Swordfish vs Devastator

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How long would it take the Japanese to recover, rearm, and refuel after taking down the torpedo planes? All of those things would be factors, no?
If you haven't read it, I highly recommend "Shattered Sword", it answers all those questions and many more. But in essence, what you've just stated is part of the disruption that the IJN was suffering that morning which led to the SBD's pounding KdB before they could strike at TF16 and 17.
 
As I went walking I remembered an "uninterrupted 40 minutes" as being the time Admiral Nagumo needed to stage and launch a strike. Due to the scattered attacks AND having to recover the first strike at some point (40 minutes for that?), the time wasn't there.
 
So a few things (regressing back to earlier posts)
And before someone tries to say that the Swordfish was more maneuverable than the TBD and "could have" evaded better, the Japanese pilots flying CAP that day were the best in the world and I'm sure would have had no problem adjusting firing solutions for a target moving under 100 mph.
The Zero/Reisen was one of the most maneuverable fighter of the war, no? I can't see how the Swordfish would have fared better. Heck, how would the Avenger have fared in that situation, being jumped on by multiple hostile fighters without an escort??
 
The Zero/Reisen was one of the most maneuverable fighter of the war, no? I can't see how the Swordfish would have fared better. Heck, how would the Avenger have fared in that situation, being jumped on by multiple hostile fighters without an escort??

It fared poorly - losing 5 out of 6 planes at Midway. This was arguably better than the Devastator though.
 
The Zero/Reisen was one of the most maneuverable fighter of the war, no? I can't see how the Swordfish would have fared better. Heck, how would the Avenger have fared in that situation, being jumped on by multiple hostile fighters without an escort??

It wouldn't of fared better but might have been a more difficult target to hit

When you have a slow flying aircraft like the Swordfish, it's turning radius can be very tight and brought down to speeds below the Zero's VS1 or even below VS0 making it a difficult target to hit. IIRC the Zero stalled at 60 knts VS1, the Swordfish at 40. Make sense?

Again - the Japanese pilots flying CAP that day were the best in the world at that time. They would have adjusted accordingly.
 
Yes those factors were. There's a great set of videos that deal exactly with that. They're by Montemayor. It's called "Midway from the Japanese perspective" or close to it. He shows how the uncoordinated attacks kept Admiral Nagumo from being able to re-arm and launch later strikes much better than I could describe it.

After reading Shattered Sword it's pretty clear the Japanese were beaten the moment they left port, they did not train to loose, they trained to win to the point the practice scenario's the pilots were taught heavily favored them so the training wasn't realistic, the CAP procedures/doctrine was based around the A6M's lack of 20mm ammunition which meant the decks were kept clear for them to rearm instead of launching bombers, the fire control damage control was centrally organised with a clear pecking order of who was in charge, when those central people were killed no one knew what to do, the ships themselves were poorly designed so when they were hit they burned out, the IJN was a strong force on paper but when the shooting started it had a glass jaw.
 
On Drachinifel's YouTube site, there's a great video on the differences between USN and IJN damage control entitled "Differences between American and Japanese damage control ". Kinda says it all.
There's also an interesting one called "IJN Taiho-always train your crew."
 
After reading Shattered Sword it's pretty clear the Japanese were beaten the moment they left port, they did not train to loose, they trained to win to the point the practice scenario's the pilots were taught heavily favored them so the training wasn't realistic, the CAP procedures/doctrine was based around the A6M's lack of 20mm ammunition which meant the decks were kept clear for them to rearm instead of launching bombers, the fire control damage control was centrally organised with a clear pecking order of who was in charge, when those central people were killed no one knew what to do, the ships themselves were poorly designed so when they were hit they burned out, the IJN was a strong force on paper but when the shooting started it had a glass jaw.
The problem with the IJN plans was that the USN never did what it was "supposed" to do.
 

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