Rn vs IJN

[z42]

Somewhat related here's a video discussing the development of RN naval aviation in the interwar years.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmZMNtxYLxE

 

[Glider]

A lot of the radar depends on date and type.
British had radar in the summer of 1940 on some ships in the Med, Both the radar and the technique of using it changed.
Japanese Radar of 1942 was unlikely to be equal to British Radar of 1942. British Radar was not instantly upgraded to latest versions. Much like the US had "flag" ships with older generation radar than some of their escorts.
The British was the first navy to set up "plotting" tables/stations in the bridge area of some of their ships, this was in WW I. It was a way for commander to keep track of the movements of his own ships and the enemy's reported positions or bearings. This was especially useful at night well before radar. Just look at some of both the US and Japanese mistakes of identifying enemy ships as friendlies and vice versa. They would loose sight of a friendly and a number of minutes later pick up a ship in roughly the same direction and think it was the friendly reappearing. Plotting last known courses and speeds helps but does not eliminate such confusion. In a night battle it is too much for commander to keep it in his head.
This is part of the night battle "doctrine". Not saying the RN was perfect, but they had been thinking about night battles for over 20 years and practicing from them. There is practice and there is Practice. Conducting an annual night battle practice so they can check off a box on a form doesn't actually do much. Analyzing and changing things that go wrong does.
The Ajax did not have flashless propellent in the Fall of 1940, there is some debate about radar, she may have had air waring radar only. There was light fog/haze. Italians did not concentrate their forces (trying to "scout" at night limits options.) The Ajax got lucky, dodging (by luck or on purpose) numerous torpedoes from the 7 Italian ships involved, She sank two of the three torpedo boats (800 tons, three 3.9in guns, four 18in TT) and crippled the destroyer Artigliere (1850 tons, four 4.7in guns, six 21 in TT) latter sunk by the HMS York. Ranges at times got down to machine gun range. Ajax was operating without any support.
British ships fought many night actions across the North Sea and Channel and many actions in the Med. Not always successful but they probably had more experience than any other navy by the end of 1941.
By 1943-44 some British ships had 3-4 different radar sets doing different jobs. A Japanese ship with 1-2 radar sets is still behind.
Maybe the Japanese in 1941-42 were close in many aspects to the British (radar excepted and that is a big one) but the RN was a long way ahead of the USN in 1942 and 43. Not just in the radar it self but in how to use it (like plotting all available radar contacts at all times to help sort out new from existing) and how to maneuver formations.

Again radar is not infallible or all seeing/all knowing but a number of the early USN disasters might not have occurred to the British. The HMAS Hobart At the Battle of Savo with the transports (miles away form the action) had picked up the Japanese attackers before they opened fire as an indication of the difference between British radar and American radar at the time. One of the 8in gun Australian cruisers also had a better idea of what was going on but the US practice of putting the force commander on the most prestigious ship instead of the one with the best sensors and command facilities played a big part in the outcome.

I believe that Ajax had Type 279 radar which was a surface/air surveillance radar early on in the war. Later on in 1942 she was refitted with a much larger suite of more modern radars.

I should add that RN MTB's started to be fitted with Radar in 1942

 

[Shortround6]

I believe that Ajax had Type 279 radar which was a surface/air surveillance radar early on in the war. Later on in 1942 she was refitted with a much larger suite of more modern radars.

You maybe correct. I have seen two different accounts and they say different things. I also have no idea how well the Type 279 worked in surface mode in 1940 (or even if the Type 279 on the Ajax was working correctly. Apparently the closest Italian ship got about 2,000 meters away before it opened fire. I don't know if that was deliberate by the Ajax (sounds very very risky indeed if it was true).
A lot of major British ships had multiple radars by the end of 1942 but 1942 is kind of a pivotal year. A lot of equipment showed up at some point in 1942 so end of 1942 was quite different than early 1942.

I kind of like this scenario as it allows, somewhat, for evaluation British performance in 1939/40 and some of 1941 to be put up against the Japanese performance in pretty much beginning/middle of 1942.

Trying to base peacetime 1939 performance against Japanese 1942 performance adds even more butterflies.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I mentioned the Japanese seaplanes and the star shells because the IJN used both in some battles in the war against the USN

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

(searchlights too though that often led to catastrophe)

 

[Shortround6]

I mentioned the Japanese seaplanes and the star shells because the IJN used both in some battles in the war against the USN

They did, no question, it is just that other people had thought using aircraft about it and some had practiced it, at least in peace time.
Star shells were pretty standard, at least in thought. Again actual use varied.
British used rocket flares on 4in guns on Anti-sub ships.

Worked because expected ranges for surface engagements vs Subs was short. Gun could stay loaded with anti-sub round while the rocket flares were launched.
The Japanese did do a lot of things to try to prepare for night action. Thing is that they were not only people doing it. The British also had been preparing for night actions for over 20 years. As I have said, there was a lot of "talk" (written articles) actual realistic exercises and not pre scripted ones (like US submarine ones where getting a periscope sighted counted as an automatic kill during the exercise) were a lot fewer.
There had been a few German destroyer raids in the winter of 1917 after Jutland and Threat of German raids was what prompted Zeebrugge.
The British were far from happy with the night time action at Jutland.

 

[EwenS]

I almost get the impression from some of the above posts that some think radar appeared British fleet wide almost instantaneously! It didn't. It was a process that took from late 1938 to mid-1943. How quickly older ships got it depended on many factors including when they returned to the UK for refit (very few ships received British radars in overseas dockyards) and the theatres they were operating in. For example (from Raven & Roberts British Cruisers) Enterprise had no radar until her Dec 1942-Oct 1943 refit. Prior to that she was in the Indian Ocean.

As for introduction dates:-
Air Warning
Type 79Y - 1938. Only Rodney and Sheffield by outbreak of war. 4 more ships by end of 1939.
Type 279 - 1940 updated version of the above.
Type 281 - 1940. First fit cruiser Dido on completion Sept 1940. See below.
Type 286 - 1940. Dual purpose air/surface warning for small ships. From June 1940. Based on ASV Mk.I/II. Also fitted in some cruisers due to lack of anything better.

Gunnery
Type 284 - Dec 1940 trials on KGV
Type 285 - Nov 1940 trials on Hunt class Southdown.

Surface warning (centimetric sets)
Type 271 - first trials in Flower class Orchis March 1941. 29 sets in service by end of Sept, all in smaller vessels.
Type 272 - first trials Aug 1941. Intended for carriers, cruisers, sloops
Type 273 - for larger ships (battleships and cruisers). First fit July 1941 in Prince of Wales.

The trials of Type 281 found that it could locate surface targets out to 3-10 miles ( trimmed down sub to cruiser sized) and could follow the flight and shell splashes of 5.25" shells to 5,000 yards. From that developed a ranging panel for use with it and Type 279. This facility was little used, Matapan being a notable exception along with Nigeria off Norway in Sept 1941. This was because COs were reluctant to lose the air warning capability and because gunnery sets were becoming more common in a similar timeframe. They stopped fitting the ranging panel to Type 279 in Dec 1942 and subsequently removed it. In Type 281 it became an integral part of the set so took longer to remove.

Regarding Ajax she received a Type 279 set in her Dec 1939-July 1940 refit. Her next refit May-Oct 1942 saw Types 284 & 285 added along with centimetric Type 272 for surface warning.

Sheffield, having had Type 79 since 1939 (upgraded to 279) received Type 284/285 in her June-Aug 1941 refit. A further refit April-July 1942 saw 279 replaced by 281 and 282/283/273 added.

Radar policy aboard ship.
Late 1940 unrestricted. But in the main theatre of operations, the Med, the Italians installed listening stations on Sicily and Sardinia around Oct 1940. So the policy needed to change, the RN being very aware of the intelligence to be gained from direction finding. Type 279 signals could be detected at 150-250 miles depending on the quality of the DF equipment. Type 281 at 100-200 miles. From about mid 1941 the Med Fleet in the eastern Med maintained radar silence at night while within range of enemy listening stations. When visual contact on an enemy was achieved radar would be activated. But orders could be changed operation by operation depending on the circumstances and the radars available (Type 286 could only be detected at 70 miles so could be used at night as it became available on more ships).

There was also a special shell for use by cruisers, available for at least the 5.25" armed Didos, designed to produce a strong radar reflection on Type 284 up to 11,000 yards (Raven "British Cruiser Warfare".

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Really, really interesting.

 

[Shortround6]

An advantage for the British is that they were using radar and coming up with doctrines to use it (or not use it at times). All of which takes time for another navy, Just fitting radar does not the mean the training and doctrine are ready to go. The US was fitting radar in the summer/fall of 1942, Their training/doctrine/procedures still took a number of months to work out.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

An advantage for the British is that they were using radar and coming up with doctrines to use it (or not use it at times). All of which takes time for another navy, Just fitting radar does not the mean the training and doctrine are ready to go. The US was fitting radar in the summer/fall of 1942, Their training/doctrine/procedures still took a number of months to work out.

Training and doctrine also had to be adjusted, sometimes more than just a little bit, once they had actually been tested against an uncooperative enemy.

It was also much easier to make a radar receiver (which can detect the location of the emitter, as well as the presence of radar emissions).

The idea that the RN was more advanced or less likely to make mistakes than the USN is ludicrous. They had some advantages, and clearly some disadvantages.

 

[Glider]

The idea that the RN was more advanced or less likely to make mistakes than the USN is ludicrous. They had some advantages, and clearly some disadvantages.

Again I believe that its where you draw the line. If we take mid 1942 the RN would be far ahead of the USN. They had more radar, better radar and three years of war experience to draw on.
Roll on eighteen months to the end of 1943 the USN would have caught up. The RN were more than willing to let the USN in on all their technical and practical knowledge, talk to the RN to learn the lessons and of course get production rolling, and the installation of the new equipment.
Go another twelve months and few would disagree that the USN was ahead. The latest USN radars were at least as good as the RN and in some cases better. The ships and naval aircraft were newer and better than the average RN vessels

I believe that Its the moment in time you pick which decides where the advantage lies

 

[Shortround6]

The idea that the RN was more advanced or less likely to make mistakes than the USN is ludicrous.

Evidence for this and not feelings?

The RN had been using radar in combat for over 1 year before Pearl Harbor and almost 2 years before the Battle of Salvo if the use by the British was in the late summer/early fall of 1940. Not saying the RN didn't make mistakes, but they had a lot more time to fix the mistakes.

 

[EwenS]

Training and doctrine also had to be adjusted, sometimes more than just a little bit, once they had actually been tested against an uncooperative enemy.

It was also much easier to make a radar receiver (which can detect the location of the emitter, as well as the presence of radar emissions).

The idea that the RN was more advanced or less likely to make mistakes than the USN is ludicrous. They had some advantages, and clearly some disadvantages.

Introduction of radars to the USN:-

Air warning
XAF - 1 set in 1938 on New York. Later removed. Developed into CXAM.
CXAM - 6 sets installed July /Aug 1940. Yorktown, California and 4 Cruisers.
CXAM-1 - 14 sets fitted late 1941
SC - first fit end of 1941. CXAM electronics with a smaller aerial giving less range. Rapidly replaced with refined SC-1 version.

Fire control
Mk 3 - main battery for Cruisers / Battleships from late 1941.
Mk 4 - fire control for Mk 33 & 37 directors from first fit in Sept 1941

Surface warning (centimetric)
SG - prototype in destroyer Semmes May 1941. First operational set in cruiser Augusta April 1942.

In terms of actual operational fits in warships the USN was 6-12 months behind the RN 1939-42 but rapidly catching up, with the extra development time allowing more compact and refined production sets. But with Britain at war a radar set now was worth more than a more refined set 6-12 months down the road.

See Friedman Naval Radar.

The advantage of the US air warning sets was that they had a narrower beam width which in due course aided fighter direction.

In a Warship article back in the 1980s on Cruiser Radar, Friedman noted that the British cruiser radar set up as it developed was more geared to Cruisers operating independently and relying on their guns for defence. The US set up as it developed was geared towards task groups working with more aerial protection.

Edit:- And as I've noted previously, many of the USN/USMC/USAAF personnel responsible for setting up the first fighter direction schools and night fighter schools in the US in late 1941 / early 1942 had been trained in Britain in 1940 / 41 and took the skills and techniques they had learned here back home.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I wasn't referring to radar, but in general.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

I almost get the impression from some of the above posts that some think radar appeared British fleet wide almost instantaneously! It didn't. It was a process that took from late 1938 to mid-1943. How quickly older ships got it depended on many factors including when they returned to the UK for refit (very few ships received British radars in overseas dockyards) and the theatres they were operating in. ".

Hi EwenS, the only exception I know of is HMS Repulse carrying radar sets to the Far East

August 1941
30th – At 1000 hours REPULSE, SHEFFIELD and destroyers LIGHTNING, BADSWORTH and VIVACIOUS arrived at Greenock.
Whilst at Greenock REPULSE embarked 6 type 286P, air warning, radar sets. One of the sets was fitted in REPULSE on the passage to Freetown by the ships staff. The other 5 sets were for the aircraft carrier HERMES and other ships in the Indian Ocean.

See HMS Repulse, British battlecruiser, WW2

HMS Hermes was at Durban undergoing a refit, so her radar must have been installed there, but of the other radar sets, I suspect they went to Singapore.

 

[EwenS]

Hi EwenS, the only exception I know of is HMS Repulse carrying radar sets to the Far East

August 1941
30th – At 1000 hours REPULSE, SHEFFIELD and destroyers LIGHTNING, BADSWORTH and VIVACIOUS arrived at Greenock.
Whilst at Greenock REPULSE embarked 6 type 286P, air warning, radar sets. One of the sets was fitted in REPULSE on the passage to Freetown by the ships staff. The other 5 sets were for the aircraft carrier HERMES and other ships in the Indian Ocean.

See HMS Repulse, British battlecruiser, WW2

HMS Hermes was at Durban undergoing a refit, so her radar must have been installed there, but of the other radar sets, I suspect they went to Singapore.

I'd forgotten about that. The one I was thinking about was Warspite at the end of 1941 at Puget Sound NY on the US west coast where a fair bit of the work was carried out by the crew. It doesn't seem to have been a very successful installation given the complaints about her radars in the IO in mid-1942!

Hermes and her radars is a bit of a mystery. Radar at Sea says Repulse delivered 5 Type 286 sets and a petty officer & 15 ratings to Hermes at Mombasa. That must have been on 14 Oct 1941 as Hermes was present there undergoing a period of self-maintenance. The only other time she was there was a month later. But there doesn't seeem to be any evidence that a radar set was fitted to her before her loss. She did gain the Type 72 homing beacon system in that final refit, as is apparent from the photo of her taken in early 1942 (see below, taken at Trincomalee).

 

[Shortround6]

I wasn't referring to radar, but in general.

The RN could certainly make mistakes, they would be less likely to make the same mistake as the US made, in part because the RN had already made some them once.
No Navy (Or other armed force) was immune from making mistakes.

The RN had not only been practicing night combat more in peace time, all of their cruisers had torpedoes (at least as built) . Granted in smaller numbers than the Japanese, but torpedo attack and defense was part and parcel of an RN cruiser captain's (or squadron commander's) thinking and not something to be shuffled off to destroyer captain/commanders to think about. The only US cruisers that had torpedoes were the Omaha class

Which, with only a few exceptions, were kept well away from any dangerous areas.
The Pensacola and North Hamptons had them as built but they were taken away, maybe about the time the four 5in AA guns were changed to eight guns.
Next US cruisers with torpedoes were the Atlanta's.
Torpedoes were not a real important part of USN cruiser doctrine.

The RN did suffer in other ways. They lead the way in AA gunnery for most of the 1920s and 30s. This lead them to think that the AA guns were the solution instead of using violent maneuvering (which throw off the guns) as a primary defense. Many commanders could not change thinking in the few years it took for aircraft to change from nuisance to serious threat.

Now please note that the Japanese sort of depended on their own aircraft for AA defense, how much of this was actually planning or how much was being behind the British in regards to AA guns/equipment/thinking I don't know, but Japanese ships without air cover did not fair well at all. The Japanese navy did not want to be anywhere near Guadalcanal in daylight when the Cactus Air force could reach them.
from Wiki, The CAF reached its peak of combat power on 12 November with 47 fighters, 23 tactical bombers, and 12 medium bombers.[56]
Which is not much different than a large carrier.
Things did get a lot better by the end of Dec 1942 with 161 aircraft.

But Japanese naval AA truly sucked, for the entire war, only a few occasional ships were excepted (12 Akitsuki destroyers spread over 3 years?) . British Naval AA ranged from truly sucking to mediocre in the early years (into 1942) and some ships got better. As noted in another thread, British don't really get proximity fuses until just about 1944. In this scenario they may never show up ?

The Japanese 3.9in guns on the Akitsuki class were roughly comparable to the British 4in AA guns, similar rate of fire, Japanese gun had higher velocity but about 83% of the shell weight.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The RN could certainly make mistakes, they would be less likely to make the same mistake as the US made, in part because the RN had already made some them once.
No Navy (Or other armed force) was immune from making mistakes.

Each force had both advantages and disadvantages. Pre-war planning varied a lot in how well it survived 'contact with the enemy'. Inevitably there needed to be serious adjustments. That's how the FAA ended up starting the war with Sea Gladiatior, Swordfish, Fulmar, Skua, and (as an emergency adjustment) Sea Hurricane. Pre-war planning dictated that these (and AA) would be sufficient to fight the naval war. Reality showed otherwise.

By contrast, pre-war planning by the IJN, at least on the tactical level, seemed to pan out quite well. Their aircraft turned out to be highly effective, as did their land army, as did their warships in surface combat. As did technical innovations such as their highly advanced optics and their excellent torpedoes, and the night-training that went with it.

We know they made some strategic errors, and had some flaws in some of their kit. But by and large they emerged from the era of guess-work pre-war better, arguably, than most. Certainly better than the RN and FAA.

The RN had not only been practicing night combat more in peace time, all of their cruisers had torpedoes (at least as built) . Granted in smaller numbers than the Japanese, but torpedo attack and defense was part and parcel of an RN cruiser captain's (or squadron commander's) thinking and not something to be shuffled off to destroyer captain/commanders to think about. The only US cruisers that had torpedoes were the Omaha class

The torpedo was obviously the biggest fly in the ointment of the US planners, and one of the bigger strengths of the British by comparison.

Wartime engagements seem to indicate to me that the most effective use of surface launched torpedoes was never by heavy cruisers, but rather by fast destroyers (both for the Japanese in the early war and for USN in the later war) and light cruisers, for the Japanese.

I suspect this is for two reasons - speed and agility of the DDs, and CAs being kept back usually in the formations, with DDs further out, and often closer to the enemy at contact, so at closer range for torpedoes. CAs being larger, are also more vulnerable to being hit, and not necessarily well enough armored to protect against torpedoes.

Comparing some IJN vs RN destroyer classes
IJN
Fubuki (1928 - 24 built) 6 x 5" guns, 9 x torpedo tubes, 18 x torpedoes, 18 x depth charges, 38 knots
Akatsuki (1932 - 4 built) 6 x 5" guns, 9 x Torpedo tubes, 18 x torpedoes, 18 x depth charges, 38 knots
Hatsuharu (1931 - 6 built) 4 x 5" guns, 6 x torpedo tubes, 18 x depth charges, 36 knots
Shiratsuyu - (1933 - 10 built), 5 x 5" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 16 x torpedoes, 16 x depth charges, 33 knots
Asashio - (1937 - 10 built), 6 x 5" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 16 x torpedoes, 36 x depth charges, 35 knots
Kagero - (1939 - 19 built), 6 x 5" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 16 x torpedoes, 36 x depth charges 35.5 knots

RN
A-Class (1924 - 20 built) 4 x 4.7" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 35 knots
D-Class (1930 - 20 built) 4 x 4.7" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 20 depth charges, 36 knots
H-Class 1934 - 24 built) 4 x 4.7" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 20 x depth charges, 35.5 knots
Tribal Class (1938 - 27 built) 8 x 4.7" guns, 4 x torpedo tubes, 20 x depth charges, 36 knots
J-K-N Classes (1937 - 24 built) 6 x 4.7" guns, 8 x torpedo tubes, 2 launchers for dc, 36 knots

Overall, on balance, it looks to me like the IJN destroyers are a bit more heavily armed, though it is pretty close. But of course, the IJN torpedoes are faster and have a good bit better range.

View attachment 762045
Which, with only a few exceptions, were kept well away from any dangerous areas.
The Pensacola and North Hamptons had them as built but they were taken away, maybe about the time the four 5in AA guns were changed to eight guns.
Next US cruisers with torpedoes were the Atlanta's.
Torpedoes were not a real important part of USN cruiser doctrine.

I don't know of a lot of examples where cruisers hit and destroyed ships with torpedoes. A few of the IJN battles, but as noted, most of the torpedo "kills" were by destroyers, as were most of the US ones later in the war.

The RN did suffer in other ways. They lead the way in AA gunnery for most of the 1920s and 30s. This lead them to think that the AA guns were the solution instead of using violent maneuvering (which throw off the guns) as a primary defense. Many commanders could not change thinking in the few years it took for aircraft to change from nuisance to serious threat.

Just thinking anecdotally of several battles, it seems like the USN did a lot better with damage control. Or it could just be down to luck.

Now please note that the Japanese sort of depended on their own aircraft for AA defense, how much of this was actually planning or how much was being behind the British in regards to AA guns/equipment/thinking I don't know, but Japanese ships without air cover did not fair well at all. The Japanese navy did not want to be anywhere near Guadalcanal in daylight when the Cactus Air force could reach them.
from Wiki, The CAF reached its peak of combat power on 12 November with 47 fighters, 23 tactical bombers, and 12 medium bombers.[56]
Which is not much different than a large carrier.
Things did get a lot better by the end of Dec 1942 with 161 aircraft.

I think those "Cactus" numbers are a bit off, though I'm not sure precisely when that is supposed to be. Eventually there was a ton of aircraft on Guadalcanal.

And well, needless to say the RN proved highly vulnerable to Axis bombers, starting with the Battleship HMS Prince of Wales and Battlecruiser HMS Repulse near Singapore in 1941. AA proved ineffective and they were done-in by a relatively small force of 34 x G4M and G3M land based torpedo bombers, and we can also see how it went for the HMS Hermes and friends off Ceylon, despite air cover.

Numerous RN ships in the various convoys as attacked by the Germans also suffered very badly, even when they did have some air protection from carriers.

But Japanese naval AA truly sucked, for the entire war, only a few occasional ships were excepted (12 Akitsuki destroyers spread over 3 years?) . British Naval AA ranged from truly sucking to mediocre in the early years (into 1942) and some ships got better. As noted in another thread, British don't really get proximity fuses until just about 1944. In this scenario they may never show up ?

The Japanese 3.9in guns on the Akitsuki class were roughly comparable to the British 4in AA guns, similar rate of fire, Japanese gun had higher velocity but about 83% of the shell weight.

Ultimately, WW2 showed that you needed either fighter aircraft or heavy shore AA (ala Norway) to protect ships from air attack. And the Japanese definitely had the advantage with fighters and strike aircraft.

 

[EwenS]

The British I/J/K/N class destroyers were designed for 10 TT (2x5). As completed in 1940-42 the N class completed with only 1 set as part of the early war AA upgrades.

 

[Shortround6]

Each force had both advantages and disadvantages. Pre-war planning varied a lot in how well it survived 'contact with the enemy'. Inevitably there needed to be serious adjustments. That's how the FAA ended up starting the war with Sea Gladiatior, Swordfish, Fulmar, Skua, and (as an emergency adjustment) Sea Hurricane. Pre-war planning dictated that these (and AA) would be sufficient to fight the naval war. Reality showed otherwise.

We are getting into planned/wanted and what they got. Two different things.
Pre- war planning called for what would be wind up being the Firefly to be in service in 1941. We know how that worked out. The Sea Gladiator was only supposed to be a temporary emergency fill in for the Fulmar, which was supposed to be the temporary fill in for the Firefly. Pre war planning was hoping that war would not break out before the Firefly was ready.
The requirement for the Barracuda was issued in 1937. That was pre-war planning, and we know what happened. 3-4 years should have been enough time to get the Barracuda into service. Then a war happened.
The British had a very good idea of what would happen going to war with Swordfish, Fulmar and Skua, they didn't have a choice.

The US Cruiser force commanders made a number of bad choices in the Pacific in 1942. I may be wrong but keeping to straight courses with few changes and few speed changes is good for gunnery, it is not good if you are thinking about torpedo attack (or being attacked by torpedoes). It is a different mindset.
For the US the destroyers, in the big fleet action planned, would keep the Japanese destroyers (and light cruisers) away from effective torpedo range (what the US though was effective range) while the heavy cruisers (the US ONLY had the Omaha's) supported them with long range gunnery.
British had longer ranged torpedoes and in a similar situation would use their light cruisers (C,D,E, Leander's, Arethusa's, and occasional town class) to beef up the destroyer formations and mix it up with the enemy torpedo attack flotillas.
It is a different mind set, many British cruiser captains were running their own attack calculations through their heads and their own dense calculations (how long to maintain course before turning if enemy launched torpedoes at this point vs 5 minutes ago vs 5 minutes from now.) Japanese torpedo performance would throw those calculations off. It seems like the US Commanders weren't even making them?

The US leapt to the front of the pack with the 5in/38. far in front. The always important fire control may have lagged bit. The US was playing catch up with the 1.1in AA and the .50 cal was keeping space open.
The RN was actually doing OK with the 4in gun, The 4.5 as an AA gun wasn't a big improvement. the 5.25 was actually not quite as good an AA gun. The 5.25 was in class of it's own for shooting up ships. The multiple 2pdr was as good as it got in 1930s until the 40mm Bofors showed up. Unfortunately for the British and the US 2-4 big medium AA mounts (which often had directors) could not handle the number of aircraft attacking each minute in 1940 and later. Being attacked by 3-6 planes might have worked well but more than that saturated the medium AA batteries. The .5 and .50 cal were revenge weapons, they shot down the plane that had just dropped the fatal bomb/torpedo. 20mms were better but only just. and they didn't have enough of them.
Japan had crap for heavy AA, slow firing, slow elevation and traverse. Most Japanese battleships had the AA armament of an Cruiser. Most of the their heavy cruisers had the armament of an allied light cruiser. Japanese medium AA..............didn't exist. It melted into the light AA. The 25mm was slow firing, it didn't turn or elevate fast enough, it wasn't destructive enough. It seldom had remote sights/director. and in 1942 it was scarce. Japanese 13mm and 7.7mm guns were pretty bad.