Tank armament effectiveness vs infantry
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parsifal
Colonel
Let's get my background straight:
I'm an educated mechanical engineer (Not a structural engineer), I served 20+ years in the military, 18 of which was with SOF's. If you want to go even further back I started inside the military when I was 17, and got payed by the military during education within the university.
And the reason I can make a somewhat accurate assumption on what will happen to a building struct by a 75mm HE shell is because I've actually seen what happens when a building is hit by comparable ordnance.
So Parsifal, let me ask you, what experience do you have ? Besides letting out lies talking crap[/B]
You have not given specific details of your experience. you are still hedging around the critical issue of your experience
I am an ex RAN officer, having reached the rank of lieutenant serving 1976 to 1983. Saw some frontline work on border security, and am a trained staff officer. This required that I complete degree level in strategic studies, which covered a wide range of subjects, and included practical training for battle situations in the air, on land, and at sea. I have completed advanced small arms course, which included training in the use and safety of grenades, and have had occasion to use small arms on active service situations, apprehending and searching illegal fishermaen, drug smugglers, and illegal immigrants. I was the top scorer in my small arms course. I was also the Navy boxing champion, described by others as being irrationally tenacious and basically unstoppable, once my blood was up. If i get angry my opponent is safe. if I get cold and unemotuional, like I am now, nothing will stop me.
All my life I have had an intense dislike of bullies and standover merchants. make of that what you will. I wil always stand up against thugs like that
Prior to being deployed on this duty, I engaged in further training with the Australian SAS (I am not SAS, but they taught me how to shoot better, and to handle confict situations better), and also with the Australian Federal Police. Each of these segements of my training lasted about six weeks. I have been shot at on a number of occasions. I was deployed to the Arabian Sea during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a seaman officer, on the carrier .
I have observed the effects of artillery fire as well, from protected locations that were as close as 300 metres from the target zone. The reason for that was so that I could observe the fire effect of naval weaponary up to 5" calibre.
I left the navy for medical reasons. After I left the navy, I obtained degrees in Urban Plannig, with major strands in Building structural design design. I also completed major courses of study in envirnmental land management, and environmental/land use law. I have completely turned away from guns because i have no need of them, and dont believe they serve any useful purpose outside the military or the police. I gave up boxing, and now am a long distance cyclist, and runner
I have practiced environmental law and planning since 1990. I am a part time wargame designer, and have several titles that have been published, or which I have contributed towards
So when you are ready to properly debate the issue, rather than trying to bully people into submission, I am ready anytime to reset the debate. I would suggest to clear the air that you calmly and concisely state your position, similar to what i did some posts back. If not, I am happy to keep going as is,
I'm an educated mechanical engineer (Not a structural engineer), I served 20+ years in the military, 18 of which was with SOF's. If you want to go even further back I started inside the military when I was 17, and got payed by the military during education within the university.
And the reason I can make a somewhat accurate assumption on what will happen to a building struct by a 75mm HE shell is because I've actually seen what happens when a building is hit by comparable ordnance.
So Parsifal, let me ask you, what experience do you have ? Besides letting out lies talking crap[/B]
You have not given specific details of your experience. you are still hedging around the critical issue of your experience
I am an ex RAN officer, having reached the rank of lieutenant serving 1976 to 1983. Saw some frontline work on border security, and am a trained staff officer. This required that I complete degree level in strategic studies, which covered a wide range of subjects, and included practical training for battle situations in the air, on land, and at sea. I have completed advanced small arms course, which included training in the use and safety of grenades, and have had occasion to use small arms on active service situations, apprehending and searching illegal fishermaen, drug smugglers, and illegal immigrants. I was the top scorer in my small arms course. I was also the Navy boxing champion, described by others as being irrationally tenacious and basically unstoppable, once my blood was up. If i get angry my opponent is safe. if I get cold and unemotuional, like I am now, nothing will stop me.
All my life I have had an intense dislike of bullies and standover merchants. make of that what you will. I wil always stand up against thugs like that
Prior to being deployed on this duty, I engaged in further training with the Australian SAS (I am not SAS, but they taught me how to shoot better, and to handle confict situations better), and also with the Australian Federal Police. Each of these segements of my training lasted about six weeks. I have been shot at on a number of occasions. I was deployed to the Arabian Sea during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a seaman officer, on the carrier .
I have observed the effects of artillery fire as well, from protected locations that were as close as 300 metres from the target zone. The reason for that was so that I could observe the fire effect of naval weaponary up to 5" calibre.
I left the navy for medical reasons. After I left the navy, I obtained degrees in Urban Plannig, with major strands in Building structural design design. I also completed major courses of study in envirnmental land management, and environmental/land use law. I have completely turned away from guns because i have no need of them, and dont believe they serve any useful purpose outside the military or the police. I gave up boxing, and now am a long distance cyclist, and runner
I have practiced environmental law and planning since 1990. I am a part time wargame designer, and have several titles that have been published, or which I have contributed towards
So when you are ready to properly debate the issue, rather than trying to bully people into submission, I am ready anytime to reset the debate. I would suggest to clear the air that you calmly and concisely state your position, similar to what i did some posts back. If not, I am happy to keep going as is,
parsifal
Colonel
Here are some of the primary references that i have relied on in this debate. It may pay people to have a look at them before making comments
Military History
Hand Grenades
General information of artillery weapons and shells
The role of Armor in Urban Combat
Effects and Weight of Fire
I also referred to the Infantry Training Manual, 1939, which is a publication relating directly to the period, which state:
In Section 91 of the Regs " (in defence of villages) "A town or a village should be allotted a complete formation as its garrison. Villages can be seldom destroyed by shellfire, , and give good cover and shelter to the defence, and are difficult to attack"
It also says the following " On the other hand small or poorly constructed villages and buildings particualrly without cellar accommodation may become shell traps…."
NJ, we are saying simlar things, but there ar3e important differnces, relating to the defencability of buildings in certain situations. What I want to advance this debate, is for the other side to provide evidence other than namecalling, so that we can move forward. Its taken seven pages of arguing to get to that point, and still we are not there.
Military History
Hand Grenades
General information of artillery weapons and shells
The role of Armor in Urban Combat
Effects and Weight of Fire
I also referred to the Infantry Training Manual, 1939, which is a publication relating directly to the period, which state:
In Section 91 of the Regs " (in defence of villages) "A town or a village should be allotted a complete formation as its garrison. Villages can be seldom destroyed by shellfire, , and give good cover and shelter to the defence, and are difficult to attack"
It also says the following " On the other hand small or poorly constructed villages and buildings particualrly without cellar accommodation may become shell traps…."
NJ, we are saying simlar things, but there ar3e important differnces, relating to the defencability of buildings in certain situations. What I want to advance this debate, is for the other side to provide evidence other than namecalling, so that we can move forward. Its taken seven pages of arguing to get to that point, and still we are not there.
Thanks Soren
I had checked a couple of the newer 88s from the site, but from these there were no info on bursting charge, one should never give up too easily.
But we have Spielberger's info that the HE shell of Pak 43/3 and /4 has only one kg explosive content. So the only actual 88mm HE tank shell of which we have now relevant info had less HE than those which hit the two building in Helsinki May 1918.
Maybe Germans wanted their tank HEs to produce fewer but bigger shrapnels, that might have good against A/T weapons, not only incapacitating gunners but also weapons.
And why Germans armed their specialist city warfare vehicles, SturmPz III and IV, with 150mm gun-howitzer, if 75mm was enough powerful? Bigger shells mean less shells in AFV. And SturmMörser VI with that awkward 380mm rocket weapon?
Kruska
Quote: "Stalingrad had already been taken by the Wehrmacht to 90% and was not lost due to "open ways" or "supply lines", it was lost due to Stalingrad being encircled by the Russians."
IMHO that 10% still held by Soviets was all important. It acted like magnet drawing German mechanized Divisions into costly street fighting and same time at the apex of the front. All but one of the best mechanized German divs were in Stalingrad when the Soviet counterattack came. IMHO Stalingrad functioned almost optimically for Soviets. Germans knew that something was brewing on the flanks of Stalingrad and had made some preparations in case of Soviet counter attack. West of Stalingrad they had one PzCorps (22nd and 1st Romanian PzDs) and South of Stalingrad the only elite-class mechanized div in the area, which wasn't in Stalingrad, 29th MotD, which had withdrawn from the line and was rested and re-equipped at least almost at its TOE level for a dash toward Baku when the situation at Stalingrad was cleared. But 14th, 16th and 24th PzDs and 60th MotDiv (was also 3rd Mot in Stalingrad?) were engaged into city combat. IIRC PzR of 14.PzD, or what was left of it, was at last moment withdrew from the city as a counter-attack force plus at least part of div's artillery, but without infantry the force wasn't as effective as a combined arm force would have been and IIRC the artillery was override by Soviet cavalry. Also IIRC the Combat Engineer Battalion of 22. PzD, like the most other CE Batts in the area was removed from its division and sent into the city. If Germans had succeeded to occupy whole Stalingrad before Soviet counter-attack, I'm sure that their troop disposition would have been much better for responsing the new situation, meaning ability to response effectively to the Soviet counter-attack.
Thanks for the Grozny link. Now Chechen were rather well adapted to warfare and they chose to fight in the city. IIRC the battle of Grozny took some 2 months. It seem that Soviet city warfare doctrine was probably same in late 80s that it had been in early 70s. (Chechens had got a Soviet training and I bet that Finnish Army city warfare regulations were based on Soviet ones because Finns had very limited experience in city warfare but Soviets got plenty during WWII and in 56 at Budapest). What I remember was that one ought to keep at least some men also in upper floors because otherwise it was difficult to know what happens around. Also the habit of shooting from inner rooms was an old trick and was in the regulations. Not that that gives much more protection but it made the detection of the shooter more difficult.
"any historian knows that the Russians loved to totally exaggerate their losses"
Now if the claims was only on Soviet casualties during Berlin fighting, I cannot comment, but if a general claim on Soviet casualty declarations, I beg to differ. In fact IMHO at least most historians know/knew that CCCP definitely tried to play down its casualty figures and only from late 80s onwards more realistic casualty figures has began to surface.
Quote: "unless you provide me with proof and pictures showing buildings and houses immune to artillery and tanks "
IMHO nobody has claimed that buildings were immune to tanks or artillery. IMHO only thing almost immune is bunker dug deep into mountain and even its entrance is vulnerable. Even heaviest concrete bunker is vulnerable, if enemy can lob heavy shells on its roof days on and is able to bring HV heavy gun to direct fire position and is able to keep steady fire on firing slits.
Juha
I had checked a couple of the newer 88s from the site, but from these there were no info on bursting charge, one should never give up too easily.
But we have Spielberger's info that the HE shell of Pak 43/3 and /4 has only one kg explosive content. So the only actual 88mm HE tank shell of which we have now relevant info had less HE than those which hit the two building in Helsinki May 1918.
Maybe Germans wanted their tank HEs to produce fewer but bigger shrapnels, that might have good against A/T weapons, not only incapacitating gunners but also weapons.
And why Germans armed their specialist city warfare vehicles, SturmPz III and IV, with 150mm gun-howitzer, if 75mm was enough powerful? Bigger shells mean less shells in AFV. And SturmMörser VI with that awkward 380mm rocket weapon?
Kruska
Quote: "Stalingrad had already been taken by the Wehrmacht to 90% and was not lost due to "open ways" or "supply lines", it was lost due to Stalingrad being encircled by the Russians."
IMHO that 10% still held by Soviets was all important. It acted like magnet drawing German mechanized Divisions into costly street fighting and same time at the apex of the front. All but one of the best mechanized German divs were in Stalingrad when the Soviet counterattack came. IMHO Stalingrad functioned almost optimically for Soviets. Germans knew that something was brewing on the flanks of Stalingrad and had made some preparations in case of Soviet counter attack. West of Stalingrad they had one PzCorps (22nd and 1st Romanian PzDs) and South of Stalingrad the only elite-class mechanized div in the area, which wasn't in Stalingrad, 29th MotD, which had withdrawn from the line and was rested and re-equipped at least almost at its TOE level for a dash toward Baku when the situation at Stalingrad was cleared. But 14th, 16th and 24th PzDs and 60th MotDiv (was also 3rd Mot in Stalingrad?) were engaged into city combat. IIRC PzR of 14.PzD, or what was left of it, was at last moment withdrew from the city as a counter-attack force plus at least part of div's artillery, but without infantry the force wasn't as effective as a combined arm force would have been and IIRC the artillery was override by Soviet cavalry. Also IIRC the Combat Engineer Battalion of 22. PzD, like the most other CE Batts in the area was removed from its division and sent into the city. If Germans had succeeded to occupy whole Stalingrad before Soviet counter-attack, I'm sure that their troop disposition would have been much better for responsing the new situation, meaning ability to response effectively to the Soviet counter-attack.
Thanks for the Grozny link. Now Chechen were rather well adapted to warfare and they chose to fight in the city. IIRC the battle of Grozny took some 2 months. It seem that Soviet city warfare doctrine was probably same in late 80s that it had been in early 70s. (Chechens had got a Soviet training and I bet that Finnish Army city warfare regulations were based on Soviet ones because Finns had very limited experience in city warfare but Soviets got plenty during WWII and in 56 at Budapest). What I remember was that one ought to keep at least some men also in upper floors because otherwise it was difficult to know what happens around. Also the habit of shooting from inner rooms was an old trick and was in the regulations. Not that that gives much more protection but it made the detection of the shooter more difficult.
"any historian knows that the Russians loved to totally exaggerate their losses"
Now if the claims was only on Soviet casualties during Berlin fighting, I cannot comment, but if a general claim on Soviet casualty declarations, I beg to differ. In fact IMHO at least most historians know/knew that CCCP definitely tried to play down its casualty figures and only from late 80s onwards more realistic casualty figures has began to surface.
Quote: "unless you provide me with proof and pictures showing buildings and houses immune to artillery and tanks "
IMHO nobody has claimed that buildings were immune to tanks or artillery. IMHO only thing almost immune is bunker dug deep into mountain and even its entrance is vulnerable. Even heaviest concrete bunker is vulnerable, if enemy can lob heavy shells on its roof days on and is able to bring HV heavy gun to direct fire position and is able to keep steady fire on firing slits.
Juha
What details about my experience do you need Parsifal ?
I volenteered into the military when I was seventeen, spent 12 months as a recruit, I decided to come back after my education within the university with the hope of perhaps becoming an officer. However I altered opinion since one of my good friends had went for the special forces, and so I decided to have a go at this myself. I ended up successfully fullfilling all the admission tests and started my carreer within the SOF's which lasted just over 18 years.
I volenteered into the military when I was seventeen, spent 12 months as a recruit, I decided to come back after my education within the university with the hope of perhaps becoming an officer. However I altered opinion since one of my good friends had went for the special forces, and so I decided to have a go at this myself. I ended up successfully fullfilling all the admission tests and started my carreer within the SOF's which lasted just over 18 years.
parsifal
Colonel
What details about my experience do you need Parsifal ?
I volenteered into the military when I was seventeen, spent 12 months as a recruit, I decided to come back after my education within the university with the hope of perhaps becoming an officer. However I altered opinion since one of my good friends had went for the special forces, and so I decided to have a go at this myself. I ended up successfully fullfilling all the admission tests and started my carreer within the SOF's which lasted just over 18 years
So, are we done calling each other an idiot, and a liar, for now? Will you accept that perhaps I might have somethng mneaningful to bring to the table in terms of knowlege or experience. I am ready to move to some real debate, are we ready to move on to constructive debate, or are you enjhoying and learning from this?
I volenteered into the military when I was seventeen, spent 12 months as a recruit, I decided to come back after my education within the university with the hope of perhaps becoming an officer. However I altered opinion since one of my good friends had went for the special forces, and so I decided to have a go at this myself. I ended up successfully fullfilling all the admission tests and started my carreer within the SOF's which lasted just over 18 years
So, are we done calling each other an idiot, and a liar, for now? Will you accept that perhaps I might have somethng mneaningful to bring to the table in terms of knowlege or experience. I am ready to move to some real debate, are we ready to move on to constructive debate, or are you enjhoying and learning from this?
I've been open to a real and constructive debate from the beginning Parsifal, but it is hard to have such when I get continiously misquoted by you.
Kruska I's positions are clear and have been so from the beginning:
1. It is unwise to fortify oneself in a building during an artillery attack or when tanks show up. That is why people are taught not to do this in the military.
2. Although buildings are great cover and defensive platforms in smallarms firefights they make one vulnerable to artillery tank fire. Again the reason people in the military are taught not to seek cover in buildings if tanks are present or if they are under artillery attack.
3. A single 75mm HE shell will most of time be able to bring down an ordinary 2 storey home.
4. (And this was what set the whole argument off) A 75mm HE shell will make a real mess out of anyone within a 10m radius of it detonating. (Safety range is 750m for a 75 76mm HE shell)
5. Handgrenades have a high probability of killing you if you're within 15m of it going off, and are infact dangerous way beyond 50m. Hence why you stand behind concrete protective walls whilst throwing them at targets 25 - 30m away.
Kruska I's positions are clear and have been so from the beginning:
1. It is unwise to fortify oneself in a building during an artillery attack or when tanks show up. That is why people are taught not to do this in the military.
2. Although buildings are great cover and defensive platforms in smallarms firefights they make one vulnerable to artillery tank fire. Again the reason people in the military are taught not to seek cover in buildings if tanks are present or if they are under artillery attack.
3. A single 75mm HE shell will most of time be able to bring down an ordinary 2 storey home.
4. (And this was what set the whole argument off) A 75mm HE shell will make a real mess out of anyone within a 10m radius of it detonating. (Safety range is 750m for a 75 76mm HE shell)
5. Handgrenades have a high probability of killing you if you're within 15m of it going off, and are infact dangerous way beyond 50m. Hence why you stand behind concrete protective walls whilst throwing them at targets 25 - 30m away.
Hello parsifal,
1). What is a "typical" hand grenade to you?
I was referring to a German HG DM51 with 6000+ steel bearings, which up to 10m is absolutely lethal and highly injury prone to 16m.
Including its fragmentation mantle it is termed as a defensive hand grenade since it will be thrown from a stationary position at attackers.
Upon removing the fragmentation mantle it becomes an offensive grenade which now only relies on its detonation pressure with a lethal range of maximum 5m and as such is thrown whilst the soldier is running/moving towards enemy positions or groupings.
Meaning if an attacking "running" soldier would throw a defensive grenade he is most likely to get himself killed or injured due to his closing in towards the detonation point.
Due to an effective fragmentation effect of a defensive grenade of up to 50m, it is therefore a "RULE" to throw and duck behind protective walls till after detonation.
The effect of even a defensive grenade at beyond 50m is only a discussion topic during peacetime mainly in regards to avoid probable injuries for national drafts servicemen and as such to avoid newspaper headlines. The 230m is totally not in regards to the range of fragmentation material (far too light – especially the US versions using cut wire particles) it is in reference to structural parts of the grenade, such as lever, igniter or mantle parts.
But again it depends on what kind of grenades you are talking about. The Danish Army Patruljekompagniet LRRP/SSR (To me the world #1 LRRP unit for Nordic warfare) is partially still using the M36 also called Mills Bomb and rebuilds of it, due to the restriction on blast impact in Nordic environment:
Howstuffworks Please scroll down to bottom
2). As I mentioned before, the probability of a single 75mm round destroying a house during the WWII period cannot be out ruled, chances however are very low in central Europe, in Russia or eastern countries due to most house structures being mostly of wood, the chances are very high. If a 20mm HEI hits a 2 storey house let's say in Germany nowadays, and you wouldn't call the fire department, the chances of this house burning down and eventually even causing a collapse would be more than 80%. As for your second part in regards to houses still standing or intact, doesn't prove that the soldiers inside wouldn't be dead.
3 and 4). All the three cities that you have cited have been taken by the attackers. That they are significant points of resistance has never been denied by me. Especially in fortified or bunker positions. But this discussion was about "normal" buildings, and as such they do not provide any adequate protection against the previously mentioned combination of weapons. If (as it was the case) the defenders took shelter in cellars in order to survive the bombardment and then to come up in order to shelter in the rubble it will become harder for the attacker, however the attacker now has the chance to eliminate the defenders since they are no more in the cellars.
But before Soren and I brought up the cellar issue you were pointing at the occupation by soldiers in a building as a good position for defending an urban area, which it is not, since the bombardment by the previously mentioned combination of weapons would have killed most of them straight away. And from a cellar you can't engage the attacker can you?
So except for snipers or defender units in specially prepared buildings, no other soldier will take a protection within normal buildings into account in regards to engage incoming troops –those who did died, more or less instantly. And exactly this is taught by the German Army, how to fortify an existing normal building, how to engage from within a fortified building (never directly at the window) and to get out of the normal or even fortified (sandbaged and heavy furniture) building as soon as AFV's or artillery is imminent or detected, or after the ambush as been conducted.
BTW, all Bundeswehr combat vehicles carry AT and HEI ammunition, the good part about the German 20mm cannon (and for the new 30mm) in contra to other forces, is its double feeder mechanism, which allows instant switching whilst shooting between AP and HE ammunition.
Regards
Kruska
1). What is a "typical" hand grenade to you?
I was referring to a German HG DM51 with 6000+ steel bearings, which up to 10m is absolutely lethal and highly injury prone to 16m.
Including its fragmentation mantle it is termed as a defensive hand grenade since it will be thrown from a stationary position at attackers.
Upon removing the fragmentation mantle it becomes an offensive grenade which now only relies on its detonation pressure with a lethal range of maximum 5m and as such is thrown whilst the soldier is running/moving towards enemy positions or groupings.
Meaning if an attacking "running" soldier would throw a defensive grenade he is most likely to get himself killed or injured due to his closing in towards the detonation point.
Due to an effective fragmentation effect of a defensive grenade of up to 50m, it is therefore a "RULE" to throw and duck behind protective walls till after detonation.
The effect of even a defensive grenade at beyond 50m is only a discussion topic during peacetime mainly in regards to avoid probable injuries for national drafts servicemen and as such to avoid newspaper headlines. The 230m is totally not in regards to the range of fragmentation material (far too light – especially the US versions using cut wire particles) it is in reference to structural parts of the grenade, such as lever, igniter or mantle parts.
But again it depends on what kind of grenades you are talking about. The Danish Army Patruljekompagniet LRRP/SSR (To me the world #1 LRRP unit for Nordic warfare) is partially still using the M36 also called Mills Bomb and rebuilds of it, due to the restriction on blast impact in Nordic environment:
Howstuffworks Please scroll down to bottom
2). As I mentioned before, the probability of a single 75mm round destroying a house during the WWII period cannot be out ruled, chances however are very low in central Europe, in Russia or eastern countries due to most house structures being mostly of wood, the chances are very high. If a 20mm HEI hits a 2 storey house let's say in Germany nowadays, and you wouldn't call the fire department, the chances of this house burning down and eventually even causing a collapse would be more than 80%. As for your second part in regards to houses still standing or intact, doesn't prove that the soldiers inside wouldn't be dead.
3 and 4). All the three cities that you have cited have been taken by the attackers. That they are significant points of resistance has never been denied by me. Especially in fortified or bunker positions. But this discussion was about "normal" buildings, and as such they do not provide any adequate protection against the previously mentioned combination of weapons. If (as it was the case) the defenders took shelter in cellars in order to survive the bombardment and then to come up in order to shelter in the rubble it will become harder for the attacker, however the attacker now has the chance to eliminate the defenders since they are no more in the cellars.
But before Soren and I brought up the cellar issue you were pointing at the occupation by soldiers in a building as a good position for defending an urban area, which it is not, since the bombardment by the previously mentioned combination of weapons would have killed most of them straight away. And from a cellar you can't engage the attacker can you?
So except for snipers or defender units in specially prepared buildings, no other soldier will take a protection within normal buildings into account in regards to engage incoming troops –those who did died, more or less instantly. And exactly this is taught by the German Army, how to fortify an existing normal building, how to engage from within a fortified building (never directly at the window) and to get out of the normal or even fortified (sandbaged and heavy furniture) building as soon as AFV's or artillery is imminent or detected, or after the ambush as been conducted.
BTW, all Bundeswehr combat vehicles carry AT and HEI ammunition, the good part about the German 20mm cannon (and for the new 30mm) in contra to other forces, is its double feeder mechanism, which allows instant switching whilst shooting between AP and HE ammunition.
Regards
Kruska
Hello Juha,
Good post. Stalingrad was Hitler's blunder, too late and not enough units. The 4th Pz. Army was in the south toward the Caucasus, and the 6th Army was more occupied fighting the Russians on their north-western flank then the Russians inside Stalingrad.
As for Grozny, IMO the Russian Army until today simply doesn't have the $$ to engage in any war scenario even as small as Grozny. They rather relied on their tanks and infantry (which also was rather limited) to solve the problem, which off course without artillery they couldn't.
Regards
Kruska
Good post. Stalingrad was Hitler's blunder, too late and not enough units. The 4th Pz. Army was in the south toward the Caucasus, and the 6th Army was more occupied fighting the Russians on their north-western flank then the Russians inside Stalingrad.
As for Grozny, IMO the Russian Army until today simply doesn't have the $$ to engage in any war scenario even as small as Grozny. They rather relied on their tanks and infantry (which also was rather limited) to solve the problem, which off course without artillery they couldn't.
Regards
Kruska
Kruska
"Stalingrad was Hitler's blunder, too late and not enough units. "
Easy to agree, besides he wanted Stalingrad and Baku same time, original OKH's plan was much better and MIGHT have succeed.
"They rather relied on their tanks and infantry (which also was rather limited) to solve the problem, which off course without artillery they couldn't. "
Maybe initially, but rather quickly the artillery was bought to play its part. And historically, at least from 18th Century, Russian/Soviet artillery had been one of their best arms, time to time the best. Now according to some Russians, problem during 1995-96, or was that during 94-5, was that much of the arty ammo used was from WWII wintage and so not enought powerful against dwelling blocks, in this later war 2002 - , they used newer ammo and even aerosol warheads in their artillery rockets.
Juha
"Stalingrad was Hitler's blunder, too late and not enough units. "
Easy to agree, besides he wanted Stalingrad and Baku same time, original OKH's plan was much better and MIGHT have succeed.
"They rather relied on their tanks and infantry (which also was rather limited) to solve the problem, which off course without artillery they couldn't. "
Maybe initially, but rather quickly the artillery was bought to play its part. And historically, at least from 18th Century, Russian/Soviet artillery had been one of their best arms, time to time the best. Now according to some Russians, problem during 1995-96, or was that during 94-5, was that much of the arty ammo used was from WWII wintage and so not enought powerful against dwelling blocks, in this later war 2002 - , they used newer ammo and even aerosol warheads in their artillery rockets.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
1. It is unwise to fortify oneself in a building during an artillery attack or when tanks show up. That is why people are taught not to do this in the military.2.
The British Army Infantry Regulations of the time dont say this is the case ( see my previous quote) in all situations. For completeness, i have copied thenm again ghere for you to look at :
In Section 91 of the Regs " (in defence of villages) "A town or a village should be allotted a complete formation as its garrison. Villages can be seldom destroyed by shellfire, , and give good cover and shelter to the defence, and are difficult to attack"
It also says the following " On the other hand small or poorly constructed villages and buildings particualrly without cellar accommodation may become shell traps
Also you should look at the post I have attached as one of my sources, concerning the german defences at Ortona. Here is the link again for you to look at if you like.
Military History
Although buildings are great cover and defensive platforms in smallarms firefights they make one vulnerable to artillery tank fire. Again the reason people in the military are taught not to seek cover in buildings if tanks are present or if they are under artillery attack.
The report relating to the Battle at ortonaa, which set the trend for the allied urban combat concepts, doesnt support that. The relevant extract from the attached report is as follows:
In making the initial break-in assault on a selected part of the town, every form of supporting fire, including artillery, was to be employed – to blast the assault troops into the first buildings, to isolate by fire the chosen assault sector from German reinforcement, and to defilade it from German fire.
Thereafter, artillery was felt to be of limited value. Street fighting was a task for close-support weapons, the medium machine guns, mortars, tanks, and anti-tank guns. These weapons were to be integrated in the fire-plan for the initial break-in, but once the infantry had secured their foothold within a building or block of buildings at the edge of the town, they were then needed forward quickly. The anti-tank guns, in particular, had to be brought up at once, and as their towing vehicles were unlikely to be able to get forward due to German fire or mines, they had to be manhandled, at least, for the last 100 yards of their required positioning.11 Once the assault troops were established in the first buildings and their supporting weapons had been brought up to them, the urban battle could begin. From this point, observed a report, the fighting would become a grim infantry battle, with anti-tank guns and mortars assisting as best they could.
The issue of providing armoured support seems to revolve more about the ability to bring the tanks to bear more than the abillity of the shell to bring down buildings. You have repeatedly said that tanks can genenerally destroy buildings with a single hit, I disagree with that, in certain situations. So we are just going to have to leave that, and try and examine how difficult it was to bring the tanks to bear on buildings in an urban environment. The Ortona report suggests that there was considerable difficulty in doing this, with the issue of obstacles, mines, and AT defences from concealed positions all working to make the deployment and use of tanks in this battle quite difficult.
Returning to the issue of whether the 75mm gun (or smaller) could destroy a building in a single hit (as a general trend), I think you will need to provide some evidence of that to support your case. I believe I have presented some sources that suggest this is not the case, which you can choose to accept or not, but for you to promote your assertions, you now need to support it. if not, we are just going to have to leave it where it is, ie unresolved.
3. A single 75mm HE shell will most of time be able to bring down an ordinary 2 storey home.
See my comments above. In my opinion, it depends on the context, the nature of the construction, and other factorrs. There are a lot of variables in this equation, and i think it makes it very difficult to generalize. The army regs of the british army certainly dont seem to support that notion in my opinion, at least in the urban setting.
4. (And this was what set the whole argument off) A 75mm HE shell will make a real mess out of anyone within a 10m radius of it detonating. (Safety range is 750m for a 75 76mm HE shell)
I never disagreed with that, with a possible exception of if the Infantry is a protected position. Defining what is a "protected" position has been the difficult issue. Safety blast radius of 750 metres has to be different to effective blast radius. The artillery site suggests that effective blast radius of a 75 mm is about 15-25 metres (very approximately, I didnt bother to check back, but its there) blast radius. I doubt very much that you are trying to say that the effective blast radius is 750m, but if so you had better correct me, we dont want any more squabbles about misunderstood posts. i also note that you say "range", I have assumed you mean "blast radius by this.
5. Handgrenades have a high probability of killing you if you're within 15m of it going off, and are infact dangerous way beyond 50m. Hence why you stand behind concrete protective walls whilst throwing them at targets 25 - 30m away.
Are you saying that the effective range of a hand grenade is 50 metres plus, or are you saying that this is the safety range. The safety range for an M-67 in my opinion is actually 230metre. The effective range for a lethal hit is a lot less than that. So, you need to clarify what you consider to be the effective range, and then try to back that up with some hard evidence. The US TM says the effective range is 5m in order to kill someone and 15 metres in order to maim someone. your previous posts seem to me to suggest that in fact that you think that even at 15 metres, the overwhelmingly likley outcome is a lethal hit. What you need to do to support your contention here is to provide some factual supporting data.
The British Army Infantry Regulations of the time dont say this is the case ( see my previous quote) in all situations. For completeness, i have copied thenm again ghere for you to look at :
In Section 91 of the Regs " (in defence of villages) "A town or a village should be allotted a complete formation as its garrison. Villages can be seldom destroyed by shellfire, , and give good cover and shelter to the defence, and are difficult to attack"
It also says the following " On the other hand small or poorly constructed villages and buildings particualrly without cellar accommodation may become shell traps
Also you should look at the post I have attached as one of my sources, concerning the german defences at Ortona. Here is the link again for you to look at if you like.
Military History
Although buildings are great cover and defensive platforms in smallarms firefights they make one vulnerable to artillery tank fire. Again the reason people in the military are taught not to seek cover in buildings if tanks are present or if they are under artillery attack.
The report relating to the Battle at ortonaa, which set the trend for the allied urban combat concepts, doesnt support that. The relevant extract from the attached report is as follows:
In making the initial break-in assault on a selected part of the town, every form of supporting fire, including artillery, was to be employed – to blast the assault troops into the first buildings, to isolate by fire the chosen assault sector from German reinforcement, and to defilade it from German fire.
Thereafter, artillery was felt to be of limited value. Street fighting was a task for close-support weapons, the medium machine guns, mortars, tanks, and anti-tank guns. These weapons were to be integrated in the fire-plan for the initial break-in, but once the infantry had secured their foothold within a building or block of buildings at the edge of the town, they were then needed forward quickly. The anti-tank guns, in particular, had to be brought up at once, and as their towing vehicles were unlikely to be able to get forward due to German fire or mines, they had to be manhandled, at least, for the last 100 yards of their required positioning.11 Once the assault troops were established in the first buildings and their supporting weapons had been brought up to them, the urban battle could begin. From this point, observed a report, the fighting would become a grim infantry battle, with anti-tank guns and mortars assisting as best they could.
The issue of providing armoured support seems to revolve more about the ability to bring the tanks to bear more than the abillity of the shell to bring down buildings. You have repeatedly said that tanks can genenerally destroy buildings with a single hit, I disagree with that, in certain situations. So we are just going to have to leave that, and try and examine how difficult it was to bring the tanks to bear on buildings in an urban environment. The Ortona report suggests that there was considerable difficulty in doing this, with the issue of obstacles, mines, and AT defences from concealed positions all working to make the deployment and use of tanks in this battle quite difficult.
Returning to the issue of whether the 75mm gun (or smaller) could destroy a building in a single hit (as a general trend), I think you will need to provide some evidence of that to support your case. I believe I have presented some sources that suggest this is not the case, which you can choose to accept or not, but for you to promote your assertions, you now need to support it. if not, we are just going to have to leave it where it is, ie unresolved.
3. A single 75mm HE shell will most of time be able to bring down an ordinary 2 storey home.
See my comments above. In my opinion, it depends on the context, the nature of the construction, and other factorrs. There are a lot of variables in this equation, and i think it makes it very difficult to generalize. The army regs of the british army certainly dont seem to support that notion in my opinion, at least in the urban setting.
4. (And this was what set the whole argument off) A 75mm HE shell will make a real mess out of anyone within a 10m radius of it detonating. (Safety range is 750m for a 75 76mm HE shell)
I never disagreed with that, with a possible exception of if the Infantry is a protected position. Defining what is a "protected" position has been the difficult issue. Safety blast radius of 750 metres has to be different to effective blast radius. The artillery site suggests that effective blast radius of a 75 mm is about 15-25 metres (very approximately, I didnt bother to check back, but its there) blast radius. I doubt very much that you are trying to say that the effective blast radius is 750m, but if so you had better correct me, we dont want any more squabbles about misunderstood posts. i also note that you say "range", I have assumed you mean "blast radius by this.
5. Handgrenades have a high probability of killing you if you're within 15m of it going off, and are infact dangerous way beyond 50m. Hence why you stand behind concrete protective walls whilst throwing them at targets 25 - 30m away.
Are you saying that the effective range of a hand grenade is 50 metres plus, or are you saying that this is the safety range. The safety range for an M-67 in my opinion is actually 230metre. The effective range for a lethal hit is a lot less than that. So, you need to clarify what you consider to be the effective range, and then try to back that up with some hard evidence. The US TM says the effective range is 5m in order to kill someone and 15 metres in order to maim someone. your previous posts seem to me to suggest that in fact that you think that even at 15 metres, the overwhelmingly likley outcome is a lethal hit. What you need to do to support your contention here is to provide some factual supporting data.
Hello parsifal,
As I said earlier there is too much switching of positions in contra to earlier statements or as such twisting of words which makes an ongoing of this discussion meaningless.
You are now bringing in the defense of a town that was prepared for a long defense as such was fortified, booby trapped, emplacements even for 88, tunnels leading from building to building etc. etc.
This was never part of the initial discussion: Soldiers seeking refuge/protection in normal buildings / houses and a 75mm shell killing the occupants and the probability of even causing the 2 storey house to collapse.
In the end the Canadians took the town, so what does this post now prove??? That a 75mm shell can't kill the soldiers in a house??? That a house did not collapse after a single shot???
This whole account again proves that the Germans did not defend normal buildings by simply placing themselves in normal buildings. They had entrenched positions, fortified emplacements, caused the demolition of buildings to act as barriers and protection and used the cellars and tunnels to move around. And those poor devils that were ordered to remain in the buildings were shot dead until nobody remained to replace them and as such lost out to the Canadians.
What you totally seem to forget is, that the Germans defended from 1943 onwards since they were too weak to attack, and as such it was only a matter of time for them to lose the war, they had lost the initiative of attack, and there wasn't a single town or city they held till the end of the war because you can't win a defensive war by allocating your troops in stationary positions such as buildings or a town/city.
Look at the Finns, they managed to survive a defensive war because they dug in on open terrain providing natural suitable cover and not in cities, making Stalin loose enough troops for him to consider an armistice. Tito won his war against the Germans by using terrain as a battleground and not towns or cities, same would apply for the Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army.
The only valid reason to barricade in a city or town acting as a bottleneck towards advancing troops, is to sacrifice men to buy time, in order to prepare a counter attack. But your assumtion that buildings provide a better cover then open ground with dug in positions is totally wrong. Once the enemy manages to force you into defending tows or cities, you already lost the war.
Urban combat techniques in the Bundeswehr are 80% about how to storm houses and not how to use them as defensive positions.
I hereby rest my case.
Regards
Kruska
As I said earlier there is too much switching of positions in contra to earlier statements or as such twisting of words which makes an ongoing of this discussion meaningless.
You are now bringing in the defense of a town that was prepared for a long defense as such was fortified, booby trapped, emplacements even for 88, tunnels leading from building to building etc. etc.
This was never part of the initial discussion: Soldiers seeking refuge/protection in normal buildings / houses and a 75mm shell killing the occupants and the probability of even causing the 2 storey house to collapse.
In the end the Canadians took the town, so what does this post now prove??? That a 75mm shell can't kill the soldiers in a house??? That a house did not collapse after a single shot???
This whole account again proves that the Germans did not defend normal buildings by simply placing themselves in normal buildings. They had entrenched positions, fortified emplacements, caused the demolition of buildings to act as barriers and protection and used the cellars and tunnels to move around. And those poor devils that were ordered to remain in the buildings were shot dead until nobody remained to replace them and as such lost out to the Canadians.
What you totally seem to forget is, that the Germans defended from 1943 onwards since they were too weak to attack, and as such it was only a matter of time for them to lose the war, they had lost the initiative of attack, and there wasn't a single town or city they held till the end of the war because you can't win a defensive war by allocating your troops in stationary positions such as buildings or a town/city.
Look at the Finns, they managed to survive a defensive war because they dug in on open terrain providing natural suitable cover and not in cities, making Stalin loose enough troops for him to consider an armistice. Tito won his war against the Germans by using terrain as a battleground and not towns or cities, same would apply for the Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army.
The only valid reason to barricade in a city or town acting as a bottleneck towards advancing troops, is to sacrifice men to buy time, in order to prepare a counter attack. But your assumtion that buildings provide a better cover then open ground with dug in positions is totally wrong. Once the enemy manages to force you into defending tows or cities, you already lost the war.
Urban combat techniques in the Bundeswehr are 80% about how to storm houses and not how to use them as defensive positions.
I hereby rest my case.
Regards
Kruska
parsifal
Colonel
In reply to Kruskas Post No 148
1). What is a "typical" hand grenade to you?
I think a good representative grenade is the US M-67. I think this might be the most common western grenade in use at the moment. Accorrding to the TM for US grenades, this weapon has an effective "Kill" radius of 5 metres and a "Casualty" radius of 15metres. The question being asked, is whether these numbers are correct or not. Not arguing that if you throw the thing, you should duck, because the effective throwing range for most soldiers is probably not more than 20metres,, which in my opinion would be dangerously close to the effective casualty range of most grenades.
What is being disputed is the effective kill and injury radius of a grenade. If a grenade goes off on normal terrain (ie neither a football field, or a trench, but somewhere in between, ie with trees, slight folds in the terrain, etc, what would be the effective,range of the weapon. At what point does the wepon cease to be a significant threat to enemy troops. Do they need to be 5metres, 30 metres, 50 metres 250 metres, to reduce the liklehood of being killed by the grenade.
I did a probability analysis, that showed that if the probability of being killed by a grenade was 200% at 5metres, then for a person at 50 metres, the threat was reduced to just 1.1%. This was based on the surface area, (for shrapnel effects) and volume (for blast effects). A 200% probability is actually a mathematical error (since you cannot increase a probability of more than 100%), but i did it that way because I beleievcved there were two separat ways that you could be killed by a grenade, either blast effect, or shrapnel effect. I could do the same sort of pronbability analysis of your German grenade, but would need to know its effective Kill radius.
Due to an effective fragmentation effect of a defensive grenade of up to 50m, it is therefore a "RULE" to throw and duck behind protective walls till after detonation.
The US says that the effective kill range of its M-67 is 5 metres, but it can be dangerous right out to 230 metres. The question is, how fast does the probability of a "kill" decrease, as the range increases. It depends on at what point a "kill" ceases to be guranteed. The US manual says for its grenades, it is guranteed out to 5metres, paast that point it becomes a probability of something less than 100%. The odds of a "kill are actually very good out to about 20 metres, but beyond that the odds of a kill start to drop away, until by the time the range separating the target and the point of detonation reaches 50 metres, the chances of a kill are very low. b
The effect of even a defensive grenade at beyond 50m is only a discussion topic during peacetime mainly in regards to avoid probable injuries for national drafts servicemen and as such to avoid newspaper headlines. The 230m is totally not in regards to the range of fragmentation material (far too light – especially the US versions using cut wire particles) it is in reference to structural parts of the grenade, such as lever, igniter or mantle parts.
Still, the safety instruction say that they can cause injury out to 230 metres. When we trained with them, no-one was allowed out of the sqafety trenches or anywhere near the firing range to a distance of about 1 km from memeory. This was purely to avoid any freak accidents.
But again it depends on what kind of grenades you are talking about. The Danish Army Patruljekompagniet LRRP/SSR (To me the world #1 LRRP unit for Nordic warfare) is partially still using the M36 also called Mills Bomb and rebuilds of it, due to the restriction on blast impact in Nordic environment:
The old Mills bomb has an effective rkill range the same as the M-67, but its Casualty range is only 10 metres (which is why I got mixed up in my previous post to you. I suspect it has a smaller effective radius because it has a relatively poor burst pattern. The old pineapple pattern did not breakl up that well, and being heavy, reduced the explosive content of the bomb.
2). As I mentioned before, the probability of a single 75mm round destroying a house during the WWII period cannot be out ruled, chances however are very low in central Europe, in Russia or eastern countries due to most house structures being mostly of wood, the chances are very high. If a 20mm HEI hits a 2 storey house let's say in Germany nowadays, and you wouldn't call the fire department, the chances of this house burning down and eventually even causing a collapse would be more than 80%. As for your second part in regards to houses still standing or intact, doesn't prove that the soldiers inside wouldn't be dead.
I think we are saying basically the same thing, but in a different way. The sources I am relying on arent saying that houses are fullproof protection, and right from the start I said that the chances of a building collapse depended on its construction and context. in the battle of Ortona, the germans used mostly all stone block houses, which were very effective at resisting shellfire. They were, in effect, makeshift bunkers. The British army regs of the times also make similar observations. Moreover, from the very beginning of this argument i have tried to make clear that whilst you guys wanted to talk about isolated farm houses, I was talking about a different context, namely buildings, particulalry stone and masonary buildings, in a close urban environment. In that context, there are any number of reasons why hiding inside buildings is better than being outside.
I strongly recommend you read the link I have provided for the battle Of ortona, and then tell me what you think.
3 and 4). All the three cities that you have cited have been taken by the attackers. That they are significant points of resistance has never been denied by me. Especially in fortified or bunker positions. But this discussion was about "normal" buildings, and as such they do not provide any adequate protection against the previously mentioned combination of weapons. If (as it was the case) the defenders took shelter in cellars in order to survive the bombardment and then to come up in order to shelter in the rubble it will become harder for the attacker, however the attacker now has the chance to eliminate the defenders since they are no more in the cellars.
I have to clarify that whilst you and Soren were concentrating on farmhouse buildings, i was not. I was always inferring buildings of substantial construction, in an urban environamt. The reason I weighed into this debate was because it appeared to me that dangerous generalizations were being made about attacks on buildings in all situations, and against all building types and sizes, that was patently not true. In the conte4xt of the urban environment, I still believe that Most buildings provide good protection, becauseat the very least they conceal the enemy Infantry, and protect them from small arms fire. When used in conjenction with a "street denial" strategy (eg, roadblocks, booby traps, minefields etc) the urban assault problem becomes a very difficult one for an attacker. IMO
But before Soren and I brought up the cellar issue you were pointing at the occupation by soldiers in a building as a good position for defending an urban area, which it is not, since the bombardment by the previously mentioned combination of weapons would have killed most of them straight away. And from a cellar you can't engage the attacker can you?
No i didnt say that, and it was not you and soren who brought up the cellar issue. In my original Post (No 31) I said that Buildings provided good defensive positions, AFTER, they had been reduced to Rubble. You misread my post.. I then said that historically the Germans utilizing buildings in Caen were located mostly in the cellars, to which Soren made some comments about. So no, my position was that rubble made the better defense, and that cellars provided good shelter from hevay direct bombardment.
So except for snipers or defender units in specially prepared buildings, no other soldier will take a protection within normal buildings into account in regards to engage incoming troops –those who did died, more or less instantly. And exactly this is taught by the German Army, how to fortify an existing normal building, how to engage from within a fortified building (never directly at the window) and to get out of the normal or even fortified (sandbaged and heavy furniture) building as soon as AFV's or artillery is imminent or detected, or after the ambush as been conducted.
Suggest you read the article about Ortona. That is NOT what the germans did there.....
1). What is a "typical" hand grenade to you?
I think a good representative grenade is the US M-67. I think this might be the most common western grenade in use at the moment. Accorrding to the TM for US grenades, this weapon has an effective "Kill" radius of 5 metres and a "Casualty" radius of 15metres. The question being asked, is whether these numbers are correct or not. Not arguing that if you throw the thing, you should duck, because the effective throwing range for most soldiers is probably not more than 20metres,, which in my opinion would be dangerously close to the effective casualty range of most grenades.
What is being disputed is the effective kill and injury radius of a grenade. If a grenade goes off on normal terrain (ie neither a football field, or a trench, but somewhere in between, ie with trees, slight folds in the terrain, etc, what would be the effective,range of the weapon. At what point does the wepon cease to be a significant threat to enemy troops. Do they need to be 5metres, 30 metres, 50 metres 250 metres, to reduce the liklehood of being killed by the grenade.
I did a probability analysis, that showed that if the probability of being killed by a grenade was 200% at 5metres, then for a person at 50 metres, the threat was reduced to just 1.1%. This was based on the surface area, (for shrapnel effects) and volume (for blast effects). A 200% probability is actually a mathematical error (since you cannot increase a probability of more than 100%), but i did it that way because I beleievcved there were two separat ways that you could be killed by a grenade, either blast effect, or shrapnel effect. I could do the same sort of pronbability analysis of your German grenade, but would need to know its effective Kill radius.
Due to an effective fragmentation effect of a defensive grenade of up to 50m, it is therefore a "RULE" to throw and duck behind protective walls till after detonation.
The US says that the effective kill range of its M-67 is 5 metres, but it can be dangerous right out to 230 metres. The question is, how fast does the probability of a "kill" decrease, as the range increases. It depends on at what point a "kill" ceases to be guranteed. The US manual says for its grenades, it is guranteed out to 5metres, paast that point it becomes a probability of something less than 100%. The odds of a "kill are actually very good out to about 20 metres, but beyond that the odds of a kill start to drop away, until by the time the range separating the target and the point of detonation reaches 50 metres, the chances of a kill are very low. b
The effect of even a defensive grenade at beyond 50m is only a discussion topic during peacetime mainly in regards to avoid probable injuries for national drafts servicemen and as such to avoid newspaper headlines. The 230m is totally not in regards to the range of fragmentation material (far too light – especially the US versions using cut wire particles) it is in reference to structural parts of the grenade, such as lever, igniter or mantle parts.
Still, the safety instruction say that they can cause injury out to 230 metres. When we trained with them, no-one was allowed out of the sqafety trenches or anywhere near the firing range to a distance of about 1 km from memeory. This was purely to avoid any freak accidents.
But again it depends on what kind of grenades you are talking about. The Danish Army Patruljekompagniet LRRP/SSR (To me the world #1 LRRP unit for Nordic warfare) is partially still using the M36 also called Mills Bomb and rebuilds of it, due to the restriction on blast impact in Nordic environment:
The old Mills bomb has an effective rkill range the same as the M-67, but its Casualty range is only 10 metres (which is why I got mixed up in my previous post to you. I suspect it has a smaller effective radius because it has a relatively poor burst pattern. The old pineapple pattern did not breakl up that well, and being heavy, reduced the explosive content of the bomb.
2). As I mentioned before, the probability of a single 75mm round destroying a house during the WWII period cannot be out ruled, chances however are very low in central Europe, in Russia or eastern countries due to most house structures being mostly of wood, the chances are very high. If a 20mm HEI hits a 2 storey house let's say in Germany nowadays, and you wouldn't call the fire department, the chances of this house burning down and eventually even causing a collapse would be more than 80%. As for your second part in regards to houses still standing or intact, doesn't prove that the soldiers inside wouldn't be dead.
I think we are saying basically the same thing, but in a different way. The sources I am relying on arent saying that houses are fullproof protection, and right from the start I said that the chances of a building collapse depended on its construction and context. in the battle of Ortona, the germans used mostly all stone block houses, which were very effective at resisting shellfire. They were, in effect, makeshift bunkers. The British army regs of the times also make similar observations. Moreover, from the very beginning of this argument i have tried to make clear that whilst you guys wanted to talk about isolated farm houses, I was talking about a different context, namely buildings, particulalry stone and masonary buildings, in a close urban environment. In that context, there are any number of reasons why hiding inside buildings is better than being outside.
I strongly recommend you read the link I have provided for the battle Of ortona, and then tell me what you think.
3 and 4). All the three cities that you have cited have been taken by the attackers. That they are significant points of resistance has never been denied by me. Especially in fortified or bunker positions. But this discussion was about "normal" buildings, and as such they do not provide any adequate protection against the previously mentioned combination of weapons. If (as it was the case) the defenders took shelter in cellars in order to survive the bombardment and then to come up in order to shelter in the rubble it will become harder for the attacker, however the attacker now has the chance to eliminate the defenders since they are no more in the cellars.
I have to clarify that whilst you and Soren were concentrating on farmhouse buildings, i was not. I was always inferring buildings of substantial construction, in an urban environamt. The reason I weighed into this debate was because it appeared to me that dangerous generalizations were being made about attacks on buildings in all situations, and against all building types and sizes, that was patently not true. In the conte4xt of the urban environment, I still believe that Most buildings provide good protection, becauseat the very least they conceal the enemy Infantry, and protect them from small arms fire. When used in conjenction with a "street denial" strategy (eg, roadblocks, booby traps, minefields etc) the urban assault problem becomes a very difficult one for an attacker. IMO
But before Soren and I brought up the cellar issue you were pointing at the occupation by soldiers in a building as a good position for defending an urban area, which it is not, since the bombardment by the previously mentioned combination of weapons would have killed most of them straight away. And from a cellar you can't engage the attacker can you?
No i didnt say that, and it was not you and soren who brought up the cellar issue. In my original Post (No 31) I said that Buildings provided good defensive positions, AFTER, they had been reduced to Rubble. You misread my post.. I then said that historically the Germans utilizing buildings in Caen were located mostly in the cellars, to which Soren made some comments about. So no, my position was that rubble made the better defense, and that cellars provided good shelter from hevay direct bombardment.
So except for snipers or defender units in specially prepared buildings, no other soldier will take a protection within normal buildings into account in regards to engage incoming troops –those who did died, more or less instantly. And exactly this is taught by the German Army, how to fortify an existing normal building, how to engage from within a fortified building (never directly at the window) and to get out of the normal or even fortified (sandbaged and heavy furniture) building as soon as AFV's or artillery is imminent or detected, or after the ambush as been conducted.
Suggest you read the article about Ortona. That is NOT what the germans did there.....
parsifal
Colonel
You are now bringing in the defense of a town that was prepared for a long defense as such was fortified, booby trapped, emplacements even for 88, tunnels leading from building to building etc. etc.
According to the Ortona Report, the Village was not fortified prior to the battle. It specifically says….." Ortona, a town only some 450 metres in width, edged to the east by cliffs overlooking the harbour, and to the west by a deep ravine, was approachable only from the south, and was a potentially strong urban defensive position. Its stone buildings offered formidable strong points. In the older, northern part of the town, the Cathedral Church of San Tommaso stood amid aged buildings of two or three storeys, the lower of which were often just a single large windowless room, overlooking dark and narrow cobbled streets. Many of the structures had deep cellars with underground passages linking several houses. The castle overlooking the port, its walls weakened by earthquakes and railway tunnelling, was not a keystone in the town's defence."
These were precisely the types of buildings I had in mind when I said "it depends on the building construction and its context". I think all of a sudden you realize you have not considered every situation perhaps…..
And further into the article, it states "A feature of the defence was that the Germans, having no opportunity to construct specific concrete and steel pillbox type fortifications, improvised from what was available on site. The stone buildings of the town, especially in the older quarter, were sturdy enough to provide good protection for the defenders and their equipment. "
The report does indicates that the town was well prepared, but cannot be considered fortified. That would have taken weeks or months, and absorbed resources that were simply unavailable to the germans, The field improvements consisted of some elementary booby traps demolitions and mines in the street. In point of fact, the Canadian advance from Moro only left the germans a few days or a week in which to prepare their defences. So it cannot in any sense be considered a fortified position. It was a "prepared position", but that is not inconsistent in any way with anything I have said previously. It did not attract resources or time that could in any way be seen as additional to those available to the defenders. Special construction engineers were not used, ther were no bunkers or entrenchments to any extent. It was NOT a fortified position.
This was never part of the initial discussion: Soldiers seeking refuge/protection in normal buildings / houses and a 75mm shell killing the occupants and the probability of even causing the 2 storey house to collapse.
My initial posts made it very clear that I was saying 'it depended on the building type, its construction and its context. This was the sort of context that I had in mind
In the end the Canadians took the town, so what does this post now prove??? That a 75mm shell can't kill the soldiers in a house??? That a house did not collapse after a single shot???
If the article is accurate, then I think it proves that defending in some building types is a good defensive move, whether or not that building is demolished. I have never said that it was not always the right thing to do (ie use a building for defence), nor have I said that it was not possible to push a house over with a single 75 mm round. What I did say was that there were a lot of instances that defending in a house was the proper thing to do, but that it would depend on construction and context. I also said that there seemed a lot of instances where 75 mm guns or smaller could not bring down a house, This report is slightly different to my position in that it says that artillery was not that useful after the initial point of break in, and that it was difficult to bring armour to bear in the interior of towns like this, and that in part this was due to the collapsed rubble in the street. This was something I had pointed out to you some time ago, but you told me i didn't know what I was talking about basically
This whole account again proves that the Germans did not defend normal buildings by simply placing themselves in normal buildings. They had entrenched positions, fortified emplacements, caused the demolition of buildings to act as barriers and protection and used the cellars and tunnels to move around. And those poor devils that were ordered to remain in the buildings were shot dead until nobody remained to replace them and as such lost out to the Canadians.
They did not have the time, in any sense of the word, to entrench or fortify this position. The few days grace that they had before the Canadians hit them, allowed them to provide normal improvement to the position, but not to entrench or fortify. To entrench or fortify a position takes weeks, or even months or preparation, and would evidence bunkers, trenches, barbed wire, tank traps and the like.
What you totally seem to forget is, that the Germans defended from 1943 onwards since they were too weak to attack, and as such it was only a matter of time for them to lose the war, they had lost the initiative of attack, and there wasn't a single town or city they held till the end of the war because you can't win a defensive war by allocating your troops in stationary positions such as buildings or a town/city.
The germans defending in cities did not cause or contribute to the german defeat, german weakness caused that. Moreover german weakness forced the germans to seek defensive benefit from cities, in order to stretch their meagre resources as far as they could. I believe the British Army Infantry Regs were correct (previously quoted) when they describe villages with the proper and appropriate buildings as good defensive positions
Look at the Finns, they managed to survive a defensive war because they dug in on open terrain providing natural suitable cover and not in cities, making Stalin loose enough troops for him to consider an armistice. Tito won his war against the Germans by using terrain as a battleground and not towns or cities, same would apply for the Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army.
The Finns used forest as their primary terrain for defence, because forests are also good defensive terrain, and also because that was the dominant terrain in that theatre of operations
The only valid reason to barricade in a city or town acting as a bottleneck towards advancing troops, is to sacrifice men to buy time, in order to prepare a counter attack. But your assumtion that buildings provide a better cover then open ground with dug in positions is totally wrong. Once the enemy manages to force you into defending tows or cities, you already lost the war.
I think that barricading in a town is mostly about reducing the pressure on the line, so as to be able to redistribute men elsewhere on the front. This, in itself does not contribute to defeat. It may be a symptom that an army is losing, but it does not cause the defeat.
Urban combat techniques in the Bundeswehr are 80% about how to storm houses and not how to use them as defensive positions.
Maybe its harder to learn how to attack a town than it is to defend in one?
According to the Ortona Report, the Village was not fortified prior to the battle. It specifically says….." Ortona, a town only some 450 metres in width, edged to the east by cliffs overlooking the harbour, and to the west by a deep ravine, was approachable only from the south, and was a potentially strong urban defensive position. Its stone buildings offered formidable strong points. In the older, northern part of the town, the Cathedral Church of San Tommaso stood amid aged buildings of two or three storeys, the lower of which were often just a single large windowless room, overlooking dark and narrow cobbled streets. Many of the structures had deep cellars with underground passages linking several houses. The castle overlooking the port, its walls weakened by earthquakes and railway tunnelling, was not a keystone in the town's defence."
These were precisely the types of buildings I had in mind when I said "it depends on the building construction and its context". I think all of a sudden you realize you have not considered every situation perhaps…..
And further into the article, it states "A feature of the defence was that the Germans, having no opportunity to construct specific concrete and steel pillbox type fortifications, improvised from what was available on site. The stone buildings of the town, especially in the older quarter, were sturdy enough to provide good protection for the defenders and their equipment. "
The report does indicates that the town was well prepared, but cannot be considered fortified. That would have taken weeks or months, and absorbed resources that were simply unavailable to the germans, The field improvements consisted of some elementary booby traps demolitions and mines in the street. In point of fact, the Canadian advance from Moro only left the germans a few days or a week in which to prepare their defences. So it cannot in any sense be considered a fortified position. It was a "prepared position", but that is not inconsistent in any way with anything I have said previously. It did not attract resources or time that could in any way be seen as additional to those available to the defenders. Special construction engineers were not used, ther were no bunkers or entrenchments to any extent. It was NOT a fortified position.
This was never part of the initial discussion: Soldiers seeking refuge/protection in normal buildings / houses and a 75mm shell killing the occupants and the probability of even causing the 2 storey house to collapse.
My initial posts made it very clear that I was saying 'it depended on the building type, its construction and its context. This was the sort of context that I had in mind
In the end the Canadians took the town, so what does this post now prove??? That a 75mm shell can't kill the soldiers in a house??? That a house did not collapse after a single shot???
If the article is accurate, then I think it proves that defending in some building types is a good defensive move, whether or not that building is demolished. I have never said that it was not always the right thing to do (ie use a building for defence), nor have I said that it was not possible to push a house over with a single 75 mm round. What I did say was that there were a lot of instances that defending in a house was the proper thing to do, but that it would depend on construction and context. I also said that there seemed a lot of instances where 75 mm guns or smaller could not bring down a house, This report is slightly different to my position in that it says that artillery was not that useful after the initial point of break in, and that it was difficult to bring armour to bear in the interior of towns like this, and that in part this was due to the collapsed rubble in the street. This was something I had pointed out to you some time ago, but you told me i didn't know what I was talking about basically
This whole account again proves that the Germans did not defend normal buildings by simply placing themselves in normal buildings. They had entrenched positions, fortified emplacements, caused the demolition of buildings to act as barriers and protection and used the cellars and tunnels to move around. And those poor devils that were ordered to remain in the buildings were shot dead until nobody remained to replace them and as such lost out to the Canadians.
They did not have the time, in any sense of the word, to entrench or fortify this position. The few days grace that they had before the Canadians hit them, allowed them to provide normal improvement to the position, but not to entrench or fortify. To entrench or fortify a position takes weeks, or even months or preparation, and would evidence bunkers, trenches, barbed wire, tank traps and the like.
What you totally seem to forget is, that the Germans defended from 1943 onwards since they were too weak to attack, and as such it was only a matter of time for them to lose the war, they had lost the initiative of attack, and there wasn't a single town or city they held till the end of the war because you can't win a defensive war by allocating your troops in stationary positions such as buildings or a town/city.
The germans defending in cities did not cause or contribute to the german defeat, german weakness caused that. Moreover german weakness forced the germans to seek defensive benefit from cities, in order to stretch their meagre resources as far as they could. I believe the British Army Infantry Regs were correct (previously quoted) when they describe villages with the proper and appropriate buildings as good defensive positions
Look at the Finns, they managed to survive a defensive war because they dug in on open terrain providing natural suitable cover and not in cities, making Stalin loose enough troops for him to consider an armistice. Tito won his war against the Germans by using terrain as a battleground and not towns or cities, same would apply for the Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army.
The Finns used forest as their primary terrain for defence, because forests are also good defensive terrain, and also because that was the dominant terrain in that theatre of operations
The only valid reason to barricade in a city or town acting as a bottleneck towards advancing troops, is to sacrifice men to buy time, in order to prepare a counter attack. But your assumtion that buildings provide a better cover then open ground with dug in positions is totally wrong. Once the enemy manages to force you into defending tows or cities, you already lost the war.
I think that barricading in a town is mostly about reducing the pressure on the line, so as to be able to redistribute men elsewhere on the front. This, in itself does not contribute to defeat. It may be a symptom that an army is losing, but it does not cause the defeat.
Urban combat techniques in the Bundeswehr are 80% about how to storm houses and not how to use them as defensive positions.
Maybe its harder to learn how to attack a town than it is to defend in one?
Hello Kruska
" Look at the Finns, they managed to survive a defensive war because they dug in on open terrain providing natural suitable cover and not in cities."
Mostly true, but the main reason for that was that Finland was an agrarian country and we managed to stop Soviet troops before they got near our town/cities. Exception was Viipuri/Wyborg. in 1940 we fight in it during the last days of the Winter War. Soviets used most of their attacking forces in attempts to try to encircle the city, from NE through wooden, rocky and hilly terrain and from South over frozen over Bay of Viipuri. Winter 39-40 was exceptionally cold and the ice over the bay was strong enough to carry even T-26 light tanks (one 45mm cannon and 1-2mgs). This Southern move surprised Finns totally and developed into very dangerous bridgehead on the western shores of the bay. Very hard fighting took place in Viipuri/Wyborg during the last couple days before the truce. Finns lost the SE part of city but still hold the centre and NW part of it when the truce began. IIRC Finns had then one Inf.Rgt in the city and Soviets used one Inf.Div plus one TankBr against it. The reasons of this fight were mostly political, it was our 2nd largest city.
CORRECTION: During the last couple weeks of the Winter War 2 regiments of Finnish 3rd Div defended Viipuri. In SE the defence line ran some ½ km front of the city, in S some 2 km S of the edge of the city. Attacking force was Soviet 7th Div with some tank support. On the last evening before the truce Finns got permission to give up SE part of the city because situation on both flanks of the city was getting worse. Finns withdrew to their support line of which 2/3 ran on a rock ridge between the city centre and the SE suburbs and only 1/3 through build-up area. One of the Finnish rgts occupied the support line and the other withdrew out of the city. So only true urban fighting in Viipuri was fought in the last morning and forenoon of the war and even that only on 1/3 of city's defence line.
Same in the summer 44, for prestige our C-in-C demanded that the city must be held but the attempt failed miserably, Viipuri was lost in a day, mainly because the artillery of the defending brigade ran out of ammo after a short while and also the brigade, which had just arrived from the north, wasn't familiar to city warfare.
The little what I remember on urban warfare regulations is: some men ought to be in upper floors, so that the defenders knew what would happen around and not be easily trapped in basement by surprise attack. The buildings used ought to be reinforced by various ways, there ought to be various exit routes, building used should not be at edge of the city, some of the buildings at the edge of the city would probably been demolished to barricade streets. During artillery barrage most of men should be in heavy reinforced cellars.
To my very limited understanding the expectation was that urban fight would be like in Parcifal's quote: " the fighting would become a grim infantry battle" added with "VERY grim AND BLOODY.
To understand Finnish Army position one must remember that we were and are a very small nation with 1800 km border with what was a rather unscrupulous military superpower. In 1939 it was 3½ million Finns against 180 million Soviet citizens and in 70s somewhat over 5 million against some 240 million. So the question wasn't who would win but will Finland survive as an independent state or not. And maybe better way to describe the situation in 70s, would we be able to convince CCCP that Finns were prepared to made so effective stand that the gains possible to achieve by an attack were not worth of the price they would have to pay for it and same time convince CCCP that Finns could keep other foreign troops out of their country so that Finland could not be used as a base for attack against CCCP. So it was clear to all Finns that if a war broke out, Finns would took lot of casualties; no chance for an easy and cheap war for us. And what was also clear was that a positive result for Finns would be very much in doubt. And no Amis would arrive to rescue us.
Juha
" Look at the Finns, they managed to survive a defensive war because they dug in on open terrain providing natural suitable cover and not in cities."
Mostly true, but the main reason for that was that Finland was an agrarian country and we managed to stop Soviet troops before they got near our town/cities. Exception was Viipuri/Wyborg. in 1940 we fight in it during the last days of the Winter War. Soviets used most of their attacking forces in attempts to try to encircle the city, from NE through wooden, rocky and hilly terrain and from South over frozen over Bay of Viipuri. Winter 39-40 was exceptionally cold and the ice over the bay was strong enough to carry even T-26 light tanks (one 45mm cannon and 1-2mgs). This Southern move surprised Finns totally and developed into very dangerous bridgehead on the western shores of the bay. Very hard fighting took place in Viipuri/Wyborg during the last couple days before the truce. Finns lost the SE part of city but still hold the centre and NW part of it when the truce began. IIRC Finns had then one Inf.Rgt in the city and Soviets used one Inf.Div plus one TankBr against it. The reasons of this fight were mostly political, it was our 2nd largest city.
CORRECTION: During the last couple weeks of the Winter War 2 regiments of Finnish 3rd Div defended Viipuri. In SE the defence line ran some ½ km front of the city, in S some 2 km S of the edge of the city. Attacking force was Soviet 7th Div with some tank support. On the last evening before the truce Finns got permission to give up SE part of the city because situation on both flanks of the city was getting worse. Finns withdrew to their support line of which 2/3 ran on a rock ridge between the city centre and the SE suburbs and only 1/3 through build-up area. One of the Finnish rgts occupied the support line and the other withdrew out of the city. So only true urban fighting in Viipuri was fought in the last morning and forenoon of the war and even that only on 1/3 of city's defence line.
Same in the summer 44, for prestige our C-in-C demanded that the city must be held but the attempt failed miserably, Viipuri was lost in a day, mainly because the artillery of the defending brigade ran out of ammo after a short while and also the brigade, which had just arrived from the north, wasn't familiar to city warfare.
The little what I remember on urban warfare regulations is: some men ought to be in upper floors, so that the defenders knew what would happen around and not be easily trapped in basement by surprise attack. The buildings used ought to be reinforced by various ways, there ought to be various exit routes, building used should not be at edge of the city, some of the buildings at the edge of the city would probably been demolished to barricade streets. During artillery barrage most of men should be in heavy reinforced cellars.
To my very limited understanding the expectation was that urban fight would be like in Parcifal's quote: " the fighting would become a grim infantry battle" added with "VERY grim AND BLOODY.
To understand Finnish Army position one must remember that we were and are a very small nation with 1800 km border with what was a rather unscrupulous military superpower. In 1939 it was 3½ million Finns against 180 million Soviet citizens and in 70s somewhat over 5 million against some 240 million. So the question wasn't who would win but will Finland survive as an independent state or not. And maybe better way to describe the situation in 70s, would we be able to convince CCCP that Finns were prepared to made so effective stand that the gains possible to achieve by an attack were not worth of the price they would have to pay for it and same time convince CCCP that Finns could keep other foreign troops out of their country so that Finland could not be used as a base for attack against CCCP. So it was clear to all Finns that if a war broke out, Finns would took lot of casualties; no chance for an easy and cheap war for us. And what was also clear was that a positive result for Finns would be very much in doubt. And no Amis would arrive to rescue us.
Juha
Parsifal,
Plz lets's not start to divert from the original issue once more, we've done that enough already.
What Kruska I have been saying from the start is that a single 75mm HE shell is usually enough to bring down an ordinary two storey home. Now you're suddenly talking about reinforced buildings prepared for defense, which is not what Kruska and I were refering to.
Remember that often you simply don't have time reinforce or prepare defensive positions inside buildings. Most city fighting was defending until the enemy came close and then running from building to building as either you or the enemy advanced.
Parsifal the safety range for a frag grenade is 300m, at 230m there are still parts of the handgrenade which can kill or cause you serious injury, although cases of anyone struck at such ranges are extremely rare.
The effective range of a handgrenade is the range out to which it is most likely to cause injuries, which is 15-20m. However beyond 15-20m it is still extremely dangerous, and even for a million bucks I wouldn't stand tall within 50m of one going off in open terrain.
Now considering that a 75mm HE shell packs roughly the same punch as 15 hangrenades going off at once I was astonished to say the least that Juha could doubt that anyone within 10m of one going off would be a real mess (You agree with this however) considering his claim that he had been a combat engineer. I found that very strange. Now upon further inquiry he let us know he was but a draftee and was mostly ducking in foxholes whilst they went off, which would explain his comments. You don't become an expert by witnessing 2 or 3 controlled detonations whilst ducking in a foxhole.
Plz lets's not start to divert from the original issue once more, we've done that enough already.
What Kruska I have been saying from the start is that a single 75mm HE shell is usually enough to bring down an ordinary two storey home. Now you're suddenly talking about reinforced buildings prepared for defense, which is not what Kruska and I were refering to.
Remember that often you simply don't have time reinforce or prepare defensive positions inside buildings. Most city fighting was defending until the enemy came close and then running from building to building as either you or the enemy advanced.
Parsifal the safety range for a frag grenade is 300m, at 230m there are still parts of the handgrenade which can kill or cause you serious injury, although cases of anyone struck at such ranges are extremely rare.
The effective range of a handgrenade is the range out to which it is most likely to cause injuries, which is 15-20m. However beyond 15-20m it is still extremely dangerous, and even for a million bucks I wouldn't stand tall within 50m of one going off in open terrain.
Now considering that a 75mm HE shell packs roughly the same punch as 15 hangrenades going off at once I was astonished to say the least that Juha could doubt that anyone within 10m of one going off would be a real mess (You agree with this however) considering his claim that he had been a combat engineer. I found that very strange. Now upon further inquiry he let us know he was but a draftee and was mostly ducking in foxholes whilst they went off, which would explain his comments. You don't become an expert by witnessing 2 or 3 controlled detonations whilst ducking in a foxhole.
parsifal
Colonel
Plz lets's not start to divert from the original issue once more, we've done that enough already.
What Kruska I have been saying from the start is that a single 75mm HE shell is usually enough to bring down an ordinary two storey home. Now you're suddenly talking about reinforced buildings prepared for defense, which is not what Kruska and I were referring to.
I am not trying to divert from the original issue. And the original issue for me was that the inference was that in nearly every case it could be said that a building be brought down by a single round. I was specifically thinking about urban warfare cases, such as at ortona. I tried to make that very clear from an early point. I tend to agree with you guys, an individual, stand alone farmhouse out in the middle of nowhere is not good cover, because far from concealing your Infantry, it is exposing them.
My whole argument is mostly about groups of buildings....that is cities and large villages. Kruska has hinted (but then at times not hinted) that cities are not good defensive positions. I'm not sure about your position on this. However my position is this.....cities are very defensively advantageous positions. Taking a city is a tough assignment, for any army, but even more-so if you are light on on Infantry assets, and top heavy with armour. . Thats what I have been saying from the start, I am not sure that you are arguing that they arent, but Kruska seems to be saying that they (cities) are a defensive liability, which is something I hotly dispute.
Now, the ortona defence was NOT buildings that had been reinforced. It was a hasty defence....there had been some preparation, but nothing too major, some limited demolitions, to prevent easy access by tanks into the interior of the village, some booby trapping, and some placement of mines. This i would consider to be standard procedure when hastily preparing a city for defence.
But Ortona was NOT fortified, and the buildings not especially prepared, except some rudimentary connection of buildings (which may have been done already by the residents themselves...the report is unclear). There may or may not have been some sandbagging of buildings, but this appears very unlikely, given the time the Germans had to get into the city and prepare their defence. It was something typical of a standard defence, the types of preparations certainly anticipated and recommended in the British Infantry Regs (ie, if the defenders had been British, that is certainly the way they would have prepared the village). Moreover the Ortona battle demonstrated that after the initial break in the role of artillery was limited.
So I disagree that this example is not relevant. And i also disagree that this is a deviation of the debate, at least for me. From the very start i have been arguing context and construction....this argument about individual buildings has not been a point I have ever argued against....From the very beginning of my involvement in this discussion, I have said repeatedly, whether hiding in a building is the correct thing to do depends on its construction, and its context. Put another way, I mean whether there are a lot of buildings, and how well constructed they are,, and whether they have cellars, narrow streets, etc etc....
Remember that often you simply don't have time reinforce or prepare defensive positions inside buildings. Most city fighting was defending until the enemy came close and then running from building to building as either you or the enemy advanced.
I agree, but there is more to city defences than that, as the description of Ortona makes clear. generally, falling back onto a city you may have a few days or a week of preparation, and depending on th resources you have, it can be expected that the Ortona style preparations will be more or less typical in that scenario.
Parsifal the safety range for a frag grenade is 300m, at 230m there are still parts of the hand grenade which can kill or cause you serious injury, although cases of anyone struck at such ranges are extremely rare.
Well, the US regs say it was 230metres, in Australia you weren't allowed out of the safety bunker until the all clear had been given otherwise it was about 1 km to the range perimeter. But that is not the point. I am wanting to determine what is the effective range of a grenade.
The effective range of a hand grenade is the range out to which it is most likely to cause injuries, which is 15-20m. However beyond 15-20m it is still extremely dangerous, and even for a million bucks I wouldn't stand tall within 50m of one going off in open terrain.
The effective range at which you are 100% likely to cause injury is 15metres, according to the US TM. At 15 metres the probability of an assured kill is less than 100%, because the lethal range is listed as 5metres. Lethal range and casualty range are two different things. I have been calculating the probability of a kill at a certain range. If the probability of a kill is 200% at 5 metres, then at 50 metres the probability of a kill is 1%. Now, the probability of an injury i have never worked out. As a mechanical engineer you could work that out better than me.
Now considering that a 75mm HE shell packs roughly the same punch as 15 hangrenades going off at once I was astonished to say the least that Juha could doubt that anyone within 10m of one going off would be a real mess (You agree with this however)
I agree, but that is for exposed Infantry. if the infantry is entrenched or in some sort of proper protective cover, it will be different. An extreme example. If the Infantry is in a bunker, even a direct hit wont usually hurt them. I have not read Juhas earlier posts, but I suspect he was referring to infantry in cover when he said that .
One thing that does need to be made, however. In WWII, I have read it was rare for artillery to use shrapnel rounds. This was because shrapnel rounds were really only effective on exposed infantry. If shrapnel is not being used there is still flying debris, but not nearly so many, so the round is relying mostly on blast radius instead of shrapnel effect, for its lethality. Blast effect radii are generally much smaller than shrapnel effect, so even though the artillery round is many time the size of the grenade, it does not follow that its lethal radius is comparable on a linear basis.
In fact, the decrease in lethality as range as increased (comparing blast raddi of grenades and artillery rounds) is a 1/d3 relationship (if you assume a perfectly spherical burst pattern, which is not entirely true either)
considering his claim that he had been a combat engineer. I found that very strange. Now upon further inquiry he let us know he was but a draftee and was mostly ducking in foxholes whilst they went off, which would explain his comments. You don't become an expert by witnessing 2 or 3 controlled detonations whilst ducking in a foxhole.
Doesn't help the debate in any way, so I make no comment on this part
What Kruska I have been saying from the start is that a single 75mm HE shell is usually enough to bring down an ordinary two storey home. Now you're suddenly talking about reinforced buildings prepared for defense, which is not what Kruska and I were referring to.
I am not trying to divert from the original issue. And the original issue for me was that the inference was that in nearly every case it could be said that a building be brought down by a single round. I was specifically thinking about urban warfare cases, such as at ortona. I tried to make that very clear from an early point. I tend to agree with you guys, an individual, stand alone farmhouse out in the middle of nowhere is not good cover, because far from concealing your Infantry, it is exposing them.
My whole argument is mostly about groups of buildings....that is cities and large villages. Kruska has hinted (but then at times not hinted) that cities are not good defensive positions. I'm not sure about your position on this. However my position is this.....cities are very defensively advantageous positions. Taking a city is a tough assignment, for any army, but even more-so if you are light on on Infantry assets, and top heavy with armour. . Thats what I have been saying from the start, I am not sure that you are arguing that they arent, but Kruska seems to be saying that they (cities) are a defensive liability, which is something I hotly dispute.
Now, the ortona defence was NOT buildings that had been reinforced. It was a hasty defence....there had been some preparation, but nothing too major, some limited demolitions, to prevent easy access by tanks into the interior of the village, some booby trapping, and some placement of mines. This i would consider to be standard procedure when hastily preparing a city for defence.
But Ortona was NOT fortified, and the buildings not especially prepared, except some rudimentary connection of buildings (which may have been done already by the residents themselves...the report is unclear). There may or may not have been some sandbagging of buildings, but this appears very unlikely, given the time the Germans had to get into the city and prepare their defence. It was something typical of a standard defence, the types of preparations certainly anticipated and recommended in the British Infantry Regs (ie, if the defenders had been British, that is certainly the way they would have prepared the village). Moreover the Ortona battle demonstrated that after the initial break in the role of artillery was limited.
So I disagree that this example is not relevant. And i also disagree that this is a deviation of the debate, at least for me. From the very start i have been arguing context and construction....this argument about individual buildings has not been a point I have ever argued against....From the very beginning of my involvement in this discussion, I have said repeatedly, whether hiding in a building is the correct thing to do depends on its construction, and its context. Put another way, I mean whether there are a lot of buildings, and how well constructed they are,, and whether they have cellars, narrow streets, etc etc....
Remember that often you simply don't have time reinforce or prepare defensive positions inside buildings. Most city fighting was defending until the enemy came close and then running from building to building as either you or the enemy advanced.
I agree, but there is more to city defences than that, as the description of Ortona makes clear. generally, falling back onto a city you may have a few days or a week of preparation, and depending on th resources you have, it can be expected that the Ortona style preparations will be more or less typical in that scenario.
Parsifal the safety range for a frag grenade is 300m, at 230m there are still parts of the hand grenade which can kill or cause you serious injury, although cases of anyone struck at such ranges are extremely rare.
Well, the US regs say it was 230metres, in Australia you weren't allowed out of the safety bunker until the all clear had been given otherwise it was about 1 km to the range perimeter. But that is not the point. I am wanting to determine what is the effective range of a grenade.
The effective range of a hand grenade is the range out to which it is most likely to cause injuries, which is 15-20m. However beyond 15-20m it is still extremely dangerous, and even for a million bucks I wouldn't stand tall within 50m of one going off in open terrain.
The effective range at which you are 100% likely to cause injury is 15metres, according to the US TM. At 15 metres the probability of an assured kill is less than 100%, because the lethal range is listed as 5metres. Lethal range and casualty range are two different things. I have been calculating the probability of a kill at a certain range. If the probability of a kill is 200% at 5 metres, then at 50 metres the probability of a kill is 1%. Now, the probability of an injury i have never worked out. As a mechanical engineer you could work that out better than me.
Now considering that a 75mm HE shell packs roughly the same punch as 15 hangrenades going off at once I was astonished to say the least that Juha could doubt that anyone within 10m of one going off would be a real mess (You agree with this however)
I agree, but that is for exposed Infantry. if the infantry is entrenched or in some sort of proper protective cover, it will be different. An extreme example. If the Infantry is in a bunker, even a direct hit wont usually hurt them. I have not read Juhas earlier posts, but I suspect he was referring to infantry in cover when he said that .
One thing that does need to be made, however. In WWII, I have read it was rare for artillery to use shrapnel rounds. This was because shrapnel rounds were really only effective on exposed infantry. If shrapnel is not being used there is still flying debris, but not nearly so many, so the round is relying mostly on blast radius instead of shrapnel effect, for its lethality. Blast effect radii are generally much smaller than shrapnel effect, so even though the artillery round is many time the size of the grenade, it does not follow that its lethal radius is comparable on a linear basis.
In fact, the decrease in lethality as range as increased (comparing blast raddi of grenades and artillery rounds) is a 1/d3 relationship (if you assume a perfectly spherical burst pattern, which is not entirely true either)
considering his claim that he had been a combat engineer. I found that very strange. Now upon further inquiry he let us know he was but a draftee and was mostly ducking in foxholes whilst they went off, which would explain his comments. You don't become an expert by witnessing 2 or 3 controlled detonations whilst ducking in a foxhole.
Doesn't help the debate in any way, so I make no comment on this part
No it doesn't Parsifal, it says that fragments can fly as far as 230m away, hence the 300m safety range. At 230m there are still a few pieces of a grenade that can cause serious eínjury or even kill you, but chances of getting hit by one is 1 out of a million, and then tge chances of it killing you are probably just as high.
Not quite. The effective casualty range is the range which you are nearly 100% likely to cause serious injury, i.e. enough to put an individual out of the fight.
Agreed. (Again it's called the killing radius
)Very true, but rest assured that at 15m one is highly likely going to die as-well, maybe not instantly (Eventhough there's a high chance of that happening as-well) but not much after because of all the wounds one has suffered.
Parsifal remember that at 5m the blast effect is strong enough to kill you alone, while at 50m shrapnel is the killer.
Soren
Quote:"at 5m the blast effect is strong enough to kill you alone"
Source, please. Now Schu-mine or whatever, polkumiina in Finnish, anyway small wooden box anti-personel mine widely used by Soviets, Germans and Finns had some 80-120g TNT filling and exploded when one stepped on it and it did seldom killed the victim, and then by blood loss from damaged foot and possible from lower body also, the later wounds depending earth material blown up by the blast. Nearby other soldiers were not in danger from the blast effect alone. Of course depended the amount of explosive in handgranade but if defensive, IMHO WWII some 70-80g, offensive ?, maybe double of that, ie some 150-170g. Of course better blast effect if explodes in trench than in open. Meaning that if the target is also in the same trench.
Juha
Quote:"at 5m the blast effect is strong enough to kill you alone"
Source, please. Now Schu-mine or whatever, polkumiina in Finnish, anyway small wooden box anti-personel mine widely used by Soviets, Germans and Finns had some 80-120g TNT filling and exploded when one stepped on it and it did seldom killed the victim, and then by blood loss from damaged foot and possible from lower body also, the later wounds depending earth material blown up by the blast. Nearby other soldiers were not in danger from the blast effect alone. Of course depended the amount of explosive in handgranade but if defensive, IMHO WWII some 70-80g, offensive ?, maybe double of that, ie some 150-170g. Of course better blast effect if explodes in trench than in open. Meaning that if the target is also in the same trench.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
Parsifal remember that at 5m the blast effect is strong enough to kill you alone, while at 50m shrapnel is the killer.
Thats why the probability model says 200%. There is a 100% (ie prob = 1)chance that the shrapnel will kill you, and also a 100% probability that the burst effect effect will kill you. Total probability = 200%, or prob = 2.
Even with those assumptions, the probability of a kill at 50 metres is down to 1.1%. If you want the breakdown, its just over 1% due to fragments, and just under 0.1% due to blast. Total probability of a kill at 50 metres is 0.011
The assumptions here are as follows.
Prob of a Kill = 2 @ 5 metres
Burst and shrapnel effect are both perfectly spherical and symmetrical (I know this is not true, but for the purposes of this excercise it doesnt matter)
Blast effect is a function of volume, whilst shrapnel effect is a function of surface area. As a mechanical engineer you should know that, and why, but if not, I can explain it more if you need explanation
The results are able to be predicted with absolute mathematical certainty. No guesswork at all is needed. Provided the starting assumptions are correct.
We caqn do exactly the same for prob (casualty) if you want.
Thats why the probability model says 200%. There is a 100% (ie prob = 1)chance that the shrapnel will kill you, and also a 100% probability that the burst effect effect will kill you. Total probability = 200%, or prob = 2.
Even with those assumptions, the probability of a kill at 50 metres is down to 1.1%. If you want the breakdown, its just over 1% due to fragments, and just under 0.1% due to blast. Total probability of a kill at 50 metres is 0.011
The assumptions here are as follows.
Prob of a Kill = 2 @ 5 metres
Burst and shrapnel effect are both perfectly spherical and symmetrical (I know this is not true, but for the purposes of this excercise it doesnt matter)
Blast effect is a function of volume, whilst shrapnel effect is a function of surface area. As a mechanical engineer you should know that, and why, but if not, I can explain it more if you need explanation
The results are able to be predicted with absolute mathematical certainty. No guesswork at all is needed. Provided the starting assumptions are correct.
We caqn do exactly the same for prob (casualty) if you want.
