Tank busters for the air forces?

New technology is nice but Germany doesn't require it. Just different production priorities.

Several German aircraft types were able to kill tanks. However experts such as Rudel and Neumann preferred the Ju-87. I've got to assume they knew what they were talking about. So the Ju-87 will be the standard German tank busting aircraft.

This presents a problem as so few Ju-87s were produced historically.
1939. 134.
1940. 603.
1941. 500. Ju-87D introduced during 1941.
1942. 960.
1943. 1,672.
1944. 1,012. Ju-87 production ends.

Our minimum objective should be 1,200 Ju-87s operational on the Russian front. This would provide 100 army divisions with a single Ju-87 squadron for CAS. To meet the objective Ju-87D production will be quadrupled to 2,000 aircraft during 1941. IMO entirely reasonable for an inexpensive single engine aircraft. Engines are not a problem as Germany had plenty of Jumo 211s.

We will speed introduction and production of the 3.7cm gun pod for the Ju-87. No new technology. Just different production priorities.

We will increase production of existing cluster munitions so they are widely available for Ju-87 units.

We will fund development of an improved AT bomblet that is smaller and less expensive then the SD4. Ultimately we want an effective 100kg AT cluster munition that is inexpensive to mass produce. This would allow a Ju-87D or Fw-190F to carry two under each wing plus a drop tank under the fuselage.

Glider said:

Some of the 2TAF strikes against buildings had a respectable hit rate. It depends on the building but most would need more than one to knock it down

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According to Operational Research Section 2nd Tactical Air Force Report No.20 "The Accuracy of Rocket Firing at Armament Practice Camps" 10% of rockets fired would hit a large building,defined as 120'x54'x50'. One aircraft firing eight rockets might reasonably,statistically,expect to score at least one hit. It had a slightly better than 50% chance.

Only 2.8% of rockets fired would hit an Army hut,considered to be 60'x30'x20', so one aircraft firing eight rockets was statistically unlikely to hit it.

Hitting a tank was an altogether more difficult proposition with only 0.5% of rockets fired scoring a hit.

This was at practice camps,not in theatre where the attacking aircraft might themselves expect to be opposed by various types of Flak.

Cheers
Steve

Edit. BTW the rather odd size of the large building equates to a horizontal projected area,from a 45 degree dive,of 1,000 square yards. There is reason in their madness!

Fw 190F-8

Against the enemy tanks and armoured vehicles we usually made skip bombing attacks, running in at speeds of around 485 k.m./h. [300 m.p.h.] at between 4 and 10 m [15 and 30 ft] above the ground and releasing the bomb just as the tank disappeared beneath our engine cowling. The 250 kg bombs used during these attacks would either skip off the ground and into the tank, or else smash straight into the tank, the bombs were fused with a one second delay to give us time to get clear before they went off. It was a very accurate form of attack and we used it often against tanks we caught in open country

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This method may work but flying directly over an enemy tank at an altitude of 10 meters exposes the CAS aircraft to fire from every machinegun in the vicinity. Even a point blank anti-infantry weapon such as the 92mm Nbw grenade launcher (standard on most late war German tanks) has a chance to hurt the aircraft. Dropping a cluster bomb from 500 meters is still plenty dangerous but it's a vast improvement over dropping an iron bomb from 10 meters.

Great find - a skip bombing of a tank is as great as it sounds
As for level of danger: a bomb run done at 500 ft altitude is way more dangerous (for the airplane) than an one made at 10m. The plane dashing at 10m is a tough thing to spot, let alone to train the MG/cannon against it.

The USAAF 9th Air Force pilots tried to "bounce" their .50 Calibre machine gun rounds off a roadway or hard surface in an attempt to strike the underside of a tank but this did not involve making the virtually suicidal attack described above.

I don't have the book mentioned in the link. I wonder which pilot and what unit was making this type of attack.

Cheers
Steve

tomo pauk said:

Great find - a skip bombing of a tank is as great as it sounds
As for level of danger: a bomb run done at 500 ft altitude is way more dangerous (for the airplane) than an one made at 10m. The plane dashing at 10m is a tough thing to spot, let alone to train the MG/cannon against it.

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Except that the attacking aircraft would have to descend and fly straight and level on a direct course for the intended target for some time. This goes against everything that the pilots of the Western Allies were taught to do when attacking ground targets. The attacking German fighter is not altering its bearing or elevation relative to the target's guns,and is only altering its bearing slowly relative to nearby weapons,for several seconds which has to be a very dangerous tactic.
I was taught as a boy that my best chance of hitting a rabbit (with a shotgun) was if it ran directly away from me. A German fighter flying directly at me in level flight presents the same easy solution.
Cheers
Steve

a bomb run done at 500 ft altitude is way more dangerous (for the airplane) than an one made at 10m.

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Who am I to doubt an air defense expert?
However I still think cluster munitions are preferable to iron bombs for tank busting. Even a green pilot can hit a tank with an AB250 container from an altitude of 10 meters.

If your standard attack altitude is 10 meters then a dive bomber such as the Ju-87 offers little advantage. Might as well use some Fw-190Fs at low altitude to supplement Ju-87s diving from 3,000 meters.

Who am I to doubt an air defense expert?

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Diving down from altitude and leveling off at 4-10 meters at 300 mph isn't something a green pilot is going to be able to do very consistently. 30 feet at 300mph is only a eyeblink away from -1 ft. And terrain isn't usually flat anywhere in the world i've been, flying 12-30 ft at 300mph over most terrain is going to take a experienced pilot, or you're just gonna end up with a lot of instant burials.
But if you get down that low the only weapons that's going to be able to follow you is one you're headed directly for, or from. Most Russian and Axis tanks only had the main gun and hull MG, they're not going to be shooting at you, western tanks were the only ones with the turret hatch mounted .50 or .30.

The Russian tanks sometimes had several tank riders, they might be shooting, or they might be looking for cover.

I know from my own experience in Vietnam, you avoid those middle altitudes, it's either 50 feet and below, or above 3000 agl. 500 ft might be above small arms, except for a golded BB, but that's about ideal height for light flak.

With top MG in the hands, tank's commander can be shredded by planes MGs/cannons. I agree that flying at such low altitudes is a risky business, maybe just slightly lower than at the altitudes where light AAA can get you.

Does anyone know who was using this tactic?
I'm not doubting a quote repeated by Price,I would just like to back it up with some hard evidence.
Cheers
Steve

stona said:

According to Operational Research Section 2nd Tactical Air Force Report No.20 "The Accuracy of Rocket Firing at Armament Practice Camps" 10% of rockets fired would hit a large building,defined as 120'x54'x50'. One aircraft firing eight rockets might reasonably,statistically,expect to score at least one hit. It had a slightly better than 50% chance.

Only 2.8% of rockets fired would hit an Army hut,considered to be 60'x30'x20', so one aircraft firing eight rockets was statistically unlikely to hit it.

Hitting a tank was an altogether more difficult proposition with only 0.5% of rockets fired scoring a hit.

This was at practice camps,not in theatre where the attacking aircraft might themselves expect to be opposed by various types of Flak.

Cheers
Steve

Edit. BTW the rather odd size of the large building equates to a horizontal projected area,from a 45 degree dive,of 1,000 square yards. There is reason in their madness!

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I stand corrected, thanks for this its always good to pick up info like this

parsifal said:

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I would claim this to be fairly consisten with my guesstimate of 900 rockets at least half of which were napalm fired by 21st CAG an d 77 TFW to destroy or disable 80 tanks.

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The problem though is that the controlled trial results I quoted were highly inconsistent with actual combat results in Korea in the only period where we know those results with any degree of certainty. Again, UN a/c in the period June-Nov 1950 claimed at least 1100 North Korean tanks destroyed, and a pretty extensive survey report concluded that only on the order of 100 had actually been destroyed by a/c (both of which are fairly rough numbers as discussed above, but the ordre of magnitude is clear). If results like those in the trials were common in actual combat, it stands to reason the rate of overclaim would have been much lower (though a/c are still naturally prone to overclaims v tanks by 'killing' the same tanks multiple times, even before decoys are considered). And in the RAF case 1944 we have a direct estimate of the variation between trial and combat results, both of which have been quoted in the thread. A controlled trial yielded 3 for 64 or around 5%, but operations research concluded that the average combat hit rate was more like 0.5%.

Again, there were no on-the-ground verifications of UN aerial claims of Communist tanks destroyed after Nov 1950, so simply no evidence as to how many actual tanks destroyed are represented by the 80 claims you mention. The 1950 results would imply the 80 claims might correspond to around a half dozen different tanks actually destroyed. Although it could have been many more. Or it could have been fewer or none at all especially considering the possiblity of tank decoys when striking the essentially static Communist armies in that period. That wasn't as much of a factor in the initial mobile phase of the Korean War, nor in France in 1944.

I have lots of war diaries of air units in Korea. USMC ones in particular are often very detailed. We could also go through their claims for tanks destroyed '51-'52 period (including their carrier ops in the Yellow Sea: small USN carriers with a Marine F4U sdn and RN/RAN light carriers rotated in that duty, exact same missions) and find the types and amount of ordnance they used to do it mission by mission. But, we just couldn't conclude anything solid from it, as far as effectiveness: we have no way of estimating their actual success, and previous examples like 1950 and 1944 refute the idea estimating their success by assuming it would closely follow trial results.

Joe

JoeB said:

Again, UN a/c in the period June-Nov 1950 claimed at least 1100 North Korean tanks destroyed, and a pretty extensive survey report concluded that only on the order of 100 had actually been destroyed by a/c
Joe

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Interestingly that claim to loss ratio almost exactly reflects that in a report compiled by Wing Commander Graham and Squadron Leader Abel of ORS 2nd TAF. They were based at Aywaille in the Ardennes salient from where they carried out an extensive ground search for tanks destroyed by the Air Forces,in this case primarily the USAAF.
They concluded.

"For every hundred claims we could only find one tank indubitably destroyed by air."

I really need to put the books away and get on with my crashed Fw190 "fliegerdenkmal" diorama

Cheers
Steve

I have located an article by Fred Lane, who I believe works at the Australian National Maritime Museum in Sydney, in an article titled " Operation Strangle: Naval aviation in Korea." delivered to the Naval Officers Club in July 2004 HMAS Sydney's ground strikes undertaken in her 11 patrols yielded the following results

"According to verifiable results from the CBAL section(CBAL is, I think, the Australian intelligence operational research section attached to the Australian command based in Japan....I think) Sydney's aircraft, in total, killed 1428 troops, destroyed 7 armoured vehicles(my mistake.....I didnt recall correctly, or perhaps the reference to 80 tanks is the claimed casualty number, and 7 is the actual number) , 7 field guns, and destroyed 47 rail and 4 road bridges. Most of these bridges had, of course, been dropped more than once. The aircraft had demolished more than 1000 buildings or troop shelters, sunk 39 junks and 66 sampans or barges and destroyed 234 MT and horse drawn vehicles of various kinds (including trucks and ox carts). Sixteen ammunition dumps and seven fuel dumps were blown up".

To achieve this outcome, the flew just over 1607 strike sorties, expended 802 bombs and 6359 three-inch rockets. In total 240000 rounds of 20mm ammunition was expended by the air group.

Langs analysis of Sydneys air/ground results, he notes RAN operational technmiques and usual load outs...." RAN Fireflies were used extensively for for bridge-dropping and tunnel-blocking tasks. They usually carried two 500 lb bombs and 240 rounds of 20 mm for this task and adopted a a 30-degree dive bomb to a 10-degree anti-submarine glide bomb profile, with 37-second delay fuses, Firefly pilots became expert at dropping bridge spans and blocking tunnels. For armed reconnaissance sorties of the road, rail and waterways networks, RAN Sea Furies typically carried eight three-inch ballistic rockets with 60 lb HE heads, 600 rounds of 20 mm and two 45-gallon drop tanks. Unlike the RAAF, USAF and USN, no RAN aircraft ever carried napalm in Korea"(another mistaken assumption by me apparently. According to RAAF sources I have looked at, Napalm bombs were not used by them in Korea until Feb 1952).

When carrying bombs, the Fireflies could carry 4x 60lb RPs at the same time. With two bombs per a/c, and 802 bombs dropped, the maximum number of targets destroyed by bomb ordinance cannot exceed 401 targets (both bombs have to be droped simultaneously). From the information provided in Langs paper, we know that there were 1404 targets hit and destroyed. There is no information on near misses. Deducting the 401 targets destroyed by bombs (assumed), and disregarding the 1428 personnel killed (a fair bet they perished by strafing anyway) we arrive at a figure of 1003 targets destroyed by rocket attack, or at least likely to have been destroyed by rocket attack. And just to drive the point home, RAN reporting procedures were the far more conservative than either the USN, or the USAF at this time.

1003 targets destroyed by 6359 projectiles is an accuracy rate of 15.7%. That takes no account of near misses or direct hits. This analysis works on the principal of "if its destroyed it counts toward the projectiles accuracy."

Lang notes that RAN reporting standards were far higher and conservative compared to those used by either the USN or the RN. He states "RAN aircrew claims were deliberately conservative. For instance, RAN aircrew claimed a North Korean Army divisional headquarters building destroyed in 6 October 1951 raid, but nothing else. An American Army ground-based intelligence source, "Leopard", credited the same raid with not only destroying that building but also many troops, stores, vehicles, outlying shacks and other booty. RAN aircrew found this very hard to believe and it was never included in any formal RAN damage claims

Conversely, reliable reports plus good photographic data led to Sydney claiming no rail or road bridge standing in the RAN sector on completion of one patrol in late November 1951. That included the important main rail line running south from Pyongyang. Days later, a major USAF intelligence summary reported rail traffic unhindered and operating at normal capacity throughout North Korea. Again, RAN aircrew found this hard to believe, at least for the sector they controlled.

It was perhaps no coincidence that about that time that even the USAF Fifth Air Force was trying to convince the CinCFE (GENL Ridgway, who had relieved the sacked GENL MacArthur in April 1951) that it was time to change its costly Operation Strangle strategy"

Lang then produces some photograhs that show a number of bridges withinn the Sydneys operational sector as clearly destroyed.....

Diving down from altitude and leveling off at 4-10 meters at 300 mph isn't something a green pilot is going to be able to do very consistently.

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Experienced Fw-190f pilots did a power dive @ a 50 degree angle. That way you get below effective AA range as quickly as possible. A green pilot would probably dive at a shallower angle and lower rate of speed, making it easier for someone like tomo pauk to put a couple 30mm rounds into your aircraft. That's the price you pay for poor pilot training.

Your starting altitude is about 3,000 meters. The dive to 10 meters should only take a minute. It will take tomo that long to put down his doughnut and coffee cup. 8)

With regard to the effects of RP firing aircraft in sinking U-Boats, it needs to be understood that rockets were seldom used as the only weapon in a given attack. A far more usual method was to deliver a rocket attack and then follow that up immediately with a pattern of depth charges from the same aircraft. Consequently it is difficult to know what was the cause of the U-Boat sinking.

Neither is the total number of sinkings by aircraft all that helpful. The peak month of U-boat losses to aircraft was July 1943, when 34 were lost to aircraft, either wholly or partially due to air attacks. At that time all attacks were either bomb or DC attacks or both. Coastal Command A/C were only flying an average of 200 hours per attack , compared to 800 hours per attack in 1944. The reason for this is primarily the changes in U-Boat tactics. Whereas in July they were remaining surfaced and attempting to fight it out with CC, and generally following a more or less direct route to the western approaches, by January 1944, the U-Boats were remaining submerged by day, and only briefly surfacing by night to recharge batteries. they were also taking enormous detours to avoid CC, via the coasts of Spain and similar.

Howerver between July 1943 and January 1944, RP became more or less part of the standard arsenal of CC and the USN CVEs operating in the Atlantic (and the RN CVEs as well) In July the number of sinkings per airborne attack was 11.5%....that is, 11.5% of attacks carried out resulted in the loss of the U-Boat. By January 1944, whilst the total number of attacks had dropped, of those attacks were far more lethal. Fully 35% of attack made resulted in the loss of the U-Boat. And nearly all attacks by January 1944 involved either rocket attacks, or Molins Gun (or equivalent) attacks.

There are, of course other factors at work here. For one thing, whereas in 1943 the U-Boats were concentrating less on concelament and more on firing back (which had to have had an effect on accuracy) by 1944 they were hardly firing back at all, and were relying on concelament. by definition, then, if they were being attacked, their primary means of defense (their concealment) was already compromised. Still, one cannot help but think that the RPs were improving the lethality of the aircraft that used them.....that was certainly the view of the crews involved.

It should also be remembered that, in a lot of cases, the rockets fired backwards; the early manifestation of MAD gear was in the western approaches to the Mediterranean, where U-boats passed through submerged, but not far below the surface. The aircraft (often a B-24) flew over, and, if the magnetic gear was activated, fired its rockets back at the spot, then turned and followed up with depth charges.

Lets call the armoured formation that Tomo wants to attack "lightly defended", in terms of Flak.

The RAF would attack this with a dive bombing attack. A relatively steep dive angle was considered essential for safety and accuracy. My scanner is bust so I can't post the contemporary diagram I have but I can repeat the explanatory notes.

"When in vicinity of target section changes to echelon starboard. The leader when over the target allows it to pass under the leading edge of his port wing as in second phase in diagram.When the target reappears at trailing edge the leader executes a semi stalled turn to port,followed by the other aircraft of his section. The result of this manoeuvre is a line astern attack at a steep angle on the reciprocal of the original course as shown in the third phase of the diagram. After releasing bombs,all aircraft make a violent evasive turn in a prearranged direction and reform in a section line abreast."

At no point do any aircraft fly straight and level.

The RAF did make low level attacks. These were carried out in a dive at about 30 degrees with the bombs released at about 800' and the aircraft flying at high speed to escape small calibre and light flak as well as fragments and debris from their own bombs.Typhoons attacked in pairs using bombs fitted with short delay fuses (like the Fw190s) so that the second pair attacked just after the first's bombs had exploded. Such attacks were considerd extremely hazardous and an RAF report warned that four aircraft going down in two pairs was all that could reasonably expected to get away with this type of attack.

Again this is a diving attack,albeit ffrom a shallow angle,and at no point are the attacking aircraft flying straight and level which the RAF considered suicidal.

Cheers
Steve

That probably has a lot do do with poor accuracy. Cluster munitions are essential for dive attacks on armored vehicles. Even when using a Ju-87, which is inheritly more accurate then any fighter-bomber.