Tank busters for the air forces?

[stona]

The abandoning or destruction of tanks by their own crews fell into an area which noone,including the various ORS at the time could quantify. This was the degradation of morale caused by constant air attack by an enemy with total air supremacy. Some consider this,rather than any physical destruction,to have been the most important contribution of allied air power in North Western Europe.
There is no doubt that other factors applied to that statistic as well. The soldiers would argue that it was the approach of "feet on the ground" that caused the abandonment and destruction of so many tanks by their crews. The truth lies somewhere between the two.

In the Falaise pocket (and elsewhere) the Germans were unable to resupply their tanks and other vehicles. With no fuel or ammunition they were always going to be abandoned. I have never suggested that the allied Air Forces didn't have a hand in this. It was Rommel and various other German commanders,not me,who said that they were not a decisive factor.

Another report on the effect of air power on the stemming of the Ardennes offensive said whilst the allied Air Forces had made a considerable contribution this

"was not by the direct destruction of armour,which appears to have been insignificant; but rather by the strafing and bombing of supply routes,which prevented essential supplies from reaching the front"

This is not CAS.

The thread was about tank busting aircraft and in this role ALL allied fighter bombers in North West Europe were virtually useless.

I did miss the other Commonwealth Vengeance squadrons. I was quoting from notes rather than Smith's book.
4 RAAF squadrons used the type in combat.

21 Squadron used it for two weeks in New Guinea in January 1944 before the type was withdrawn. The squadron returned to Australia and converted to Liberators.

23 Squadron used theirs supporting American troops around Saidor for less than a month in February 1944 before they too converted to Liberators.

24 Squadron used the Vengeance,in combat and as a dive bomber from August 1943 until March 1944,a decent period,before they returned to Australia and converted to the Liberator.

25 Squadron used the Vengeance in various Army support roles from August 1943 right through until January 1945.

I'm not aware of any reports or comparisons of the Australian use of these aircraft,unlike their British and Indian colleagues but I'm all ears if anyone has some information on them.

I have a note about RNZAF personel at Amberley in Australia with the word "Vengeance" in brackets. Not sure what I meant,anyone able to cast some light on New Zealand use of the aircraft? Of the 24 or so RNZAF squadrons that fought in the Pacific were any Vengeance equipped?
I simply don't have time to go trawling through my library

Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

1950 is a different ball game as most aircraft should have been equipped with gyro stabilized gun and bomb sights. FF rockets were available too and cluster bombers were more widely used. Weapons accuracy should have been much better then during 1940.

 

[Juha]

IMHO one should not be too pessimistic on the effects of air attacks on tanks, while generally ineffective, there were exceptions, for ex. P-47s at Dompaire, LW CAS planes during Orel Bulge fighting mid-July –early Aug 43, Hurricane IIDs in Africa, when they caught panzers in open without AA support and in India/Burma during Imphal fighting. These all are verified results. Also Il-2s made effective strikes against 8.PzD in 44, but I cannot remember was it only soft targets which suffered or also Panzern.

Juha

 

[tomo pauk]

Hello, Steve,

...
The thread was about tank busting aircraft and in this role ALL allied fighter bombers in North West Europe were virtually useless.
...

I really appreciate your input at this thread (and other constructive stuff from other people), but I'm afraid you're slightly wrong at the quoted sentence.
The thread is not about tank busting aircraft that existed, but rather about how the dedicated tank buster for the air forces would've looked like if we go for an ideal plane's layout. The second part of the sentence is okay, and sorta makes the point that Allies could've used such a plane - a big gunned craft, hopefully well armored, and, by 1944, able to carry a significant 'suppressing' weaponry (or more big guns).

 

[stona]

I have found at least a partial explanation for the tendency of tank crews to bale out under air attack from rocket firing aircraft. It comes from "Tactical Buletin no.45" from RAF No.38 Group and is from October 1944.

"Interrogation of prisoners has shown without question that German tank crews are extremely frightened of attacks by RP (rocket projectiles).
Crews are very aware that if an RP does hit a tank,their chance of survival is small. It is admitted that the chances of a direct hit are slight;nevertheless,this would hardly be appreciated by a crew whose first thought would be of the disastrous results if a hit was obtained".

Also from ORS 2nd TAF/No.2 ORS joint report No.3

"Experienced crews stated that when attacked from the air they remained in their tanks which had no more than superficial damage,cannon strikes or near misses from bombs. They had great difficulty in preventing the inexperienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked".

Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

hi Steve

I want to repeat again my opinion that the chances of a direct hit by an RP are very small, but still not so small as to be irrelevant. the threat of rocket attack were very real. i have said repeatedly that the generally accepted number for WWII era CAS was about 1%. Quite possibly the abandonment due to fear of attack is another possibility, though I would surmise that is less likely than we would like to think. I think caution, and the will to survive is a better way of describing the human factors. What i think would be highly likely, is a german tank, bailed up in cover, but being pressured by ground forces, but too concerned about air attack to move because of the fear of crossing open ground due to the air attack threat. Whilst not particularly glamorous it still attaches value to rocket firing aircraft, or any other ground attack aircraft. It certainly was the case in 1940, when German Stuka attacks, or the threat of them, caused the so-called 'finest army in Europe" at that time 9the french army) to lose its nerve on countless critical occasions

You mentioned somewhereabout rommels quotes on airpower. The best one i know are his comments pertaining in Alam halfa, where, the Rommel papers he states "…non-stop and very heavy air attacks by the R.A.F., whose command of the air had been virtually complete, had pinned my army to the ground and rendered any smooth deployment or any advance by time-schedule completely impossible" that suggests to me that like the abandonment issue, on an army wide scale, sustained CAS would pin the army, and prevent its freedom of movement, and again, as the French campaign clearly shows, mobility is far more important to an army's effectiveness than any other factor, including firepower. Surely you will agree that CAS denied mobility to the germans . Viewed in those terms, allied CAs was not just a thing 'nice to have....it was absolutely critical to allied victory. the allies could not afford manpower wise to get into a heavy slugging match with the germans, yet most post war studies clearly shhow that man for man, without airpower, the Germans enjoyed a significant qualitative advantage over the allied armies. The Dupuy institute have made an indepth analysis of this as i recall. The comparisons are not great exercises military analysis, but revealing just the same. without the effects of airpower, in 1940, the "average" german soldier (in the context of his organization) was the equivalent of 2.63 british soldiers. By September 1944, that ratio was down to about 1.53, from memory. With airpower effects thrown in, and the superiority of British army mobility that superiority was completely turned around....


Field Marshal Rommel's reaction to being pinned to the ground by Allied tactical air was a repetition of the feelings he had expressed during the dark days of 1942, when confronted with the effects of the DAF. Already by June 9, Admiral Ruge was writing that "the air superiority of the enemy is having the effect the Field Marshal had expected and predicted: our movements are extremely slow." The next day, Rommel wrote to his wife: "The enemy's air superiority has a very grave effect on our movements. There's simply no answer to it." In walks with Ruge, Rommel continued to complain about the invasion situation, "especially the lack of air support." Ruge concluded that "utilization of the Anglo-American air force is the modern type of warfare, turning the flank not from the side but from above." The situation turned increasingly bleak. By July 6, during a dinner party, a "colonel of a propaganda battalion" remarked that soldiers were constantly asking "Where is the Luftwaffe?"

 

[stona]

Hello, Steve,
I really appreciate your input at this thread (and other constructive stuff from other people), but I'm afraid you're slightly wrong at the quoted sentence.

You are quite correct of course,sorry for the misquote.
I would say that because of inter-service rivalries as well as doctrinal and cultural reasons the Anglo-American allies were never going to invest in any specific tank busting aircraft. Their own intelligence showed that they didn't need one.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

At the battle of Mortain the Germans committed 70 Panthers,75 MkIVs and 32 self-propelled guns (177 vehicles). The attack was halted on 7th August nine miles short of Avranches. Everyone,including the Germans was convinced it had been halted by the intervention of 83 Groups rocket firing Typhoons.They were supported by P-47 fighter bombers and the rare rocket firing P-47s from the USAAF 9th Air Force. Other American fighters ensured that the Luftwaffe fighters meant to cover the advance didn't get within forty miles of the action. The British flew 294 sorties and the Americans 200 in good weather,it should have been a slaughter. When two different ORS examined the battlefield they did not miss a single German vehicle,even doing an air reconnaissance of the battlefield. They found only 46 tanks and SPGs in the area and only NINE had been destroyed from the air. German PoWs were adamant that tanks hit from the air were never recovered as they were inevitably irepairable.The histories of both the 2nd Panzer Division and 1st SS Panzer Division (Liebstandarte Adolph Hitler) greatly exaggerate the effect of the air attack,though not quite as wildly as the RAF pilots' claims. Attacking pilots said that their attacks caused great confusion and that they saw German tank crews bailing out and running for cover,regardless of whether their tanks were blocking the road. This is the psychological effect of such attacks

Rommel did suffer at the hands of the Desert Air Force. Particularly effective was the Hurricane IID with its 40mm cannon. We have already seen that cannon or MG were by far the most accurate weapons for a fighter bomber. So impressed was Rommel that he is said to have taken a sample of one of the armour piecing shells that the RAF (and SAAF) had been shooting at his tanks back to Germany,when illness compelled his return after the battle of Alam Halfa in September 1942.
The most important thing the RAF took from the Desert Air Forces North African operations was the basis for the command and control of Close Air Support operations developed by Coningham which was fused with the system developed in 1940 (after the French debacle) by Group Captain Wann and Colonel Woodhall who carried out various experiments in the relative safety of Northern Ireland.

The allied Air Forces certainly denied both freedom of movement, by day, and the ability of the Germans to concentrate their forces. They fighter bombers were also effective as a phsychological weapon and produced a real collapse in some units ability to fight. One officer described the effect of a few rocketing Typhoons on a German unit as being greater than a creeping artillery barrage.
They were also effective in an interdiction role,not so much against infra structure as supply lines,soft skinned vehicles,tankers,which could be accurately attacked with cannon and machine guns.

As an aside,and supporting evidence from Korea,a direct hit from an RP was the only means of disabling or destroying a tank.
A trial was conducted in 1944 by the RAF using a captured Panther tank. It was set up as a stationary target and attacked by rocket firing Typhoons. 64 rockets were fired and a total of three hits achieved. One hit the tanks engine cover and exploded inside igniting the remnants of oil and petrol. One hit the side of the turret and exploded and one struck the tank's gun barrel. These hits showed that the rockets could penetrate all but the frontal armour of the Panther hull or turret but it was considered that even hits here might cause casualties amongst the crew. The rocket had no near miss value with blast and splinters of nearby ground strikes causing no damage.
This is from Appendix F of No.83 Group ORB "Trial to determine the effect of an RP fitted with a 60lb H.E. shell on a German Panther tank",July-August 1944.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Lucky13]

Here's a question, could the Bofors 40mm have been worked on, to be made into an aircraft born tank cracking gun?

 

[JoeB]

1950 is a different ball game as most aircraft should have been equipped with gyro stabilized gun and bomb sights. FF rockets were available too and cluster bombers were more widely used. Weapons accuracy should have been much better then during 1940.

No this is incorrect. The weapons used were as mentioned in the causes of tank loss according to wreck surveys: napalm, rockets (mainly HVAR, some 6.5" ATAR which was HVAR with HEAT warhead, no folding fin rockets were used at that time), bombs and .50 cal/20mm strafing in order of number of known kills. No AT cluster bombs were used. The a/c involved had the same types of gyro gunsights used late in WWII, like the K14, which had no air to ground computing mode, you can read that in the pilot's manuals for F-51's and F-80's to see it explained. And many or the a/c themselves were WWII produced, like the F-51D's and USN/USMC F4U-4's, and others very comparable to WWII a/c like the AD. The main difference in a/c was that a fair % were straightwing jets like the F-80.

But on the whole the situation of a/c AT operations Korea was quite comparable technologically to that of typical 'Western style' (non heavy gun, non cluster weapon) AT a/c of late WWII. And it's well documented. Also, while comparable technologies were used, it's a useful alternative example to a question which can otherwsie perhaps get too narrowly focused on just the campaign in France in 1944. Note for example that some 9th AF fighter bombers in 1944 also used napalm though it's less often mentioned in discussions of that campaign. Some units believed it the most effective AT weapon available, and this is confirmed in study of the the early Korean War example.

And also though similar technologies were used and some aspects of the results were similar to NW Europe, like the very high overclaim rate, other aspects were not the same, like the fact that a significant % of the enemy tank losses in the 1950 campaing were to a/c. In fact there's little question IMO that air action was the biggest single factor in neutralizing the KPA tank threat. The early successful actions of US medium tanks (like M4 and M26) and the 3.5" bazooka v the T-34 are often celebrated, but first occurred weeks and days respectively after the KPA tank threat had actually crested. Air attacks in the first week and a half of July not only largely stripped the KPA tanks of their support vehicles as many POW's later related, but inflicted relatively heavy losses on the tanks themselves, particularly when a large KPA armor column was stalled south of Pyeontaek July 11, 1950, and an estimated 38 were (actually) destroyed. Thereafter the KPA tanks were never used quite as aggressively or in the same numbers in any one place. Most of the subsequent KPA successes in the first phase of the war were infantry-centered, though other interesting armor actions were also fought.

Joe

 

[stona]

Napalm was extensively used by the 9th AF. It was considered effective against armour though it was not used in close proximity to friendly troops.

The 9th's own ORS described how it reduced German defensive effectiveness.

"Heavy artillery and/or GP bombing destroys or damages buildings,communications facilities,prepared defences. Consequently the enemy must utilise masses of rubble and smashed houses as defensive positions.Napalm,upon the devastated area renders these temporary emplacements untenable,causes fires to take hold in the wreckage and drives the enemy into the open. The enemy troops who are not evacuated have,in a majority of cases,taken refuge in cellars and are subject to assault without being able to offer effective resistance."

It was also effective against targets which you might not expect. It was used against pill boxes and other fortifications.

"(the napalm) had a tremendous psychological and physical effect upon the enemy troops occupying the defences outside the pill boxes. These outer defences were given up because of the napalm attack,forcing the enemy troops into the pill boxes. This enabled our attacking troops to get to the rear of these fortifications,utilise pole charges and sieze the pill boxes.
PoWs stated that napalm did not bother them while they were in pill boxes,however the demoralising effect was great and fear of further attack by 'fire bombs' persuaded them to stay in their pill boxes"

Cheers
Steve

 

[Juha]

Here's a question, could the Bofors 40mm have been worked on, to be made into an aircraft born tank cracking gun?

Why not, it was much heavier than 40mm S gun, but if one developed a reliable autoloader, why not. Hungarians modified 4 Me 210Ca-1s with a M36 4cm Bofors, but probably for use against 4-engine bombers. But there were at least an AP and an AP-Tracker shells for the Bofors, at least Finns had them.

Juha

 

[JoeB]

QUOTE=stona;895634]A trial was conducted in 1944 by the RAF using a captured Panther tank. It was set up as a stationary target and attacked by rocket firing Typhoons. 64 rockets were fired and a total of three hits achieved..
[/QUOTE]
For completeness, the comparable live fire trial results by USAF v captured T-34's were as follows, per a memo to 5th AF Hq Oct 7 1950:
5" HVAR v tank: F-80C's carrying 4 HVAR
Part I: rockets fired one per pass, 28 of 32 functioned properly, 1 hit, pentrated top of turret and completely destroyed the tank; one near miss did cut the tank's track (misrecalled that before) and a later near miss it was believed would have if the track had still been there.
Part II: first pass one rocket, second pass rippling off the remaining 3, 21 of 24 functioned properly, one hit blew off front sprocket and penetrated tank's side armor, tank considered destroyed.
Part III: all four rockets in ripple, 15 of 16 functioned properly, 3 hit all penetrating the turret.
6.5" ATAR v tank, four rockets fired in ripple, 19 of 20 functioned but none hit (a test stateside showed that an ATAR placed against the side armor of an M26 was effective).

In total 5 hits (plus two near misses judged at least partly effective) in 83 shots if including the ATAR's. Again the F-80C's had no 'high tech' fire control systems which came much later, and if anything their higher speed might have been considered a liability to accuracy compared to prop planes. And indeed a similar test, but against just a simulated T-34 target area, conducted in Japan around the same time, F-51D's scored 20 simulated hits in 147 shots. That test like the F-80 test also included trials of single shot v ripple fire and six shot ripples were found optimum with 7 for 47, 15%, hits. So WWII era rockets had the potential for acceptable accuracy, and types like HVAR or RP-3 (though less so for example the USAAF's tube launched 4.5" used in 1944) had reasonable lethality against even fairly well protected WWII tanks if they hit directly. But, it's not hard for me to believe that the vagaries of actual combat lowered hit %'s drastically from what was achieved in these trials, as consistent with the relatively few enemy tanks found destroyed by rockets, even in Korea.

Tests in the same series w/ F-80's with napalm were also not entirely to determine accuracy but also test different attempted aim points short of the tank. Drops 50-100' short with two cannisters if also correct in azimuth would envelope and destroy the tank. The exact % of 'live' runs which were hits is not clear, but see earlier figures, in real combat in Korea napalm kills were much more common against tanks than rocket kills. And though it's not clear either what total % of combat attacks were made by each weapon, anecdotally it doesn't seem as if napalm attacks were nearly as dominant a % of attacks on tanks as napalm kills were of a/c tank kills per the survey. It seems napalm was the superior tank killer in the Korean situation. Note that photos from these napalm drop tests sometimes appear in books mislabeled as actual combat shots.

Joe

 

[davebender]

Schlachtflieger-Experiences
Brief summary of interesting details
Bombs used: AB250, AB500-SD1 and -SD10, AB250-SD4HL on 20-30% of aircraft. Enemy fears AB-bombs.

Normal drop height of Fw 190 after starting the attack at 3-5.000m is 1.000.1.400m,

ABs should not be dropped above 1.000m

dive angle ca. 50-60°.

The hitting accuray with Fw 190 is the same as with Ju 87.

For strong flak defense, one Staffel per Gruppe is dedicated for attacking the Flak

 

[parsifal]

In total 5 hits (plus two near misses judged at least partly effective) in 83 shots if including the ATAR's. Again the F-80C's had no 'high tech' fire control systems which came much later, and if anything their higher speed might have been considered a liability to accuracy compared to prop planes. And indeed a similar test, but against just a simulated T-34 target area, conducted in Japan around the same time, F-51D's scored 20 simulated hits in 147 shots. That test like the F-80 test also included trials of single shot v ripple fire and six shot ripples were found optimum with 7 for 47, 15%, hits. So WWII era rockets had the potential for acceptable accuracy, and types like HVAR or RP-3 (though less so for example the USAAF's tube launched 4.5" used in 1944) had reasonable lethality against even fairly well protected WWII tanks if they hit directly. But, it's not hard for me to believe that the vagaries of actual combat lowered hit %'s drastically from what was achieved in these trials, as consistent with the relatively few enemy tanks found destroyed by rockets, even in Korea

.

I would claim this to be fairly consisten with my guesstimate of 900 rockets at least half of which were napalm fired by 21st CAG an d 77 TFW to destroy or disable 80 tanks. I note and concur with your appraisal of the problem of the f-80's high speed as a disadvantage to accuracy. RAAF Meteor f-8 of the 77 wing/sqn had similar issues. They were judged significantly less effective in the CAs role compared to the Fireflies of 21 CAG. Fireflies had a top speed of 386mph, but thanks to their patented youngman wings could slow thir bomb runs to well under 200mph. This was only possible if flak was absent or could be suppressed, and explains why if possible firefllies carrying out a rocket attack would usually have a Furey escorting it, assigned to Flak suppression.

I will see if i can dig up these reports I keep talking about. i know I have them somewhere...

Tests in the same series w/ F-80's with napalm were also not entirely to determine accuracy but also test different attempted aim points short of the tank. Drops 50-100' short with two cannisters if also correct in azimuth would envelope and destroy the tank. The exact % of 'live' runs which were hits is not clear, but see earlier figures, in real combat in Korea napalm kills were much more common against tanks than rocket kills. And though it's not clear either what total % of combat attacks were made by each weapon, anecdotally it doesn't seem as if napalm attacks were nearly as dominant a % of attacks on tanks as napalm kills were of a/c tank kills per the survey. It seems napalm was the superior tank killer in the Korean situation. Note that photos from these napalm drop tests sometimes appear in books mislabeled as actual combat shots.

Ive recently downloaded a document (which i will attempt to find) that says something similar....napalm attacks were not used on a widespread basis until 1951.....but were more effective than HE at killing tanks

 

[parsifal]

Ive found this regarding the operations 77 sqn 91 composite wing (my mistake on the name)

Meteor Operations in Korea

Some extracts which i think are consistent with what we are saying:

The RAAF pilots found the accuracy of the conventional bombing in the mountainous Korean terrain left something to be desired and had a definite preference for the air-to-ground rocket. Late in 1951, the RAAF developed a new type of rocket containing napalm, known as the 'Flaming Onion', and after trials at Williamtown and preliminary testing in Korea, the first examples arrived at 77 Squadron early in February 1952.


The Americans showed considerable interest in the new weapon, and on 8 February 1952, when the napalm rocket was first used in combat, the USAF provided an RF-80 reconnaissance aircraft to record the results on film for later analysis. The Squadron's new CO, Wing Commander Ron Susans led four Meteors armed with the new rockets in an attack on several buildings with 75% of the rockets scoring hits on the targets, resulting in numerous fires. The new weapon was to prove extremely useful against the enemy vehicle convoys and troop concentrations and soon became the standard under wing weapon carried by RAAF Meteors, with each aircraft capable of carrying eight rockets.

The contribution made by 77 Squadron during the three years of the Korean War is totally out of proportion to its size. During the war the Squadron flew a total of 18,872 sorties, comprising of 3,872 Mustang sorties and 15,000 Meteor sorties. The effect this had on the enemy was devastating; 3,700 buildings, 1,500 vehicles, 16 bridges, 20 locomotives and 65 railway carriages destroyed

. 19000 sorties to destroy 5000 targets means that during the war, if all missions are assumed to to be rocket strikes (which clearly they were not.......) equates to about a 2-5% hit percentage (each strike by a meteor carried 16 rockets0. if we allow 3000 sorties as rocket attacks, with 16 rockets carried per sortie, thats about 48000 rockets fired by the squadron to destroy 5000 targets (give or take)....or roughly a hit rate of 2.5%

 

[parsifal]

Tuening now to 817 sqns Fireflies i have not been able to find an overall combat summary. However from this website, I did find the following;

HMAS Sydney

(Sydney on 18th November departed )....for the East coast, to take part in Operation Athenaeum, a co-ordinated air and surface strike against Hungnam, carried out on 20th and 21st November. Sydney flew 113 sorties in two days, 78 were strike, and 38 CAP. 11 buildings were destroyed, and 31 damaged.

now there were 11 Fireflies on strength but after the typhoon I believe that only 9 were actually available. Anyway, assuming all 78 combat sorties were rocket attacks (and rockets, like 77 Sqn rockets were overwhelmingly the preferred ordinance, that means a maximum of 320 rockets. Assuming 1 hit for destruction, and at least one hit within 20m for a damaged building, thats a total of 42 hits or near misses or a hit or near miss rate of about 12-14%....in wintery conditions

 

[stona]

The American asessment of the effects of a near miss from a rocket on a tank differ from 83 Group's which specifically states that a near miss caused no damage to the Panther. The British definition of a near miss is vague "nearby ground strikes" gives no distance from the target.

According to Price in "The 3" Rocket" an average Typhoon pilot firing all eight rockets had a 4% chance of hitting a target the size of a German tank.

Rockets were not much used by the USAAF 9th Air Force. The first P-47s equipped with rockets became operational in July 1944. Initially each aircraft carried only four 5" HVARs. This was increased to ten later.
The 9th Air Force fired a total of 13,959 rockets during the war which may seem a lot,but compared with the 222,515 fired by fighter bombers of RAF 2nd TAF pales into insignificance.
It could be argued that napalm became the blunt weapon for the 9th,equivalent to the British use of rockets. The Americans were aware that they had no other viable airborne anti-tank weapon.
Both weapons had a profound psychological effect on German troops despite their limited lethality. The various researchers found this effect difficult to quantify at the time,but it was very significant.

This example is typical.

On 1st November 1944 a German strongpoint on the island of North Beveland declined an offer to surrender from the 8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment. Air support was sought from 2nd TAF's 84 Group. The Canadian commander informed the Germans that the Typhoons would make one pass without firing but subsequently would attack their position. 18 Typhoons appeared on schedule and flew low across the island. As soon as they had passed over the Germans started to surrender,the Canadians taking 450 prisoners without a shot being fired.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Lucky13]

Why not, it was much heavier than 40mm S gun, but if one developed a reliable autoloader, why not. Hungarians modified 4 Me 210Ca-1s with a M36 4cm Bofors, but probably for use against 4-engine bombers. But there were at least an AP and an AP-Tracker shells for the Bofors, at least Finns had them.

Juha

Cheers Juha!

 

[Glider]

. 19000 sorties to destroy 5000 targets means that during the war, if all missions are assumed to to be rocket strikes (which clearly they were not.......) equates to about a 2-5% hit percentage (each strike by a meteor carried 16 rockets0. if we allow 3000 sorties as rocket attacks, with 16 rockets carried per sortie, thats about 48000 rockets fired by the squadron to destroy 5000 targets (give or take)....or roughly a hit rate of 2.5%

This isn't my strong suite but I think your maths is out. They also seem to work on the basis that only one aircraft attacked each target and that only one rocket hit each target. I suspect its more likely that more than one plane attacked each target and probable that on average more than one rocket hit as a building is a lot bigger than a tank.
Some of the 2TAF strikes against buildings had a respectable hit rate. It depends on the building but most would need more than one to knock it down