Goblin was referring to but correct me if I'm wrong.

This is still going to be a pretty high level overview, and so far I've read only about 2/3 of the book, but I thought it was already worth sharing some observations because I think it will shape how this conversation is evolving a bit.

First, this is a very different type of book from the South Pacific Air War or Solomons Air War series. Those are much more prosaic, going day by day with all losses and claims and some details of missions, but in a very sober and sometimes frankly dull manner (though to me, still extremely interesting). This "Pacific Adversaries" series seems to be pulling from largely the same data set (i.e. from both Allied and Japanese records) but in a format that is much looser, more episodic, and with a lot more editorializing by the author. It's also a very fun read, very exciting and dramatic. Quite entertaining I'd say, and more 'action packed' than the Solomons Air War or South Pacific Air War (or the very similarly prosaic day by day records type series by Christopher Shores, Michael Piegzik, Bergstrom etc.) but in that sense, I'd say this book, and presumably the others in the "Adversaries" series, are a bit more questionable in terms of research. Claringbould is not really putting all his cards on the table here, for example he doesn't usually list claims by squadron for the Allies, and doesn't always give you the entire picture, but instead focuses on interesting and dramatic bits. And then he does hold forth and in particular about overclaiming and the records of pilots involved etc., which he seems to be struggling with a good bit.

Instead of going day by day including the boring days like in the other series, here he focuses on a series of 15 "episodes" which all took place in the Solomons in 1943. He says on the title that this volume covers 1943-1944, but the episodes start in January 1943 and the last is in August of 1943. Unless I missed it there isn't any action from 1944.

So that's one thing. It is indeed quite early days for the Corsair in particular. There is nothing here involving the Hellcat unless I missed it.

The fighting involves the following scenario. This starts in the waning days of the rather epic battles around Guadalcanal, and moves into the period where the US are island hopping up the chain of islands in the Solomons - through 'the slot', with a pretty large number of their best avalable aircraft (from USAAF, USN and USMC, as well as RNZAF) supporting the amphibious campaign as they capture one island or islet after another and swiftly build (or fix / improve) airfields on them. The Japanese are mustering an equally impressive force of fighters, here in this book it always seems to be Zeros, a mix of different marks of A6M3 with some A6M2, which also by the way here includes quite a few trained and experienced fighter pilots, and a bit more haphazard force of land based and carrier based (but I think mostly operating from land) bombers, and seaplanes and etc. There are similtaneously some JAAF operations going on here but he seems not to focus on these for whatever reason. Initially the Allies are operating from Guadalcanal but as they take over the little islands they move up to forward bases in the Solomons and fly from there.

The Allied fighter units include USMC and Wildcats, at least four USMC F4U squadrons, (I think?) two P-38 squadrons, two P-40F squadrons from 18th FG which we had mentioned recently in some other threads on here) and one or two squadrons of RNZAF Kittyhawk IIIs, which appear to be P-40K type (they could also be P-40M).

I have to say, this is a cool time and place to focus on. There has been so much written about the Guadalcanal campaign and many other specific battles or periods of intense conflict, Bizmark Sea, Marianas, Leyte Gulf etc. etc., but this seems to be a pretty intense battle going on too and I've not seen a lot of coverage of it before.

So getting back to the book, of all the 15 'epsidoes' he covers, only about 4 or 5 of them seem to cover intense fighter vs fighter engagements. Some of these start with one side in a numerical or positional advantage, some are the reverse. Others are fighters engaging with bombers, or seaplanes like one where a suicidally brave force of F1M2 Petes flown by mostly inexperienced crews tries a Quixotic attack against an Allied ampibious landing and runs into a buzz saw of P-40s and F4Us, with fairly predictable results (although of the plucky "Petes" some do survive). Others include B-24s caught alone in enemy bases and wrecked by zeros, leading to a lot of death and some dramatic survival stories. I'll cover just one of the episodes here very briefly, with some comments, and if there is interest I'll delve deeper into some others later.

7 June 1943
In this one, IJN Zeros (A6M2 and A6M3 models 21, 22 and 32) engage with a mix of Allied fighters over the Russel Islands. He doesn't indicate what mark of Lightnings were involved but maybe somebody knows?

Ultimately in this engagement, 81 Zeros (of which only 60 engaged the Allied fighters, 21 ended up attacking some isolated TBFs) got into a series of running fights with 62 Allied fighters. These includes 12 x USMC F4U-1 "Birdcage" Corsairs from VMF-112, 24 x USN F4F-4 Wildcats from VF-11, 9 x USAAF Lightnings from 339th FS, 5 x USAAF P-40F "Warhawks" 44th FS, and 12 x Kittyhawk IIIs from 15 Sqn RNZAF. Another 10 x USMC F4U-1 from VMF-121 were in the area but did not see or engage any Japanese fighters. So it was a pretty even fight in terms of numbers.

In the fight the Allies were somewhat separated, with USAAF, RNZAF, USN and USMC units engaging separately with varying numbers of Zeros, and the Japanese started with an altitude advantage, bouncing the Corsairs of VMF-112. Some of the USMC pilots left detailed accounts of the fighting, specifically Major Robert Fraser from VMF 112 described many details of the combat, including how he foolishly followed a Zero into a loop and ultimately got shot down as a result.

Two other F4U pilots also got shot down and had extremely harrowing experiences, which they nevertheless survived - Lt Logan was being attacked in his parachute when part of his right foot was cut off by a Zero flying by strafing him as he 'spilled' his chute trying to evade it, and a Lt Percy tried to bail out but his chute failed to open and he hit the water at full speed, but somehow survived with a broken pelvis and two sprained ankles. He was then saved from the Zero by the arrival of an RNZAF Kittyhawk. All three F4U pilots actually somehow survived their crashes, as did the other six allied pilots lost, whereas all the Japanese pilots lost died, which is a prevalent theme in the Pacific i can say from the many other books I've been reading recently.

The fighting broke down into separate areas, and the Allies credited the following:
USAAF P-40Fs from 44th FS were awarded eight victories
USAAF P-38s from 339th FS were awarded three victories
USMC F4Us from VMF 112 plus the Wildcats from VF-11 were awarded thirteen victories (frustratingly, he doesn't distinguish which was which here)
And the RNZAF was awarded one.

Total Allied claims were 25 'confirmed' victories.

Actual Japanese losses were 9 x Zeros.

Allied losses were 7 or 9, depending on how you count them.

Combat losses were 7 fighters: 3 x F4U listed above, one P-40F which collided with a Zero, and 3 x Wildcats. In addition, two more F4Us ran out of fuel on the way back to base (which seemed to be a common problem) and ditched, and all but two of the remaining VMF-112 that made it back to base were so badly damaged they were out of commission undergoing repairs for a long time, leaving only two still operational. Claringbould counts the two F4Us that ran out of fuel as combat losses but I'm not sure that is right. They might have run out of fuel due to damage or just flying around at high power too long, or may really be 'operational' losses (running out of fuel, partly due to navigation errors seemed to be a common problem with both the F4Us and P-38s in this Theater, whether they got into combat or not). If they were in fact engaged in combat but he doesn't indicate which of the two Corsair squadrons these were from (VMF-121 did not get into any combat on this day).

Claringbould says that of the unit which engaged the USMC and USN fighters, totaling 24 Zeros from No. 204 Ku, only three were lost. The other unit 251 Ku was engaged 'mainly' with the USAAF but lost six Zeros.

So it looks like the Corsairs and Wildcats got 3 out of the 13 actually claimed between the two units, which I couldn't determine which unit claimed the most. The P-40Fs and P-38s together got 6 out of 11 claimed, with it appears the bulk going to the P-40s. Overall overclaiming was about 3-1 for the Allies. I didn't see the claim total for the Japanese.

Here there seem to be two factors in play - The Japanese got the "bounce" on the Corsairs, and the inexperience or lack of discpline of some of the Allied pilots, i.e. playing the Japanese game by following into loops etc. In some of the other battles, the many 'teething' problems with the Corsairs were a factor, as well as maintenance issues with the P-38s and P-40s too. But the F4Us had a lot of issues with magnetos, superchargers, oil leaks, fogged wind screens, and guns jamming.

In at least two of the other big fighter vs fighter encounters I read, F4Us and P-38s ditched due to running out of fuel, and Claringbould counts these as combat losses, but again it isn't clear to me that they actually were. There is one big battle which I believe Jobbin mention in which the Allies had the numbers, but still came out badly on the losing end. There is also at least one other where the Japanese Zeros got the worst of it pretty badly.

Overall, I'd say all this book really proves are:

• Overclaiming was a thing
• Corsairs had mechanical problems
• Corsair pilots were still perfecting their tactics and discipline to use them
• Other Allied fighter types had mechanical problems too
• Positional advantages and experience still mattered
• In some kinds of fights, like where you have to protect bombers or say, ships over a particular spot, it's less convenient shall we say to engage in proper energy fighting or 'boom and zoom' tactics. And here the A6M fighter still had some advantages.

None of this is really new to me, though it's fun to read about all this in detail. The main thing I see as a slight shift in my perspective is that maintenace issue. I'm used to reading that the Japanese had a lot of maintenance problems in the Pacific and CBI due to their delicate aircraft in the rough tropical conditions. But here while they still had trouble, it's really more the US side that was experiencing the most trouble due to maintenance issues, weather, navigation and so on. But maintenance in particular. Planes were very often turning back due to engine problems and so on.

This in turn is one advantage of using older fighters vs developing and deploying new ones. Every year your old warplane type is in the field you learn better and better how to keep it flying from tropical islands and so on. On the other hand, the other side also learns the flaws and weaknesses of your old warplanes, and how to exploit them. And more powerful engines etc. do play a role. This is clear even in this battle that the Corsair, the Lightning, and the RNZAF Kittyahwk III were able to disengage from the Zeros fairly easily, and that is a big help in surviving. Ultimately the biggest problem the Japanese had was in this battle as in general, they lost a lot more pilots than the Allies did (nine vs none in this fight). That means the attrition war is really going against them even where they do break even in the fighting.

 

[beers]

Given "their oft-mentioned, and unreliably high, claim-to-loss ratios" After all the Chinese air force was small and usually poorly trained.

They didn't fight only the Chinese air force. Russia was also there in 1939 - by their own admissions, losing 3:1 was a good month; in at least one they were going 10:1 against the IJAAF, which was even by this point putting inexperienced pilots in planes due to how many sorties they were flying.

Ironically both sides broke it off to go fight elsewhere. Who knows what history would have looked like if Russia was fighting a 2-front war and without the USA fully committing to it?
This also solidifies why the Ki-43's requirements were so similar to the Ki-27, why fix what isn't broken? Would any air force go for a complete change in tactics, doctrine, and equipment when having such successes (which from the claimer's side would look even better)?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

but plenty of Blenheims operating in Burma and India, and I believe in Malaya.

Ah yes, declared completely correct statements are made which by definition require no evidence to back them up. A little later a declared completely correct but a shortened version is issued which by definition requires no evidence to back it up, as it has the earlier incorrect bits removed.

What elected office do you hold?

The Aussies didn't have any but they did operate Beauforts, to very mixed success. Beaufighters on the other hand proved useful in all of the Theaters.

Now for the off topic switch to look at me the expert bit with another completely correct statement which by definition requires no evidence to back it up. What does very mixed mean? The Australians chose the Beaufort because it was a torpedo bomber (and the British GR version of the Blenheim called the Bolingbroke they had on order was cancelled, not to be confused with Canadian versions of the Blenheim which were called Bolingbroke), the RAAF ordered Beaufighters as well, as the risk to Australia was lone surface raiders to possibly a raid by a single carrier (inferior Japanese job with inferior aircraft and crew), a strike force of Beaufort and Beaufighter would see the enemy off, add some Sunderlands for long range detection and you have the RAAF 1939 aircraft procurement plan.

The RAAF torpedo bomber idea hit two big snags, firstly failure to set up dedicated units to maintain the torpedoes until the second half of 1942 plus a lack of torpedo training, secondly the need to switch to US torpedoes, less reliable and causing more drag. Overall result no torpedo hits and few chances after the Bismarck Sea battle anyway. As a light bomber it was less survivable in contested airspace than the US light and medium ones. As MacArthur preferred US units in the front line the RAAF Beauforts spent a lot of the war attacking Japanese positions that had been mostly bypassed.

Beaufighters came as night fighters, long range day fighters and maritime strike, with better performance, unsurprising they were more useful than Beauforts.

Bask in your confidence in this regard,

Thanks, though ego basking lotion is expensive for obvious reasons.

but I don't think it necessarily means anything. I'm not under any obligation to engage with anybody, and generally speaking, one can post tons of numbers and statistics and still not be misleading or missing important bits.

Yes, everyone is now well aware cleaning up your mess is a someone else's problem.

Blenheims were going on missions and routinely losing 25-50% of their force,

The fun thing about this is the way the RAF command is seriously bad, to keep doing missions with these sorts of losses, but blindingly good because of their Kittyhawk use.

What does routinely mean? Which theatres, which times? There are Blenheim raids with 100% casualties starting in April 1940, the Bomber Command figures have been posted, double the day losses to around 10% if using attacking sorties, it was hard to bomb Germany by day in 1940 but they kept trying. Provide the evidence of routine 25 to 50% loss raids.

Now to a routine loss evaluation. Richard Davis put together spreadsheets of allied strategic bomber raids as part of his biography of General Spaatz, quite comprehensive, the 8th Air Force one has 5,579 entries of which 1,725 have 9 or less aircraft attacking, entries include carpetbagger, night leaflet, recalled/failed/abandoned/no attack, RCM, Aphrodite, supply. Raids are split by bomb sighting method, so where some bombed visually, some using H2X, some using GH creates 3 entries, all bombing visually would have one entry.

8th Air Force, 10 or more heavy bombers attacking, 20% or more of attackers lost. Date order.

Attack	Lost	Date	Target Struck	Location
15	3​	21-Oct-42	UB/Pens	Lorient
16	5	04-Mar-43	M/Y	Hamm
29	7	01-May-43	UB/Pens	St. Nazaire
44	19	13-Jun-43	UB/Yards	Kiel/Deutsche
12	5	26-Jun-43	A/F	Villacoublay
14	3	25-Jul-43	M/Y	Heide
15	3	26-Jul-43	T/O	Wesermunde
42	10	26-Jul-43	Tires	Hannover/Gummiwerke
28	15	28-Jul-43	A/Iasy FW 190	Oschersleben/AGO Flugzugwerke
51	23	17-Aug-43	Bearings	Schweinfurt/VKF 2
46	10	06-Sep-43	I/A	Stuttgart
51	13	06-Sep-43	M/Y	Offenburg
67	20	06-Sep-43	I/A	Strasbourg
138	30	10-Oct-43	M/Y	Munster
61	35	14-Oct-43	Bearings	Schweinfurt/VKF 1
36	8	11-Jan-44	A/Icomp	Halberstadt
38	11	11-Jan-44	A/Iasy Me 110	Brunswick/Waggum
138	34	11-Jan-44	A/Iasy FW 190	Oschersleben
15	5	21-Jan-44	NB/Ski Cons	St Agathe d'Aliepmont
138	29	10-Feb-44	I/A	Brunswick
19	4	22-Feb-44	T/O	Wernigerode
29	11	22-Feb-44	T/O	Bunde
34	8	22-Feb-44	A/Icomp Ju 88	Aschersleben
45	9	22-Feb-44	A/Iasy Ju 88	Bernburg
13	8	03-Mar-44	T/O	Misc., Ge
31	11	04-Mar-44	I/A	Berlin
18	7	06-Mar-44	I/A	Oranienburg
19	4	06-Mar-44	M/Y	Berlin/Spandau
19	4	06-Mar-44	T/O	Berlin/Potsdam
33	10	09-Apr-44	A/I	Posen
41	11	18-Apr-44	I/A	Barnewitz
84	26	24-Apr-44	A/Iasy Me 410	Oberpfaffenhofen
25	18	29-Apr-44	I/A	Magdeburg
14	10	12-May-44	M/Y	Zwickau
16	12	12-May-44	M/Y	Gera
36	15	28-May-44	City	Dessau
92	20	07-Jul-44	A/Iasy Ju 88	Bernburg
10	2	20-Jul-44	T/O	Marburg
13	3	21-Jul-44	RR/Br	Bullay
28	6	29-Jul-44	M/Y	Hildersheim
38	9	15-Aug-44	A/F	Wiesbaden/Erbenheim
27	6	16-Aug-44	A/Iasy	Halle
22	11	11-Sep-44	O/Sy	Ruhland/Schwartzhelde
58	15	12-Sep-44	O/Sy	Ruhland/Schwartzhelde
35	25	27-Sep-44	M/Y	Gottengen
35	9	02-Nov-44	I/A	Bernburg
112	25	26-Nov-44	O/R	Hannover/Misburg
10	3	25-Dec-44	C/C	Nettersheim
68	14	31-Dec-44	O/R	Hamburg/Rhenania
11	5	01-Jan-45	O/R	Magdeburg/Rothensee
10	2	17-Feb-45	M/Y	Hanau
78	22	11-Apr-45	A/F	Regensburg/Ober-Traubling

Only 52 entries but plenty more for the 9 or less attackers. Also of course losses in big raids can be concentrated on one formation, the bloody hundredth effect, see Schweinfurt entries above. So can we declare the US heavies routinely lost 20% or more and therefore are junk? The losses were happening regularly from start to finish.

Now for the off topic look at me the expert bit, overall the 8th Air Force incendiary tonnage was 17% of its HE, for the raids recording over 500 aircraft attacking a target that jumped to 34%, most aimed by H2X, Marshalling yards tended to be well within the urban area, for those who wonder about USAAF city busting in Europe. Short tons.

Bomb	HE	IB	HE	IB
Sighting	H2X	H2X	Vis	Vis
A/Iasy Me 110	1120.3​	560.9​
A/Ieng	781.5​	634.7​
AFV	1663.2​	1373.6​
Army HQ OKH	0​	0​	811.3​	581.3​
I/A	2871.1​	1662.7​	919​	511.6​
M/Y	8644.1​	3900.7​	2859.5​	421.3​
MCG/A	2035.7​	2024.9​	1639.3​	106.6​
O/R	1439.4​	417.2​
O/Sy	5183.3​	893.1​	1388.2​	0​
P/A	4928.7​	1223.7​
T/T	0​	0​	2850.1​	0​
UB/Yards	4327.5​	402.3​
Total	32994.8​	13093.8​	10467.4​	1620.8​

Fragmentation bomb tonnage not included above.
MCG/A = middle of Berlin
T/T mostly the Cobra and Seine crossing bombings.
P/A Port Area, I/A Industrial Area, hard to precision bomb an area.
Army HQ/OKH Zossen This and a simultaneous raid on the Oranienburg Marshalling Yards were a cover for the destruction of a German Atomic research establishment that was slated to be in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. I did say off topic.

whereas Kittyhawks had nowhere near that loss rate during any strikes that I've seen in Burma or the South Pacific. If and when I have the time I'll post some specific examples.

Actually given the small numbers in most raids against the Japanese in early mid 1942, it was easy to lose 20% of the formation or 1 or 2 aircraft. Meantime everyone is awaiting the Kittyhawk bombing raids from early 1942, the ones from an earlier completely correct statement that is now due for editing.

They did sometimes lose a lot in the Middle East, incidentally, but by that time Blenheims were no longer even operating in daylight tactical strikes of that type.

But apparently not enough to qualify for routinely losing.

I realize I'm saying something here that isn't backed up with any data I've posted in this thread here, but I also know that this is easy to verify by most people active in this thread because we all have sources we can check.

Remember the truth has been declared, the reader's problem is to work out how accurate it is by themselves. Meaning homework time has also been declared.

It's hardly controversial.

Move along, nothing to see here, apart from an idea which writings are worth the time to read.

They didn't fight only the Chinese air force. Russia was also there in 1939 -

And in 1938 but in terms of number of fighting days much lower than the combats with China since 1918, casualty rates were another matter.

Ironically both sides broke it off to go fight elsewhere.

Yes, the IJA really wanted large colonies in Asia, Siberia kept looking nice long term as it was undeveloped. Japan was the last to leave what became the USSR post WWI. It meant most IJA war plans were against the USSR, the IJN against the USN, pulling in two different directions with two different force mix requirements.

This also solidifies why the Ki-43's requirements were so similar to the Ki-27, why fix what isn't broken? Would any air force go for a complete change in tactics, doctrine, and equipment when having such successes (which from the claimer's side would look even better)?

Exactly, add the lessons from China, it helped push the range requirements for the A6M but also allowed assumptions of low loss rates.

Meantime comfortable seat, good food and drink, agreeable companions, nice weather, free entertainment, cheerful bird song etc., ACME Ego Basking Lotion New Formulation supply ensured. Requested sign came back with "Out to Lunch, back in 2036" instead of 2026 on it, sounds like a plan. Life can be great.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

They didn't fight only the Chinese air force. Russia was also there in 1939 - by their own admissions, losing 3:1 was a good month; in at least one they were going 10:1 against the IJAAF, which was even by this point putting inexperienced pilots in planes due to how many sorties they were flying.

Ironically both sides broke it off to go fight elsewhere. Who knows what history would have looked like if Russia was fighting a 2-front war and without the USA fully committing to it?
This also solidifies why the Ki-43's requirements were so similar to the Ki-27, why fix what isn't broken? Would any air force go for a complete change in tactics, doctrine, and equipment when having such successes (which from the claimer's side would look even better)?

There are big issues with keeping the old fighter / making incremental improvements vs introducing new ones and taking the gamble that it (and any possible new engine involved) can get through it's teething processes and suitable tactics and training, and maintenance processes can be developed in time to be really useful and effective.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Ah yes, declared completely correct statements are made which by definition require no evidence to back them up. A little later a declared completely correct but a shortened version is issued which by definition requires no evidence to back it up, as it has the earlier incorrect bits removed.

What elected office do you hold?

As the boss of me, I won with a landslide in my election to president of myself, of which I am a long time incumbent. You, alas, have no votes in this caucus.

I don't want to be rude to you mate but I don't see getting into the weeds of this discussion as potentially fruitful in any way. Do you suspect you might change your mind in the face of evidence? I don't think it's likely. You wear an agenda on your sleeve and I don't see acceptance of anything which mitigates against it landing softly, no matter how categorical.

This particular thing we are debating (Kittyhawk vs Blenheim effectiveness / capabilities and survival rates as a bomber, and how quickly the Kittyhawk started being used for bombing missions, as well as how many and what type of bombs they carried) is a fairly well known topic, one which has been discussed before many times, I don't think it's controversial and it's covered in numerous books that I know most the regular posters to this forum have in their libraries.

If I have time later I'll start another thread and post some data on when the Kittyhawk started being used to drop larger bombs in each of several different Theaters (China, Burma, South Pacific, Alaska, Middle East, and Russia, which was all in 1942), but I'm not really interested in debating it here and now in this thread, because I know if I do it's just going to get murky and very long winded, especially since you give a lot of obvious signs that you are not really trying to have a discussion. So you'll have to forgive me I'm opting out of that for now.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I just finished the very prolific Michael Claringbould's Pacific Adversaries #4, and I want to reiterate, this is a very entertaining book. And it's also a good bit looser than his day by day series like South Pacific Air War and Solomon's Air War.

JoblinTheGoblin I looked pretty carefully through the major battles involving Corsairs and Lightnings and A6Ms, which is as I said before, a smaller subset of the 15 incidents covered in the book. Basically four big air battles involving fighters on both sides. I don't have the time right now to get into all the details but I want to note that my conclusions is that generally speaking, Claringbould is pushing the envelope here in downplaying Allied victory claims and overstating their combat losses against the IJN fighters. This is unfortunate because I don't think that is necessary to do because the data is interesting enough on it's own, but Claringbould does seem to have either a bit of an agenda here, or he's just overreacting somewhat to learning that overclaiming is a thing...?

In the final episode of major combat in the book, there is a complex set of engagements in August of 1943, in which the US landed on an Island in the Solomons, catching the Japanese by surprise, and the IJN launched a series of three major raids (morning, noon and evening) to attack the ships conducting the amphibious landing there, being intercepted by a mix of Allied aircraft, including IIRC two squadrons of USMC F4U-1, one squadron each of of USAAF P-40s and P-39s, and a squadron of RNZAF P-40s.

Total Allied losses for the day were 11 Corsairs, and 1 Warhawk, while the Japanese losses were 7 A6M and 11 D3A bombers. No ships were hit by the bombers who were effectively driven away.

Allied fighter claims were for 28 enemy aircraft confirmed, with 13 A6Ms credited to the Corsairs, two to the USAAF Warhawks, one to the P-39s; and 11 Vals - seven to the Corsairs, one to the Warhawks, and three to the RNZAF Kittyhawks.

Claringbold makes a convincing case that two of the Vals were shot down by flak from the ships, so that leaves actual losses of 7 A6M and 9 Vals, so 16 vs claims of 28.

The 'fudgy' part of this is that of the Corsair losses, (and I need to go back and double check this because it's all a bit buried in the text across several pages) it seems that two Corsairs collided with each other during takeoff, one other crashed on takeoff, one ran out of gas, two turned back with mechanical problems, and at least two more that were lost in combat seemed to be crippled by defensive fire from the bombers, i.e. not damaged from combat with the Zeros. One more Corsair flipped over on landing due to a burst tire but was later repaired (I think). Not sure he counted that one as a loss or not, he's not that clear in the details. One additional 44th FS Warhawk also crash landed back at base.

So the overclaiming looks to be a bit less than 2-1, which is actually fairly good by WW2 standards (let alone in a day of fighting as complex as this one was), and the real Corsair combat losses were more like five or six, which since they got the lion's share, maybe 13 of the 16 enemy planes actually lost in air to air combat, doesn't look so bad to me. I think Claringbould is overstating the case here. And in particular I don't think you can say this was a one to one engagement in terms of outcomes. The Corair pilots focused more on the bombers because that was their mission, i.e. to protect the ships, but they got plenty of fighters too in this one, while basically eliminating two dive valuable bomber units from the IJN roster.

There is another big battle in the middle of the book where the Japanese did very well even though being heavily outnumbered, but I'll cover that in a later post.

 

[beers]

it helped push the range requirements for the A6M but also allowed assumptions of low loss rates

For the A6M? Not the Ki-43, whose range was one of the biggest improvements over the Ki-27?

 

[SaparotRob]

Ah yes, declared completely correct statements are made which by definition require no evidence to back them up. A little later a declared completely correct but a shortened version is issued which by definition requires no evidence to back it up, as it has the earlier incorrect bits removed.

What elected office do you hold?

Sorry man. I didn't get past this.

Laughing with.

 

[Dimlee]

They didn't fight only the Chinese air force. Russia was also there in 1939 - by their own admissions, losing 3:1 was a good month; in at least one they were going 10:1 against the IJAAF, which was even by this point putting inexperienced pilots in planes due to how many sorties they were flying.

Ironically both sides broke it off to go fight elsewhere. Who knows what history would have looked like if Russia was fighting a 2-front war and without the USA fully committing to it?
This also solidifies why the Ki-43's requirements were so similar to the Ki-27, why fix what isn't broken? Would any air force go for a complete change in tactics, doctrine, and equipment when having such successes (which from the claimer's side would look even better)?

I apologise for my "nitpicking", but there was no "Russia" there in 1939. The Soviet Union was there.
R.S.F.S.R. represented "Russia" in the USSR. It's safe to assume that most pilots and other Soviet personnel in China in 1939 were from the RSFSR, as from the largest republic with a more urbanised population, but not all of them. Just a quick look at the list of the famous figures in the Soviet aviation groups in China and Mongolia: Smushkevich - Jew from Lithuania, Kokkinakki - Greek, Blagoveshensky - Belarus. Suprun, Tkhor, Kravchenko - Ukrainians.
Sorry for this distraction. Back to the topic.

 

[GregP]

but plenty of Blenheims operating in Burma and India, and I believe in Malaya.

Ah yes, declared completely correct statements are made which by definition require no evidence to back them up. A little later a declared completely correct but a shortened version is issued which by definition requires no evidence to back it up, as it has the earlier incorrect bits removed.


I noticed that, too Geoffrey. It has been my observation that people who don't have sources for their claims and don't think sources are important don't usually have a coherent, well thought-out argument except for unreferenced statements that are supposed to be taken on face value, as you say above. I'm pretty sure of my opinions, but don't exactly recall all the numbers from reference books that I have read but did not memorize. Re-looking at sources is a time-honored tradition for accurate arguments when the subject is more than a few days old.

I wish I always did that before posting! It's bad to realize you made a mistake right after you post it, but worse when a reply comes out before you can correct it! Yes, it's happened to me, and I try to not do that anymore. I hope I manage to succeed the vast majority of the time.

Cheers.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Frankly, I think you are both clumsily trying to derail this thread, which bears a message you don't appreciate

But I'll start another one about "Kittyhawks and Blenheims", no problem You don't seem to like it when the books do come open in our interactions so far, but who knows?

 

[GregP]

There is no message in here I don't appreciate and I'm not clumsy. I appreciate discussion. You, apparently, may not ... the jury is still out.

You want to run roughshod over any discussion that runs contrary to your opinion. That was me 25 years ago. That means you are difficult to discuss things with since you want to "hold court." It makes constructive discussion somewhat less than something to look forward to.

I took my first flying lesson in 1967, have been looking into WWII airplanes since well before that, and don't appreciate being dismissed with no discussion while being told that some statement by you with no primary reference backup is the truth and that any contrary opinon is foolish.

That dog don't hunt. I was born, but it wasn't yesterday.

That's all.

I have learned that perhaps all books and references may not be correct, even if I like what they have to say. People you may not like at first, or sometimes at all, are many times correct.

Want proof? Go read a Martin Caidin book about WWII aircraft. He was a pilot and an author and owned (and flew) a Ju 52, but there seems to have been a somehwat sporadic relationship between stories in his books and the truth.

Perhaps understand that there are many people in here who have been looking at WWII aviation (and other aspects as well) for a LONG time and have opinions backed up by decades of research. They might be wrong, true. But they might just as well not be wrong.

It may not seem like I should say it, but cheers to you. Stick around and discuss with the forum. It'll be fun if you do.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Japanese fighter range improvements,

For the A6M? Not the Ki-43, whose range was one of the biggest improvements over the Ki-27?

True, the penalty I pay for reading and remembering much more about IJN than IJA aircraft operations.

As the boss of me, I won with a landslide in my election to president of myself, of which I am a long time incumbent.

Which explains the low ranking in the governance quality survey. All leaders charge a fee for their leadership, one that tends to grow over time, not just material items, but things like more obedience from everyone else.

You, alas, have no votes in this caucus.

Few do, a source of much rejoicing given candidate quality, you might notice the migration rate sometime.

I don't want to be rude to you mate but I don't see getting into the weeds of this discussion as potentially fruitful in any way.

I think that translates to fragile ego alert. Anyway I have found much good fruit, as people have chimed in with useful questions and answers, and had had a chance to look at the data, the bonus being some comic replies and for all that you do not intend to continue.

Do you suspect you might change your mind in the face of evidence? I don't think it's likely. You wear an agenda on your sleeve and I don't see acceptance of anything which mitigates against it landing softly, no matter how categorical.

Amazing what some people write looking in mirrors.

This particular thing we are debating (Kittyhawk vs Blenheim effectiveness / capabilities and survival rates as a bomber, and how quickly the Kittyhawk started being used for bombing missions, as well as how many and what type of bombs they carried) is a fairly well known topic, one which has been discussed before many times, I don't think it's controversial and

Ah yes, declared completely correct statements are made which by definition require no evidence to back them up. A little later a declared completely correct but a shortened version is issued which by definition requires no evidence to back it up, as it has the earlier incorrect bits removed. As now it is Kittyhawk bomber against Blenheim Bomber, not Blenheim versus Boston etc. and survival rates, not how often a formation took large losses.

it's covered in numerous books that I know most the regular posters to this forum have in their libraries.

Now that would be useful information, could you post say the top 50 posters with their top 50 useful books, since you already know the answer, saves everyone else asking and it will all be in the one place, how about 100 x 100?

If I have time later I'll start another thread and post some data on when the Kittyhawk started being used to drop larger bombs in each of several different Theaters (China, Burma, South Pacific, Alaska, Middle East, and Russia, which was all in 1942), but I'm not really interested in debating it here and now in this thread, because I know if I do it's just going to get murky and very long winded, especially since you give a lot of obvious signs that you are not really trying to have a discussion.

I think the light over the mirror is failing, how many self elected leaders does it take to change a light bulb?

So you'll have to forgive me I'm opting out of that for now.

Why not go for the bonus forgiveness option, back each and every one of your opinions with referenced facts, treat it as the well deserved penance that comes with forgiveness. Some fellow living in Rome has a lot of open books on the concept, big house, fancy dress door people, hard to miss.

Frankly, I think you are both clumsily trying to derail this thread, which bears a message you don't appreciate

Ah, the mirror cracked from the strain of reflecting what was in front of it and now there are two reflections.

But I'll start another one about "Kittyhawks and Blenheims", no problem You don't seem to like it when the books do come open in our interactions so far, but who knows?

Mirror light must be really flickering now.

Two more opinion pieces presented, its the want to be influencer new thing, sugar, fat, fact and mental exertion free messages

Think of the following as a silver crucifix smeared with garlic (with just a hint of mint) in vampire country, or facts to shorten the expression.

When it comes to bomber losses there is Bomber Losses in the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 1 1939 to 1942, by David Gunby and Pelham Temple. Meant to include aircraft lost on ferry flights to the theatre as well as all causes losses, pages 17 to 36 the 1940 war losses, pages 37 to 114 for 1941, pages 116 to 211 for 1942. The most common way for a formation to take multiple losses was an anti shipping strike.

A quick leaf through for multiple losses on the one raid, 1941, Western Desert unless mentioned otherwise, 4 or more
13 April, 6 out of 6 Blenheim, Greece, fighters
23 May, 5 out of unknown number Blenheim, fighters
27 May, 6 out of unknown number, Blenheim, Crete, none to enemy action
9 July, 4 out of 7 Blenheim, causes not given
12 September, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim anti shipping, flak
1/2 November, 5 out of unknown number Wellington, fog.
20 November, 5 out of 9 Maryland, army co-operation, fighters
22 November, 4 out of 6 Blenheim, fighters
10 December, 5 out of 6 Boston, fighters
12 December, 5 out of unknown number Maryland, fighters
20 December, 4 out of 12 Blenheim, fighters

In 1942,
4 February, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim, low cloud
16/17 August, 4 out of unknown number Wellington, none enemy action
13/14 September, 4 out of unknown number Wellington, probably none enemy action
4 December, 9 out of unknown number Blenheim (NW Africa), fighters

There are probably others, plus dropping the minimum loss to 3 will add more.

Interesting that from pre Gazala battle daylight bomber losses to enemy action drop away, in the western desert anyway.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Japanese fighter range improvements,

True, the penalty I pay for reading and remembering much more about IJN than IJA aircraft operations.


Which explains the low ranking in the governance quality survey. All leaders charge a fee for their leadership, one that tends to grow over time, not just material items, but things like more obedience from everyone else.


Few do, a source of much rejoicing given candidate quality, you might notice the migration rate sometime.


I think that translates to fragile ego alert. Anyway I have found much good fruit, as people have chimed in with useful questions and answers, and had had a chance to look at the data, the bonus being some comic replies and for all that you do not intend to continue.


Amazing what some people write looking in mirrors.


Ah yes, declared completely correct statements are made which by definition require no evidence to back them up. A little later a declared completely correct but a shortened version is issued which by definition requires no evidence to back it up, as it has the earlier incorrect bits removed. As now it is Kittyhawk bomber against Blenheim Bomber, not Blenheim versus Boston etc. and survival rates, not how often a formation took large losses.


Now that would be useful information, could you post say the top 50 posters with their top 50 useful books, since you already know the answer, saves everyone else asking and it will all be in the one place, how about 100 x 100?


I think the light over the mirror is failing, how many self elected leaders does it take to change a light bulb?


Why not go for the bonus forgiveness option, back each and every one of your opinions with referenced facts, treat it as the well deserved penance that comes with forgiveness. Some fellow living in Rome has a lot of open books on the concept, big house, fancy dress door people, hard to miss.


Ah, the mirror cracked from the strain of reflecting what was in front of it and now there are two reflections.


Mirror light must be really flickering now.

Two more opinion pieces presented, its the want to be influencer new thing, sugar, fat, fact and mental exertion free messages

Think of the following as a silver crucifix smeared with garlic (with just a hint of mint) in vampire country, or facts to shorten the expression.

Since we are being candid here, I find your posts extremely long, with endless charts, and generally a rambling mix of turgid opinions, snarky implied insults, and cranky grumbling.

But sure, I'll take the bait. I'm not sure what you think you know about me, but I do have the library everyone else has. None of this - about the Blenheim, the Kittyhawk, the Boston etc., is news. But we can plunge into all of it, like a clumsy Blenheim staggering through the clouds toward it's doom over an Axis base.

When it comes to bomber losses there is Bomber Losses in the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 1 1939 to 1942, by David Gunby and Pelham Temple. Meant to include aircraft lost on ferry flights to the theatre as well as all causes losses, pages 17 to 36 the 1940 war losses, pages 37 to 114 for 1941, pages 116 to 211 for 1942. The most common way for a formation to take multiple losses was an anti shipping strike.

A quick leaf through for multiple losses on the one raid, 1941, Western Desert unless mentioned otherwise, 4 or more
13 April, 6 out of 6 Blenheim, Greece, fighters
23 May, 5 out of unknown number Blenheim, fighters
27 May, 6 out of unknown number, Blenheim, Crete, none to enemy action
9 July, 4 out of 7 Blenheim, causes not given
12 September, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim anti shipping, flak
1/2 November, 5 out of unknown number Wellington, fog.
20 November, 5 out of 9 Maryland, army co-operation, fighters
22 November, 4 out of 6 Blenheim, fighters
10 December, 5 out of 6 Boston, fighters
12 December, 5 out of unknown number Maryland, fighters
20 December, 4 out of 12 Blenheim, fighters

In 1942,
4 February, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim, low cloud
16/17 August, 4 out of unknown number Wellington, none enemy action
13/14 September, 4 out of unknown number Wellington, probably none enemy action
4 December, 9 out of unknown number Blenheim (NW Africa), fighters

There are probably others, plus dropping the minimum loss to 3 will add more.

Interesting that from pre Gazala battle daylight bomber losses to enemy action drop away, in the western desert anyway.

This thread right here is about "Regarding the true combat performance the P-38 and other advanced US fighters in the PTO from 1942-44" etc. The issue of second generation fighters like the Lightning, Thunderbolt, Corsair, Hellcat, and yes including the RAF Spitfire VIII, against supposedly obsolete Japanese fighters like the A6M and Ki-43. I think that is an interesting and worthy subject to discuss, which is why I chose to participate. There is new data emerging in the last 3-5 years shedding light on this particular topic which hasn't been published before. So it's new. It's new data about WW2 air combat that a lot of us haven't seen before and are just learning about. That is interesting.

This is not a thread about a deep dive into the bomb load or survival rates of bombers in the DAF, which is the topic you seem to have chosen. I'm not obligated to dig into this with you, no matter how much you want me to. However, I will open that topic up for that discussion. You were already proven wrong by other people here about your cranky and pointlessly pedantic assertion of the Blenheim bomb load. I'll cover the rest of your statements in the new thread. But I'll do that when i have the time and feel like it.

Right now you are trying to derail this thread so that you can grandstand with one of your turgid missives which I doubt a lot of people actually read, since it's the same stuff every time with slightly different charts. You want to steer the discussion toward something you think you understand better, or a topic which just pleases you more to discuss because something about this one makes you nervous.

The problem is there have already been dozens of threads on this forum about the P-40, the Blenheim, the DAF, Burma, China, Malaya etc. Books covering the data you are trying to debate right now have been out since the 1960s and before. So this is not new information. That makes it less interesting and a lower priority for me. But sure "Geoffrey", we'll go there.

 

[GregP]

Since we are being candid here, I find your posts extremely long, with endless charts, and generally a rambling mix of turgid opinions, snarky implied insults, and cranky grumbling.

But sure, I'll take the bait. I'm not sure what you think you know about me, but I do have the library everyone else has. None of this - about the Blenheim, the Kittyhawk, the Boston etc., is news. But we can plunge into all of it, like a clumsy Blenheim staggering through the clouds toward it's doom over an Axis base.



This thread right here is about "Regarding the true combat performance the P-38 and other advanced US fighters in the PTO from 1942-44" etc. The issue of second generation fighters like the Lightning, Thunderbolt, Corsair, Hellcat, and yes including the RAF Spitfire VIII, against supposedly obsolete Japanese fighters like the A6M and Ki-43. I think that is an interesting and worthy subject to discuss, which is why I chose to participate. There is new data emerging in the last 3-5 years shedding light on this particular topic which hasn't been published before. So it's new. It's new data about WW2 air combat that a lot of us haven't seen before and are just learning about. That is interesting.

This is not a thread about a deep dive into the bomb load or survival rates of bombers in the DAF, which is the topic you seem to have chosen. I'm not obligated to dig into this with you, no matter how much you want me to. However, I will open that topic up for that discussion. You were already proven wrong by other people here about your cranky and pointlessly pedantic assertion of the Blenheim bomb load. I'll cover the rest of your statements in the new thread. But I'll do that when i have the time and feel like it.

Right now you are trying to derail this thread so that you can grandstand with one of your turgid missives which I doubt a lot of people actually read, since it's the same stuff every time with slightly different charts. You want to steer the discussion toward something you think you understand better, or a topic which just pleases you more to discuss because something about this one makes you nervous.

The problem is there have already been dozens of threads on this forum about the P-40, the Blenheim, the DAF, Burma, China, Malaya etc. Books covering the data you are trying to debate right now have been out since the 1960s and before. So this is not new information. That makes it less interesting and a lower priority for me. But sure "Geoffrey", we'll go there.

You may not know it, but there is an infamous thread about the P-39 with over 100 pages! Yes, over 100 pages on the P-39 and related stuff including some number of pages with just insults on them. It's commonly referred to in here as the groundhog thread. It never got so bad that it had to be locked.

If the insults get too personal, the mods will lock the thread and not allow anyone to post in it anymore. It's one of the things mods do on most forums.

So, yeah, there are some threads with a LOT of information in them and some with a lot of nonsense that was, if nothing else, fun at the time ...

 

[beers]

I apologise for my "nitpicking", but there was no "Russia" there in 1939. The Soviet Union was there.

You're absolutely right haha. But the point got across so I'm counting it as a win.