Thats a glaring error ch and you should know better. The F14 was never in competition with the F-111B and as for it being superior, the F-14 was only created in the first place because the F-111B was an abject failure. Why would Grumman go to the expense of developing a whole new fighter when they they had the contract to build the F-111B all sewn up? Answer, because the thing was no bloody good.
If you want to know why you're wrong and cannot manage to ask openly, say something like 'Please Elucidate.'
Until then, try reading Illusions Of Choice by Coulam.
As a starting primer:
1. The F-14 with six Phoenixs runs in what is called an 'overload waiver' condition. This means that it doesn't have the same G ratings or wind over deck requirements. The F-111B was required to perform at 'full G with full fuel and weapons'. Which at the time meant 30,000lbs of go-fur and six AIM-54. Furthermore, 'in the interests of commonality'; the USN insisted that the jet perform to the period USAF definition of combat G. 7.33 rather than 6.5. We'll get back to the F-14 equivalents in a minute but as a baseline, the Tomcat cannot operate (recover or launch) with the TF30 engine and adequate fuel to perform it's mission and recover with particularly nighttime reserves.
2. The F-111B had 29 'fix or no-fly' major deficiencies in it's initial evaluation. The F-14 had 43. The A-6 changed 8% from it's statistical base weight to it's final critical design review mapped out (detail design drawings) issuance. The F-111B changed ZERO. Because the USN would not write a spec for it that listed their gotta haves and wanna haves as is typical for every military aircraft design process on the planet. And by which the contractor starts working trade-offs.
3. The Navy routinely insisted that the Sea Vark was not carrier suitable. Yet again equally REFUSED to issue a specification by which that capability could be met by any jet. Until Daddy Mac got tired of their little-children-want-more-water-so-they-can-have-to-pee-and-then-a-story-please delay of game and cancelled the VAX which was shaping up to be the Boeing TFX contender as a workaround to true commonality. ONLY THEN did the USN go from 235 jets to 450 odd. ONLY THEN did they put a flag rank officer at the SPO with the authority to sign off on subjects and write a spec that had nothing to do with meeting weight and performance issues. But only with yet another round of DOG'ing the program until it became one. Namely via the 'N1' set of specs which demanded 2,500lbs more fuel and 6,000lbs more structural weight to carry it.
4. The F-111B was deemed 'underpowered' yet the Navy would not mandate (empower $$-wise) P&W with a fix order becauase 'that was GFE and we don't want to mess with the system'. Eventually the engine they needed would be built, for the USAF, as the TF30-P-100 aboard the F-111F. With 35% more power in both military and burner. Squid Air did demand a minor increase in thrust and reliability for the 111B/N1 that eventuated as the P-10. But only 3 years into the program with the specific intent of making the jet miss the 1967 production commit decision as they wouldn't evaluate anything but the 'full production standard' Sixth Prototype (the heaviest and most delayed). Comparitively, only the first 67 of 463 intended F-14's was supposed to be built with the TF30 engine. Yet despite THREE major overhauls and at least TWO DOZEN early losses directly attributed to the specific installation of the TF-30 on that 'fighter' jet, they never did qualify the intended F401 for production. Instead they derated the PW-412 engine until the Tomcat literally couldn't takeoff in a lot of wind over deck conditions exactly similar to those of the F-111B. Preferring to replace JBDs and accept yet another hit on station time and safety (reserves) as a fuction of burner-always takeoffs.
5. The AWG-9 weighed 1,900lbs in the F-111B yet for the same reason, the USN would not allow Hughes to be issued a design challenge to come up with weight savings (in the F-14 exactly this challenge WAS issued and resulted in a 1,300lb production radar).
6. The F-111B was supposed to have a -8 know WOD to launch. Instead, it had a +19 knot requirement. But it could launch with six AIM-54s. The F-14A could not. And indeed it's basic 'qualifying' weapons load was more akin to the F-4s, namely six AIM-7 and 2 AIM-9 (1,800bs vice 6,000lbs).
7. The F-111B landed too fast, here the USN actually screwed themselves over to the extent that they had to both add major N1 'final spec' increases to an overweight bird and delay flight tests until after a 'gentlemens agreement' saw the F-111B program cancelled before carrier suitability tests began. Because, thanks to some ingenious flap mods, the F-111 with six AIM-54 and a 1,900lb radar and 2,500lbs more fuel and 6,000lbs more structure, (roughly 16,000lbs overweight) landed at 115 knots. 11 knots slower than the F-4. 20 knots slower than the F-14 would in the same configuration.
Grumman test pilots in 1968 said it handled well in the carrier circuit. Only USN fighter jocks were the only ones allowed to vote however. If the aircraft had been seen and used as a missileer (i.e. 'suitable for evaluation by attack pukes') the evaluation would have come down to an angry admiral telling a ready room full of 'career naval aviators' that they would have to lie for the good of the USN. Because flag didn't want a USAF jet. And the fighter mafia didn't want to do the mission well if they could 'dogfight instead'.
7. The F-111B was supposed to loiter 3.5 hours at 150nm (by comparison the F6D was supposed to carry eight 1,300lb Eagles and stay on station 6 hours). It made THREE. The F-14 was set at a 2hr loiter at the same distance and missed by 20%. The reason was nominally that the TF30 was missing its TSFC by 5%, a reason that had also been applied to the F-111B. The difference being that this time, the USN was willing to live with it rather than demanding that everything be exactly to-spec. Keeping in mind that the program was dead before this OPEVAL type (pass/fail) rating could be applied, you have to understand that if the jet had been given good marks, a lot of high ranking Naval personalities would have been 'embarrassed' right out of a job (comparitively, the USN insisted that the F/A-18E/F was a 550nm strike aircraft until it was not. Then they demanded it achieve 390nm. Which it did not. Before 'rewriting the rules' so that 363nm was good enough. While the F/A-18A made a 580nm flight with two targeting pods, three tanks and four Mk.83, back in 1980 or so).
If the little boys in the Squid Patrol had acted like men, they would have had the F6D and the F-4H at a time when the USSR was starting to make CMs a real threat, in the late 50s. They would have effectively had a BETTER BULLET system which could put up fewer jets with more missiles and kill targets (up to 300km/185nm away if assisted by the E-2C) further away than the F-14 ever did.