The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Yeah and I wouldn't have bothered reading it so there that too.
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Yeah and I wouldn't have bothered reading it so there that too.You refer to Galipoli as a disaster, but not the loss of Malaya and Singapore. Your criteria for disaster labeling makes no sense. I had a longer rebuttal drafted but there's no point, and we'd be threadjacking the thread off topic. Back to Ceylon I go.....
How good were HM forces at cooperation and coordination? IJN was the master of coordinated air strikes. However, the IJN and IJA would rather commit hari kiri then work together. The USN was still at the "okay that didn't work, let's try this" stage.You refer to Galipoli as a disaster, but not the loss of Malaya and Singapore. Your criteria for disaster labeling makes no sense. I had a longer rebuttal drafted but there's no point, and we'd be threadjacking the thread off topic. Back to Ceylon I go.....
Do we know what Nagumo's plan was for venturing into the Indian Ocean? Did he know there was a British carrier force to attack? If the goal was just to harass any transports or small British bases in the region then sailing much of your Empire's essential capital ships to within easy reach of Ceylon-based naval and air power seems a massive risk. Of course we could argue the risk paid off since Nagumo's fleet made it home again, but save for an old carrier and some cruisers Sommerville's force remained untouched. Once he was made aware that the British eastern fleet remain intact, how can Nagumo consider his mission anything other than a failure?
The risk to Nagumo does not seem worthwhile. Had the British attacked with what they had (rather than what I'm suggesting they could get) Nagumo could have have lost a carrier or two, significantly impacting IJN preparations for the coming Coral Sea and Midway operations. Nagumo should have been at home, preparing his fleet. I wonder if he was jealous that the army was getting all the glory at Malaya and DEI and wanted to venture out - but he's got the laurels of Pearl Harbour to sustain any ego I would think. That said, until now only Rear Admiral Takagi at Java Sea has given the IJN much of anything to do in 1942, beyond troop transportation.
Do we know what Nagumo's plan was for venturing into the Indian Ocean? Did he know there was a British carrier force to attack? .
Not good at all, as shown at the Feb 1942 Channel dash where the RAF and FAA completely failed to coordinate their strikes on Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, et al. One of the biggest fails of combined RAF/FAA ops.How good were HM forces at cooperation and coordination?
It's now end of Feb 1942 the British receive intel that a major IJN move into the Indian Ocean is planned at the end of March or early April. So now we need to assemble and prepare the RAF strike and get it and the necessary bombs, torpedoes, fuel, spares, etc. to Ceylon within the next two to three weeks in order to have time to prepare and gain familiarity with each other, train against RN targets, work with newly set up radar early warning and Catalina long range recon, etc.We're Boston's and Maryland's used in low-altitude precision level bombing in this timeframe? They were available in Egypt. Very dangerous to attack carriers in daylight with them as they would be unescorted, but also large payload and good range. Potentially lethal to a carrier even if attrition to the attackers is very high. But I don't know if they were quite suitable, or had the tactics necessary developed for them. But a crash-course on ship sinking could be endeavoured maybe?
Yeah and I wouldn't have bothered reading it so there that too.
I don't know how good UK sigint was in the Indian Ocean, but getting RN submarines where they can attack Nagumo's force would be first, followed by night air-launched torpedo attacks. If the Nagumo keeps approaching, continue submarine and night air attacks. If they get close enough for RAF fighters to escort attack aircraft, try day attacks, with dive bombers preferentially attacking carriers. After dark, let the destroyer flotillas loose.
IMO, the RAF needs at least ten squadrons (120 aircraft + spares) of torpedo strike aircraft, six squadrons (72 aircraft + spares) of dive or low level bombers and five additional squadrons (60 aircraft + spares) of single-seat fighters.
I'd disagree with you, the RAF could have had sufficient torpedo dive bombers and could have had sufficient long range fighters to escort them. The HP Hampden could both dive bomb and torpedo drop. The Miles M. 20 with drop tanks could have escorted them if it had been built. The Fairey Battle was available in both South Africa (340) and Australia (366). It too could dive bomb.Some rather obvious problems with this
I doubt that the whole of the RAF didn't have ten squadrons of torpedo strike aircraft. They definitely didn't have six squadrons of dive bombers. Low level bombers would have been Blenheim's which were suffering huge losses in anti shipping strike missions in the North Sea and there is reason to believe losses against the IJN would be any less. The fighters could have been scraped together if the UK would release some of the Spit V fighters that were not doing much on the Channel Raids.
Do not underestimate the IJN 25mm AA guns they were not as bad as people paint them.
Not even a peek with one eye?
With production beginning in 1938, Britain produced 1,180 Bristol Beaufort Mk.I. I don't know how many were produced by Feb 1942, but I would have thought by 1942 Bristol would have changed over to the Mk.II. The RAF's second torpedo bomber, the Hanley-Page Hampden was produced from 1936 to 1941, with 1,430 built. Ceylon needs ten squadrons, or 120 aircraft plus spares. This doesn't seem a huge stretch given the number of aircraft produced to Feb 1942.I doubt that the whole of the RAF didn't have ten squadrons of torpedo strike aircraft.
The RAF doesn't have any dive bombers whatsoever, but I want anything that can shallow dive with any accuracy. I agree it's likely going to be Blenheims, along with Bostons, Battles and Hudsons. They'll have to depend on fighter cover to make it to their targets. The FAA has just withdrawn its Skuas and they have France's Vought Chesapeakes - maybe send those for this final mission, operating the latter from land in a lightened state.They definitely didn't have six squadrons of dive bombers. Low level bombers would have been Blenheim's which were suffering huge losses in anti shipping strike missions in the North Sea and there is reason to believe losses against the IJN would be any less.
Japanese carriers were vulnerable at Midway because they had a fully armed and fueled strike below decks leading to uncontrollable fires. Shokaku was hit by 3 1000 pound bombs but her hangers were empty so there was no catastrophic fire.With production beginning in 1938, Britain produced 1,180 Bristol Beaufort Mk.I. I don't know how many were produced by Feb 1942, but I would have thought by 1942 Bristol would have changed over to the Mk.II. The RAF's second torpedo bomber, the Hanley-Page Hampden was produced from 1936 to 1941, with 1,430 built. Ceylon needs ten squadrons, or 120 aircraft plus spares. This doesn't seem a huge stretch given the number of aircraft produced to Feb 1942.
I suggest these three active Canadian torpedo squadrons join up with No. 413 Squadron RCAF (PBY Catalinas) already at Ceylon. The RAF doesn't have any dive bombers whatsoever, but I want anything that can shallow dive with any accuracy. I agree it's likely going to be Blenheims, along with Bostons, Battles and Hudsons. They'll have to depend on fighter cover to make it to their targets. The FAA has just withdrawn its Skuas and they have France's Vought Chesapeakes - maybe send those for this final mission, operating the latter from land in a lightened state.
Considering that IJN carriers seem to be vulnerable to single bomb hits, perhaps 500 lb bombs slung under Fulmars and Hurricanes (Hurribombers were thus armed in 1941) will suffice and the Blenheim, etc can stay home. Making the RAF's part a Beaufort and Hurricane event makes it easier for the RAF.
If just a few of these get through to Nagumo's matchstick flattops and it's inferno time.
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True. If operating within a hundred miles of Ceylon I have to think there would be ready aircraft fueled and armed in the hangars or on deck. But it doesn't take an avgas explosion to mission kill an IJN, or any non-AFD carrier, a few bomb hits should suffice this far from home. If we can get the Hurricanes, can we train their pilots in accurate bombing in time?Japanese carriers were vulnerable at Midway because they had a fully armed and fueled strike below decks leading to uncontrollable fires. Shokaku was hit by 3 1000 pound bombs but her hangers were empty so there was no catastrophic fire.
It was a rather risky move on Japan's to send five carriers into the Indian Ocean so close to Ceylon on the assumption that the island was poorly defended. The ROI just wasn't there, putting more than half of the Kido Butai's carriers at risk to sink old Hermes, a couple of cruisers and some lighter ships. The Japanese seem to have a habit of attacking enemy bases with the goal of hitting enemy fleet carriers - but like at Pearl Harbour and now Ceylon, the carriers are never where they're intended to be.The Shokaku might not have had a catastrophic fire but it was unavailable for months. It was out of the fight. It might have tipped the balance in the IJN's favor at Midway.
I guess that's the same reason why the battle of the Surigao Strait has been a compelling subject for me.It was a rather risky move on Japan's to send five carriers into the Indian Ocean so close to Ceylon on the assumption that the island was poorly defended. The ROI just wasn't there, putting more than half of the Kido Butai's carriers at risk to sink old Hermes, a couple of cruisers and some lighter ships.
That they tried again in 1944, this time with a pitiful sized force suggests they thought the Indian Ocean was rich with soft targets. Too bad HMS Hermes and the cruisers HMS Dorsetshire and Cornwall weren't still alive to avenge 1942, now that would have been a fun fight to study.
It's 79 years ago this week that Nagumo completed his Indian Ocean raid. The anniversary has got me thinking of this topic once more.I doubt that the whole of the RAF didn't have ten squadrons of torpedo strike aircraft. They definitely didn't have six squadrons of dive bombers. Low level bombers would have been Blenheim's which were suffering huge losses in anti shipping strike missions in the North Sea and there is reason to believe losses against the IJN would be any less. The fighters could have been scraped together if the UK would release some of the Spit V fighters that were not doing much on the Channel Raids.
It's 79 years ago this week that Nagumo completed his Indian Ocean raid. The anniversary has got me thinking of this topic once more.
Given what was available, and the intel that Nagumo was coming with a strike force of some size, what's the best trap the Brits can set?