well Im glad you have so much confidence in your source material. You do understand that many of the claims and losses for many accounts are based on highly questionable sources.
I dont believe there are any credible sources. Please understand that is my position. But just to show that the figures are hot;y contested, I will rely on sources that paint a completely differnt picture. Principally Hardesty ("Rise Of the Phoenix - Soviet Airpower on the Eastern Front"), and Brian Moynahan ("Claws Of the Bear - The rise of the Soviet Armed Forces in WWII").
Hardesty does confirm that over 120 Soviet aircraft were lost in the preemptive strike over Kharkov on the 5 July. He also confirms that this temporarily gave air superiority over the front lines of the southern sector. However, Hardesty also point out that whilst this debacle was occurring, other German airfields were being hit on the southern sector by over 417 Soviet A/c. According to Hardesty, over 50 LW aircraft were lost in these parrallel strikes lines. However these strikes dide fail to blunt the Germans own preemptive strikes launched on the 5th July.
So, substantially, I guess Hardesty is in agreement that for the 5th July, on the southern sector, the Germans held the advantage, but this is far from enjoying complete air supremacy. They had an advantager, but that advantage was not complete as is suggested in your account. At least not according to Hardesty. As Hardesty notes "The opening four days of Citadel saw intense air activity as the two sides engaged in combat over the breakthrough corridors". This suggests to me that the disputed airspace was over the german lines, not the Soviet, and this was fundamentally different to the previous offensives by the germans. Moreover as the following account shows, Soviet activity was more extensive, a sort of aerial equivalent of the broad front strategy so favoured by the Soviets, wheras the Germans tended to concentrate on their two principal breakthgrough points only. The germans for some time over these breakthroughs appear to have been more effective, but this came at the cost of ignoring the other sectors of the front. this is hardly a situation of enjoying air superiority. Its a situation of exploiting tactical and quklaitative advantages only.
Hardesty states that the LW in those first four days claimed over 400 Soviet aircraft downed. He further states that this allowed the germans to mount sustained ground support operations with Stukas and HS129s in the vicinity of the breakthroughs. This supports your notion of the germans holding air superiority. However, at the same time he elsewhere states "Nevertheless the VVS remained very active and effective in both sectors and on their flanks. VVS fighter activities frustrated German ground support activities". A further 110 Soviet aircraft were lost over the Central Sector. German air presence at this time over the central sector amounted to about 300 bombers and 100 fighters, a substantial force, but they were opposed by over 1232 Soviet aircraft of the 16th Air Army. According to Hardesty the Germans lost a further 106 aircraft in 76 group sized engagements. Hardesty says these 106 claimed by the Soviets "have been confirmed in german accounts"
Hardesty acknowledges the confusion and less than stellar performance of the VVS on the first day, but it is far from complete air supeiority in the terms that the Eastern Front had seen up to the time of Kursk. He goes on to described in considerable detail the operations of the succeeding days. On the second day, Soviet 2nd and 6th Guards Air Armies hit German 9th Army with over 450 aircraft to inhibit assault onto the Ol'khovatchkta ridge. Similar attacks in similar size were mounted on the southern flanks as well, by 2nd and 17 Gds air armies. Hardesty further states that Soviet Long Range Aviation continued to hit the german rear areas, compelling the germans to pull their fighters out of the offensive support to a purely air defence role. This is hardly the mark of an air force holding air superiority.
Hardesty states "Unable to sustain the level of the opening day's air operations, the Luftwaffe began to decline sharply in tems of effectiveness, reflected in the numbers of aircraft ready for operations". On July 5th they had flown 4286, on July 6th it was down to just over 2000.
By July 10 the situation has reversed, Germans were on the defensive, and the airspace was dominarted by the VVS....
I do not think that this account supports the notion that the germans enjoyed complete superiority over Kursk. In fact they enjoyed a tactical superiority on Day1, thereafter they progressively lost control of the skies, and with that, their ability to influence the ground battle.