Russo-Japanese war 1904-1905

Does the book state When Lloyd George was PM, Winston Churchill was Minister of Munitions in his cabinet ?
This is the point why he was never tried as a traitor.

The problem with the Anglo-Japanese alliance is that this made the USA the enemy and this wasn't the position the British Empire wanted to be in.

The Sempill mission in 1921 gave the Japanese navy everything about Royal Navy air power for the hope of large military orders. Literally everything!

No spying was needed as aircraft and weapons and even aircraft carrier designs were openly given away.

Sempill kept contact with the IJN. He was also a business consultant to Mitsubishi in Europe during the 1930s.

Sempill was passing high level secrets to the Japanese and it was only after Pearl Harbour that he was finally cleared out.

Problem was any official trial would involve knowledge of breaking Japanese codes and also his high family connections was too well known. Also it would make UK look stupid for keeping a known spy in a very sensitive position when he has knowingly passed secrets many years ago.

A lesser man would and should have been executed for treason.

Thanks Basket.
It was a common knowledge at the time that hypothetical enemy for the Imperial Japanese Navy was the US since its foundation in 1872 like it was Russia for the Army.

nuuumannn said:

The Civil War was also a very mobile conflict. The battle front moved up and down almost the entire East Coast of the USA, battles were waged across great distances.

Click to expand...

The Crimean war was the "FIRST" of the modern wars. Or it introduced a number of "firsts" even if it took quite a while for the full implications to sink in.

It was the first war in which one side used primarily rifle small arms. Yes "rifles" had been used in small numbers (or by small special units) in earlier wars but the Crimean war was the first one in which the the majority of the troops had rifled shoulder arms using elongated projectiles and this increased their effective range by at least 3 -4 times. It took quite a while for this to sink into the tactics of the officers (60-70 years in some cases) It also meant that infantry could reply (at least in limited fashion) to smooth bore artillery.

It was the first war in which the telegraph was used. This allowed Politicians in London or Paris to get reports and send back orders in 24 hours instead of several weeks by ship.

It was the first war that steam ships played any real role (even as transports)

It was the first war that "ironclads" were used in. Although they were more floating batteries duking it out with forts on shore than actual sea going ships (Most US Civil War Ironclads were best restricted to calm coastal waters or rivers).

It was the first war in which railroads were used to move troops or supplies but given the existing European rail net (or the Russian one for that matter) railroads only replace part of the long distance marches (or transits by ship).

The American Civil War added a few things but Gatling guns were hardly common place. Rifled artillery made a large scale appearance. Practical breechloaders and repeating rifles showendup (in small numbers). More use was made of trains for movement and supply (and the disruption of enemy rail lines and telegraph lines became important)


The Franco-Prussian war of 1871 saw several more advances, both sides using Breech Loading rifles.
first wide spread use of "machine guns"

Although with only 190 operational at the start of the war widespread has to be taken with a grain of salt. SInce it was on an artillery carriage and looked like like a piece of artillery it tended to be used like an artillery piece of the day (placed wheel to wheel in full view of the enemy) and many were promptly put out of action by Prussian artillery.

Unfortunately many officers refused to believe the results on the battlefield of these changes and clung to the tactics that had worked for hundreds of years during the reign of the smoothbore musket. They wrote off these 3 wars as aberrations.

The first battle between Ironclad warships was between the CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor. While the USS Monitor was ill-suited for open ocean (as it turns out), the CSS Virginia would have been capable of moderate seas.
Another innovation of modern warfare, was the naval mine, developed by the Confederates to try and prevent Union warships from entering bays or rivers. As it turns out, land mines were later developed from this.

And it was my understanding that the Civil War was the first to use railroads as a strategic military tool, moving not only troops and supplies, but weapons, like railway artillery - particularly mortars.

The appearance of Admiral Perry in 1853 taught the Japanese that diplomacy came from the barrel of a gun. A lesson they learnt for their own uses.

I wondered if Japanese expansion was based on self defence or the need for resources. Or self defence was based on the need for resources.

The first use of something and the effective use of something is not the same.

First for self-defense and then for expansion because they understood that there were lot of chances to do so with the modernized weapons. China and NK are doing same now in this area but what they do not understand is the risk of costs.

GrauGeist said:

The first battle between Ironclad warships was between the CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor. While the USS Monitor was ill-suited for open ocean (as it turns out), the CSS Virginia would have been capable of moderate seas.

Click to expand...

That is true, however the first use of Ironclads was in the Crimean war, only the French had them so there were no ship to ship battles


They were only good for about 4 kts under their own power and had to be towed over long distances. British had two but didn't get them to the Crimea in time for combat.

Once you have several nations building Ironclads a battle between them becomes almost inevitable.

Another innovation of modern warfare, was the naval mine, developed by the Confederates to try and prevent Union warships from entering bays or rivers. As it turns out, land mines were later developed from this.

Click to expand...

Naval mines had been used (or at least known of) for several centuries in the west. Chinese use may go back several centuries before that. Problems were sealing the mine (black powder being notoriously subject to failing when wet/damp) fusing (getting the thing to go off when you want it to).

From wiki for the 18th Century:

"
In 1812 Russian engineer Pavel Shilling exploded an underwater mine using an electrical circuit. In 1842 Samuel Colt used an electric detonator to destroy a moving vessel to demonstrate an underwater mine of his own design to the United States Navy and President John Tyler. However, opposition from former President John Quincy Adams scuttled the project as "not fair and honest warfare."[10] In 1854, during the unsuccessful attempt of the Anglo-French fleet to seize the Kronstadtfortress, British steamships HMS Merlin (9 June 1855, the first successful mining in history), HMS Vulture and HMS Firefly suffered damage due to the underwater explosions of Russian naval mines. Russian naval specialists set more than 1500 naval mines, or infernal machines, designed by Moritz von Jacobi and by Immanuel Nobel,[11] in the Gulf of Finland during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. The mining of Vulcan led to the world's first minesweeping operation.[12][13] During the next 72 hours, 33 mines were swept.[14]

The Jacobi mine was designed by German-born, Russian engineer Jacobi, in 1853. The mine was tied to the sea bottom by an anchor. A cable connected it to a galvanic cell which powered it from the shore, the power of its explosive charge was equal to 14 kilograms (31 lb) of black powder. In the summer of 1853, the production of the mine was approved by the Committee for Mines of the Ministry of War of the Russian Empire. In 1854, 60 Jacobi mines were laid in the vicinity of the Forts Pavel and Alexander (Kronstadt), to deter the British Baltic Fleet from attacking them. It gradually phased out its direct competitor the Nobel mine on the insistence of Admiral Fyodor Litke. The Nobel mines were bought from Swedish industrialist Immanuel Nobel who had entered into collusion with Russian head of navy Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov. Despite their high cost (100 Russian rubles) the Nobel mines proved to be faulty, exploding while being laid, failing to explode or detaching from their wires and drifting uncontrollably, at least 70 of them were subsequently disarmed by the British. In 1855, 301 more Jacobi mines were laid around Krostadt and Lisy Nos. British ships did not dare to approach them"

Yes the American Civil war saw the much larger use of mines than any war before it.

And it was my understanding that the Civil War was the first to use railroads as a strategic military tool, moving not only troops and supplies, but weapons, like railway artillery - particularly mortars.

Click to expand...

See: Grand Crimean Central Railway - Wikipedia

It was more tactical supply than strategic, I don't know how much use of railways was done in England and France to bring supplies/men to the docks to load on ships.

Railways were a booming industry in the mid 1800s, England may have gone from 90km of track in 1829 (mainly horse drawn) to 1500km of track in 1839 to 8000km of track in 1850.

The US was bit behind in getting started but considering the distances involved in the US, caught up pretty well if not surpassing Britain in the 1850s.

The Basket said:

Sempill was passing high level secrets to the Japanese

Click to expand...

The nature of this accusation is highly suspect however. On the face of it he and Fredrick Rutland (Rutland of Jutland) were accused by the British government of supplying the Japanese with 'secrets', yet trade in the kinds of 'secrets' between British aircraft and engine manufacturers continued whilst these two were being investigated. A couple of British manufacturers were building aircraft for the Japanese and seeking them as customers, as well as Rolls-Royce supplying engine details - for manufacture or supply is not known.

A change in the country's policy toward Japan in 1921 with the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance saw these charges made, and yes, Sempill maintained contact with his Japanese colleagues, but the sale of aircraft and weapons to Japan, for which Sempill was acting as intermediary continued, despite the charges against him and Rutland. They revolved around the Blackburn Iris and its supply to Japan, which didn't materialise, possibly because of the charges, yet in 1929, some years later, the Short Brothers concluded a similar deal with Kawanishi for the construction of a big flying boat similar to the Singapore, the Kawanishi Navy Type 90-2 or H3K1. No accusations of the supply of secrets to the Japanese were made.

It was all a bit political and the charges were somewhat trumped up owing to a change in government policy, yet private arms manufacturing firms maintained contact with Japan and continued supplying arms throughout the between-the-wars period. The government was paying lip service to the foreign ministry at the expense of these two guys.

I understand well that the British happily sold technology to the Japanese and would have sold anything and everything.

But he did give secrets away which he wasn't supposed to. Including high level political discussion in which Japan was mentioned.

It is possible that he get secrets from the Japanese in a quid pro quo basis but the Japanese went very secretive in the late 1930s so much that the true capabilities of the Yamato are still not fully known.

So maybe Sempill was playing both sides.

Although it is funny to give the Japanese full access to the biscuit tin and then call it treason. The support given to the IJN carrier force is bonkers now in hindsight.

In my view the IJN was never taken seriously enough until the bombs started to fall. The IJN was formidable in 1941 and to send the Prince of Wales as a stab at gunboat diplomacy was purest folly.

The Russo-Japaness war was short and sharp and gave the Japanese a quick decisive victory over a world power which turned out to be a paper tiger.

Then sold the same weapons used to the Russians in ww1 because everyone loves irony.

Making the Russians pay for their own defeat must have been sweet.

One issue has always perplexed me about Japan in WW2 is they attacked the USA without any hope of victory.

There only possible victory is that the Americans run away and never come back.

How is this a military goal? The moment Japan attacked is the greatest strategic defeat possible. I just cannot understand that. Surely this was known? But then again the Russians were defeated in a very similar manner.

They, especially IJN, did not think they could win the US but they did not think they would lose either.

The idea was to strike the US fleet at Pearl, inflict a severe loss and then draw the remnants of the US fleet into a decisive battle that would force the U.S. to negotiate a peace.

Yamamoto expressed his doubts that this would work and felt that a pre-emptive strike on the U.S. was a bad decision, but Tojo would hear none of it. The poorly timed Diplomatic message didn't help things at all.

The plan worked to perfection.
Apart from the outcome of Midway.
That went downhill fast.

The early success and the aggressive tactics work when your winning.

Even if the Americans ran away, still fighting the British Empire and in China.

And eventually the Soviets. But then again this was the path they chose.

In the postwar Japan, left-wing groups took power in the public office and at school for decades.
As teachers denied nationalistic values of prewar Japan, I and my classmates had few chances to learn the lost era of our own country.
Not a few teachers, and students, often refused singing our national anthem at school and it was regarded as a matter of course by such 'advanced' people.

Frankly, I didn't understand that old Japan looked a big threat to the rest of the world until I joined this forum though I don't know I was lucky or unlucky. However, I can now understand why my father was proud of his old Japan and I won't deny him anymore.

One point to add is that both Russia and Japan was up to shenanigans and fighting over someone else's land.
Russia's imperial ambition took a dive while Japan's got a boost.

Whether the Chinese or Koreans see the glory in such history is not one I can answer.

The Basket said:

The plan worked to perfection.

Click to expand...

Far from it.
They failed to catch the carriers, the damage inflicted on the Battleships and cruisers were minimal (many "sunken" Battleships would come back to haunt them) and they failed to destroy the crucial oil bunkers.

In reality, all the IJN had to do at Pearl Harbor, was a quick surgical strike on the Oil bunkers while the bulk of the force struck the Navy bases San Diego, Long Beach/San Pedro and San Francisco and seize the Panama Canal. Never mind the Aleutians.

With the fleet at Pearl without fuel and the west coast bases in ruins, the U.S. would have been more attuned to negotiations.

Instead, the half-assed strike on Pearl Harbor simply transformed an isolationist nation into a vengeful beast overnight.

Pearl was on the very edge of IJN capabilities. Any move further east was impossible.

The Basket said:

Pearl was on the very edge of IJN capabilities. Any move further east was impossible.

Click to expand...

You're talking about the world's 3rd most powerful navy...how were they on the edge of thier capabilities?
At the start of the Pacific war, Japan had more aircraft carriers than the US and Britain combined and were more than capable of projecting their power if they were to stay focused on a single objective.

If they concentrated forces to the west coast for a decisive strike, instead of scattering their forces across the Pacific, they could have incapacitated the USN in one shot and then turned westward to resume their conquest of the SW Pacific. The Dutch, French and British holdings were barely defended as the mother countries were engaged with Germany, so the key objective in the Pacific would have been taking the U.S. out of the equation quickly and then dealing with the colonies afterwards.

Supply.
Attacking the east coast is simply not happening.