Super Adolfine ?

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Could such an aircraft having to carry the fuel for the return trip to Europe fly high enough to avoig American interceptor ?
1. Of the standard types ?
2. Of rapidely modified optimized ones ?
3. Of dedicatedely designed ones ?

1. That would be bring good results in itself, if somewhat short lived.

2. A previous post talked about light weight versions of P-38s P-47s and P-51s (Corsairs?). Simply reducing armement, fuel, and armour. All good but really enough ?
[edit : also 'easy' stretching of existing wings. For P-51 especially.]

I was thinking also of some powder rocket pod(s) to be fitted under fuselages or wings (P-38 ) for a last dash for altitude and a shoot. Limited but if there'd been an emergency it would have been tried.

Against fighter interception :

We must remember that we are considering a target plane that has a lot of wing, an amazing power setup for very high flight, and large amounts of GM1 boost.

At this stage of its mission it should considered not 'overweight' but rather 'fit' for its size (wings) although not 'light' by any stretch of imagination. The Uk attack pattern being entirely different from this point of view.
Obviously the amount of fuel for the return trip (US) cannot in any way be considered as light, but that return would be the least consumming part. Starting from high altitude, with this time a light to 'very light' aeroplane geared for altitude cruise and, when towards Europe, helping stratospheric winds (I think.)
Not forgetting the weight of the bomb itself naturaly.

When in target aera and 'interceptor country', the plane might not afford 'fighting turns' when the opposing pursuit fighters were on, but before that it certainly could perform longuish flat turns for route changes, that look small and 'instantaneous' enough on a Us state/coast track scale. To offset easy interception and ruin prediction even under plain radar surveillance. Many turns.
Germany had enough experience of Allied reconnaissance tricks then (i.e. 'the Mosquito') to know what to do.

(Of course some ULTRA prewarn could change a bit the datas... and it is not unlikely that for such strategical and probably opportunistic choices of targets for these special 'high profile' mission, the orders would come from high up using the dedicated very direct and restriced communication lines, to specifiy what target to strike from the 'highest level' of authority direct to the airfields concerned... Which lines were precisely those (among others...) that were monitored and deciphered by the wally guys in Bentchley Park and their funny machines.)

So I remain thinking that, short of detailled computations, the Super Adolfine thing would yes have been able to perform US bound missions in afordable safety for... 'quite some time.'

Then there is the 'problem' of high tech flak, that could be tough. (but not instantaneous to set in placeS, at that time, even for the USA.) (?)

Precision :
The whole value of the concept was linked to any workable precision from the altitudes drops and guidance of Fritz-X, which is tricky certainly (wouldn't the plane overtake too much its bomb after such long drop down ??)
And what possible remaining targets would there be that equaled in size the precision cone then defined ? Worthy of a single bomb ?
There is not doubt at all that the bettering of this key criterium could have come from rather simple modifications of both bomb and the bomb aimer installation, to a certain extand, and therefore would have been carried out energically, once the first set of effective (and handy) optical gear for the aimer would have been necessarily produced.
Of course, there is nothing you can do against adverse weather. And from Germany to the US coast, to predict it (then). So targets in multiple aeras should have been devised, hence 'the turns', but here too, up to an extent.
This problem coming from the high altitude of the drops, the UK attacks perfomed at higher altitude even would have come more difficult in way.

As for controllable homing on radio beam source for a bomb, yes the Germans had it about then :
Blohm Voss BV 246 Glide Bomb Luft '46 Entry
Blohm Voss BV 246 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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In the link it says they tested 10 of them and 8 were failures with 2 successes.

I don't think they had it sufficiently invented before the war was over. I'd not fly 10 aircraft 4000+ miles for 2 hits, and there is NO reason to think any aircraft factory would have a working radar anywhere near the assembly line. So even if they GOT some hits, they'd be taking out a radar site only, not a manufacturing site.

Again, not worth the effort for the damage done unless the bombs were nuclear, and that's a whole different story.
Yes GregP but it shows some efforts would have been carried out in this direction, for the sake at least to mount some scarce spy-on-the-ground effective operations. Might, might not have worked. And in time ?
It seems that the whole affair (effective auto homing) should not be above technological means of the era. Perhaps the BV auto-homing glide bomb just did not benefitted from much priority. It certainly lacked a massive Luftwaffe to carry on its employ while exploiting it for any sizeable attack. (knocking down radar(s) is only of temporary use, some important or sizeable attack is to be carried on in mean time. It just opens up a route for the bombers.)
As for radar equipped ships (carriers, battleships..), the lesson of simply cutting radio emissions for some minutes would have been quickly learnt. [plus planting phoney emiters, like dragging buys with enclosed jackhammers were used to offset sound-homing torpedoes during the Battle of the Atlantic. (or is it a myth?)]

The fact that Germany built 1000 of these bombs might indicate that they were confident enough about it. The fact that they didn't employ them might indicate that they were not, short of a large scale employ for statistical results.. that they could not afford. Or that they did not possess the necessary Lufwaffe to exploit it anymore. Or perhaps, like with the earlier Düpplen (Dümpeln ?)(the German 'windows' or chaffs), they were much concerned by a possible Allied copy of it, and forseenable reply, and somehow sorted out that it would/could/should be costlier for them to engage these first, than actually do nothing.

In the case of 'super adofine' missions it would have been a late comer with rare opportunities, possibly a zero-effectiveness zero-engagement case too.
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Another aera of weakness for those ultra long range missions would have to be the first part of the inbound journey.

Massively overweight, the thing would have been barely able to sustain itself in the air during the first quarter, first third or perhaps first half of the incoming flight. Such an easy target. With only a remote tail barbette as a defense, that is, nothing. Unable to turn away efficiently, with very probable risks of structural failures if doing so. The sitting duck, golden lounge, VIP seat.
When encountering enemy fighters - even a Liberator ! - , an emergency abandon of the mission with the dropping of the bomb and some magical instantaneous dumping of the fuel, would not even have allowed it to out climb its adversaries, all the way up to very high altitude, where and only where it did have a niche.

To perform cross Atlantic plus some American 'trekking', distant outer Ural or cross Pacific missions the aeroplane would have to be, let's repeat awfully overweight at take off.
I remain convinced that it would require a solid tow behind a He-111Z if one wanted to avoid dedicated very long runways, not only of expensive constructions but noticeable and therefore bombed. All this, on top of the mendatory amount of rato rockets and jettisonnable landing gears (the standard He-177 undercarrige being itself well enough for the light landings.)

For missions departing from South West France there would be a long ride across the Bay of Biscay ( ) where doubtlessly America and Britain could have deployed some curtain of radar carriyng ships, and a few carriers. Long range Mosquito and Liberator patrols as well. Especially when coupled with the 'killing' forewarning of Ultra intercepts and readings, eventually giving the time schedule as a bonus, we're bound for catastrophic losses for the Lufwaffe. Closing the show there probably.

Of course this part of the trip should have been carried out in nightime.

Let us grant the Germans for some display of them legendary procedural discipline and cool nerve in front of foreign adversity, and not try to depict too closely how they would achieve victory again in performing those acrobatic, take-off routines in the dark.

Hélas ! the US were about to provide radar 'pods' for their single seat Navy fighters (already?), and also we can easely forsee an emergency deployment of standard NF Mosquitos aboard carriers, for one shot missions taking off ('normally') from ships and landing home up there in England. A handful of such mossies aboard standing carriers would have brought down results.
There remains for the Super Adolfine to stick to low or very low flight to avoid detection, a one feat it was confidently able to perform at this stage of its mission.
But low level flight at night...

One could have witnessed however a good LW offensive against these shippings, using classical means at its disposal then. Quite spectacular and with open odds one should think. Short of a Marianna-class deployment in the Bay of Biscay of course... But what about if those damned Western Allies fancied some Overlording in mean time, with obvious goals at flashing through Northern France direct to Stuttgart ? Ach... un choix difficile.

Besides, some welcome vacationning trips for the Bomber Command and milkrun rides of the 8th Air Force upon the lovely dry pinhead flatlands and sunny drinkwater lakes hollidays paradises not-so-far-from-the-ocean such as these of Mont-de Marsan, Cazaux and Biscarosse, and a Bordeaux-Mérignac special, would have fast returned them to their original sand and dune nature of pre-Colbertian ages within, let's have a guess, less, or more than 2 weeks ?

For Norweagian departures to Artic routes bound to Northern America, the nasty low level dragging of hopeless Adolfine, above polar deserts should proove safer. That is again, short of any 'real angry' American settlement on and of the matter there too.
North Norway is not that large of country and possible aeras for major airfields perhaps not such a free choice. ( Google Image Result for )
There could be a good furtivity game to play for Germany there. Leaving no tell-tale traces of semi secret strips of random temporary pickings, yet requiring regular rolls back to German safety. Of the whole circus. It all becomes rather fuel expensive in the end.
Some combined Allied operations then, should become worthy given the relative smallness and remoteness of the whole suspect region. Not only throught air big stick usage, but with decent land complications as well. A look at the map will also show that this land is remarkably fitted for classic Royal Navy employ of the good old days, especially summer time, with an amazing portion of the territory under range of battleship canonade.
Besides in summer in northernmost latitudes there is no such place for a dark hide from destiny.
Perhaps some, well one, historical sortie of the Tirpitz in the finest bushido tradition.

So, appart from the usual rock crushing show of the 'big cars' and their British fellows, by day this time upon the few well known aviation fields dubbed suspicious, I would recommend for a flat-out general invasion of the land, or at least the settlement of permanent ground fighting there. That without much strategical disturbance of Allied main plans and means, yet very ennoying for the Germans if they wanted to put a fight, would sweep off the Northern Adolfine menace at the very minimum on practibility issues.

An ennemy tank across the runway being one of the two arch foes of the flying man.

The other being adverse weather. And talking about it Norway... as a place for rocambolesque departure, to be followed by lengthy polar experiments, to be followed by better documented North Atlantic general behaviour... for a plane designed and laden not to withstand high g stresses... hm.

As for Soviet bound progressive morrows and the cruel first stages of every missions, above ennemy land all the way, the very careful detection of fast disappearing interstices in that 'solidifying' approaching soviet air phenomenom , would be mendatory devotion.
Night trips of course, for this beginning of the mission. Soviet weaknesses there. But easy Occidental help too : with such hopeless elephantesque targets dragging pain and sorrow throughtout East Baltic Sea, Poland Belarus Ukraine Western Russia Central Russia slowly evolving East, at low to moderate altitude, on their ways to still distant Ex-Katareninburg or Novosibirsk, I think that even third hand Douglas P-70s should do. (i.e. A-20 night fighter Havocs)
Again Norway departure bases for polar routes, eastern this time, should be required, which brings us back to preceeding paragraphs.
An interesting East Germany to Baltic Sea alternative could be devised, cautiously walking its way between Sweedish airspace and eastern red shores onwards to overfly Finland, then polar again before 'falling back' on Siberia either to strike mammoths specialities there, or more occidental tankograd conglomerates from the back ending with a much, much safer straight-to-Germany return flight. A good possibillity while of course I haven't LAID ONE SINGLE WORD ON NAVIGATION prouesses along this thread.
Suffices to say that Finland, after some inner thinkings that belongs only to 'em finnies we have to guess, would sometime decide that well, after all... total forbiddence of any further German overflight with shoot on sight is more the order of the day.
In which case even a 1944 Mosköv Morane should suffice.
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I think you could surprise them several times. With the range we're talking about, you could hit from Iceland or Greenland and land back in Germany. You could also sortie, say, 4 or 5 too many planes and use those 4 or 5 to drop thier bombs on internediate targets. Maybe you could sneak up in Scappa Flow a few times.

Let's not forget the Me 261 could make 385 mph. Perhaps the super Adolfine could cruise in at 330 mph or so. It sure was effective with Mosquitoes.

Be tough to hit from either; Iceland was under Allied occupation. I doubt if Germany could support an airbase of any sort in either Greenland or Iceland.

In any case, these super-adolfines are going to be very expensive, highly specialized aircraft. Each one produced would prevent the construction at least three or four fighters; each squadron would require the same effort to support as at least four or five fighter squadrons. For what? The maximum possible sortie rate for each of these aircraft would probably be no more than two per week. Assuming a sensible serviceability rate -- say 60% -- and a fleet of 500 aircraft (which would displace 2000 single-engined fighters from the Luftwaffe) -- that's barely 1000 sorties/week.

This is going to help the German cause, how? By severely pissing off all the people in the US so we stop the strategic bombing campaign?

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