parsifal
Colonel
The figures given by Ellis in his statistical reference for 1940 Britain/Germany are
Fighter: 4283/2746
Gnd Attack: 0/603
Bombers: 3488/2852
Recce: 387/971
Transport: 0/388
Trainers: 6415/1870
Production of SE engined fighters during the BoB for the two protagonists was as follows
Jun: 446/164
Jul: 496/220
Aug: 476/173
Sep: 467/218
Oct: 469/144
Nov: 458/150
Dec: 413/c150
Total: 3195/1519
According to an unrefernced appendix that I photocopied more than 30 years ago, the Germans spent more than 5.08 Billion RM on aircraft procurement in 1940.
I dont have conclusive figures for the RAF, but it seems pretty clear to me that the British were getting a more efficient return for the investment in aircraft production:
From this site:
http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/fro...r-force-rearmament-programme-1934-1940.html/4
The priority given to the RAF did not, however, mean the end of financial considerations. On the contrary, successive proposals for revision of the Scheme F of came up for discussion, and all of them were beyond the available financial resources. Even the great rearmament vote and loan of 7th March 1938 fell short of the needs of the RAF. That vote brought the total planned expenditure of the RAF over the next four years to about £500 millions, but the cost of the minimum programmes which the Air Ministry had formulated at the end of 1937 was established as at least £650 millions by 1941.
In March 1938, the negotiations between the Secretary of State for Air and the Cabinet were suddenly overtaken by Hitler's annexation of Austria, which at once made the dangers in the international situation become more immediate and apparent. There was little time to lose, and for the first time a real mood of urgency crept into the discussions of the air plans at the highest level. Suddenly, finance was no longer considered the worst obstacle. The question was no longer what the country's finances could afford but what industry could turn out. So when the Cabinet met in the early days of April to decide finally and urgently the scale of the aircraft programme, they were compelled to define it not in terms of finance but in those of industrial capacity.
An entirely new principle entered into the plans. The revised Air Ministry proposals required a whopping 12,000 aircraft in two years. Analysis of the industrial capacity showed that this was also the maximum which the aircraft industry could produce by that date. On 27th April 1938 Cabinet authority was consequently given to the new plans, and Scheme L of 12,000 aircraft in two years came into operation.
The passing of Scheme L was a real turning point. Not only did it reflect the heightened sense of urgency in the Government, but it also signified the end of the purely financial checks on rearmament. The RAF was the first among the Services to enter into what to all intents and purposes were wartime conditions of supply, for from now on expansion in the air was to subject only to industrial limitations: production capacity, raw materials, labour and management.
The scale of the upswing in the overall rearmament programme in 1938-1939 can be illustrated by the following numbers. The annual cost of equipment and stores for the fighting Services rose nearly eightfold from about £37 million in the financial year ending March 1934 to £273 million in the year ending March 1939. During the same time, standard rate of income tax rose from 4s. 6d. in the pound in 1934 to 5s. 6d. in 1936 and 7s. 6d. in 1939. In 1937, the Government launched a five-year rearmament loan of £400 million, but in the spring of 1939 this had to be raised to £800 million.
In point of fact I think the relative efficiency in production of the Brits versus the Germans arose not so much from the "produceability" of given types, as the arrangements made at the factory floor. The prewar Brit military expenditure was all about getting factories and industries ready for the "big push". Setting up aluminium industries, shadow factories skilling up of unskilled labour, that kinda thing. The Germans failed to do this, make the investment in basic infrastructure to maximise production efficiencies later. its one of the choices they made that probably lost them the war. Why did they do this. because the country was being run by supreme gamblers, and they thought it was better to go for the quick victory rather than the long haul. Later, when it was too late, the germans did make their industries efficient, under Speer.....
Fighter: 4283/2746
Gnd Attack: 0/603
Bombers: 3488/2852
Recce: 387/971
Transport: 0/388
Trainers: 6415/1870
Production of SE engined fighters during the BoB for the two protagonists was as follows
Jun: 446/164
Jul: 496/220
Aug: 476/173
Sep: 467/218
Oct: 469/144
Nov: 458/150
Dec: 413/c150
Total: 3195/1519
According to an unrefernced appendix that I photocopied more than 30 years ago, the Germans spent more than 5.08 Billion RM on aircraft procurement in 1940.
I dont have conclusive figures for the RAF, but it seems pretty clear to me that the British were getting a more efficient return for the investment in aircraft production:
From this site:
http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/fro...r-force-rearmament-programme-1934-1940.html/4
The priority given to the RAF did not, however, mean the end of financial considerations. On the contrary, successive proposals for revision of the Scheme F of came up for discussion, and all of them were beyond the available financial resources. Even the great rearmament vote and loan of 7th March 1938 fell short of the needs of the RAF. That vote brought the total planned expenditure of the RAF over the next four years to about £500 millions, but the cost of the minimum programmes which the Air Ministry had formulated at the end of 1937 was established as at least £650 millions by 1941.
In March 1938, the negotiations between the Secretary of State for Air and the Cabinet were suddenly overtaken by Hitler's annexation of Austria, which at once made the dangers in the international situation become more immediate and apparent. There was little time to lose, and for the first time a real mood of urgency crept into the discussions of the air plans at the highest level. Suddenly, finance was no longer considered the worst obstacle. The question was no longer what the country's finances could afford but what industry could turn out. So when the Cabinet met in the early days of April to decide finally and urgently the scale of the aircraft programme, they were compelled to define it not in terms of finance but in those of industrial capacity.
An entirely new principle entered into the plans. The revised Air Ministry proposals required a whopping 12,000 aircraft in two years. Analysis of the industrial capacity showed that this was also the maximum which the aircraft industry could produce by that date. On 27th April 1938 Cabinet authority was consequently given to the new plans, and Scheme L of 12,000 aircraft in two years came into operation.
The passing of Scheme L was a real turning point. Not only did it reflect the heightened sense of urgency in the Government, but it also signified the end of the purely financial checks on rearmament. The RAF was the first among the Services to enter into what to all intents and purposes were wartime conditions of supply, for from now on expansion in the air was to subject only to industrial limitations: production capacity, raw materials, labour and management.
The scale of the upswing in the overall rearmament programme in 1938-1939 can be illustrated by the following numbers. The annual cost of equipment and stores for the fighting Services rose nearly eightfold from about £37 million in the financial year ending March 1934 to £273 million in the year ending March 1939. During the same time, standard rate of income tax rose from 4s. 6d. in the pound in 1934 to 5s. 6d. in 1936 and 7s. 6d. in 1939. In 1937, the Government launched a five-year rearmament loan of £400 million, but in the spring of 1939 this had to be raised to £800 million.
In point of fact I think the relative efficiency in production of the Brits versus the Germans arose not so much from the "produceability" of given types, as the arrangements made at the factory floor. The prewar Brit military expenditure was all about getting factories and industries ready for the "big push". Setting up aluminium industries, shadow factories skilling up of unskilled labour, that kinda thing. The Germans failed to do this, make the investment in basic infrastructure to maximise production efficiencies later. its one of the choices they made that probably lost them the war. Why did they do this. because the country was being run by supreme gamblers, and they thought it was better to go for the quick victory rather than the long haul. Later, when it was too late, the germans did make their industries efficient, under Speer.....