Tank busters for the air forces?

[Shortround6]

Before you get too carried away with this idea just how many "bomblets" do you think are going to fit the 105 shell?

BTW, everybody had cargo shells as Parachute flares, smoke and chemical shells in addition to leaflet shells were cargo shells. Some smoke shells were bursters but many ejected multiple canisters of burning smoke composition.

US 105mm howitzer shells of much later than WW II (some used in first Gulf war) carried 18 anti personnel bomblets. one type was 38mm in diameter, 63mm long, weighed 120grams and had 28 grams of explosive filler.

A 155mm could hold 60-96 bomblets, or 9 anti-tank mines or 36 anti-personel mines.

An 8 in shell could hold 192 M42 dual purpose grenades.

Pictures of US bomblets here: Subs 2

The tapes or ribbons on some indicate armor piercing bomblets as the tape or ribbon acts as a tail to help them hit hollow charge side down.

Figure in WW II fuses and WW II knowledge of shaped charges and I doubt that WW II bomblets are going to be quite as small.

 

[stona]

Until gyro stabilized gunsights were introduced it's almost impossible for an aircraft to hit anything with either a cannon or rockets at ranges greater then 300 meters. If the target is an enemy fighter aircraft effective range drops to about 150 meters. That's WWII reality.

I'm glad someone has finally mentioned sighting. The introduction of the modified Mk.IID gunsight on Typhoons did improve accuracy somewhat. ORS 2nd TAF compared attacks on German occupied buildings in Holland in 1944 and attacks on similar targets in Germany in 1945 with the newer sight. It found that distance of the mean point of impact of rockets from the aiming point had decreased from 62.5 yards to 43 yards,hardly enough to have well dug in or protected enemies quaking in their boots. Essentially,as someone pointed out earlier,any hit with a rocket was a lucky one.

Another report directly compared the accuracy of various weapons used in strafing. It makes for sobering reading for the peoponents of rocketry.

Aiming at a 10 foot square target normal to the line of flight of attacking aircraft 32 out of 120 rounds from 20mm cannon were hits. For 3" rockets the hit rate was 0.045 for every eight fired.

At least rockets were better than bombs! In another test 89% of rockets landed within 150 yards of a target whereas only 45% of bombs did.

Fighter bombers in WW2 were so inaccurate that the British Armies Military Operational Research Unit (MORU) report into air support of 1946 carried a warning for future historians in its introduction.

"He will remember,too,the tremendous bombings aroun Caen where it seemed that nothing could survive ,and yet where the the SS and parachute troops fought on as bitterly as ever............
He will remember too how the Germans managed to stage an Army Group counter-attack in the Ardennes,almost without air support of their own,and he will remember those Germans,among them Rommel,who claimed that our air superiority was by no means the decisive factor in the North West European Campaign..............
He will be able to sum up only by saying,at greater or lesser length,that air support was immensely important,perhaps vital,but that sometimes it seemed signally to have failed,and that some people held that it was important perhaps,but not particularly so."

I would suggest that investing a lot of time and effort in any tank busting aircraft and associated weapons system would be a poor investment. The return on that investment will certainly be low. The largest effect it seems to have had was not a physical one but a degrading of enemy morale,something that various allied research organisations struggled to quantify.
The Western allies,with their Fighter-Bomber concept probably got it just about correct.

Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

only after the Germans had observed for themselves the effectiveness of allied rockets used in massed attacks. .

What effectiveness?
For a 50% chance of hitting a 5 yard diametre gun pit required 350 rockets (44 sorties)
For a Panther tank it is 140 rockets and 18 sorties.
For a large gun position of 10 yards diametre it is 88 rockets and 11 sorties.

To get into the realms of what a flight of Typhoons might reasonably expect to hit we need to look at much larger targets.

For an "Army Hut",taken to be 60'x30'x20', it is 24 rockets and 3 sorties.

For what an individual aircraft might have a 50% chance of hitting we need to go larger still!

For a large building, taken to be 120'x54'x50', it is 7 rockets and 1 sortie.

I'm not sure what "massed attacks" the Germans witnessed,but to do any real physical damage we would have needed thousands of these rocket firing aircraft. As I intimated above the effect on morale may have been more important and was reflected in PoW interrogations carried out by the various Operational Research Sections (ORS).

Those of you proposing twin engined types might want to consider another type of efficiency. One area where single engined fighter bombers do outshine twin engined types or larger medium bombers is in their Load/Personnel factor. Essentially how many people you need to deliver a tonnage of ordnance.

Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

Until gyro stabilized gunsights were introduced it's almost impossible for an aircraft to hit anything with either a cannon or rockets at ranges greater then 300 meters. That's WWII reality.

Not for rocketry.
The official RAF methods for attack with rockets were two fold.

1. Against a heavily defended target the attacking aircraft would make a steep 60 degree dive at 7-8,000 feet and fire all eight rockets in a salvo from 1,500 feet at a range of 1,000 yards.

2. Against lightly defended targets the attcking aircraft were to make a shallow dive at 20-30 degrees from 3-4,000 feet and fire their rockets in four pairs,again from a range of about 1,000 yards.

There is plenty of gun camera footage of both these modes of attack

The official tactics were not always used. One Typhoon pilot recalled that his unit's method was to fly low in a shallow dive,aim at 600-700 yards and then fire cannon and all rockets in a salvo from close range,between 400 and 250 yards.

The tactics for a strafing attack,with MG or cannon, were quite different. The attacking aircraft approached the target from a wide turn with a loss of height that ensured they were at "average" speed and not higher than 1500 feet when levelling out for the attack. After steadying the aircraft and acquiring his target the pilot would open fire at a height of 700 feet and a range of 500 yards and at an angle of 25-30 degrees. It was found that the harmonisation of the guns at 250 yards,which was an air-to-air combat consideration,worked well for this kind of strafing attack on an individual target. For attacking so called area targets pilots would open fire at wider ranges in order to create a larger "beaten zone" covering the target.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you, all very important points to consider.

 

[davebender]

I agree. To make fighter bombers effective for CAS you need cluster bombs.

German AB500 container. A fighter-bomber such as the Fw-190f would probably carry the smaller AB-250 container which holds 40 SD4 AT bomblets. A Fw-190f or Ju-87 would carry one AB-250 container under each wing.

SD4 AT bomblet. HEAT warhead more then adequate for penetrating the top armor on WWII era tanks. As a bonus the blast will kill enemy infantry riding on the tank.


However I still think artillery offers a more economical method for delivering AT bomblets. Aircraft delivered cluster munitions could supplement artillery attacks by striking enemy staging areas located beyond artillery range.

 

[stona]

Aircraft delivered cluster munitions could supplement artillery attacks by striking enemy staging areas located beyond artillery range.

Therein lie other problems.

Targets such as bridges or railway lines could be seen by pilots,though they rarely hit them. The average radial error for bombs dropped by fighter bombers (Typhoons and Spitfires in this case) was 158 yards! 50% of bombs fell within 130 yards. A very blunt tool. There is no way they could have dropped cluster type munitions any more accurately and it is not good enough for them to have been effective.

Smaller or camouflaged targets were difficult to see and were usually marked by smoke fired from allied artillery. This means the target is already within artillery range and adds another potential error.

We live in an era of precision,guided,weapons systems. It is difficult to overstate just how innacurate the weapons available for CAS were in WW2.

The most accurate weapons these aircraft had were their cannon and machine guns and others have already shown the limited effectiveness of these against armoured or fortified targets. They could be devastating on a horse and cart,as some US gun camera footage shows,but on a well constructed bunker more or less useless.

Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

An entirely different matter from destroying armored vehicles. An R4M rocket or SD-4 bomblet would barely scratch a bridge or rail line. You need a 500kg bomb delivered with precision. That's what Ju-87, Ju-88 and Me-410 dive bombers are for.

More info on the SD-4 bomblet.
SD-4 HL, hollow charge anti personel vehicle bomb

Penetration of the Hollow charge of the Sd-4 Hl is 130mm steel @ 60 degr. angle.

Length of comlete bomb : 310mm
Length of body : 212mm
Body diameter : 90 mm

The SD-4 HL bombs were used in so called AB (Abwurf Behalter) containers:
74 bombs were placed in a AB-500-1 container
40 bombs were placed in a AB-250 container

IMO the SD-4 is overkill. 50mm penetration would punch through top armor of WWII era tanks. Shrink this 4kg bomblet to 1.5 kg and it will still get the job done. However you would only need a 100kg container so the aircraft can carry twice as many weapons. A CAS aircraft such as the Ju-87 or Fw-190f could carry 4 such weapons. Two under each wing.

 

[stona]

An entirely different matter from destroying armored vehicles. An R4M rocket or SD-4 bomblet would barely scratch a bridge or rail line.

That's not the point I'm making. A fighter bomber was unable to place any kind of bomb or bomb container with any degree of accuracy. If,on average,you are deploying your bomb container more than 150 yards from your intended target what are the chances of one of your bomblets actually hitting the target? This is assuming the pilot has actually managed to see a camouflaged tank.
The complete inability of these aircraft to deliver any weapon (apart from MG or cannon rounds) within a viable range of any target with any certainty makes them inherently unreliable. I posted the awful figures for rockets (from ORS 2nd TAF) and yet rockets were actually more accurate than air dropped munitions. An allied cluster weapon is a "what if" and obviously no data exists for it but I suspect that had it existed the data would make familiarly depressing reading.

I've been trying to find some reliable data for the use of cluster weapons by the Luftwaffe but so far have drawn a blank. I appreciate that they were not widely used in a CAS role.Luftwaffe doctrine favoured dive-bombing and the adoption of the Fw190 (mainly,though I've seen pictures of a Bf109 armed with anti-personel bomblets) in a fighter bomber role was really forced on it. If anybody has this information I would love to see it.

Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

With good reason as a Ju-87 could place 50% of bombs within 30 meters of the aiming point. But air superiority is essential if you want to use dive bombers.

Which begs the question why the RAF and USAAF didn't employ dive bombers as they normally had air superiority from 1941 onward.

WRG - Luftwaffe Bomb Annex - AB 250-3 Type I II Container
The AB250-3 container was designed specifically for dive bomber use. So you get 30 meter accuracy plus cluster munition area coverage. A winning combination if you have air superiority.

 

[parsifal]

What effectiveness?
For a 50% chance of hitting a 5 yard diametre gun pit required 350 rockets (44 sorties)
For a Panther tank it is 140 rockets and 18 sorties.
For a large gun position of 10 yards diametre it is 88 rockets and 11 sorties.

There are problems with this analysis, not that for even a second would i suggest rockets were accurate for pinpoint attack. they relied on their massed effect to be effective.A direct hit was difficult to achieve, but eight rockets hitting the ground simultaneously is going to do a lot of damage. With that many detonations occurring simulataneously, you wont need a direct hit to knock out the tank. If the eight rockets hit within about a 40m radius there is a very high likelihood of disabling either the tank, or the crew or
both.

The other thing is that rockets are a weapon fired at a single tank is unlikely to hit....but a rocket fired at a concentration of tanks is likely to hit something. and for tanks to be effective they have to form a concentrated phalanx to provide mutual protection and firepower. A tank attacking individually, or in small groups will minimise the risk from rocket or gun attack, but greatly increase its risk from individual stalking or counterbattery fire.

To give some idea of the firepower being unleashed by an eight rocket 5" HVAR barrage, each rocket has the equivalent effect of a 5/38 shell, and it was a known fact that a 5/38 was easily able to stop even a tiger tank, with or without a direct hit, as was shown repeatedly during sicily, but in particular at gela during husky. And the 5' HVAR was not even the heaviest ordinance carried. that was reserved for the "Tiny Tim", used at okinawa with a projectile weight in excess of 1200 lbs, an expplosive capility superior to a 12"/50 shell.

I dont know as much as yourself about the statistical probabilities of Rockets in WWII. Ive read that rockets fired at an individual vehicle had about a 1% chance of a direct hit, and about a 5% chance of a hit within 30 yds. But the thing is, if one rocket of a salvo hits within that zone, chances are 6 or 8 are also going to hit there as well. And therein lies your lethality.

In Korea, the 21st CAG of HMAS Sydney and 77 Sqn of the RAAF, between them fired a total of 8900 rockets between September 1951 and February 1952. In that period they are credited with destroying over 80 tanks. one might be termpted to say that the success rate for these rocket attacks was in line with WWII average of 1%, but rocket attacks on tanks were not the only targets. For 817 Sqn, flying fireflies, there were five main targets , including, roads, bridges, rail links, communication, airfields, and finally troop concentrations. If we assume equal effort for each of these target types, and then split the 20% of rocket attacks in half between attacks on tanks and attacks on other troops, then somewhere between 900 and 1800 rockets were needed to destroy 80 tanks. Thats somewhere between 10 and 20 rockets expended for every kill. Admittedly most of the kills were burn outs (based on the reports by the advancing UN troops being supported...which makes sense, since the australians were using napalm rockets by then ) and the koreans/chinese were using their tanks almost wheel to wheel, but it certainly is a lot better than "almost never" hitting the target.


I do know as well the level of success enjoyed against u-boats and German Shipping. In 1944 the 30 or so mosquitoes attached to just one of CC in the north sea, sank 8 u-boats using rockets and cannon fire. Other aircraft types achieved other victories. And achieving a sink of a sub really did require a direct hit. arguing that rockets could not hit anything is clearly wrong, given those known outcomes. Chances were low, but they existed, and were more than just lucky shots,

To get into the realms of what a flight of Typhoons might reasonably expect to hit we need to look at much larger targets.

For an "Army Hut",taken to be 60'x30'x20', it is 24 rockets and 3 sorties.

For what an individual aircraft might have a 50% chance of hitting we need to go larger still!

For a large building, taken to be 120'x54'x50', it is 7 rockets and 1 sortie.

What about the chances of hitting a concentration of 45 tanks (a typical tiger battalion), supported by 8-900 men, 150 trucks etc by 30 aircraft, each armed with 4x 20mm cannon and 8 x 5 'HVAR? your scenario is unrealistic, because it is not looking at the typical circumstances that might confront the CAS aircraft...multiple targets concentrated and fully engaged.

I'm not sure what "massed attacks" the Germans witnessed,but to do any real physical damage we would have needed thousands of these rocket firing aircraft. As I intimated above the effect on morale may have been more important and was reflected in PoW interrogations carried out by the various Operational Research Sections (ORS).

Massed attacks are attacks by many aircraft into a small area on an enemy forced to concentrate due to the pressures of the ground assault it was resisting. Though not the focus of a fighter bomber attack, read what happened to Lehr during the cobra breakout. I do not accept that given the right conditions, that Fighter bombers were inneffective. All the training, all the experience i have suggests quite the opposite. the scenario you are envisaging is not a realistic application of fighter bombers in warfare i would suggest because it fails to take into consideration troop concentrations, and multiple attacks.

 

[Juha]

Hello
Much of CAS effectiveness depended on environment, on the terrain and on the lever of enemy's countermeasures.
When German tanks were caught in fairly open area as the 112 PzBrig was at Dompaire, fighter bombers could be rather effective against tanks, as all participants of the combat at Dompaire testified. At Dompaire I./PZR 29 lost 34 of its Panthers and after the battle had only 4 operational Panthers left. PzAbt 2112 had only 17 of its original 45 Pz IVs operational. Of the 33 tanks found in Group Massu's sector, 13 had been knocked out by tank or TD fire, 16 by air attack made by P-47s and 4 had been abandoned intact. French losses were 5 M4A2s, 2 M5A1s, 2 half-tracks and 2 Jeeps. One P-47 was shot down.
Same in Eastern Front, In late July 43 W of Orel LW CAS a/c very effectively hindered Soviet armour attacks.
On the other hand during the big battles on Summer 44 in Karelian Isthmus appr 400 Il-2s didn't succeed to destroy even one Finnish AFV and according to Soviet info but contrary to LW claims and Finnish opinion during these battles the ability of Ju 87s of I./SG 3 or Fw 190s of 1./SG 5 to destroy Soviet AFVs was very limited indeed. The terrain is rather closed there. And at least 1./SG 5 had to change its tactics because the amount of Soviet AA protecting Soviet major assault was much more than that they were used in the Northernmost part of the Eastern Front.

And in any case much of the effects of any CAS was psychological, which wore out quickly, so a land attack should follow quickly and in deep penetration attack that produced problems if enemy defensive system was a deep one. If the attack plan incl a massive air attack, even if at first defenders were stunned, deeper one penetrated, more time the defenders had to recover, as during the Goodwood. If the plan incl. series of air attacks ever deeper in enemy rear that easily meant that the attacker could not utilize fleeting opportunities opening during the attack because of the fear to be caught by own air bombardments as during the Totalizer.

Juha

 

[stona]

Which begs the question why the RAF and USAAF didn't employ dive bombers as they normally had air superiority from 1941 onward.

The only dive-bomber used operationally during WW2 by the British/Commonwealth Air Forces was the Vultee Vengeance which equipped four RAF squadrons (45,82,84,110) and two RIAF squadrons in the Far East. They can't have been very good as a report comparing dive bombers and fighter bombers in close support compiled by RAF 3rd Tactical Air Force (of Air Command South East Asia) noted that 4th Corps considered Hurricane fighter bombers more accurate and they didn't require an escort,which the Vengeance units did. This was after operations in the Arakan.
Peter Smith's book "Jungle Dive Bombers At War" covers this very well.

The RAF did not have a doctrine or culture of dive bombing. The pilots were fighter pilots and continued flying armed reconnaissance missions as such throughout operations in North West Europe. For example pilots of the 2nd TAF received an initial three week course on rocket firing,followed by regular refresher courses at Armament Practice camps back in the UK. Attendance at the latter demonstrated just how innacurate they were!

There was also an inter service rivalry which is difficult to understand with modern eyes. Much blame may be attached to the RAF which exhibited a junior service complex,always seeking to assert its equality and independence and fighting to resist Army attempts to subordinate air operations to those on the ground. From the Army's side most General Staff officers had no understanding of the role air power could play and generally considered it someone else's problem,leaving it to their G (Air) sections. They resented what they saw as the other services interference in their operations.

Only one school of instruction in air support was set up and the Army made clear what it thought of it.

"The object of the course has been confined almost entirely to teaching the soldier about the Air Force,a statement which might be qualified by substituting - to teach the Army what the Air Force thinks the Army ought to know about the Air Force."

This is in an official report and the resentment is clear to see.
Another Army report of late 1944 stated,regarding Army policy towards the RAF.

"Whether a policy of appeasment was ever profitable is a matter of opinion. In any case it is difficult to believe in it under the present circumstances where,superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, and behind the scenes criticisms and back biting on the other .... constitute a poor substitute for genuine cooperation".

Ouch!

Another 1944 report stated.

"Improvement can only come from a recognition of air action as an integral part of Army operations...
If this recognition is to take a practical form a reorientation of our training will be necessary so that at all stages and in all our staff colleges and schools, supporting air action is taught and studied in the same way and with the same prioritie as other operational subjects".

In 1943-5 the British Army was doctrinally unprepared for such a step and the RAF would not have stood for it.

This is why CAS was such a shambles and also why the RAF never developed dive bombers. Any successes were in spite of,rather than because of the policy of the two services' senior officers. They were often due to cooperation,on the ground,by junior officers trying to win a war.

Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

I forgot to add, the average frontage of a german division in Normandu was less than 4km width, and 2km depth. The average frontage of a tank battalion in an offensive posture was about 500 yards, and a depth of about 250 yds. But the tanks in a concentrated posture ar likley to be deployed around key point of that deployment zone and may well be concentrated within an area less than 12000 square yds for the battalion, which as i said might be supported by 8-900 men and somewhat further behind 150-200 soft skinned vehicles. Thats one tank every 240 m2 (sorry for the change to metric), and one man every 12m2. how many square metres does a salvo of eight rockets obliterate?

i admit that my scenario represents the other end of the spectrum to attacking an individual tank. A panzer battalion would be unlucky to be caught so badly. but it is equally unrealistic to damn fighter bomber attacks of wwii as inneffective because they could not hit a single vehicle. WWII vehicles seldom operated on their own. There was always some dgree of concentration

Dont get me wrong. Statistically, air attack only ever accounted for about 5-10% of casualties on the ground, even under the most optimistic of conditions. but they were worth every penny spent on them in my opinion

 

[davebender]

The British Army was on the receiving end of quite a few Ju-87 and Ju-88 attacks. I'm surprised people like FM Montgomery didn't demand similiarly accurate CAS support by RAF dive bombers.

 

[stona]

All the training, all the experience i have suggests quite the opposite. the scenario you are envisaging is not a realistic application of fighter bombers in warfare i would suggest because it fails to take into consideration troop concentrations, and multiple attacks.

Every single number and statistic I have quoted comes from the Operational Research Section of the 2nd TAF. You may consider it unrealistic but these were the men who went on the ground both during and after a battle to analyse the results of the RAF's efforts. They measured the craters,examined the vehicles and gun emplacements and interogated the PoWs.

By far the most likely way for a German tank to be destroyed was by its own crew.

As a typical example 82 German tanks were destroyed in the "Shambles" area in August 1944.
8 by armour piercing shot (ground fire)
2 by rocket
38 by crew
33 abandoned
1 unknown cause.

Similar statistics for the "Chase" area where 98 tanks were destroyed.
8 by armour piercing shot (ground fire)
55 by crew
26 abandoned
9 unknown cause.

You'll notice here a big fat zero for rockets.

For the oft quoted "Falaise Pocket" I can give you the numbers for armour but not specifically tanks. This includes tanks,self propelled guns and AFVs.

11 by rockets
4 by bombs
18 by cannon or MG
100 abandoned/destroyed by crew.

Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

The British Army was on the receiving end of quite a few Ju-87 and Ju-88 attacks. I'm surprised people like FM Montgomery didn't demand similiarly accurate CAS support by RAF dive bombers.

Montgomery was a soldier.

The RAF had kept control of air operations in the Western desert and had been vindicated by the results. A vast expanse of more or less featureless desert with one road in it is not North Western Europe.

RAF officers who proved willing to cooperate closely with their Army counterparts in 1943-45,such as Air Vice Marshall Broadhurst (who had commanded RAF Desert Air Force after Coningham) was actually censured by his seniors whilst in control of No.83 Group 2nd TAF in North Western Europe.

This is a doctrinal and cultural problem within both services,the sort of thing that takes years to overcome.

Cheers
Steve

 

[riacrato]

I think this subject's been dealt with a million times and the not very satisfying answer to "what was the best tank killer aircraft of ww2" seems to be: There is none. They were all rather ineffective and the occasional tank they got didn't matter in the bigger picture.

So keep it to fighter bombers and destroy the supply vehicles, half tracks, troops and the likes. Leave the tanks without the support they need and they will either flee or be abandoned or destroyed by your ground forces. That doesn't mean tanks cannot be supportive in destroying tanks: They can force them to dig in and suppress their movement, they just are not very likely to actually destroy them.

 

[parsifal]

By far the most likely way for a German tank to be destroyed was by its own crew.

As for the previous post, this point rather misses the point. Why on earth would the crews destroy their own tanks for no reason, which is what is suggested or inferred here. they would destroy them pure and simple for three possibilities

1) they were out of fuel or ammunition...ask yourself...why would they run out fuel or ammunition....answer (or at least a big part of it) because of the interdiction undetaken by the air umbrella above them

2) They could not retreat because the roads and bridges they needed to make their escape were destroyed, or being interdictewd by allied air power. better to take your chances on foot than risk geting your backside blown away as you tried to cross a river, or down a street heavily patrolled by allied fbs

3) Your tank has broken down. Often because of near misses by aircraft

As a typical example 82 German tanks were destroyed in the "Shambles" area in August 1944.
8 by armour piercing shot (ground fire)
2 by rocket
38 by crew
33 abandoned
1 unknown cause.

Yep, those numbers say it all...airpower , particuilarly CAS aircraft were very effective at providing the key force multippliers that enable armies to destroy the fighting potential of your enemy. this is the classic theories of tactical airpower applied. The ground is taken by the ground force, but the ground force has it fire potential multilied by the aiurpower....and airpower in 1944 meant fighters firing rockets.....Have you looked at why 33 tanks were abandoned and 38 were destroyed by their own crews? I will bet the family fortune some of them were abandoned because they didnt go anymore, and I bet that was because there huge holes in the ground nearby

Similar statistics for the "Chase" area where 98 tanks were destroyed.
8 by armour piercing shot (ground fire)
55 by crew
26 abandoned
9 unknown cause.

Tells the same story as above, and can be readily argued how effective the fighter bombers were in neutralising the German AFVs. Frontal penetrations of armour are always about the last way a tank is destroyed

You'll notice here a big fat zero for rockets.

Yes, I do, and I also notice how many were destroyed by their own crews, or were otherwise abandoned. There is a reason for that. A retreating army, unhindered by an enemy air force over their heads, firing rockets at themn doesnt leave 88 tanks and then 97 tanks (or whatever the number), because it had a bad day at the office. Compare the losses suffered by the germans in the collapse after Normandy to the losses they suffered after an equally catrophic defeat in 1918You will not find such wholsale abandonments unless they are being harrassed by airpower.

Incidentally your summation of the vengeance squadrons omitted the additional squadrons used by the RAAF and the RNZAF. Wildcat will know the precise numbers but it was quite a few squadrons. in the Jungles of New Guinea they were highly prized, and were only withdrawn from New Guinea because of range issues

 

[JoeB]

1. With that many detonations occurring simulataneously, you wont need a direct hit to knock out the tank. If the eight rockets hit within about a 40m radius there is a very high likelihood of disabling either the tank, or the crew or
both.

2. To give some idea of the firepower being unleashed by an eight rocket 5" HVAR barrage, each rocket has the equivalent effect of a 5/38 shell, and it was a known fact that a 5/38 was easily able to stop even a tiger tank, with or without a direct hit, as was shown repeatedly during sicily, but in particular at gela during husky.

3. And the 5' HVAR was not even the heaviest ordinance carried. that was reserved for the "Tiny Tim", used at okinawa with a projectile weight in excess of 1200 lbs, an expplosive capility superior to a 12"/50 shell.

4. In Korea, the 21st CAG of HMAS Sydney and 77 Sqn of the RAAF, between them fired a total of 8900 rockets between September 1951 and February 1952. In that period they are credited with destroying over 80 tanks.... Admittedly most of the kills were burn outs (based on the reports by the advancing UN troops being supported...which makes sense, since the australians were using napalm rockets by then ) and the koreans/chinese were using their tanks almost wheel to wheel, but it certainly is a lot better than "almost never" hitting the target.

Again I think we all agree that (.50/20mm) strafing, rocket and bomb attacks as characterized Western fighter bombers in WWII/Korea could severly impact mechanized operations, by knocking out non-armored vehicles and causing morale effects on tank units themselves. The early phase of the Korean War shows this clearly, according to extensive interviews with captured KPA armor crews, and just the conduct of KPA operations: in the opening week or two from June 25 1950, T-34 units were used in relative mass in daylight, after around July 10 they weren't, but in smaller numbers and near dawn or dusk or otherwise limited visbility.

But you come back to the point of supposed ability of rocket near misses to actually knock out tanks, and in studying this I've seen little evidence of this: I don't believe it would be common.

1. I've found some of the individual wreck survey reports done by the US forces in the Korea in 1950, and research papers written at the time based on them. I know of no cases where the wrecks were determined to have been knocked out by rocket *misses*, though the exact causes weren't always known. In the live fire tests the USAF did v captured T-34's with HVAR's, a couple of near misses were speculated to have been close enough to break the tracks on the tank, but the target captured tank had no tracks actually.

2. Jentz's "Panzertruppen" Vol 2 reproduces the combat reports of Hermann Goering Pz Div, the german tank unit involved at Gela. In the actual battle at Gela only 1 Pz.III was reported lost to naval guns. In later battles further inland in following days 2 Pz.IV's were repoted lost to naval guns. No Tigers (of 17 of Pz.Abt.504 attached to HG Pz Div) were reported lost to naval guns. Again, the armored operations were definitely affected by the naval gunfire, especially the Pz.III/IV equipped portions of HG Pz Div which actually reached the beaches at Gela July 11. They did then retreat and though their report says it was due to fuel and ammo shortages, the storm of fire from offshore, and some US tanks and arty pieces already on the beaches, surely affected the situation also. And some tanks blown to prevent capture, rather than recovered, might have been due in part to artillery fire falling all around, in part naval. But I see no reason to disbelieve their account of tank losses directly to NGF. An Italian unit with captured French light tanks also suffered unknown losses possibly to NGF in an attack before the German one. But there is no evidence here that medium naval shell near misses would commonly actually destroy medium or heavy tanks.

3. Yes, but this weapon was mainly limited to single shots where a hit or very near miss on a tank was not likely. And I know of no verified claims of TT's knocking out tanks by either hits or near misses, though latter might be be theoretically possible.

4. There was no surveying of wrecks of Communists tanks in Korea in this period, only in the period following the initial North Korean retreat from South Korea up to November 1950. At that time, 239 T-34 wrecks were reported, of which 60 were to napalm, 17 to rockets, 7 to bombs, 4 to strafing and 10 to air-unspecified, though 15 were altogether unknown. In "Tank Warfare in Korea" Zaloga says this correponded to 857 USAF claims of tanks destroyed; in "Armor of the Korean War" Dunstan says 1134 UN aerial claims v tanks; but counting that myself in original records I would say even Dunstan's number is low, I get past it even with some known omissions.

So, there's no way to say how many real tank kills the 80 claims represents, but IMO we can't base any firm conclusion on assuming the claim accuracy was much better than the earlier period in Korea, or the similarly low % apparently achieved by both USAAF and RAF fighter bombers in NW Europe in 1944.

Communist tanks or their wrecks were very rarely seen by UN ground forces after early November 1950. We know from Communist accounts that the KPA rebuilt their tank units (virtually destroyed in the opening phase) and the Chinese sent some, but known accounts from that side also say they were usually held in reserve. In fact in the few cases where the Chinese claim their tanks ko'd UN tanks later in the war, UN accounts don't even corroborate that such tank v tank battles occurred. Air units saw and attacked these tanks sometimes, but we just don't know the actual results, and in the static warfare of that period of the war, it's also likely there were decoys.

Joe