Swordfish vs Devastator (1 Viewer)

[buffnut453]

Here's another Swordfish stat:

"In the Mediterranean, radar equipped Swordfish operating from Malta sank 50,000 tons of Italian shipping per month on average over nine months - with a record of 98,000 tons in one month."

That makes 450,000 tons of Italian shipping alone from just the Swordfish operating out of Malta. That seems like a pretty impressive tally to me....and, again, the operations were primarily at night for reasons that have been discussed up-thread (i.e. the presence of German and Italian fighter aircraft that would make daylight operations impractical for the Swordfish.

 

[Schweik]

It is impressive, I knew they got a lot of them particularly in the early war. But I think that's mostly unprotected merchant ships right? It's not like the Germans or Italians were operating carriers. If they did that much damage to the Japanese I'd be a lot more impressed.

I think the ability to do strikes at night is very useful, so did the USN which is why they put radar on PBYs and TBFs and even had carrier borne night fighters eventually (F6F-N).

But I think not being able to effectively operate in the day time is a pretty significant limitation. That in combination with limited range amounts to a substantial liability in carrier warfare at that time.

 

[nuuumannn]

Awww dang. This thread is descending into one of those dick comparing competitions, despite good information being offered. From an historical and strategic points of view, BOTH raids were pivotal moments in history, but for different reasons and in terms of size and scale (don't go there...) Pearl Harbor was most definitely the biggest, but in terms of impact, Pearl and the US Navy recovered a LOT faster than Taranto and the Regia Marina. Despite the loss of fewer capital ships in Taranto, the raid was a severe blow to Italian pride and their ability to successfully challenge the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. It was a master stroke in tactical and strategic planning and achieved exactly what the navy wanted it to, that of reducing the impact of the Italian fleet in the Med. Its success arguably affected the Italian fleet in subsequent battles, such as Matapan. Did the Japanese achieve the same at Pearl? Not at all. In fact, it infused the Americans with a resolve that would end the war, with the development and deployment of nuclear weapons - that was the strategic impact of the Pearl Harbor raid. It backfired on the Japanese, not to mention their own tactical mistakes.

So, the next point that is of interest, to me anyways is whether Taranto 'influenced' Pearl. Maybe; it's debated and claimed to be the case. I'm pretty certain the Japanese would have studied the impacts of Judgement, no doubt in my mind, but documentary evidence is scarce to what extent it actually influenced their strategy or tactics. What is known is that the whole idea of sinking warships in their own anchorages was initially ratified as policy within the Royal Navy long before Pearl and Taranto. The latter was the actioning of policy that had been discussed many times before within the Admiralty and even before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the promise of using aircraft to disable ships in their home anchorages had been proposed.

The British even went as far as to plan such a raid against the German High Seas Fleet in 1919, using aircraft carrier based torpedoplanes not much less sophisticated than the Swordfish, for such an attack, called a 'Copenhagen' in naval parlance after Lord Nelson's attack against the Danish fleet in 1801. Needless to say, resources, which involved the converting of merchant ship hulls into flat top carriers, were devoted to countering German submarine warfare from early 1917. So the raid took longer to prepare for than its supporters, Adm Sir David Beattie being its foremost protagonist, chafed at the bit to action it and saw delays as typical admiralty stalling.

How did the Japanese get wind of this? In 1921, the British Naval Mission sent torpedoplanes and instructors that were involved in the planning and training of aircrew in torpedo dropping techniques to the IJN's naval base outside of the greater Tokyo area at Kasumigaura. Did this activity contribute to the planning of the Pearl raid? Almost certainly in terms of training of techniques. The Japanese took what the British taught them and ran with it. Their inter-war torpedo fleets grew in size and sophistication to what we know of them at Pearl.

Blame the British.

 

[Schweik]

Pearl Harbor backfired mainly because the Japanese didn't declare war first - that also might have been part of what made it possible, though who knows.

The Italians inability to bounce back also had something to do with their trade and supply lines being highly vulnerable and to their being a much smaller economy at the time. Also much deeper into Fascism than their buddies up north with the corruption and malaise having longer to set in.

But Taranto was undoubtedly a masterstroke. No doubt about that.

 

[buffnut453]

It is impressive, I knew they got a lot of them particularly in the early war. But I think that's mostly unprotected merchant ships right? It's not like the Germans or Italians were operating carriers. If they did that much damage to the Japanese I'd be a lot more impressed.

I think the ability to do strikes at night is very useful, so did the USN which is why they put radar on PBYs and TBFs and even had carrier borne night fighters eventually (F6F-N).

But I think not being able to effectively operate in the day time is a pretty significant limitation. That in combination with limited range amounts to a substantial liability in carrier warfare at that time.

Those merchant shipping figures were for 1941, so hardly "early war" from the UK's perspective. I'd argue that putting any contemporaneous naval bomber type (torpedo, dive bomber etc) into the Mediterranean in 1940-1941 probably would have suffered just as bad losses in daylight as the Swordfish. Certainly the SBD would have done better in the bombing role and was certainly more survivable but, even then, operating in an environment where it would encounter high-performance, land-based fighter opposition in daylight was likely asking for trouble.

The only way ANY torpedo bomber could survive against strong fighter defences was if it had an equally strong fighter escort...or it was incredibly lucky. The Avenger was a far better aircraft than the Swordfish and yet the 6 airframes operating from Midway didn't do any better than the Devastators operating off the carriers against the Japanese fleet - 5 shot down and the one that returned to Midway was written off. The TBF came into its own right at the time when IJN aviation was starting its terminal decline...so, no surprise, it suffered fewer losses because the opposing fighter pilots weren't as experienced or capable.

Arguably, the USN's key strength in aviation was a collection of solidly-performing aircraft that, when operated in concert, presented more challenges than the IJN was able to counter. In no small part, this was due to the lack of IJN early warning and the inability to control interception to meet the most critical threats. Essentially, IJN interception was like 6-year-olds playing soccer....all the players clustered around wherever they saw the ball. Conversely, the USN played to positions, and hence could exploit gaps in the IJN defences. The flip side of the coin was exemplified in the Marianas Turkey Shoot where USN radio intercepts of IJN aircraft transmissions essentially enabled robust quarterbacking of the USN fighter forces.

 

[special ed]

There was only a year between Taranto and Pearl Harbor. Is that enough time from concept, training, modifying torpedoes, testing, and equipment supply before attacking?

 

[buffnut453]

I think the whole "Taranto inspired Pearl Harbor" idea is something of a myth. Certainly Yamamoto was already exploring how to take out Pearl Harbor before the Taranto raid went in - he was discussing potential attacks on Pearl Harbor as early as April 1940.

Certainly, Taranto may have given the IJN a clue that torpedo attacks against ships in harbour could be successful...however, to say it "inspired" Pearl Harbor is, at best, an exaggeration.

 

[Schweik]

Apparently 826 Sqn Albacores were helping doing pathfinder / strike spotting for Wellingtons (with flares) in the MTO in Dec 1941

 

[yulzari]

How many successful night time dive- or level-bombing attacks by Swordfish or Albacores were there during the war?

Well Taranto for one involved night time dive bombing (illuminated by flares).

 

[nuuumannn]

I wouldn't argue that the TBD was any more survivable or less survivable than the Swordfish in any given scenario, to be frank - as has been pointed out, heavy anti-aircraft fire and fighter defence doesn't discriminate against a slow moving straight and level target.

The reality is that how we view them and regard them has been influenced heavily by their actions during the war. Both were products of their time, one gained a reputation as something of a loser - perhaps unfairly and the other as a winner, both as a result of us believing the hype/media/propaganda that was posted at the time and since about them. Both types had qualities and drawbacks, but it is clear to see that the Devastator didn't fare too well from its negative press following Midway and the Swordfish was definitely boosted in the mind's eye because of Taranto.

These things obviously affect our perceptions. Would either have been any more successful in the other scenario? Hard to say and a moot argument really. The circumstances behind our perception of their actions are arguably not going to have changed much if either type were reversed where the Swordfish was at Midway or the Devastator was at Taranto, to be honest. There was nothing that either the Devastator or Swordfish brought to the table that especially influenced how each of the attacks were to be conducted or what the outcomes would have been, or, if it would have been any different if either type was used...

 

[nuuumannn]

I think the whole "Taranto inspired Pearl Harbor" idea is something of a myth.

I agree. Like I said, the Japanese definitely would have examined it, but did Taranto suddenly make the Japanese sit up and decide to do that? No, of course not. Like I mentioned, the strategy and tactics of attacking enemy ships in their harbours with air attack had been introduced to the Japanese as far back as 1921 and earlier. A Japanese seaplane bombed German shipping at Tsingtao in August 1914, so the idea had been around for awhile.

 

[Schweik]

Well Swordfish had a better range than TBD, so on that level alone it was definitely more effective, and it could attack at night which defintiely made it safer from fighters than a TBD.

 

[Conslaw]

It is hard sometimes to separate the strengths of the aircraft from its electronic equipment, and maybe you shouldn't. The British were the early-war leaders in airborne radar, and it shows in their ability to use the Swordfish offensively at night in 1940. It was rare for US carrier-based bombers to have radar before 1943, and not universal even then. The ability to conduct night operations was a force-multiplier favoring the British.

Similarly, how much do you weigh the superior radio equipment and (eventually) IFF gear in the F4F vs the A6M? The Zero's main weakness as a naval fighter was the inability to be vectored by radio to the location of the threat. American fighter-direction was flawed (especially at Santa Cruz), but it was effective sometimes.

 

[buffnut453]

I wouldn't argue that the TBD was any more survivable or less survivable than the Swordfish in any given scenario, to be frank - as has been pointed out, heavy anti-aircraft fire and fighter defence doesn't discriminate against a slow moving straight and level target.

The reality is that how we view them and regard them has been influenced heavily by their actions during the war. Both were products of their time, one gained a reputation as something of a loser - perhaps unfairly and the other as a winner, both as a result of us believing the hype/media/propaganda that was posted at the time and since about them. Both types had qualities and drawbacks, but it is clear to see that the Devastator didn't fare too well from its negative press following Midway and the Swordfish was definitely boosted in the mind's eye because of Taranto.

These things obviously affect our perceptions. Would either have been any more successful in the other scenario? Hard to say and a moot argument really. The circumstances behind our perception of their actions are arguably not going to have changed much if either type were reversed where the Swordfish was at Midway or the Devastator was at Taranto, to be honest. There was nothing that either the Devastator or Swordfish brought to the table that especially influenced how each of the attacks were to be conducted or what the outcomes would have been, or, if it would have been any different if either type was used...

I agree entirely with your first 2 paragraphs but I have to disagree with the third.

For one thing, the shorter range of the TBD would mean the carrier would have to get closer to enemy territory, increasing risk of detection.

Secondly, if we're taking the US capability in toto as an integrated weapon system, then the torpedo clearly was an achilles heel to achieving operational effects.

Finally, I'm not sure how the Devastator would have fared flying into barrage balloon defences at night. I think the greater manoeuvrability of the Swordfish (once it's torpedo has been dropped) would be a distinct advantage that would increase overall survivability.

 

[Just Schmidt]

I'm not sure how far the Japanese fleet was from Midway during the day of the battle, they probably got pretty close, but I don't think they had any reason to remain within strike range of Midway during the night, since their strike aircraft didn't operate at night. And you wouldn't want to send Swordfsh against the Japanese fleet during the day any more than TBDs.

From the top of my head the Japanese continued to close on Midway, as they were hoping to force a night action with their capital ships, for which they were well trained and (barring radar) equipped.

 

[Schweik]

The reality is that how we view them and regard them has been influenced heavily by their actions during the war. Both were products of their time, one gained a reputation as something of a loser - perhaps unfairly and the other as a winner, both as a result of us believing the hype/media/propaganda that was posted at the time and since about them.

I think one was recognized as a loser early on, which is why they only made 130 of them, while the other kept being made (and used) through the war, in spite of it's severe limitations, because they had a hard time coming up with anything else.

 

[Schweik]

Those merchant shipping figures were for 1941, so hardly "early war" from the UK's perspective. I'd argue that putting any contemporaneous naval bomber type (torpedo, dive bomber etc) into the Mediterranean in 1940-1941 probably would have suffered just as bad losses in daylight as the Swordfish. Certainly the SBD would have done better in the bombing role and was certainly more survivable but, even then, operating in an environment where it would encounter high-performance, land-based fighter opposition in daylight was likely asking for trouble. The only way ANY torpedo bomber could survive against strong fighter defences was if it had an equally strong fighter escort...or it was incredibly lucky. The Avenger was a far better aircraft than the Swordfish and yet the 6 airframes operating from Midway didn't do any better than the Devastators operating off the carriers against the Japanese fleet - 5 shot down and the one that returned to Midway was written off. The TBF came into its own right at the time when IJN aviation was starting its terminal decline...so, no surprise, it suffered fewer losses because the opposing fighter pilots weren't as experienced or capable.

Well, the TBF did do better than the TBD, in that one out of the six did make it back to Midway, that is kind of remarkable in and of itself considering the conditions.

I think 1941 still counts as early war. A lot had happened by then for the British, but they were in it to 1945.

If you consider the tradeoff between aircraft and warships, there were torpedo bombers which could attack targets and survive at an "acceptable" rate without really good fighter escort, they were just mostly land based aircraft and mostly twin-engined. SM. 79 did pretty well for a while, taking increasingly higher losses but they certainly sunk ships well into 1942. The Ju 88 did well too. The Beaufort and Beaufighter both had success in sinking ships, and the A-20 was used with success as a torpedo bomber by the Soviets in the Baltic, albeit with heavy losses. G4Ms sunk some ships with torpedoes. The Italian G-55 torpedo fighter probably could have done pretty well.

A lot of it did depend on the torpedoes of course - not only the American ones not working, but various others speed and launch parameters could make a big difference. It is true to some extent as well for radio and radar.

Arguably, the USN's key strength in aviation was a collection of solidly-performing aircraft that, when operated in concert, presented more challenges than the IJN was able to counter. In no small part, this was due to the lack of IJN early warning and the inability to control interception to meet the most critical threats. Essentially, IJN interception was like 6-year-olds playing soccer....all the players clustered around wherever they saw the ball. Conversely, the USN played to positions, and hence could exploit gaps in the IJN defences. The flip side of the coin was exemplified in the Marianas Turkey Shoot where USN radio intercepts of IJN aircraft transmissions essentially enabled robust quarterbacking of the USN fighter forces.

If you read the accounts in First Team etc., the early battles like Coral Sea, Midway, and many of the engagements in the Solomons and around New Guinea, fighter support was spotty and erratic, radio notwithstanding. No doubt the radio helped, but they just didn't have enough fighters and the fighters they did have could barely handle their Japanese counterparts. Quite often bombers were on their own and had to fend for themselves. They even pressed SBDs into service as emergency CAP on a couple of famous occasions.

 

[Schweik]

That said, if you had Martlets and SBDs in those convoys like Pedestal instead of Fulmars and Swordfish or Skuas, I do think they would have done much better. They did have a few Martlets (I think 6) at Pedestal but not enough to make a difference. & I know the SBDs were probably too big because they lacked folding wings.

 

[RCAFson]

Some info on the JU-87R2:

Range:

779 statute miles (1254km) with a 550kg bomb and two (66IG) drop tanks at 180mph outbound and 205mph return, at 13120ft (4000m). I have no info on reserve fuel. (data from Vanags-Baginskis)

 

[Schweik]

I thought they didn't typically use drop tanks?