Set a Ceylon trap for Nagumo, March 1942

[Admiral Beez]

I really think if your proposal is to come off, the RAF and RN must co-ordinate so that the attacks come in close together and truly tax the defensive capabilities of KdB.

I just don't know if the FAA and RAF have the training and positive relationship needed to coordinate a strike of this size. The one exception is RAF Coastal Command, the arm of the RAF that worked closely with the RN and FAA. But they didn't have the ideal aircraft in early 1942. This might need to be an all FAA event.

RAF Coastal Command - Wikipedia

Here's a squadron of heavy bombers loaned to Coastal Command, so there is hope No. 102 Squadron (RAF) during the Second World War

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I just don't know if the FAA and RAF have the training and positive relationship needed to coordinate a strike of this size. The one exception is RAF Coastal Command, the arm of the RAF that worked closely with the RN and FAA. But they didn't have the ideal aircraft in early 1942. This might need to be an all FAA event.

RAF Coastal Command - Wikipedia

Agreed that the two branches were not on the same page for so much of the war. However, if the Brits really want to pursue this defensive action, they simply must at least try to co-ordinate them, I think.

The parallel to Midway bodes ill, I think. In that battle as well, the fleet was on radio silence, and the land base had to contribute its air power without a common plan. I don't know, or think, the Brits could've have come up with a workable solution, but I'd think at least trying to would be better. If that effort fails and the attacks come in disjointed, you're no worse off than accepting uncoordination from the get-go. But if you get lucky, good things can happen.

Consider: the Enterprise and Yorktown SBDs were also uncoordinated (due to circumstances, rather than planning, is my understanding). However, the three SBD squadrons got lucky and happened to pile up over the three carriers about simultaneously.

So I'd still try to achieve co-ordination and synergy, and cross my damned fingers.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Agreed that the two branches were not on the same page for so much of the war. However, if the Brits really want to pursue this defensive action, they simply must at least try to co-ordinate them, I think.

Agreed. A good opportunity is with the 10am strike by nine Bristol Blenheims on April 9th. They approached at 11,000 ft, we're undetected by the IJN, and came close to hitting the carrier Akagi. Indian Ocean raid - Wikipedia Combine this RAF attack with a Swordish/Albacore attack and we'd have something. Ideally I'd like to see a dozen FAA Skuas flying with the RAF Blenheims, shown training together below, for a good HA/LA combo. Imagine a dozen undetected Skuas diving down onto the IJN carriers - they're almost definitely going to see one carrier crippled.

The Skuas have been mostly withdrawn from fleet service by end 1941. Do we have enough of them to send a squadron or two to Ceylon when intel warns of the IJN raid in Feb 1942?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agreed. A good opportunity is with the 10am strike by nine Bristol Blenheims on April 9th. They approached at 11,000 ft, we're undetected by the IJN, and came close to hitting the carrier Akagi. Indian Ocean raid - Wikipedia Combine this RAF attack with a Swordish/Albacore attack and we'd have something. Ideally I'd like to see a dozen FAA Skuas flying with the RAF Blenheims, shown training together below, for a good HA/LA combo. Imagine a dozen undetected Skuas diving down onto the IJN carriers - they're almost definitely going to see one carrier crippled.

View attachment 619193
The Skuas have been mostly withdrawn from fleet service by end 1941. Do we have enough of them to send a squadron or two to Ceylon when intel warns of the IJN raid in Feb 1942?

I don't know Skua numbers, you're definitely asking the wrong person about that. But my own impression, and that's all it is, is that when attacking with different types with different attack profiles, scheduling them together helps each -- hence my using the catchword "synergy", because in such cases (Shoho) -- the mere fact that the defense is split onto a knight's fork is itself a force-multiplier of sorts. One fighter cannot be in two places at one time.

That's why "quantity has a quality all its own" is a useful framework, even if the planes and attacks are very different.

 

[Admiral Beez]

We need Admiral Sommerville and Air Marshall D'Albiac to begin intraservice training and combat exercises as soon as the Eastern Fleet arrives in Ceylon in Jan/Feb 1942.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

We need Admiral Sommerville and Air Marshall D'Albiac to begin intraservice training as soon as the Eastern Fleet arrives in Ceylon in Feb 1942.

Almost certainly the best hope for a good solution. Easier typed than practiced, as we Americans showed ourselves on many occasions.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Almost certainly the best hope for a good solution. Easier typed than practiced, as we Americans showed ourselves on many occasions.

The Channel Dash is as bad an example the British need to show the lack of service coordination. The RAF Bomber Command crews at Ceylon had no experience or training in antiship bombing. Sommerville can at least help them there throughout Feb and March by exercising the three carriers against the RAF's Blenheims and PBYs.

If anything the RAF needed more bombers and fewer fighters at Ceylon, if we must cut back the Hurricanes and increase the Blenheims.

No. 11 Squadron RAF (Bristol Blenheims) (Colombo Racecourse)
No. 30 Squadron RAF (Hawker Hurricanes) (RAF Ratmalana, Colombo)
No. 258 Squadron RAF (Hawker Hurricanes) (Colombo Racecourse)
No. 261 Squadron RAF (Hawker Hurricanes) (China Bay, Trincomalee)
No. 273 Squadron RAF (Fairey Fulmars) (China Bay)
No. 202 Squadron RAF (PBY Catalina one aircraft)
No. 204 Squadron RAF (PBY Catalinas)
No. 205 Squadron RAF (one PBY Catalina aircraft)
No. 321 Squadron RAF (PBY Catalinas) (Dutch unit under formation at China Bay)
No. 413 Squadron RCAF (PBY Catalinas)

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Channel Dash is as bad an example the British need to show the lack of service coordination.

The RAF Bomber Command crews at Ceylon had no experience or training in antiship bombing. Sommerville can at least help them there throughout Feb and March.

And that a couple of months later!

I think in addition to training in early 42, doctrinal changes would be required as well -- even down to something as "simple" as shared terminology on the radio, onto "who covers what airspace", that sort of thing. It's a complex problem and not liable to a ready solution in a couple of months without serious dedication to interservice co-operation. That's the sort of thing that doesn't grow overnight.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And that a couple of months later!

I think in addition to training in early 42, doctrinal changes would be required as well -- even down to something as "simple" as shared terminology on the radio, onto "who covers what airspace", that sort of thing. It's a complex problem and not liable to a ready solution in a couple of months without serious dedication to interservice co-operation. That's the sort of thing that doesn't grow overnight.

We might be over complicating this. We need the RAF's PBYs to report the IJN location and then the FAA and RAF to quickly takeoff, form up and attack the same location at/near the same time. They can do it independently of each other, but they need to train for it. It's not ideal and there's no a lot of time to train, but with the limitations you mention it's the best that can be done.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

We might be over complicating this. We need the RAF's PBYs to report the IJN location and then the FAA and RAF to quickly takeoff, form up and attack the same location at/near the same time. They can do it independently of each other, but they need to train for it. It's not ideal and there's no a lot of time to train, but with the limitations you mention it's the best that can be done.

The details count. In order for the RAF and RN to hit the same spot at the same time, there's a lot in the background that needs to be addressed. Otherwise a lot is left to improvisation, which obviously in battle is a risky thing.

 

[Admiral Beez]

IMO, you can't defend Ceylon nor conduct an offensive maritime strike with a single squadron of Blenheims. This, Thumpalumpacus rather than a lack of coordination with the FAA is the RAF's issue. They've likely got sufficient PBYs and Hurricanes, but the RAF needs more bombers. Send three or four more squadrons of any RAF twin engined bomber and that undetected raid on April 9th might have crippled a carrier.

The British have at least several weeks warning that the IJN was coming, and certainly moved Sommerville and his three carriers plus battleships to Ceylon in anticipation of meeting the expected Japanese offensives into the Indian Ocean, but the RAF sent no reinforcement strike aircraft whatsoever.

I think if the Brits can muster the airpower it might be doable. But boy, that routing for the UK-based planes across Africa is going to be mighty hard on airframes

Many of these stops are established Imperial Airways airports or RAF stations.

Yes, they're going to be rough, dusty and lightly served, but two or three dozen twin engined bombers cycling through should be doable. The trickiest stop will be Sudan, since the airfield there is set up more for refueling the occasional airliner, like below rather than a large group of bombers.

But the logistics can be overcome, for example look at the French Air Force build up in Chad next door (Jebel Uweinat Expedition, Sudan - March 2013)

I don't know how good UK sigint was in the Indian Ocean, but getting RN submarines where they can attack Nagumo's force would be first...

Agreed. A squadron of submarines out of Calcutta to monitor the Malacca Strait might have sighted the entire IJN force returning through those confined waters.

 

[RCAFson]

I don't know Skua numbers, you're definitely asking the wrong person about that. But my own impression, and that's all it is, is that when attacking with different types with different attack profiles, scheduling them together helps each -- hence my using the catchword "synergy", because in such cases (Shoho) -- the mere fact that the defense is split onto a knight's fork is itself a force-multiplier of sorts. One fighter cannot be in two places at one time.

That's why "quantity has a quality all its own" is a useful framework, even if the planes and attacks are very different.

Within 3 months the Fulmar had been cleared to carry a 500lb bomb in lieu of the 60IG slipper DT.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Within 3 months the Fulmar had been cleared to carry a 500lb bomb in lieu of the 60IG slipper DT.

With no HA CAP, no radio-equipped fighters nor radar-directed CDC/ADR, Nagumo will have great difficultly detecting and then stopping a diving attack by a dozen or more 500 lb. armed Fulmars. This might be our best chance. Then in the confusion the Swordfish and Albacores arrive.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

With no HA CAP, no radio-equipped fighters nor radar-directed CDC/ADR, Nagumo will have great difficultly detecting and then stopping a diving attack by a dozen or more 500 lb. armed Fulmars. This might be our best chance. Then in the confusion the Swordfish and Albacores arrive.

I'd want those Fulmars just a little ahead of the Albs and Stringbags so they could regain some height out of their dives and help provide cover for the biplanes.

 

[RCAFson]

With no HA CAP, no radio-equipped fighters nor radar-directed CDC/ADR, Nagumo will have great difficultly detecting and then stopping a diving attack by a dozen or more 500 lb. armed Fulmars. This might be our best chance. Then in the confusion the Swordfish and Albacores arrive.

IIRC, there was about 30 serviceable Fulmars on Ceylon on 5 April 1942 and ~44 total.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

IIRC, there was about 30 serviceable Fulmars on Ceylon on 5 April 1942 and ~44 total.

Were there any on the carriers?

 

[RCAFson]

Were there any on the carriers?

Indomitable had 12 and Hermes was detached to Ceylon to be modified to carry Fulmars, for Operation IRONCLAD. This is why she was not with the BEF on 9 April 1942.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Indomitable had 12 and Hermes was detached to Ceylon to be modified to carry Fulmars, for Operation IRONCLAD. This is why she was not with the BEF on 9 April 1942.

Thanks for that!

 

[Admiral Beez]

Indomitable had 12 and Hermes was detached to Ceylon to be modified to carry Fulmars, for Operation IRONCLAD. This is why she was not with the BEF on 9 April 1942.

This would require changing Hermes' 36 by 36.6 ft T-shape lifts to accommodate the Fulmar's 40 ft 2 in length. That's not a small project, where was this work intended to be completed?

 

[RCAFson]

This would require changing Hermes' 36 by 36.6 ft T-shape lifts to accommodate the Fulmar's 40 ft 2 in length. That's not a small project, where was this work intended to be completed?

It was intended to complete at Trincomalee, AFAIK.