Rn vs IJN

[Glider]

So when did the RAF 4 engined types enter production? - 1939 Service 1941
Why did the RAF fail to learn from air raid damage in Britain? - Often when people invest a lot of anything into something, they have too much to lose by admitting defeat, so don't . Examples include the Flat Earth Society and Trump
What are the correct Bomber Command Accuracy figures? - That would depend on the year and a lot of variables but by the end of the war they were very accurate
When did Loran come into service? - 1942
Is the idea Spitfire V and IX float planes were not trialled? - They were
One of the early Dutch successes did not hit an important oil industry resources carrying ship? - You try finding a particular ship with next to no reccon
The USSBS conclusions on damage done are really? - Very good and complimentary of the British efforts
The Palembang refineries were where relative to the coast? - Look it up yourself
The weather reports provided are incorrect, why? - If weather reports are often inaccurate today, why do you expect them to be better seventy years ago?
The crude oil production and refining capacity figures are really? - Look it up yourself
The Japanese ended up with what refineries and who controlled them were really? - Controlling a refinery is one thing, being able to export the oil, something else
The air force navigator training levels were really?- Really very very good
The position errors in the Bismarck sighting were? - Inaccurate
The monsoon seasons are really? - difficult and wet
The lasting damage done to Darwin and other allied areas were? - None as all were repaired and improved
The true Japanese ship losses to PBY were? (Including from mines laid) - A lot
The Australian distances and populations reported are really? - Buy an Atlas

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

In your opinion!

The following article paints a rather different picture of that first raid. 12 B-24 took off. 3 failed to reach the target due to "weather, mechanical problems and fuel shortages" only 9 reached the target. In doing so they encountered 3 separate "vicious" weather fronts that they had to pass through on both the outward and return journeys. So far more than "rare", "local thunderstorms".

Four days later, and again in bad weather they repeated the exercise.

Valor: First at Balikpapan | Air & Space Forces Magazine

In August 1943, crews of the 380th Bomb Group flew three of the most daring missions of World War II.

www.airandspaceforces.com

First, I pointed this out in my post.

Second, no matter how many times I make this distinction, nobody seems to perceive it. But I never said thunderstorms are rare in the tropics during the day. Very much to the contrary. Where I live, most summers we get pretty powerful thunderstorms literally every afternoon. I said they are typically (not always) rare at night. Unless there is a cyclonic disturbance of some kind (tropical wave, storm, or cyclone).

Sometimes you can lead a horse out of the weather but they will still stand in the rain.

 

[Shortround6]

We are running into the butterfly problems.
Peace in Europe can bring a host of changes to development and procurement of aircraft. It is highly unlikely that procurement would have been according to Historical lines.
You also don't have any wartime experience to judge things on. You get possibilities like
1. More Defiants
2. Production of the Hampden is cut. Or not? It carried the smallest load of the three big twins. It carried no power turrets. It wasn't fast enough to fly in daylight. The crew could not change positions in flight. (Neither could the Havoc but the Havoc was almost 100mph faster) The Hampton was out of production in March of 1942. Canada stopped earlier. they only built 1430 of them (?)
3. Production of the Whitley is cut. Or not? They did build over 1800 of them and kept building them until June of 1943. It was the longest ranged of the big three twins (at least until the Wellington gets Hercules engines?) but it was the slowest so long flights in enemy territory could not always be conducted in darkness. Also carried the biggest load at short range. Had room for early radar sets. Sometimes could NOT keep flying with one engine. If you are not at war do you keep it or not?
4. Wellington, They did build 11,460 of them so it does look like a keeper.
5, the Beaufort. This semi-turkey was built to the tune of about 1800 planes, now please note that 700 of them were built in Australia using Mostly (all?) Australian built engines. The British built Beauforts used the wonder of the airways (sarcasm) the Taurus engine. 165 British Beauforts used P&W engines. More Beauforts were lost to their own engines than to enemy action in 1940-41. If there was not war would they keep building them?
6, The Botha, enough said.

The British don't need to build at the frantic pace they did in 1939-41 if there is no war but they do need to build some planes, Now we start arguing about how many of which.
the war wastage was huge. from Wiki so corrections welcome.

"Almost half of the Hampdens built, 714, were lost on operations, with 1,077 crew killed and 739 reported as missing. German Flak accounted for 108, one hit a German barrage balloon, 263 Hampdens crashed because of "a variety of causes" and 214 others were classed as "missing"."

There is a crap load of Butterflies in here.
.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

We are running into the butterfly problems.
Peace in Europe can bring a host of changes to development and procurement of aircraft. It is highly unlikely that procurement would have been according to Historical lines.
You also don't have any wartime experience to judge things on. You get possibilities like
1. More Defiants
2. Production of the Hampden is cut. Or not? It carried the smallest load of the three big twins. It carried no power turrets. It wasn't fast enough to fly in daylight. The crew could not change positions in flight. (Neither could the Havoc but the Havoc was almost 100mph faster) The Hampton was out of production in March of 1942. Canada stopped earlier. they only built 1430 of them (?)
3. Production of the Whitley is cut. Or not? They did build over 1800 of them and kept building them until June of 1943. It was the longest ranged of the big three twins (at least until the Wellington gets Hercules engines?) but it was the slowest so long flights in enemy territory could not always be conducted in darkness. Also carried the biggest load at short range. Had room for early radar sets. Sometimes could NOT keep flying with one engine. If you are not at war do you keep it or not?
4. Wellington, They did build 11,460 of them so it does look like a keeper.
5, the Beaufort. This semi-turkey was built to the tune of about 1800 planes, now please note that 700 of them were built in Australia using Mostly (all?) Australian built engines. The British built Beauforts used the wonder of the airways (sarcasm) the Taurus engine. 165 British Beauforts used P&W engines. More Beauforts were lost to their own engines than to enemy action in 1940-41. If there was not war would they keep building them?
6, The Botha, enough said.

The British don't need to build at the frantic pace they did in 1939-41 if there is no war but they do need to build some planes, Now we start arguing about how many of which.
the war wastage was huge. from Wiki so corrections welcome.

"Almost half of the Hampdens built, 714, were lost on operations, with 1,077 crew killed and 739 reported as missing. German Flak accounted for 108, one hit a German barrage balloon, 263 Hampdens crashed because of "a variety of causes" and 214 others were classed as "missing"."

There is a crap load of Butterflies in here.
.

Good points. In addition to the Defiants you might also have Skua. i was going to give them benefit of the doubt though and assume some kind of skirmishing happened somewhere so that they emphasize the better designs available.

I forgot about the different engines for RAF vs. RAAF Beauforts, that might explain the difference in outcomes.

The Whitley also flew at a really odd nose-down angle. Apparently because the original ones didn't have flaps. Allegedly this was why it was so slow. In it's defense, it was quite old - from 1937.

The Hampden's operational history is ... yikes. And I won't even go there with the Botha. Then there is also the Wellesley single engine bomber, which saw some action in the Middle East.

it looked almost ... French. I have a model of one of these I'm going to make one day.

It does seem to me that the Wellington was by far the major stand-out design of the early twin engined bombers for the RAF.

Overall, I also agree we are getting into a lot of butterflies. I think I made the point I wanted to make about the IJN / IJA in 1941-43.

Speculating about how Britain could have won regardless is actually pretty interesting, and I've learned some things here, but I guess I've also angered some guys and I really don't want this to get deeper into the insult hurling phase, so I think I'm going to tap out at this point and go look at some real butterflies in my garden. I'm always a fan of seeing things actually flying...

 

[EwenS]

I forgot about the different engines for RAF vs. RAAF Beauforts, that might explain the difference in outcomes.

In Britain Bristol built both Taurus engined Beaufort Mk.I/IA (1014 built) AND Twin Wasp powered Mk.II/IIA (415 built).

Beauforts continued to be built in Britain until Nov 1944, the last 121 being produced as trainers with more from earlier batches converted to fulfill that role

Edit:- some of the units in the Med were using both versions at the same time. There is a comment in "The Beaufort File" that reads:-

"It was, however, the Mk.II and IIAs which proved most suitable for Middle East operations, as their Twin Wasp engines coped better with the hot dry air than did the Taurus........Conversely, the longer range of the Taurus-engined marks made them more suitable for the Far East."

The last 2 operational RAF Beaufort squadrons were 22 and 217 based in Ceylon with Mk.IA until Aug/Sept 1944 when they converted to Beaufighter Mk.X.

 

[don4331]

Good points. In addition to the Defiants you might also have Skua. i was going to give them benefit of the doubt though and assume some kind of skirmishing happened somewhere so that they emphasize the better designs available.

While you probably don't have Skuas/Rocs, you will most likely have their successors from Specs N.5/38 (Skua replacement) and N.6/38 (Roc, aka turret fighter, replacement). Without war on immediate horizon, FAA doesn't build Fulmar. But the question is how close is the resulting aircraft to Fulmar (or Hawker Henley/Hotspur).

(Un)fortunately, by mid '42, RN has lost Ark Royal*, Courageous, Eagle, Glorious and Hermes. At which point, Argus & Furious can be ignored and aircraft designed (procured) for Illustrious class and successors. Without war in EU, FAA is still wanting to aircraft to operate from the old/slow/small carriers or major round downs.

*Ark Royal isn't old/slow/small but does have the round downs limiting deck space.

 

[Shortround6]

The Skua/Roc would have been out of service in 1941 in Peace time.
The Fulmar kind of depends on if there was any threat at all from Germany/Italy, or even Japan.
The Fulmar was ordered in 3 stages. Mid 1938 there were 127 ordered. This was raised to 250 shortly. I don't when or how the numbers were raised to 600+. However the change from the Fulmar I to the II was in Jan 1941 after just 154 of the I's had been built. Tootling about with the old Hawker Biplanes while the "new" Naval fighter (Firefly?) was developed in 1940-41 wasn't going to happen, belligerent Germany or not. Even in Feb 1940 the secretary of the Admiralty was only requesting 50 folding wing Spitfires to be available starting next July.

Now with no Germany the Griffon can get a lot faster development and perhaps you can get Firefly I's (or close) starting to show up in end of 1941 (One year early) but you need something to tied you over in meantime, even in peace time.

Same sort of the thing with the Torpedo bomber and dive bomber/attack plane. The Fulmar was supposed to use the same Merlin they were thinking about using in the Barracuda once they canceled the Exe engine. However the Barracuda was running a little late and they skipped the Merlin VIII used in the Fulmar I and went with the Merlin 30 used in the Fulmar II, still wasn't big enough. Now the idea seems to have been to use a common engine for spare parts so keep that in mind when considering "peace time" requirements.

Also consider that in peace time production would have been a fraction of what war time orders would have been.

In peace time the Eagle and Hermes would have been retired/scrapped/training carrier and one or more of the Furious, Courageous, Glorious would have joined them which gets rid of some of the old restrictions but also means that the planned "buy" of new aircraft is not going to be large.

On the other hand the Japanese were not building aircraft in large numbers either in 1941/early 42. Japan had built under 500 Zeros by the end of 1941 and 60 of them were in Dec. Zeros were not the only thing they were making but other planes were in proportion. The Japanese could not afford large losses (even operational losses)
British were out producing the Japanese by leaps and bounds in 1941/42. Trouble was that they were fighting France, North African and send stuff to Russia in the 2nd 1/2 of 1941. But without combat the production rate would have been lower.

 

[RCAFson]

The Skua/Roc would have been out of service in 1941 in Peace time.
The Fulmar kind of depends on if there was any threat at all from Germany/Italy, or even Japan.
The Fulmar was ordered in 3 stages. Mid 1938 there were 127 ordered. This was raised to 250 shortly. I don't when or how the numbers were raised to 600+. However the change from the Fulmar I to the II was in Jan 1941 after just 154 of the I's had been built. Tootling about with the old Hawker Biplanes while the "new" Naval fighter (Firefly?) was developed in 1940-41 wasn't going to happen, belligerent Germany or not. Even in Feb 1940 the secretary of the Admiralty was only requesting 50 folding wing Spitfires to be available starting next July.

Now with no Germany the Griffon can get a lot faster development and perhaps you can get Firefly I's (or close) starting to show up in end of 1941 (One year early) but you need something to tied you over in meantime, even in peace time.

Same sort of the thing with the Torpedo bomber and dive bomber/attack plane. The Fulmar was supposed to use the same Merlin they were thinking about using in the Barracuda once they canceled the Exe engine. However the Barracuda was running a little late and they skipped the Merlin VIII used in the Fulmar I and went with the Merlin 30 used in the Fulmar II, still wasn't big enough. Now the idea seems to have been to use a common engine for spare parts so keep that in mind when considering "peace time" requirements.

Also consider that in peace time production would have been a fraction of what war time orders would have been.

In peace time the Eagle and Hermes would have been retired/scrapped/training carrier and one or more of the Furious, Courageous, Glorious would have joined them which gets rid of some of the old restrictions but also means that the planned "buy" of new aircraft is not going to be large.

On the other hand the Japanese were not building aircraft in large numbers either in 1941/early 42. Japan had built under 500 Zeros by the end of 1941 and 60 of them were in Dec. Zeros were not the only thing they were making but other planes were in proportion. The Japanese could not afford large losses (even operational losses)
British were out producing the Japanese by leaps and bounds in 1941/42. Trouble was that they were fighting France, North African and send stuff to Russia in the 2nd 1/2 of 1941. But without combat the production rate would have been lower.

The other factor was that, due to the urgency to get them into the air as fighter-recon aircraft, the Fulmar's dive brakes and hardpoints were omitted. The original spec was for it to carry a 500lb bomb on the centreline and 2 x 250lb bombs, one under each wing, with flaps strengthened to act as dive brakes.

 

[don4331]

The other factor was that, due to the urgency to get them into the air as fighter-recon aircraft, the Fulmar's dive brakes and hardpoints were omitted. The original spec was for it to carry a 500lb bomb on the centreline and 2 x 250lb bombs, one under each wing, with flaps strengthened to act as dive brakes.

The original spec also includes able to mount floats and catapult spools to allow launching from cruisers/battleships. When you look at all the requirements, its surprising they turned out as well as they did in some cases.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Textbook definition of "falling between the stools" if that's true.

 

[EwenS]

The original spec also includes able to mount floats and catapult spools to allow launching from cruisers/battleships. When you look at all the requirements, its surprising they turned out as well as they did in some cases.

The catapult spools were required for carrier accelerator (catapult) launch. Britain used a collapsible trolley to raise an aircraft into a flying attitude for assisted carrier takeoffs. It was 1942 before British BH.III Carrier accelerators started to be modified for tail down launch of US types. The first British naval aircraft designed for tail down launch was the Seafire XV in 1944.

Fulmar on carrier accelerator ready for launch.

It was standard practice at the time that every naval aircraft should have a floatplane version. That requirement was dropped only with the issue of Specs N.8/39 & N.9/39 in June 1939 that led eventually to aircraft like the Firefly & Firebrand.

So there was a prototype Roc on floats which never went any further. Its performance was even worse than the wheeled version.

The M.7/36 & O.8/36 that led to the Albacore, and S.24/37 that led to the Barracuda also included provision for an alternative float undercarriage in the requirements for use in sheltered waters only. But none were ever built with them.

 

[RCAFson]

The catapult spools were required for carrier accelerator (catapult) launch. Britain used a collapsible trolley to raise an aircraft into a flying attitude for assisted carrier takeoffs. It was 1942 before British BH.III Carrier accelerators started to be modified for tail down launch of US types. The first British naval aircraft designed for tail down launch was the Seafire XV in 1944.

Fulmar on carrier accelerator ready for launch.
View attachment 735051


It was standard practice at the time that every naval aircraft should have a floatplane version. That requirement was dropped only with the issue of Specs N.8/39 & N.9/39 in June 1939 that led eventually to aircraft like the Firefly & Firebrand.

So there was a prototype Roc on floats which never went any further. Its performance was even worse than the wheeled version.

View attachment 735057

The M.7/36 & O.8/36 that led to the Albacore, and S.24/37 that led to the Barracuda also included provision for an alternative float undercarriage in the requirements for use in sheltered waters only. But none were ever built with them.

The Fulmar was catapulted off carriers quite often, as it meant that the carrier TF didn't have to come directly into the wind to launch aircraft. FAA catapults on Ark Royal and the AFD carriers had the best weight capacity until the Essex Class.

 

[EwenS]

In peace time the Eagle and Hermes would have been retired/scrapped/training carrier and one or more of the Furious, Courageous, Glorious would have joined them which gets rid of some of the old restrictions but also means that the planned "buy" of new aircraft is not going to be large.

From 1 Jan 1937 there was no limit on overall carrier tonnage or the numbers of ships, only on the size of individual ships (23,000 tons standard displacement). Mid-1939 RN forward planning for a peacetime deployment of carriers in 1942 looked like this:-

Home waters - Formidable, Illustrious, Indomitable
Training - Courageous
Reserve - Furious, Glorious, Hermes
Malta - Implacable & Indefatigable
Singapore - Ark Royal

Finally Victorious would have been either in the West Indies (Kingston) or the East Indies (Trincomalee).

So that equates to a strength of about 300 front line carrier aircraft + reserves + attrition replacements (c240 per year) plus amphibians for capital ships, cruisers and seaplane carriers.

Eagle doesn't figure in any of their plans, not even as a reserve ship. Argus would at best remain as an auxiliary Queen Bee carrier. If/when war broke out Furious would be reactivated as the training carrier while C,G & Hermes would become trade protection carriers.

One of the problems the RN had historically in 1939 when it finally regained full control over the FAA from the RAF was how to get the aircraft companies it was then dealing with to increase production to meet its wartime needs. Peak production rates for the period to about April 1942 were then estimated as follows:-

Fulmar - 20 per month
Swordfish/Albacore/Barracuda - 35-40 per month
Walrus/Sea Otter - 8 per month.
The Air Ministry believed that these monthly production figures could be doubled in the event of war.

Fairey Hayes factory was producing Swordfish and was expected to switch to Albacores by the end of 1939. Albacore production would cease about Aug 1941 after the 400th aircraft rolled off the production line. The historical successor at Hayes was the Firefly ordered in 1940.

Fairey Stockport factory was to produce the 250 Fulmars on order (it was the main source of Battles at this time) between about Nov 1939 and March 1941. (Note that this did not include the manufacturing space at the co-located shadow factory which was being reserved for RAF production. Historically it produced Halifax and Beaufighter) It would then switch to making 250 Barracudas until April 1942

The Supermarine works at Woolston (whose main product was Spitfires) was responsible for producing the amphibians.

It was acknowledged that some level of additional orders would be required to keep the factories going beyond April 1942 "whether or not the aircraft were needed for specific Fleet Air Arm requirements". That would ensure that the capacity wouldn't be lost to the RAF. But the Admiralty were not entirely happy at being so reliant on designs from one company, Fairey. Richard Fairey had made it clear he would rather build his own designs than someone else's when the idea of producing Spitfires for the RN was floated. While the Barracuda had been chosen as the new TBR at the start of 1939, Supermarine's design was to be prototyped because of the new tech it incorporated (the variable incidence wing), but the other possible fall backs in Hawker & Westland options soon evaporated as they became involved in projects and production for the RAF. Of the traditional suppliers of naval aircraft, that really only left Blackburn, which was also heavily involved in the Botha.

The other problem was that the RN was reliant on the Air Ministry allocating a share of engine and other aircraft equipment manufacturing capacity and output to its needs. This was a problem when there were only 2 main aircraft engine manufacturers in RR & Bristol whose products were in high demand by the RAF. Cancellation of the RR Exe for the Barracuda was a major headache forcing a redesign of the aircraft.

Also remember that with no war in Europe you don't have the new Blackburn shadow factory knocking out Swordfish from late 1940 nor the originally intended Albacores.

Edit - this of course ignores the Skua (production ceased early 1940) and the Roc (Production by Boulton & Paul continued until Aug 1940)

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Firstly a correction, Wellingtons with Bomber Command did lay mines, from 8 April 1942 to 3 March 1944 I should have written did not lay mines until early 1942.

Ok well, I see once again a lot of turgid anger here.

Then stop looking in the mirror and admiring the view so much. Meantime I look at all the factual material presented and ignored. Just flee forward around a circle until ending back at the start. You were asked a series of questions and chose not to answer. Like how many ships were sunk in the Mediterranean by Wellingtons. It is not worth getting angry, much more fun to watch the comedy relief pratfalls.

You don't rate what I post, and I don't rate most of what you post either to be honest.

As I said I do not write for you.

What I am detecting though (and kind of remember from the other thread on the Mediterranean air war) is that you have a problem with Ehler's book. And with the notion that air war played a decisive factor in the war in the Med. I'd say take that up with Ehlers.

Actually I have little problem with Ehler's material, I have big problems with the misuse of it, the author deserves better. I usually find the bigger the misuse the more take it up with the author is deployed.

Same for your claims about the weather in the Tropics. I live in the bloody Tropics, and worked for 25 years in the maritime industry, where issues of navigation routinely come up. I have also lived in Northern Europe, specifically at the time what was called 'West Germany', and I have seen the skies there with my own eyes. Believe whatever you would like to believe, call it anecdotal evidence. I'm fine with that.

So rain forests do not help make their own rain? Monsoon seasons in the South China Sea are what? I pointed out rain forests have more rain than deserts and therefore more clouds. Your idea of tropical weather was Wellingtons highly effective, weather systems fitted to suit. Operations in deserts that can be equated to operations in the wet tropics.

I also have done some research on the PBY "Black Cats", including reading books with data from the Japanese side and all the classics on the Pacific War, Lundstrum, First Team, Shattered Sword, as well as newer series like the South Pacific Air War by Michael Claringbould - they did hit targets in my opinion and were tactically effective in their role. I'm Ok with you disagreeing on that. You and I seem to live in different universes, and that ain't going to derail me or you I suspect.

And I have several thousand pages of original RAAF documents and am aware of the gap between your ideas of how effective and much more particular when more effective and in numbers available. The horrible day to day grind of sorties and attacks, not just the highlights the histories are forced to use. There is also the JANAC report. The Catalinas were used more defensively/rescue until 1944/45 by the RAAF, one of the few IJN submarine commerce warfare attempts was off the east coast of Australia.

I admit I am not an expert on these aircraft, but from what I have read, Hampden and Whitley were all-metal disasters. They were failures as bombers, not used in Theaters like North Africa, and quickly relegated to non-combat duties. If they were useful, why did they bother using Wellingtons and all the American types?

I point out the RAF had bigger and better all metal bombers in service (Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster) and note the Wellington's twin engined contemporaries were all metal as an aside. We now go running off on a side show. Anything but provide reasons why the 4 engined types were inappropriate for bombing things like refineries in the South China Sea area, while Wellingtons would be very effective. The other twins were no disasters, the Whitley had a long career in anti submarine, the Hampden lacked the range for bombing eastern Germany but could carry mines, they were the only Bomber Command type to lay mines until Manchesters on 29 September 1941. As the Hampdens had wing racks they often attacked another target when on minelaying operations.

The Hampdens were phased out of production to build the Halifax, last operation with Bomber Command was 14 September 1942, or around 3 years operational but little activity for the first 8 months. Whitley final operation on 28 April 1942 (ignoring OTU sorties) and they were active in the first 8 months of the war. So quickly relegated is 3 years, then comes their Coastal Command service, don't worry next time can be how they were left in service for far too long. Like the Wellingtons and Blenheims initially the Hampdens were for day raids, the Whitley for nights. Hampdens began leaflet operations in January 1940, Wellingtons did one night leaflet raid in September 1939 then resumed such operations in January 1940. The Whitley was the night bomber, performance reduced to give good handling and big bomb load, in production in March 1937, Hampdens in September 1938, Wellingtons in October 1938. Hampdens end at Handley Page in August 1940, Halifax start October.

The disaster is the person trying to fit wonder weapons into the narrative. The amusing part is watching the standard avoid inconvenient facts tactics.

Beuafort was used, and with some success (notably in the Pacific by the Australians) but was generally noted for taking fairly high losses, and it did not have anywhere near the range of the Wellington. However, properly escorted, such as by Beaufighters perhaps, it may have turned out to be a viable weapon for the British in this scenario. It's just not going to reach the East Indies from Australia.

We know, the scenario is set up for Wonder Wellington, Written (by) Woebegone Way Way Wizard Wisenheimer. So the targets have to be out of range of Beauforts, but in range of Wellingtons, the weather has Wellington mode, nicer than non Wellington mode. The airfields cannot be built large enough to take aircraft heavier than Wellingtons. Of course to achieve the ranges Wellingtons are at economic cruise, 165 to 175 mph, up to 15 hours in the air.

The RAF torpedo bomber units suffered heavy losses, less by night, more out of Malta and around Britain where axis fighters could reach them. It was not just Beauforts.

The significant argument remaining here is whether the British four engine heavy bombers would have had a role. My assumptions about the viability of the Wellington for the Pacific Theater is based mainly on learning about it's successful operational history (per Ehlers and several other sources). They worked out methods to make them effective against operational and tactical targets, including ports, airfields, trucks and trains, and in particular, ships. I found his book convincing, you apparently did not (?).

My assumption, I admit I don't know this for certain, is that the British four engined heavy bombers were a bit more challenging to use and support in remote field areas. You have twice as many engines per aircraft, (more maintenance, more fuel) you will need longer and harder runways etc. And they do not seem to be used very much against operational or tactical targets, 617 squadron being somewhat of an exception, and the main reason is that they didn't carry torpedoes.

We can only go on what you write, you talk about airfields, troops, refineries, ports and ships, and say attacks on these targets need torpedoes. Now go back to Ehlers book and dig out why the B-24 and Halifax were apparently ineffective in North Africa when bombing land targets, they have to be relative to the Wellingtons for your ideas to be correct. And if ship sinkings are the only true currency, how many did Wellingtons sink?

Next everyone has noted I provided take off distances for the Wellington, Stirling, Manchester and Halifax. And now everyone notes you assume the heavies will need longer runways, not provide the lengths, not dispute what I have written, just assume with zero data to back the assumption up. Back to the start of the circle.

Richard Davis figures, short toms, Bomber Command "tactical" targets

A/F 18284, A/F & Signals Depot 610, Army HQ 2, Army Sup (A/F) 634, Army Sup (Barr & RR/Fac) 1962, Army Sup (Barracks) 1673, Army Sup (City) 31534, Army Sup (Hutted Camp) 67, Army Sup (M/Y) 12234, Army Sup (RR/Br) 1607, Army Sup (RR/Fac) 4748, Army Sup (RR/Trans.) 384, Army Sup (RR/Via) 423, Army Sup (UB/Base) 1085, Barracks 1932, Blockship 1906, Fuel Depot 3658, Fuel Dump 955, German Fleet 2527, Goods Trains 6, Gun Emplacements 387, Military Camp 1814, Naval Installations 566, Naval Stores 17, Naval/Base 127, P/A 9631, P/A & Canal Locks 16, RR 16, RR/Br 1639, RR/Junc 7503, RR/Line 2, RR/Shops 2855, RR/Sidings 24, RR/Sta 2586, RR/Tunnel 178, RR/Via 558, Shipping 1041, T/T Coastal Installations 24165, T/T Dam 2237, T/T Field Battery 915, T/T Strong Points 29737, T/T Troops 24988, T/T Vehicles 500, UB/Base 85, UB/Pens 3295, Total 201,114 short tons. So what numbers are required for "much" usage against this category of target? Ever sat down and looked at how much Bomber Command supported operation Overlord?

By the way Bomber Command actually sank ships, mostly at Hamburg and various inland ports, but were not officially aiming for them.

The USAAF official history has a table of the authorised size of the different groups in 1945.

Very heavy bomb group, 3 squadrons, 45 B-29, 60 crews, 11 men per crew, 2,078 officers and men in group.
Heavy bomb group, 4 squadrons, 72 aircraft (B-17/24), 96 crews, 9 to 11 men per crew, 2,261 officers and men in group.
Medium bomb group, 4 squadrons, 96 aircraft (B-25/26), 96 crews, 5 to 6 men per crew, 1,759 officers and men in group.
Light bomb group, 4 squadrons, 96 aircraft (A-20/26), 96 crews, 3 to 4 men per crew, 1,304 officers and men in group.
Single Engine Fighter Group, 3 squadrons, 108-126 aircraft (P-40/47/51), 108-126 pilots, 994 officers and men in group.
Twin Engine Fighter Group, 3 squadrons, 108-126 aircraft (P-38), 108-126 pilots, 1,081 officers and men in group.
Troop Carrier Group, 4 squadrons, 80-110 aircraft (C-47), 128 crews, 4 to 5 men per crew, 1,837 men in group.
Combat Cargo Group, 4 squadrons, 125 aircraft (C-46/47), 150 crews, 4 men per crew, 883 men in group.

The rest of the units are squadrons
Night fighter squadron, 18 aircraft (P-61/70), 16 crews, 2 to 3 men per crew, 288 officers and men in squadron.
Tactical reconnaissance squadron, 27 aircraft (various including F-6), 23 pilots, 233 men in squadron.
Photographic reconnaissance squadron, 24 aircraft (F-5), 21 pilots, 347 men in squadron.
Combat mapping squadron, 18 aircraft (F-7/9), 16 crews, 9 men per crew, 474 officers and men in squadron.

Going from 1 to 2 engined fighters adds about 1 man per aircraft, the heavier bombers are generally more economical manpower wise in terms of bomb lift, but a key part is how many personnel per bomber, the Wellington tended to 5 to 6 man crews, the RAF heavies 7.

Now that said of course, they did get B-17s and B-24s to work in this environment. And they did eventually get them to be useful against some operational and tactical targets, though they were never very good at sinking surface warships. B-24s got pretty good at ASW.

How generous of you to bless them with your ignorance. So how many IJN submarines did the B-24 units sink?

It may of course have been possible to adapt Lancasters to being useful in the Pacific. They did use some Halifax bombers in the Med. But for example 205 Group seemed to mainly use Wellingtons through 1943, gradually replaced by Liberators in 1944-45.

The RAF reserved its higher performance aircraft for North West Europe, hence more Wellingtons than Halifaxes in the Mediterranean.

And while the conditions are different, North Africa and the Middle East are also in the Tropics.

On that basis the United States is in the tropics, see Hawaii. With such definitions in place no wonder so many people are pointing out weather problems. The North African battlefields were mostly in the desert zone, not tropical rain forest zone.

It is this actual real operational history which gave me the idea Wellingtons might be useful. As some may have noted, I go largely by operational history when assessing the utility of aircraft in WW2.

Actually what has been noted is you use secondary sources, fixate and announce how wonderful it is, make statements that cannot be backed up and try to ignore anything that contradicts what you prefer to believe. Writing complaints about other people, going round in circles. Your ignorance is not a virtue. Clear enough?

On another note. Beaufort I October 1939 to September 1941 (485) and February 1942 to January 1944 (516), II September 1941 to July 1942 (165), T.II August 1943 to November 1944 (250). Also there were different versions of the twin Wasp being used,

Mark Twin Wasp Propeller
II S3C4-G
V S3C4-G Curtiss Electric
VA S3C4-G Hamilton Constant Speed or De Havilland 3E50
VI S1C3-G Curtiss Electric
VII S1C3-G De Havilland 3E50
VIII S3C4-G Curtiss Electric

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Firstly a correction, Wellingtons with Bomber Command did lay mines, from 8 April 1942 to 3 March 1944 I should have written did not lay mines until early 1942.


Then stop looking in the mirror and admiring the view so much. Meantime I look at all the factual material presented and ignored. Just flee forward around a circle until ending back at the start. You were asked a series of questions and chose not to answer. Like how many ships were sunk in the Mediterranean by Wellingtons. It is not worth getting angry, much more fun to watch the comedy relief pratfalls.


As I said I do not write for you.


Actually I have little problem with Ehler's material, I have big problems with the misuse of it, the author deserves better. I usually find the bigger the misuse the more take it up with the author is deployed.


So rain forests do not help make their own rain? Monsoon seasons in the South China Sea are what? I pointed out rain forests have more rain than deserts and therefore more clouds. Your idea of tropical weather was Wellingtons highly effective, weather systems fitted to suit. Operations in deserts that can be equated to operations in the wet tropics.


And I have several thousand pages of original RAAF documents and am aware of the gap between your ideas of how effective and much more particular when more effective and in numbers available. The horrible day to day grind of sorties and attacks, not just the highlights the histories are forced to use. There is also the JANAC report. The Catalinas were used more defensively/rescue until 1944/45 by the RAAF, one of the few IJN submarine commerce warfare attempts was off the east coast of Australia.


I point out the RAF had bigger and better all metal bombers in service (Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster) and note the Wellington's twin engined contemporaries were all metal as an aside. We now go running off on a side show. Anything but provide reasons why the 4 engined types were inappropriate for bombing things like refineries in the South China Sea area, while Wellingtons would be very effective. The other twins were no disasters, the Whitley had a long career in anti submarine, the Hampden lacked the range for bombing eastern Germany but could carry mines, they were the only Bomber Command type to lay mines until Manchesters on 29 September 1941. As the Hampdens had wing racks they often attacked another target when on minelaying operations.

The Hampdens were phased out of production to build the Halifax, last operation with Bomber Command was 14 September 1942, or around 3 years operational but little activity for the first 8 months. Whitley final operation on 28 April 1942 (ignoring OTU sorties) and they were active in the first 8 months of the war. So quickly relegated is 3 years, then comes their Coastal Command service, don't worry next time can be how they were left in service for far too long. Like the Wellingtons and Blenheims initially the Hampdens were for day raids, the Whitley for nights. Hampdens began leaflet operations in January 1940, Wellingtons did one night leaflet raid in September 1939 then resumed such operations in January 1940. The Whitley was the night bomber, performance reduced to give good handling and big bomb load, in production in March 1937, Hampdens in September 1938, Wellingtons in October 1938. Hampdens end at Handley Page in August 1940, Halifax start October.

The disaster is the person trying to fit wonder weapons into the narrative. The amusing part is watching the standard avoid inconvenient facts tactics.


We know, the scenario is set up for Wonder Wellington, Written (by) Woebegone Way Way Wizard Wisenheimer. So the targets have to be out of range of Beauforts, but in range of Wellingtons, the weather has Wellington mode, nicer than non Wellington mode. The airfields cannot be built large enough to take aircraft heavier than Wellingtons. Of course to achieve the ranges Wellingtons are at economic cruise, 165 to 175 mph, up to 15 hours in the air.

The RAF torpedo bomber units suffered heavy losses, less by night, more out of Malta and around Britain where axis fighters could reach them. It was not just Beauforts.


We can only go on what you write, you talk about airfields, troops, refineries, ports and ships, and say attacks on these targets need torpedoes. Now go back to Ehlers book and dig out why the B-24 and Halifax were apparently ineffective in North Africa when bombing land targets, they have to be relative to the Wellingtons for your ideas to be correct. And if ship sinkings are the only true currency, how many did Wellingtons sink?

Next everyone has noted I provided take off distances for the Wellington, Stirling, Manchester and Halifax. And now everyone notes you assume the heavies will need longer runways, not provide the lengths, not dispute what I have written, just assume with zero data to back the assumption up. Back to the start of the circle.

Richard Davis figures, short toms, Bomber Command "tactical" targets

A/F 18284, A/F & Signals Depot 610, Army HQ 2, Army Sup (A/F) 634, Army Sup (Barr & RR/Fac) 1962, Army Sup (Barracks) 1673, Army Sup (City) 31534, Army Sup (Hutted Camp) 67, Army Sup (M/Y) 12234, Army Sup (RR/Br) 1607, Army Sup (RR/Fac) 4748, Army Sup (RR/Trans.) 384, Army Sup (RR/Via) 423, Army Sup (UB/Base) 1085, Barracks 1932, Blockship 1906, Fuel Depot 3658, Fuel Dump 955, German Fleet 2527, Goods Trains 6, Gun Emplacements 387, Military Camp 1814, Naval Installations 566, Naval Stores 17, Naval/Base 127, P/A 9631, P/A & Canal Locks 16, RR 16, RR/Br 1639, RR/Junc 7503, RR/Line 2, RR/Shops 2855, RR/Sidings 24, RR/Sta 2586, RR/Tunnel 178, RR/Via 558, Shipping 1041, T/T Coastal Installations 24165, T/T Dam 2237, T/T Field Battery 915, T/T Strong Points 29737, T/T Troops 24988, T/T Vehicles 500, UB/Base 85, UB/Pens 3295, Total 201,114 short tons. So what numbers are required for "much" usage against this category of target? Ever sat down and looked at how much Bomber Command supported operation Overlord?

By the way Bomber Command actually sank ships, mostly at Hamburg and various inland ports, but were not officially aiming for them.

The USAAF official history has a table of the authorised size of the different groups in 1945.

Very heavy bomb group, 3 squadrons, 45 B-29, 60 crews, 11 men per crew, 2,078 officers and men in group.
Heavy bomb group, 4 squadrons, 72 aircraft (B-17/24), 96 crews, 9 to 11 men per crew, 2,261 officers and men in group.
Medium bomb group, 4 squadrons, 96 aircraft (B-25/26), 96 crews, 5 to 6 men per crew, 1,759 officers and men in group.
Light bomb group, 4 squadrons, 96 aircraft (A-20/26), 96 crews, 3 to 4 men per crew, 1,304 officers and men in group.
Single Engine Fighter Group, 3 squadrons, 108-126 aircraft (P-40/47/51), 108-126 pilots, 994 officers and men in group.
Twin Engine Fighter Group, 3 squadrons, 108-126 aircraft (P-38), 108-126 pilots, 1,081 officers and men in group.
Troop Carrier Group, 4 squadrons, 80-110 aircraft (C-47), 128 crews, 4 to 5 men per crew, 1,837 men in group.
Combat Cargo Group, 4 squadrons, 125 aircraft (C-46/47), 150 crews, 4 men per crew, 883 men in group.

The rest of the units are squadrons
Night fighter squadron, 18 aircraft (P-61/70), 16 crews, 2 to 3 men per crew, 288 officers and men in squadron.
Tactical reconnaissance squadron, 27 aircraft (various including F-6), 23 pilots, 233 men in squadron.
Photographic reconnaissance squadron, 24 aircraft (F-5), 21 pilots, 347 men in squadron.
Combat mapping squadron, 18 aircraft (F-7/9), 16 crews, 9 men per crew, 474 officers and men in squadron.

Going from 1 to 2 engined fighters adds about 1 man per aircraft, the heavier bombers are generally more economical manpower wise in terms of bomb lift, but a key part is how many personnel per bomber, the Wellington tended to 5 to 6 man crews, the RAF heavies 7.


How generous of you to bless them with your ignorance. So how many IJN submarines did the B-24 units sink?


The RAF reserved its higher performance aircraft for North West Europe, hence more Wellingtons than Halifaxes in the Mediterranean.


On that basis the United States is in the tropics, see Hawaii. With such definitions in place no wonder so many people are pointing out weather problems. The North African battlefields were mostly in the desert zone, not tropical rain forest zone.


Actually what has been noted is you use secondary sources, fixate and announce how wonderful it is, make statements that cannot be backed up and try to ignore anything that contradicts what you prefer to believe. Writing complaints about other people, going round in circles. Your ignorance is not a virtue. Clear enough?

On another note. Beaufort I October 1939 to September 1941 (485) and February 1942 to January 1944 (516), II September 1941 to July 1942 (165), T.II August 1943 to November 1944 (250). Also there were different versions of the twin Wasp being used,

Mark Twin Wasp Propeller
II S3C4-G
V S3C4-G Curtiss Electric
VA S3C4-G Hamilton Constant Speed or De Havilland 3E50
VI S1C3-G Curtiss Electric
VII S1C3-G De Havilland 3E50
VIII S3C4-G Curtiss Electric

Uh, Geoff, Elvis has left the building.

 

[Glider]

Firstly a correction, Wellingtons with Bomber Command did lay mines, from 8 April 1942 to 3 March 1944 I should have written did not lay mines until early 1942.


Then stop looking in the mirror and admiring the view so much. Meantime I look at all the factual material presented and ignored. Just flee forward around a circle until ending back at the start. You were asked a series of questions and chose not to answer. Like how many ships were sunk in the Mediterranean by Wellingtons. It is not worth getting angry, much more fun to watch the comedy relief pratfalls.


As I said I do not write for you.


Actually I have little problem with Ehler's material, I have big problems with the misuse of it, the author deserves better. I usually find the bigger the misuse the more take it up with the author is deployed.


So rain forests do not help make their own rain? Monsoon seasons in the South China Sea are what? I pointed out rain forests have more rain than deserts and therefore more clouds. Your idea of tropical weather was Wellingtons highly effective, weather systems fitted to suit. Operations in deserts that can be equated to operations in the wet tropics.


And I have several thousand pages of original RAAF documents and am aware of the gap between your ideas of how effective and much more particular when more effective and in numbers available. The horrible day to day grind of sorties and attacks, not just the highlights the histories are forced to use. There is also the JANAC report. The Catalinas were used more defensively/rescue until 1944/45 by the RAAF, one of the few IJN submarine commerce warfare attempts was off the east coast of Australia.


I point out the RAF had bigger and better all metal bombers in service (Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster) and note the Wellington's twin engined contemporaries were all metal as an aside. We now go running off on a side show. Anything but provide reasons why the 4 engined types were inappropriate for bombing things like refineries in the South China Sea area, while Wellingtons would be very effective. The other twins were no disasters, the Whitley had a long career in anti submarine, the Hampden lacked the range for bombing eastern Germany but could carry mines, they were the only Bomber Command type to lay mines until Manchesters on 29 September 1941. As the Hampdens had wing racks they often attacked another target when on minelaying operations.

The Hampdens were phased out of production to build the Halifax, last operation with Bomber Command was 14 September 1942, or around 3 years operational but little activity for the first 8 months. Whitley final operation on 28 April 1942 (ignoring OTU sorties) and they were active in the first 8 months of the war. So quickly relegated is 3 years, then comes their Coastal Command service, don't worry next time can be how they were left in service for far too long. Like the Wellingtons and Blenheims initially the Hampdens were for day raids, the Whitley for nights. Hampdens began leaflet operations in January 1940, Wellingtons did one night leaflet raid in September 1939 then resumed such operations in January 1940. The Whitley was the night bomber, performance reduced to give good handling and big bomb load, in production in March 1937, Hampdens in September 1938, Wellingtons in October 1938. Hampdens end at Handley Page in August 1940, Halifax start October.

The disaster is the person trying to fit wonder weapons into the narrative. The amusing part is watching the standard avoid inconvenient facts tactics.


We know, the scenario is set up for Wonder Wellington, Written (by) Woebegone Way Way Wizard Wisenheimer. So the targets have to be out of range of Beauforts, but in range of Wellingtons, the weather has Wellington mode, nicer than non Wellington mode. The airfields cannot be built large enough to take aircraft heavier than Wellingtons. Of course to achieve the ranges Wellingtons are at economic cruise, 165 to 175 mph, up to 15 hours in the air.

The RAF torpedo bomber units suffered heavy losses, less by night, more out of Malta and around Britain where axis fighters could reach them. It was not just Beauforts.


We can only go on what you write, you talk about airfields, troops, refineries, ports and ships, and say attacks on these targets need torpedoes. Now go back to Ehlers book and dig out why the B-24 and Halifax were apparently ineffective in North Africa when bombing land targets, they have to be relative to the Wellingtons for your ideas to be correct. And if ship sinkings are the only true currency, how many did Wellingtons sink?

Next everyone has noted I provided take off distances for the Wellington, Stirling, Manchester and Halifax. And now everyone notes you assume the heavies will need longer runways, not provide the lengths, not dispute what I have written, just assume with zero data to back the assumption up. Back to the start of the circle.

Richard Davis figures, short toms, Bomber Command "tactical" targets

A/F 18284, A/F & Signals Depot 610, Army HQ 2, Army Sup (A/F) 634, Army Sup (Barr & RR/Fac) 1962, Army Sup (Barracks) 1673, Army Sup (City) 31534, Army Sup (Hutted Camp) 67, Army Sup (M/Y) 12234, Army Sup (RR/Br) 1607, Army Sup (RR/Fac) 4748, Army Sup (RR/Trans.) 384, Army Sup (RR/Via) 423, Army Sup (UB/Base) 1085, Barracks 1932, Blockship 1906, Fuel Depot 3658, Fuel Dump 955, German Fleet 2527, Goods Trains 6, Gun Emplacements 387, Military Camp 1814, Naval Installations 566, Naval Stores 17, Naval/Base 127, P/A 9631, P/A & Canal Locks 16, RR 16, RR/Br 1639, RR/Junc 7503, RR/Line 2, RR/Shops 2855, RR/Sidings 24, RR/Sta 2586, RR/Tunnel 178, RR/Via 558, Shipping 1041, T/T Coastal Installations 24165, T/T Dam 2237, T/T Field Battery 915, T/T Strong Points 29737, T/T Troops 24988, T/T Vehicles 500, UB/Base 85, UB/Pens 3295, Total 201,114 short tons. So what numbers are required for "much" usage against this category of target? Ever sat down and looked at how much Bomber Command supported operation Overlord?

By the way Bomber Command actually sank ships, mostly at Hamburg and various inland ports, but were not officially aiming for them.

The USAAF official history has a table of the authorised size of the different groups in 1945.

Very heavy bomb group, 3 squadrons, 45 B-29, 60 crews, 11 men per crew, 2,078 officers and men in group.
Heavy bomb group, 4 squadrons, 72 aircraft (B-17/24), 96 crews, 9 to 11 men per crew, 2,261 officers and men in group.
Medium bomb group, 4 squadrons, 96 aircraft (B-25/26), 96 crews, 5 to 6 men per crew, 1,759 officers and men in group.
Light bomb group, 4 squadrons, 96 aircraft (A-20/26), 96 crews, 3 to 4 men per crew, 1,304 officers and men in group.
Single Engine Fighter Group, 3 squadrons, 108-126 aircraft (P-40/47/51), 108-126 pilots, 994 officers and men in group.
Twin Engine Fighter Group, 3 squadrons, 108-126 aircraft (P-38), 108-126 pilots, 1,081 officers and men in group.
Troop Carrier Group, 4 squadrons, 80-110 aircraft (C-47), 128 crews, 4 to 5 men per crew, 1,837 men in group.
Combat Cargo Group, 4 squadrons, 125 aircraft (C-46/47), 150 crews, 4 men per crew, 883 men in group.

The rest of the units are squadrons
Night fighter squadron, 18 aircraft (P-61/70), 16 crews, 2 to 3 men per crew, 288 officers and men in squadron.
Tactical reconnaissance squadron, 27 aircraft (various including F-6), 23 pilots, 233 men in squadron.
Photographic reconnaissance squadron, 24 aircraft (F-5), 21 pilots, 347 men in squadron.
Combat mapping squadron, 18 aircraft (F-7/9), 16 crews, 9 men per crew, 474 officers and men in squadron.

Going from 1 to 2 engined fighters adds about 1 man per aircraft, the heavier bombers are generally more economical manpower wise in terms of bomb lift, but a key part is how many personnel per bomber, the Wellington tended to 5 to 6 man crews, the RAF heavies 7.


How generous of you to bless them with your ignorance. So how many IJN submarines did the B-24 units sink?


The RAF reserved its higher performance aircraft for North West Europe, hence more Wellingtons than Halifaxes in the Mediterranean.


On that basis the United States is in the tropics, see Hawaii. With such definitions in place no wonder so many people are pointing out weather problems. The North African battlefields were mostly in the desert zone, not tropical rain forest zone.


Actually what has been noted is you use secondary sources, fixate and announce how wonderful it is, make statements that cannot be backed up and try to ignore anything that contradicts what you prefer to believe. Writing complaints about other people, going round in circles. Your ignorance is not a virtue. Clear enough?

On another note. Beaufort I October 1939 to September 1941 (485) and February 1942 to January 1944 (516), II September 1941 to July 1942 (165), T.II August 1943 to November 1944 (250). Also there were different versions of the twin Wasp being used,

Mark Twin Wasp Propeller
II S3C4-G
V S3C4-G Curtiss Electric
VA S3C4-G Hamilton Constant Speed or De Havilland 3E50
VI S1C3-G Curtiss Electric
VII S1C3-G De Havilland 3E50
VIII S3C4-G Curtiss Electric

I do hope the tone of this doesn't get a good thread closed down

 

[EwenS]

Picking up on the theme of RAF Medium/Heavy, 2/4 engined bombers the potential butterflies are enormous.

Firstly both Specs B.12/36 (heavy bomber leading to Supermarine Type 317 / 318 & Stirling) and P.13/36 (medium bomber, sometimes described as a "small heavy bomber" leading to Manchester & Halifax) called for aircraft that were capable of "world wide use". The Supermarine design was delayed by other work they had in hand (Spitfire) and ended after the prototype was bombed incomplete in the factory in 1940. Stirling development, initially the backup plan, proved relatively straightforward, other than having to increase the length of the undercarriage. So ATL the Supermarine might be the heavy bomber in service from 1940 onwards?

P.13/36 proved to be a whole different ballgame. What follows is something I posted on another site in answer to some queries, over 3 years ago detailing the twists and turns with specific reference to the Manchester.

"The winner of P.13/36 was the Avro Manchester with the Handley Page HP.56 chosen as a second back-up type to meet the requirement. Both were to be fitted with RR Vulture engines. Both designs were signed off by the Air Ministry early in 1937.

The torpedo dropping requirement of P.13/36 was then dropped on 26 Aug 1937.

The catapult launch requirement was dropped on 4 July 1938. However it seems that the weight saving this should have generated could not be taken advantage of in the first 20 Avro Manchester airframes as they were already on the production lines, and it is not clear if it was ever designed out, according to Robert Kirby's "The Avro Manchester". Why the weight saving from this and not the dive bombing requirement is specifically noted in more than one book I know not. It is also odd that the first production Manchesters did not come off the production line until July 1939, if 20 were already on it in July 1938.

The dive bombing requirement was dropped on 11 Aug 1938 as the 60 degree angle required was considered unobtainable.

The troop carrying requirement also in the original specification was not dropped until 30 January 1940.

By mid-1937 the Air Ministry was becoming concerned about progress with the Vulture, and the ability of RR to deliver enough engines. In July that year the Air Ministry decided that the HP aircraft should be fitted with 4 engines. At the same time they were giving Avro a production contract for 200 Manchesters. HP went back to the drawing board and re-designed the HP.56 into the HP.57 Halifax by the end of that year, with manufacture of the prototype beginning in March 1938. So HP were able to take advantage of all the deletions from the spec. before the prototype Halifax progressed very far in its build.

So I'm not sure if it is Chadwick's "determination to meet the spec" , as you put it, or his being locked into delivering what had been signed off by the Air Ministry earlier in 1937. I've read a comment to suggest that it had been reported to the Air Ministry that "from the moment Avro's Roy Chadwick knew that HP was going to build a four-engine machine, he became dissatisfied with his Manchester design". If he was so dis-satisfied it took him until 18th April 1940 to write to the Air Ministry making proposals for Manchester variants, the last of which is the Manchester III/Lancaster I (last as it wasn't his preferred idea or last for effect?). In mid-1940 BT308 was pulled from the Manchester production line, converted, and first flew as a Lancaster in Jan 1941, with production switching over from October 1941 after completion of the initial production order for 200 Manchesters.

Why choose the HP design over the Avro one in 1937 for the 4 engine conversion? One reason might be that Avro were the competion winners and were promising prototype delivery within an estimated 12 months of selection (contract award 30 April 1937, delivery eventually slipped to July 1939) while HP were looking at 21 months (contract award on 30 April 1937, delivery slipped after re-design, which was estimated to have cost 6 months, to Oct 1939). Later Chadwick admitted "that it was his inexperience in designing large all-metal aircraft of the rigidity demanded by the specification that had led, in part, to the aircraft coming out overweight" (Kirby again). It is perhaps fortunate therefore that Avro was later able to benefit from that inexperience through the massive weight lifting capacity of the Lancaster as much as the requirements built into the original spec. that couldn't be changed."

So with less urgency in 1937 what happens? RR get more time to develop the Vulture? Halifax emerges with twin Vultures? Or Halifax emerges with Merlins reloacted downwards to cure handling problems? Avro are allowed to convert the Manchester into something else in late 1937? If it is not a Lancaster the possibilitiies for Tallboy & Grand Slam carrying disappear in the historical WW2.

Later developments.
Then we move on to the next bomber competition. B.17/38 issued to Bristol for the Type 155 a "Reconnaissance Bomber for Rapid Production" and B.18/38 to Armstrong Whitworth for what became the tricycle under carriage with composite wood/steel construction Albemarle. These probably don't happen since the urgent need isn't there, freeing resources for elsewhere and other projects.

And then we get to B.1/39 for which there were designs from Avro, Armstrong Whitworth, Blackburn, Bristol, Fairey, Handley Page, Gloster, Short and Vickers. Intended as a replacement for all heavy & medium bomber types. Max speed 280mph+ at 15,000ft while carrying 9,000lb of bombs over at least 2,500 miles and armed defensively with 20mm cannon. From these designs the Bristol Type 159 (reached mock-up stage in early 1940) and the HP.60 were chosen for development. But the whole project was canned in mid-1940 due to the Battle of Britain and the need for fighters. Details of the designs are here:-

British B.1/39 Heavy Bomber Competition

Hi! https://www.warbirdsforum.com/topic/366-additional-raf-might-have-beens/ "The B1.39 spec was to carry 9,000lb over 2,500miles cruising at least 280mph. Maximum bomb load was to be 10,000lb and some could be carried externally if necessary. Provision was made to stow 20 x 250lb or 500lb...

www.secretprojects.co.uk

So how far does this project then go and in what kind of accelerated timescale if earlier aircraft are not developed further?

 

[ThomasP]

The Vickers Warwick becomes a possibility also - whether Vulture, Sabre, R-2800, or Centaurus.powered.

Also, although the Air Ministry dropped the torpedo carrying requirement for the heavy bombers, any of the big 3 could have been easily modified to carry a couple of torpedoes internally.

 

[Glider]

I am a simple soul and tend to look at things in a similar manner.

When the war started the RAF basically had the Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Blenheim and Battle. There were some others out there but this was the core.

Going in reverse order

Battle was, and would always be, a bad idea being slow, low and almost defenceless.

Hampden was quite useful but had similar problems but it had a longer range and a better payload. It was flexible and was used in many fields, if it could avoid fighters it could be very handy.

Blenheim was unlucky in its timing. When introduced it was as good as any other light bomber but had to go up against German fighters who were more than capable of dealing with it.

Whitley had a good payload/range and was quite well defended but was painfully slow.

Wellington I am sure we will all agree was the ace in the pack having a decent performance, payload, range and self defence.

Against the Japanese in late 1941 I would argue that the Wellington, Hampden, Blenheim and Whitley had a role to play.

Wellington - All round bomber and later torpedo bomber
Whitley - Naval reconnaissance
Hampden - Torpedo bomber later replaced by Wellington
Blenheim - light bomber

Remembering that against the Japanese in the early part of the war the RAF lacked numbers and organisation. If we are looking at war without a conflict in Europe the my presumption is that these would not a a problem. So for instance Blenheim bomber raids in decent numbers say 50 plus escorted by fighters would be a difficult target for the IJA fighters to intercept. Wellingtons escorted in a similar manner would be even harder to stop and unescorted would have a fighting chance. I say this as the damage to Wellingtons inflicted by the Germans tended to be done by cannon armed fighters, and the Japanese Army airforce didn't have cannons until much later

Waiting in the wings were the four engine bombers all of which would be a considerable step forward over the Wellington and Whitley. They had a better all round performance, better range, payload and defence. To pretend that they were not a step forward flies in the face of any logic. When you start adding the Beaufighter and Mosquito, the additional technical advantages the RAF had in Radar and Navigation and Japans problems are increasing significantly.

How Japan would handle something like a Coastal Command Anti Shipping strike wing I have no idea. German escorts had much heavier AA defences than any equivalent in Japans fleet. There is a good chance that they would be torn apart.

 

[SaparotRob]

I am a simple soul and tend to look at things in a similar manner.

When the war started the RAF basically had the Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Blenheim and Battle. There were some others out there but this was the core.

Going in reverse order

Battle was, and would always be, a bad idea being slow, low and almost defenceless.

Hampden was quite useful but had similar problems but it had a longer range and a better payload. It was flexible and was used in many fields, if it could avoid fighters it could be very handy.

Blenheim was unlucky in its timing. When introduced it was as good as any other light bomber but had to go up against German fighters who were more than capable of dealing with it.

Whitley had a good payload/range and was quite well defended but was painfully slow.

Wellington I am sure we will all agree was the ace in the pack having a decent performance, payload, range and self defence.

Against the Japanese in late 1941 I would argue that the Wellington, Hampden, Blenheim and Whitley had a role to play.

Wellington - All round bomber and later torpedo bomber
Whitley - Naval reconnaissance
Hampden - Torpedo bomber later replaced by Wellington
Blenheim - light bomber

Remembering that against the Japanese in the early part of the war the RAF lacked numbers and organisation. If we are looking at war without a conflict in Europe the my presumption is that these would not a a problem. So for instance Blenheim bomber raids in decent numbers say 50 plus escorted by fighters would be a difficult target for the IJA fighters to intercept. Wellingtons escorted in a similar manner would be even harder to stop and unescorted would have a fighting chance. I say this as the damage to Wellingtons inflicted by the Germans tended to be done by cannon armed fighters, and the Japanese Army airforce didn't have cannons until much later

Waiting in the wings were the four engine bombers all of which would be a considerable step forward over the Wellington and Whitley. They had a better all round performance, better range, payload and defence. To pretend that they were not a step forward flies in the face of any logic. When you start adding the Beaufighter and Mosquito, the additional technical advantages the RAF had in Radar and Navigation and Japans problems are increasing significantly.

How Japan would handle something like a Coastal Command Anti Shipping strike wing I have no idea. German escorts had much heavier AA defences than any equivalent in Japans fleet. There is a good chance that they would be torn apart.

Okay, I'm a B-17 fanboy. Might the RAF have considered the B-17C/D for purchase? There is no Lend-Lease. The Flying Fortress Mk I did not impress in its European debut with the British but we're talking different operating conditions. B-17s were in the Philippines and Hawaii at this time, I think. While there is no urgency to buy ANYTHING they can get and no BPC, the B-17 does seem to be a better performer than these British bombers.
On a bit of a thread jack, might North American Aviation develop the P.509 on their own?