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The operations over france were fundamentally different compared to what happened over England that year. Robert Higham in his book "Unflinching Zeal" provides a pretty good pverview of the BOF. In that battle, there were slightly less than 350 Me 110s and around 860 Me 109s. Each Me 110 flew around 30% more sorties than each 109. During the first three days of the campaign, the Luftwaffe concentrated on eliminating the allied air forces as a major factor in the battle. The French (and the AASF) had anticipated this and kept most of their meagre bomber resources well back from the battlefield. Beyond 109 range, generally. The Germans used their 110s as airborne battering rams to blast a way clear for the bombers, who comprehensively pasted the allied airfields. The French in that three day period lost 192 MS 406s (and I think other fighters) , and well over 200 of their precious bombers. LW losses in those opening battles were just 16 a/c. There were just 3 110s lost in the opening phases of the battle. The French opened the battle with a very low serviceability rate for their fighters....about 25%, so fighters were mostly employed as strafers and ground attack aircraft. With its heavy firepower, stable flight characteristics, and above all long range, the 110s in these early battles were crucial. Without them, the battle would have been much harder for the germans.
Overall, the Germans found that their 109s suffered a much higher attrition rate compared to the 110s. This arose principally because of the short range and endurance of the 109. The 110, with its longer range could hang back on prepared airfields and hit the enemy by deep pentration sorties. The 109s were found to run out of fuel all too often,and were forced to use unsatisfactory forward airfields. They consequently had a much higher accident rate compared to the 110. Overall, the 350 110s deployed suffered 82 casualties during the battle, compared to well over 240 Me 109s.
The LW considered its Zerstorer squadrons its elite. Up to the beginning of the BoB it had good reason for that belief.
There were two incursions by Bf 110s into Swiss airspace which throws up an interesting comparison.
Swiss Bf 109s shot down five Bf 110s from II./ZG 1. One on the 4th of June and four on the 8th. The Swiss lost one Bf 109 which made a successful belly landing after combat.
As far as the BoF went it was a hard time for the Zerstorer units. For example on 19th May 5./ZG 26 reported only three serviceable Bf 110s. Losses increased as the Luftwaffe closed in on Dunkirk and the Zerstorer units more frequently met Spitfires operating from southern England. As Vasco says.
"..losses for the Bf 110 units in the following days would reflect this,as the limitations of combat with modern single engined enemy aircraft became clear."
Cheers
Steve
In the spring of 1940, Walter Horten, Jagdgeschwader 26 technical officer, was invited to participate in a "mock combat" with a Bf 109E. The Bf 109 bested the Bf 110 time and again. Afterward, Horten said,
[17]Gentlemen, be very careful if you should ever come up against the English. Their fighters are all single-engined. And once they get to know the Bf 110s weaknesses, you could be in for a very nasty surprise.
The campaign in the west that followed in 1940 demonstrated the Bf 110 was vulnerable in hostile skies. It performed well against the Belgian, Dutch and French Air Forces, suffering relatively light losses, but was quickly outclassed by increasing numbers of Hurricanes and Spitfires. In the Western Campaign, 60 were lost.[22] This represented 32 percent of the Zerstörerwaffe's initial strength.[25]
Besides the later night role it seems pretty obvious to me that the Bf110 was ideally suited to the precision interdictor role typified by the C4b varient.
Stephen Bungay has said this fast precision bombing role had the potential to effect the outcome of the BoB no less.
As a fighter to fight other advanced single seat fighters it must have been obvious to anyone with a clue that it was being misused?
Yes. Erpr.Gr. 210,which despite the name never did get to test the Me 210,was used in the fighter bomber role with considerable success.The Bf 110s did receive an escort of Bf 109s,contrary to another myth they were the only Bf 110 unit to receive such an escort during the BoB. Had more Bf 110 units been converted to this role we can only guess how effective they might have been against the RAF's infrastructure.
Cheers
Steve
Arguably the Ju88C could have fulfilled that role well, as it would have even greater range, firepower, and reload capacity; it could also carry some bombs to hit French airfields after enemy fighters were dealt with.
It was not, however available in quantity
The C-series was the first version of the Ju 88 to be produced as a fighter aircraft. Work on converting the Ju 88 into a fighter began with the seventh prototype in 1938. This involved replacing the glazed nose of the bomber with a solid nose containing fixed forward firing guns. The resulting aircraft could match the speed of the Bf 110, with three times the range of that aircraft. I do not know much about its manouverability, climb rates and the like. In any event, production of the Ju88 derived Heavy Fighter aircraft did not become a priority until 1943, by which time the C-series had been replaced by more modern versions.
Somer of the sub-types
C-1 and C-3
The C-1 and C-3 were planned versions powered by BMW 801 radial engines. These were in short supply, as they were used in the Fw 190A, so neither of these models entered production.
C-2
As a result the first production fighter version was the C-2. This was powered by two 1,200hp Jumo 211B or G engines, and were based on the Ju 88A-1 bomber, featuring the same short span wings as that aircraft. They carried three MG 17s and one 20mm MG FF in the solid nose. They could also carry 1,100lbs of bombs in the internal bomb bays. These aircraft were used by I./NJG 2 and carried out intruder mission over Britain during most of 1941. In other words, availble at squadron strengtrh, but too late for May 1940
C-4
The C-4 was a fighter variant of the A-5, featuring the wider wings introduced in that aircraft. It carried the same four forward guns as the C-2, was powered by two Jumo 221G or 221F engines, and carried extra armour plating for the crew. The C-4 joined I./NJG 2 in time to take part in the operations against Britain in 1941. Production was still limited, and the Bf 110 was preferred in both the heavy fighter and night fighter roles.
C-5
Ten C-5s were produced, powered by BMW 801A engines. These were used as research aircraft. The main innovation introduced with the C-5 was the replacement of the ventral gondola with a weapons pod that could carry two 7.92mm machine guns, mounted under the front bomb bay. The BMW engines improved the top speed of the aircraft to an impressive 354mph.
It should be no surpise that once the allied air forces recovered from the initial onslaugt the loss rates for the Bf110 would go up. The French actually staged somewhat of a recovery 22-25 May, and again 3-8 June. In air combats the French, and to a lesser extent the AASF were able to shoot down a lot of Luftwaffe a/c, including quite a few Me 110s. This should be easily understood. The Me 110 was not an air superiority fighter in the same way as the Me 109, Spitfire or D520 were. In the air it was vulnerable to SE fighters.
After the initial flush of victory 10-13 May, French serviceability rates normalized and they at last took to the air in reasonable numbers.
The French air force was virtually demolished and the RAF took terrible punishment as well. The latter lost with over 900 aircraft lost,including 453 Hurricanes.What is very relevant is the manner in which those Hurricanes were lost. Terraines analysis shows that 378 of them "were either destroyed on the ground, or were aircraft under repair that had to be abandoned.." Given that the Me 110 units were doing the lions share of ground attacks on airfields (along with some precision bombing units)this suggests (but does not confirm, I admit) that the majority of RAF aircraft destroyed were destroyed by Me110s and bombers, rather than Me 109s. . It might be a different story for those allied aircraft types that got airborne.
From the above figures, a maximum of 75 Hurricanes lost in combat.In the same campaign the Luftwaffe lost 367 fighters,mostly ME109s, and probably not destroyed on the ground.
This is not to suggest that 75 Hurricanes fell while knocking down 367 Messerschmitts; the air war was far more complex than that. But few historians of the assault on the West point out that it cost the Luftwaffe 1,389 aircraft of all types,and that 367 of them were "technically superior" fighters.
Derek Robinson - Invasion 1940 pp122-3
E. R. Hooton, in Phoenix Triumphant p. 267-268 lists Luftwaffe losses as 1,428, 0f which 1,129 were lost due to enemy action. Hooton goes on to list 1,092 aircrew killed, 1,395 aircrew wounded, and 1,930 aircrew missing. Corresponding French losses were 574 a/c lost in the air (of which 174 were lost to Flak), 460 aircrew killed and another 120 taken prisoner. RAF losses were 959 aircraft (of which 477 were fighters and 381 bombers) and 912 aircrew killed or missing (of which 312 were pilots) and another 184 aircrew wounded.
However there is an important footnote to add to all of this. The Luftwaffe was successful in gaining air superiority 10-13 May, in no small measure due to the effects of the Zerstorer units. Though the Allies were able to stage a partial recovery and operate in an "air denial" role, which tends to maximise losses, it was never able to gain anything of substance from its air assets, othe than the evacuatikon from Dunkirk after losing that initial confrontation. Air battles are, more than anything about control of the skies above a certain geographical area, and the successful application of airpower to support a terrestial or maritime operation. The Germans were never denied that flexibility after the initial battle