Rn vs IJN

[Glider]

Shifting back to ships.

The Japanese had 63 (?) Subs on active service on Dec 7th 1941.

There were about 5 boats at Kure assigned to training/local defense.

Combined fleet 14 boats
RO-33 & RO-34
1935-37, 700 tons, new torpedoes.

I-53 thru I-60 and I-62 and I-64 thru I-66
1927-32, 1575-1635 tons

3rd fleet had 4 boats assigned to blockade/transport
I-121 thru I-124
1927-28, 1142 tons, mine layers.


4th fleet had 9 boats assigned to the Japanese Mandate Islands RO-60 thru RO-68,
1923-27 boats of about 990 tons. old torpedoes.

5th Fleet had 26 boats.
I-1 thru I-6
1926-35, 1900-2080tons, two with float planes.

I-15 thru I-26
1940-41, 2184-2190 tons some with single floatplane.

I-68 thru I-75
1934-38, 1400-1420 tons

In Dec 1941 the Japanese had a further 29 boats under construction, to complete in 1942-43 and another 38 approved but not yet started.
The US had 111 boats in commission with 73 under construction but only 51 in the Pacific. 29 at Manila (6 S boats) and 22 at Pearl Harbor (6 S boats)
The Dutch had 12 boats of different ages.

The RN had 0.

True but if we are working on the basis that there is no war in Europe then its a safe bet that a good number of the RN's more modern boats would have transferred. Also numbers are not everything.
I53 to I66 were all assigned to training by 1942, the larger boats were at a significant disadvantage being large and slow to submerge. The others would have faced quite well equipped and trained excorts whereas the RN boats would have faced little effective defences and quite probably have a field day with a convoy

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

True but if we are working on the basis that there is no war in Europe then its a safe bet that a good number of the RN's more modern boats would have transferred. Also numbers are not everything.
I53 to I66 were all assigned to training by 1942, the larger boats were at a significant disadvantage being large and slow to submerge. The others would have faced quite well equipped and trained excorts whereas the RN boats would have faced little effective defences and quite probably have a field day with a convoy

To be fair, much of the waters in NEI are shallow, which shallow waters gave the RN subs fits in the Med. Granted that Japanese ASW was not up to Italian standards, but still.

 

[Shortround6]

I have mentioned this before in a different way. The Japanese and British built subs for different wars or different areas of operation, they were about as far apart as two navies could be. Not saying either one was bad, just that conditions were very different.
Large Japanese boats in the Med would have a life only slightly longer than a Kamikaze.
Most British boats simply don't carry enough fuel to go from Singapore to the Yellow sea or the Sea of Japan and stay for more than a couple of days.

The Smaller British boats could operate in the waters around NEI better (not great) or in the south China Sea or Philippine Sea much better. If the US is Neutral Japanese shipping is more restricted as to routes.
The Japanese could have done more with their subs but they could not operate like the Americans or Germans or British did.

I have brought in the US numbers just for comparison sake, Because of the famous MK 14 torpedo (sarcasm) the US subs didn't actually do much in first couple of years of the war.
A much smaller number of British subs with their working torpedoes could have had a significant effect in opening months or years of the hypothetical war in the NEI area.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And smaller British subs would be really good for those waters.

 

[SaparotRob]

The British subs would fly the Jolly Roger. Way cool.

 

[RCAFson]

True but if we are working on the basis that there is no war in Europe then its a safe bet that a good number of the RN's more modern boats would have transferred. Also numbers are not everything.
I53 to I66 were all assigned to training by 1942, the larger boats were at a significant disadvantage being large and slow to submerge. The others would have faced quite well equipped and trained excorts whereas the RN boats would have faced little effective defences and quite probably have a field day with a convoy

RN subs completed by 31 Dec 1941, with OTL building:

LR subs (8000nm or better at 8-10 knots)
16 x OPR class
3 x Thames class
20 x T class (18 x Aug 1941)

Shorter range:
3 x O class
6 x Grampus/Porpoise class
21 x U class (19 to 30 Oct 1941)
12 x S class

(11 older subs omitted)

 

[EwenS]

A few things to bear in mind about possible British submarine operations against the IJN.

Pre -war planning saw the British submarines taking up position in the waters south of Japan to intercept the Japanese fleet coming south. So the proposed operational area was the South and East China Seas.

There would therefore have been no attempt to push sub operations up towards the Yellow Sea (between Korea and China) or to penetrate the Straits of Tsushima (between Japan and Korea) to operate in the Sea of Japan. In terms of intercepting a Japanese Fleet such an operation would prove pointless as the main Japanese naval bases (Kure & Yokosuka) were on Japan's East coast shore bordering the Pacific or at places like Sasebo on Kyushu.

Second, a significant part of the pre-war China Station submarine flotilla was based on the depot ship Medway at Hong Kong. So at least initial operations would be at shorter range. That raises the question of how quickly Japan moves against HK and how quickly the centre of submarine operations has to move south to Singapore.

Thirdly I think you underestimate the capabilities of the British patrol subs of the O/P/R/T classes. In particular the O/P/R classes were designed with war against Japan in mind, and spent most of their time inter-war in that region. The T class were intended as their replacements and were designed to be suitable for worldwide service. But if no war in Europe there might not be quite so many T boats available (5 of those noted by RCAFson came from an order placed on 4 Sept 1939). While building would have continued, the question would be how many each year.

Singapore to Sasebo on Kyushu is about 3,100 nautical miles. These subs had a range of 8,000 miles or more at 10 knots on the surface (max speed was higher) and significantly more at 8 knots. So the journey takes about 13 days each way at 10 knots. And they would probably not be going all the way to Kyushu (see para 2). The 3 River / Thames class were fast but at an economical speed had a range of 14,000 miles. Once on patrol fuel consumption could be reduced further. The T class were designed around a 42 day patrol period. So they have at least a week probably nearer double that on station.

Particulars of British Subs 1939

www.rnsubmusfriends.org.uk

In terms of numbers of O/P/R available by 1941, it should be noted that by 1939 they were beginning to be withdrawn to Britain to reserve or training roles to be reactivated when war broke out. As more T class become available numbers probably shrink further if no war in Europe.

The smaller boats of the S class were designed with operations in the North Sea and Med in mind not the Far East. Range 5,750 miles at 8 knots. IIRC none of these were deployed east of Suez until late 1943 by which time some of their ballast tanks were converted to carry additional fuel to increase their range. The S class programme got a lift in Jan 1940 with more wartime orders, but these only began to appear from 1942.

The U class were intended as training boats with emergency use in wartime. Only 3 were built pre-war. The large orders began to be placed only on the outbreak of war as part of the wartime emergency programmes. 12 on 4 Sept 1939, another 10 in March 1940 and a further 12 in Aug 1940. No war sees very few more than the initial 3 produced. As far as I'm aware only 6 of the modified V class ever served east of Suez and IIRC only one ever carried out a war patrol there (a single operation off Burma from Colombo). Otherwise they spent their time as clockwork mice.

 

[Ovod]

Singapore to Sasebo on Kyushu is about 3,100 nautical miles. These subs had a range of 8,000 miles or more at 10 knots on the surface (max speed was higher) and significantly more at 8 knots. So the journey takes about 13 days each way at 10 knots. And they would probably not be going all the way to Kyushu (see para 2). The 3 River / Thames class were fast but at an economical speed had a range of 14,000 miles. Once on patrol fuel consumption could be reduced further. The T class were designed around a 42 day patrol period. So they have at least a week probably nearer double that on station.

Particulars of British Subs 1939

www.rnsubmusfriends.org.uk

Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942. Very soon after, the closest naval bases to Japan still under the possession by the Royal Navy would have been located in India, Ceylon and Australia (if I'm correct). Even if RN subs could reach Japan at that distance, they wouldn't have been able to spend much time on patrol.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942. Very soon after, the closest naval bases to Japan still under the possession by the Royal Navy would have been located in India, Ceylon and Australia (if I'm correct). Even if RN subs could reach Japan at that distance, they wouldn't have been able to spend much time on patrol.

But a lot of Japanese most important assets, such as oil in DEI, were pretty close to Australia

 

[Shortround6]

The British ended the war with 2nd highest kill to loss ratio of any submarine service in WW II ( the US ended up at 1st by a huge margin).
The British also lost a high percentage of their subs, 75 boats in total compared to the US 52 (?) but then the British fought for over 2 years longer and 45 of the losses were in the Med.
British claimed 493 merchant ships sunk (1,524,000 tons) and 109 damaged (518,000tons) world wide.

Japanese claimed 184 merchant ships sunk (907,000 tons ) damaged not given. Japanese lost 129 boats from all causes during the war. Strangely they lost 18 due to aircraft and 19 due to enemy subs but with 22 lost unknown that could easily flip.

Again we can fill in some of the 'gaps'. The Japanese were not operating in a target rich environment. There were fewer merchant vessels in the Pacific and they were spread further apart. US to Australia/DEI/Philippines was probably the biggest market after the US started shutting down the Japanese market and the Japanese had shut down a lot of the China/rest of the world earlier.
The merchant ships in the Pacific appear to be a bit larger than North Atlantic and especially Mediterranean ships.
The British T class seem to have been rather lucky (or just good?) against subs. They sank 13 of the them, six Italian, four German and 3 Japanese.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The only real correction you made here was that the Wellington units which were so successful in the Med were not South African, you are right about that. Regardless, they were used successfully, at night, to strike among other things ports and merchant shipping.

Actually I provided a list of facts, and received an editorial, including how good the Wellington strikes were in 1942.

There is no reason they couldn't have done the same in the Pacific.

Lots of reasons why, the different climate and the greater distances. Rain forests tend to have lots of rain clouds, deserts tend to have the opposite.

Weather was often very bad in the South Pacific but the clouds were and are not as consistent at higher altitudes the way they definitely are in Northern Europe.

Apart from once again providing opinion instead of weather references the South Pacific is the blue bits to the east of the Solomons and New Zealand, the proposed battlefield is around the South China Sea, lots more land, forests and different weather systems. The British are unlikely to start a drive north from the Solomons for a while.

There is no reason to assume Spitfire float planes would have been any good.

Of course, only you are allowed to assume what will be good or bad.

I'm not sure what good the larger four engine bombers would have been against Japan, at least until bases were captured close enough to the mainland.

There is a reason why I normally ignore your messages, confining myself to reading replies to them, you propose Wellington bombers with as little as 500 pounds of bombs will do lots of damage to Japanese installations etc., but the 4 engined types which would be carrying maybe 10 times the weight of bombs "I'm not sure what good the larger four engine bombers would have been against Japan". So why are all those airfields housing those high impact Wellingtons unable to take 4 engined types, or is it only the Wellington has the range to reach the proposed targets? Your assumptions become facts, while facts that do not fit become assumptions.

By end 1941 there were 168 Stirling, 168 Halifax, 18 Lancaster and 199 Manchester built, a peace time RAF is not going to expand anything like it did in 1940 and 1941, nor take the losses, the belief in the heavy bomber would be strong, to keep within peace time budgets the obvious thing is to wind down the twin engined bomber production as the 4 engined types appear. There is little doubt production would be lower across the board as would losses but not of the new 4 engined types in 1940/41 as they were largely filling pre war orders.

The "Black Cat" PBYs I referred to were used mainly to strike military targets. But in a 'what-if' scenario that could just as easily have been merchant shipping. There were 14 "Black Cat" PBY squadrons active in the Pacific starting in the Solomons in 1941 with VP-12. The Australians also eventually had four squadrons operating in the same role from April 1943.

Right, 14 squadrons by end of war with all that experience, the RAF had 545 Beauforts built in Britain by end 1941. The RAAF Catalina squadrons, 11 sqn in March 1941, 20 sqn in August 1941, 43 sqn in May 43, 42 sqn in June 1944. The RAAF received 18 Catalina February to October 1941, another 12 March to July 1942, it meant as of mid October 1942 the RAF had 17 PBY "Strength includes 3 from United States Navy, only one of which can be regarded as an operational aircraft." Early 1943 saw more deliveries so by end of April 1943 strength was up to 35 including the 3 USN ones. The RAAF Chiefs of Staff reports are full of detailed information. With increasing allied airpower and known Japanese losses the Catalinas could move from defensive patrols to offensive actions exploiting their range. A Britain versus Japan war has a long hanging flank into the Pacific, from Canada to the Gilbert Islands to the Solomons and New Guinea, with various neutral zones depending on the French and US attitudes. Then if the Dutch are at peace another big gap. Even without US involvement the trade routes through the Panama canal will be active and need protecting.

RAAF 11 squadron was in Port Moresby, pulled back to Cairns, Queensland November 1942, then to Rathmines New South Wales in July 1944. 20 squadron was also in Port Moresby, back to Bowen in May then Cairns in November 1942, went to Darwin in September 1944, 42 squadron was formed in Darwin, 43 squadron formed at Bowen, stayed on the Australian east coast until to Darwin in April 1944. Cairns is over 500 miles south of Port Moresby, Bowen over 700 miles, made it hard to undertake offensive sorties. What was possible in 1944/45 is different to what was possible in 1942.

Assuming there is some sort of warning, the RAF should have been able to deploy about 4 squadrons of Stirling, 4 of Halifax and say 10 of Beaufort end 1941, assuming the airfields existed. For what it is worth Malaya was largely used as advanced training for the Indian army, new drafts were being shipped in and then out to help expand the army strength in the Middle East.

 

[Shortround6]

. Then if the Dutch are at peace another big gap. Even without US involvement the trade routes through the Panama canal will be active and need protecting.

The British and the Japanese need some sort of reason to go to war. In real History the Japanese went to war to secure access to raw materials. The British may have been pissed about what Japan was doing to China but in 1938-39 they weren't doing much about it and they were rather busy watching Adolf. Even if the British had been the one to start the embargo thing and left the US out and assume that Adolf had stoke at the 1936 Olympics after seeing a non Aryan win a gold medal the Rest of the Nazi party devolved into infighting and civil wat taking them out of it, the Dutch were always going to be in the war. They were sitting on much of the resources the Japanese wanted. They also knew that the Japanese were less likly to observe treaties than the Germans were, the Japanese dropped out of treaties/agreements rather than give lip service to them.

For what it is worth Malaya was largely used as advanced training for the Indian army, new drafts were being shipped in and then out to help expand the army strength in the Middle East

And that gives at least one reason for the poor performance of the commonwealth troops in Malaya and Burma in 1941/42. low amount of training time and not full equipment.
Full issue of Art, AA, AT guns would take place once they were transported to the duty area.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Actually I provided a list of facts, and received an editorial, including how good the Wellington strikes were in 1942.

I was referring to the many details about the operational history with the Wellingtons in the Med which were posted in some other recent discussions on this very forum. In fact, some of this was in one long thread which you yourself posted in quite a bit, so I thought you would remember it. It's quite clear to me from those operational details that Wellingtons were used successfully, as I noted, to sink ships and strike ports and logistics targets. This is one post where I quoted from that source, this post has more specific data including about Wellington ops.

Having already posted a lot of this data myself direct from the source (Ehler's Mediterranean Air War), and seen several other people post corroborating data with more detail in the same threads, I thought it would be a bit tiresome to go pull the book down from the shelf and re-post all this data just because you feel like a less detailed or 'in the weeds' comment (i.e. "Wellingtons could clearly perform that kind of mission") is an "editorial" or "opinion".

So now it's being claimed that I just talk with no basis in fact.

From my notes on this, it seems there were at least two Wellington torpedo bomber units active in the Med in 1942 - 38 Sqn RAF switched to ship hunting in March 1942, and 458 squadron RAAF went into ship hunting mode in September 1942. There was also 221 Squadron RAF (or were they Coastal Command?) which was operaitonal against Axis Maritime assets in the Med from January 1942 but I don't know if those planes were carrying torpedoes or not. There appear to be another 6 Squadrons of Wellingtons operating in the Tactical role, with 205 Group by the time of Second El Alamein. At least four more seem to have arrived in Theater by the time of Operation Husky in 1943.

Lots of reasons why, the different climate and the greater distances. Rain forests tend to have lots of rain clouds, deserts tend to have the opposite.

Your original comment was "By end 1941 all 3 RAF four engined bombers were in production, forget Wellingtons and the other twins, an at peace RAF would be phasing them out and would be worried about fabric covering in the tropics."

If that is indeed an insurmountable problem, then I guess the Swordfish is out. My assumption is that they could find a way to cope with this issue with some kind of coating or something.

Apart from once again providing opinion instead of weather references the South Pacific is the blue bits to the east of the Solomons and New Zealand, the proposed battlefield is around the South China Sea, lots more land, forests and different weather systems. The British are unlikely to start a drive north from the Solomons for a while.

I've been in the South Pacific area before, and I've been in Northern Europe, and so have many other people. I thought it was general knowledge. Vast horizon to horizon cloud cover is not common in that region, but the weather is very volatile. If there is a typhoon, it can be. Do I really need to go dig up meteorological data to prove this?

I was not suggesting operations in the Solomons, especially early. I was talking specifically about the Dutch East Indies as being a viable target from Australia.

Of course, only you are allowed to assume what will be good or bad.

I was basically suggesting that we (including myself) not make assumptions. Do you have data showing that the float plane Spitfire would be effective in that role?

There is a reason why I normally ignore your messages, confining myself to reading replies to them, you propose Wellington bombers with as little as 500 pounds of bombs will do lots of damage to Japanese installations etc., but the 4 engined types which would be carrying maybe 10 times the weight of bombs "I'm not sure what good the larger four engine bombers would have been against Japan". So why are all those airfields housing those high impact Wellingtons unable to take 4 engined types, or is it only the Wellington has the range to reach the proposed targets? Your assumptions become facts, while facts that do not fit become assumptions.

I find that your objections to my "messages" are often turgid and incomprehensible. For example I don't know what your objection was precisely to my comments about Wellingtons operating in the Med in 1942. Your posts are also typically very long. But I try to read them anyway because you sometimes have useful data, though sometimes the relevance of this data is a bit mysterious.

By end 1941 there were 168 Stirling, 168 Halifax, 18 Lancaster and 199 Manchester built, a peace time RAF is not going to expand anything like it did in 1940 and 1941, nor take the losses, the belief in the heavy bomber would be strong, to keep within peace time budgets the obvious thing is to wind down the twin engined bomber production as the 4 engined types appear. There is little doubt production would be lower across the board as would losses but not of the new 4 engined types in 1940/41 as they were largely filling pre war orders.

At the risk of being accused of writing another editorial, I will try to explain my thinking. I don't know how many four engined types would be available, but yes I suspect they would be difficult to operate from remote remote or jungle fields, and they (with the exception of missions like 617 RAF with Lancasters) don't seem to have been made to strike operational or tactical targets. I never heard of them carrying torpedoes, though I know they did drop some big bombs on German ships at dockside a few times. That said the USAAF and USN did operate B-17s and B-24s respectively in the Pacific so maybe they would have a role, but unlike those aircraft i see the British four engine heavies as being maybe a little too vulnerable for daytime operations.

Basically the four engine heavies were developed (if not originally designed) to burn down German cities at night. That is the mission they got pretty good at. What I was envisioning for the Wellington in the Pacific is basically the same role they played in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943. Which is more precisely targeted. I never claimed that this was the only possible interpretation. You however did assert categorically that the Wellington was not going to work in the Pacific.

Right, 14 squadrons by end of war with all that experience, the RAF had 545 Beauforts built in Britain by end 1941. The RAAF Catalina squadrons, 11 sqn in March 1941, 20 sqn in August 1941, 43 sqn in May 43, 42 sqn in June 1944. The RAAF received 18 Catalina February to October 1941, another 12 March to July 1942, it meant as of mid October 1942 the RAF had 17 PBY "Strength includes 3 from United States Navy, only one of which can be regarded as an operational aircraft." Early 1943 saw more deliveries so by end of April 1943 strength was up to 35 including the 3 USN ones. The RAAF Chiefs of Staff reports are full of detailed information. With increasing allied airpower and known Japanese losses the Catalinas could move from defensive patrols to offensive actions exploiting their range. A Britain versus Japan war has a long hanging flank into the Pacific, from Canada to the Gilbert Islands to the Solomons and New Guinea, with various neutral zones depending on the French and US attitudes. Then if the Dutch are at peace another big gap. Even without US involvement the trade routes through the Panama canal will be active and need protecting.

RAAF 11 squadron was in Port Moresby, pulled back to Cairns, Queensland November 1942, then to Rathmines New South Wales in July 1944. 20 squadron was also in Port Moresby, back to Bowen in May then Cairns in November 1942, went to Darwin in September 1944, 42 squadron was formed in Darwin, 43 squadron formed at Bowen, stayed on the Australian east coast until to Darwin in April 1944. Cairns is over 500 miles south of Port Moresby, Bowen over 700 miles, made it hard to undertake offensive sorties. What was possible in 1944/45 is different to what was possible in 1942.

Assuming there is some sort of warning, the RAF should have been able to deploy about 4 squadrons of Stirling, 4 of Halifax and say 10 of Beaufort end 1941, assuming the airfields existed. For what it is worth Malaya was largely used as advanced training for the Indian army, new drafts were being shipped in and then out to help expand the army strength in the Middle East.

This is a good example of some data, which seems interesting, but I don't know what the relevance is to the thread. I brought up the "Black Cat" PBY squadrons just to point out that this was similar to what Wellingtons were doing in the Med, and showed that night torpedo and / or low-level bombing attacks were successful in the Pacific.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One other thing I noticed just now from the MTO thread, is that British submarines sank an astonishing tonnage of Axis shipping in the Mediterranean during the fighting there.

 

[EwenS]

But a lot of Japanese most important assets, such as oil in DEI, were pretty close to Australia

Again I don't thiink that you have quite grasped some of the distances involved nor the weather between Australia & targets in the DEI.

The airfields in the Northern Territory of Australia were mostly created in 1942 along the main supply route from Adelaide - The Stuart Highway. Railway track south from Darwin didn't go far in the grand scheme of things (about 300 miles to Larrimah). The railway from Adelaide in South Australia ran out at Alice Springs leaving a gap of over 600 miles that could only be covered by road transport, or a voyage by sea around Western Australia. On the map below airfields at Darwin, Batchelor, Adelaide River, Pine Creek, Katherine & Tindall immediately come to mind. These were built in case the Japanese invaded but some were never used while little use of others was made.

Darwin to Balikpapan ( on the east coast of the island of Borneo) is over 1,200 miles and involved flying over Japanese bases in Timor & Celebes. Look at the problems that the first raid by B-24s of the 5th AF encountered in Aug 1943. See the Shady Lady raid info.

The (Complete) Last Log of 'Shady Lady'

From Aborigines to Zeros, navigator John Nash ’39 logged an unforgettable World…

www.bates.edu

Other refineries are even further away.

Airfields in the northern part of Western Australia were few and far between. The two of the main ones were at Exmouth Gulf, (which appears at the extreme western point of Australia just before the coast turns north east in the top map, and referred to as "Potshot" in WW2 reports, and today as RAAF Learmonth) and Corunna Downs some 360 miles due east (an RAAF Liberator squadron was based in that God forsaken patch of near desert in 1944/45). Exmouth Gulf to Soerabaya on Java, the location of another refinery, is over 1,000 miles. Soerabaya is nearly 1,300 miles from Darwin and 1,100 from Corunna Downs.

In the South China Sea, and the DEI more generally, the main weather effects are the North-east Monsoon blowing between Nov & March annually (this helped shelter Japanese invasion fleets while limiting RAF aerial recce in Dec 1941), and the South-west Monsoon which blows from May to Sept annually. They bring huge cumulo nimbus cloud formations which build virtually every afternoon, often rising to heights well above the operating altitudes of WW2 era aircraft, with accompanying lightning stroms and torrential rains.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Again I don't thiink that you have quite grasped some of the distances involved nor the weather between Australia & targets in the DEI.
View attachment 734832
The airfields in the Northern Territory of Australia were mostly created in 1942 along the main supply route from Adelaide - The Stuart Highway. Railway track south from Darwin didn't go far in the grand scheme of things (about 300 miles to Larrimah). The railway from Adelaide in South Australia ran out at Alice Springs leaving a gap of over 600 miles that could only be covered by road transport, or a voyage by sea around Western Australia. On the map below airfields at Darwin, Batchelor, Adelaide River, Pine Creek, Katherine & Tindall immediately come to mind. These were built in case the Japanese invaded but some were never used while little use of others was made.
View attachment 734833

Darwin to Balikpapan ( on the east coast of the island of Borneo) is over 1,200 miles and involved flying over Japanese bases in Timor & Celebes. Look at the problems that the first raid by B-24s of the 5th AF encountered in Aug 1943. See the Shady Lady raid info.

The (Complete) Last Log of 'Shady Lady'

From Aborigines to Zeros, navigator John Nash ’39 logged an unforgettable World…

www.bates.edu

Other refineries are even further away.

Airfields in the northern part of Western Australia were few and far between. The two of the main ones were at Exmouth Gulf, (which appears at the extreme western point of Australia just before the coast turns north east in the top map, and referred to as "Potshot" in WW2 reports, and today as RAAF Learmonth) and Corunna Downs some 360 miles due east (an RAAF Liberator squadron was based in that God forsaken patch of near desert in 1944/45). Exmouth Gulf to Soerabaya on Java, the location of another refinery, is over 1,000 miles. Soerabaya is nearly 1,300 miles from Darwin and 1,100 from Corunna Downs.

In the South China Sea, and the DEI more generally, the main weather effects are the North-east Monsoon blowing between Nov & March annually (this helped shelter Japanese invasion fleets while limiting RAF aerial recce in Dec 1941), and the South-west Monsoon which blows from May to Sept annually. They bring huge cumulo nimbus cloud formations which build virtually every afternoon, often rising to heights well above the operating altitudes of WW2 era aircraft, with accompanying lightning stroms and torrential rains.

It read to me like he was talking about submarine ops, not aerial.

 

[EwenS]

It read to me like he was talking about submarine ops, not aerial.

Well the USN based the 7th Fleet subs at Fremantle in Western Australian along with the Dutch boats, and the RN subs joined them there from Sept 1944. From there they refuelled at Exmouth Gulf before heading for the Malay Barrier. In Dec 1941 the defences of Darwin were incomplete and as we have discussed before on other threads, the size of the town and facilities were wholly inadequate to support very much at all. And so it remained until well into 1945.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well the USN based the 7th Fleet subs at Fremantle in Western Australian along with the Dutch boats, and the RN subs joined them there from Sept 1944. From there they refuelled at Exmouth Gulf before heading for the Malay Barrier. In Dec 1941 the defences of Darwin were incomplete and as we have discussed before on other threads, the size of the town and facilities were wholly inadequate to support very much at all. And so it remained until well into 1945.

It would certainly strike me as worth developing if Singapore cannot be held.

 

[EwenS]

It would certainly strike me as worth developing if Singapore cannot be held.

Well historically it wasn't despite the opportunity being there. Darwin wasn't exactly a safe haven until the end of 1943. Attempts to develop it would see an escalation of Japanese attempts to knock it out.

Bombing of Darwin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well historically it wasn't despite the opportunity being there. Darwin wasn't exactly a safe haven until the end of 1943. Attempts to develop it would see an escalation of Japanese attempts to knock it out.

Bombing of Darwin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I know, but this is, after all, a what-if thread. That whole "neccessity's the mother of invention" thing.

Now as far as Japan attacking Darwin or Freemantle repeatedly, that could be seen as a threat, or an opportunity to grind them down. If Britain is not fighting Germany, its industry most assuredly can outproduce Japan's, meaning a battle of attrition ought to be winnable.