Target Schweinfurt

[iron man]

My opinion (in regard to hitting German power production) is that as much as we may have a liking to believe that WW2 'choke points' existed (and the Germans were no different with 'Operation Eisenhammer') surely the whole tale is one which shows that except for a limited tactical advantage the strategic worth of these attacks was never what was hoped for or expected?

German production was hammered relentlessly and yet they dispersed began again elsewhere, or in the case of transportation they just rebuilt and rebuilt and rebuilt.
I'm not sure anything other than a fairly temporary effect would be obvious....and I'd suggest that because of this then until the invasion was secured and eastern summer offensive of 1944 started the rapid ejection of nazi Germany from the conquered territory they held it would probably have been unwise to attempt.

My own view is that until the advent of incredibly accurate reliable 'smart weaponry' in numbers (cos even there the PR - certainly as far as Gulf War mk1 is concerned - was not quite in tune with the reality) and the systems which could reliably deliver them to maximum effect - in tandem with the pace of modern warfare - then the notion of 'choke points' probably in reality may well end up costing the attacker more than the true effect gained and only for a temporary effect.
The exception would probably be something like a 'decapitating' assassination plot (as per July '44) working out or pin-point raid getting lucky.

With all due respect.

Someone asked a question about the best way to use a highly specialized force of high speed light bomber aircraft, with highly trained crews during the Autumn of 1943. I replied with one idea.

Using such a capability against a target like Schweinfurt (deep in Germany) would have been idiotic... for the return. For that matter, so was using it as per the historical, but that's with good ol' hindsight.

Need some other ideas here? Fine.

Drop the large railway spans at Koln into the Rhine and paralyze the barge traffic from the Ruhr to the south. Destroy the lock gates on the Dortmund-Ems and the Mittelland Kanals. Hit the fracing towers at the synth facilities. These are all better utilization of this capability than bombing a prison's walls.
As was proven in combat conditions, these few units were the closest thing to a "smart bomb" at the time; they were capable of such things. Destroying the switch yard infrastructure at some of the major marshalling yards serving the Ruhr (Hamm, F.E.) would also pay huge dividends. When German industry collapsed in late 1944, it collapsed due to the complete atrophy of internal LOC's. It collapsed because they couldn't get raw materials to the factories or finished product to the front(s).

Germany ran on coal...LOTS of coal. Moving it was done by the rail network and the canal/river network. When this network was interdicted (by late 1944) it was all over.

A note on Speer and his "miracle"?

This was achieved by stripping production facilities of their "standing stocks" of semi-finished product and raw materials to provide the famous "surge" that all point to as the paramount indicator of the "failure" of the bombing campaign. The "Good Nazi"('s) post-war literary works are hardly reliable source material when looking at the extant situation in German industry as the calendar rolled into 1945. Seek out "The Collapse of the German War Economy" if you really want to know what's what on the ground in the "Heimat" during this period.
It changed my POV 100% on the matter; it will also do the same for anyone with an objective outlook on history.

Alfred Mierzejewski went through all of the DR records and relevant BA-MA sources...This IS the "rest of the story".

"Choke Points" actually killed German industrial production.

Historically?

"Tallboy"/ "Grand Slam" raids flown against the viaducts connecting the Ruhr with Central Germany...shut main (railway) line coal/steel/coke traffic down between the Ruhr and all of the eastern production facilities that needed it.
"Tallboy"/ "Grand Slam" raids flown against the Dortmund-Ems and Mittelland Canals: killed hard [anthracite] coal and coke traffic to the same areas noted above; disrupted transport of completed sub-assemblies to final production facilities (Typ.XXI U-Boat; to name but one).
"Secondary" H2S/H2X raids on marshalling yards all over Germany...messed everything up. Look to the authors extensive statistics on "car placings" and route tonnages if you wish.
Interdiction of the Rhine (happenstance...by dropping one bridge into the river) which closed this artery for the duration of the war.

The point is that this all could have been done earlier, if saner heads had prevailed.

Read the book.

Bombing Schweinfurt? Why not just cut them off from the supplies they needed?

Hindsight...yet again. Mierzejewski's book is one of those "uncut gems" that few are aware of...except for serious authors (like Overy, for one) who cite it extensively. It's the real deal.

 

[parsifal]

The US losses 5548 heavy bomber in combat mission in ETO, of this only 657 are not from enemy triple A or aircraft (for '43 alone 1036 and 108) so imho the not enemy related losses of BC were not at 50%

You may want to cross reference those numbers.

Here is a link that gives some intersting observation of the losses suffered. overwhelmingly, losses for all combatants do not relate to direct enemy action. Cant answer for the Statisitical digest, but I can tell you that for training accidents alone, the USAAC lost over 60000 a/c alone. Since even the frontline formations undertook training operations at one time or another and the 8th AF accounted for about 35% of the Us total force structure, it stands to reason that your figures of just 5500 losses are highly suspect.

Losses

Ask yourself this.....US produced 12000 B-17s, and 19000 B-24s. Nearly all the B-17s and about half the b-24s served under the 8th AF....roughly speaking. *AF started from nothing and ended the war with about 5000 bombers (from memory). What happened to the rest. Clearly, the figures you are quoting dont add up

The average airframe life for an aircraft in US service was 13 months, for the RAF it was about 10 months. Germany was 6-7 months. Aircraft in peacetime last a lot longer than that, it is inevitable that the relatively short lifespan of an aircraft is due to the losses being suffered. 5500 aircraft lost simply does not explain that. A ballpark figure for the strength of 8AF is about 5000 aircraft....if each and every one of those 5000 is statisitically going to last 13 month, then the average losses to all causes for the 8AF is going to be in the vicinity of 400 a/c each and every month. 8AF never lost anything like that number to combat related incidents.....they have to be losing the majority of their a/c to non-combat causes. If the 8AF is assumed to have been on active operations from May 1943 (anything before then they were miniscule efforts) then they were in combat for 24 months. At 400 a/c per month, they have to have lost at least 9200 a/c

Some further discussion on this issue can be found here:

Interesting aviation Stastistics from WW2 - PPRuNe Forums

 

[stona]

Something odd in Vicenzo's statistics.

Of the 3,431 Lancasters lost by Bomber Command (3/9/39 to 8/5/45) 246 were lost in operational accidents alone. BC defines an operational accident as one occurring on the way to or from a target. That's 0.16% and the only aircraft with a lower accidental loss rate is the Mosquito with 0.13%.
I can't find the figures for non-operational causes but I bet it is way higher than that.
There is a post in a thread linked to by parsifal which gives BC accidental casualties which is close to the actual figures.
8,195 men of Bomber Command died in flying or ground accidents. That equated to roughly 15% of all the 55,500 fatalities incurred. It seems logical that total accidental aircraft losses would be in the same ball park.

Steve

 

[Vincenzo]

Stona the statiscs are not my.

Acceptance of heavy bomber until august '45 B-17 12,692, B-24 18,190, B-32 118 total 31,270 (table 76) , heavy bomber delivered to USAAF 27,867 (table 79), on hand in august '45 11,065 (table 84 of this 3,090 were in 2nd line/misc), losses in Continental US 1,989 (Table 99), losses Overseas (include en ropute) 12,291 (Table 99).
There is a miss for 2,522 a bit are the losses before of december '41 (are non included in the losses) and the others surely the planes scrapped.

 

[wuzak]

With all due respect.

Someone asked a question about the best way to use a highly specialized force of high speed light bomber aircraft, with highly trained crews during the Autumn of 1943. I replied with one idea.

Actually, I asked about using a highly specialised force against a specific target.

The reason being that the target was selected and was, at that time, thought to give the AAF the best value for its bombing efforts. It was thought that the ball bearing industry was a choke point, and so it may have proved, but one off raids weren't going to cut it. The target would have to be bombed time after time, in reasonably quick succession.

That the first bombing could not be repeated for several months diluted the effects of the raid, and gave the Germans time to reorganise and re-engineer equipment so as to minimise the effects of any future bombing. BC could have followed up that night, but still wouldn't have finished the industry. Return missions would still be required.

I hypothesise that a force of 100 Mosquitoes could do the damage of the 8th AF Schweinfurt force if they use 2 x 1000lb MC bombs (GP bombs ineffective, maybe with 4 x 500lb MC bombs). They could do it with a lower loss rate (16% for Schweinfurt-Regensburg, not including damaged beyond economical repair) and thus would be more able to repeat the raid within a small timeframe.

Also that Mosquitoes flying at treetop height would be able to avoid detection or delay detection until very near the target, and would be able to match, or outrun, likely pursuers. At such a low level the percentage of bombs on target will be considerably higher than bombs dropped from altitude in formation.

I think that Mosquitoes could do the raid by themselves, without need of diversions and trick tactics. The chance of success would be greater, however, if the Luftwaffe is distracted by other operations - such as 300 bombers forming up over England as the Mossies skim their way across Europe.

Alternative target systems aren't really a topic for this thread. Indeed, that deserves its own topic - and IIRC there was such a thread a year or so ago.

 

[Milosh]

Something odd in Vicenzo's statistics.

Of the 3,431 Lancasters lost by Bomber Command (3/9/39 to 8/5/45) 246 were lost in operational accidents alone. BC defines an operational accident as one occurring on the way to or from a target. That's 0.16% and the only aircraft with a lower accidental loss rate is the Mosquito with 0.13%.
I can't find the figures for non-operational causes but I bet it is way higher than that.
There is a post in a thread linked to by parsifal which gives BC accidental casualties which is close to the actual figures.
8,195 men of Bomber Command died in flying or ground accidents. That equated to roughly 15% of all the 55,500 fatalities incurred. It seems logical that total accidental aircraft losses would be in the same ball park.

Steve

BC - Statistics

I get 17.5% of all BC losses due to non enemy action.

 

[stona]

BC - Statistics

I get 17.5% of all BC losses due to non enemy action.

That sounds much more like it and is certainly in that ball park.

Steve

 

[Vincenzo]

We have 11,8% (657/5548) for USAAF HB in ETO not so different if we count that BC flew most on night

 

[parsifal]

None of these numbers explain the losses that were suffered. To get you guys thinking, ask yourselves this series of questions:

1) how many aircraft did the US produce or accept for service in 1942-5?
2) How many did they end the war with
3) most optimistically, how many were shot down or brought down by enemy action
4) what happened to the rest?

Another way of looking at this is to examine USAAC strengths during a quiet time and compare that to the aircraft receipts in that period. 1942 fits that criteria perfectly. The USAAC was only very lightly engaged especially in Europe. Combat losses for the USAAC could be measured in the hundreds. Using Ellis, the US started the year with 4002 combat aircraft. They finish the year with 11139 aircraft. In that period 47836 a/c were produced. Not all them were accepted, many older aircraft were scrapped (but then again thats still a loss), some were indeed shot down. A good percentage were given to allies. But none of that explains the enormous differences between the numbers of aircraft produced, and the number on strength at the end of 1942. Its why all thiis talk of 11% or 4% or 1% is just nonsense. overwhelmingly, losses to all airforces had absolutely nothing to do with enemy action.

 

[Vincenzo]

Parsifal i've already replied in the 44th post.
A plane scrapped for wear is not counted in the losses.

i can add from table 98 that 18,774 HB arrivals overseas

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal i've already replied in the 44th post.
A plane scrapped for wear is not counted in the losses.

Its all good Vincenzo, no worries. Im just pointing out that the numbers are not adding up at all if is assumed that only 600 were lost for non-combat reasons. its much much much higher than that.

Why wouldnt you include an aircraft scrapped 9for whatever reason, some may be scrapped for lack of spares, others due to damage, some for being obsolete, and still others because of wear and tear. They are not on strength, are dropped from the OB and by most commanders would be considered a loss. Kenney certainly thought so when aircraft of the 5th AF were being scrapped for lack of spares in 1942.

What is not shown up in the figures for 1942 was the relatively large reserves the USAAC possessed in December 1941. Whilst frontline strength was 4000 a/c, there were 12000 a/c (roughly) available in total, with a large reserve. Unfortunately the reserve park was mostly obsolete, and was scrapped for the most part. They are losses....if so, American losses in 1942 were about 25000 a/c, of which, maybe a 1000 were due to combat related incidents.

 

[Vincenzo]

no you are changing the numbers on the table. 657 is the lost not enemy related in combat mission, the accidents in UK in not combat mission are not in that count. And yes this numbers are true your imagination worth nothing. The numbers are relatively similar to BC number, yes are lower but BC flying most on night so in obvious get more trouble.
is not me that non include is specified losses are enemy related or accidents so a planes scrapped for wear is not a losses almost for usaaf.

 

[wuzak]

Since you are talking about losses of aircraft, would you consider that the Schweinfurt mission done with 100 Mosquitoes could have done as much damage as the first actual raid with lower losses?

Is it possible, probable, unlikely?

 

[Gixxerman]

There's an interesting idea, a fast low-level mass Mossie attack.....excuse my ignorance but did any such thing ever occur?

 

[gjs238]

Did Mossies ever attack/bomb Ploesti?

 

[TheMustangRider]

P-38s did but without much success as far as I'm aware.

 

[wuzak]

There's an interesting idea, a fast low-level mass Mossie attack.....excuse my ignorance but did any such thing ever occur?

Yes - but only in small numbers, before they switched to night duties.

 

[wuzak]

Did Mossies ever attack/bomb Ploesti?

No distance was too far (before the surrender of Italy).

 

[fastmongrel]

I have never understood why BC and the 8th AF didnt just concentrate on attacking the Ruhr till nothing was higher than a snakes belly button. The bombers could carry max loads and fighters can spend more time stooging around looking for targets. Turning the Ruhr into a moonscape is going to hit steel and coke production very badly, steel and Coke works cant be moved especially whilst 500 pounders and incendiaries are landing about your ears. The LW would have had to come up and fight and would have been gutted earlier than was the case. I know the crews hated the Ruhr because of all the flak and the smog which stopped accurate bombing but it was the beating heart of Germanies war effort. Running aroung Germany with what seems with 20/20 hindsight to be a box ticking excercise (We bombed X last week now its Ys turn) seems to me to have been a waste of diluted effort.

 

[parsifal]

no you are changing the numbers on the table. 657 is the lost not enemy related in combat mission, the accidents in UK in not combat mission are not in that count.

Thankyou for pointing out the table is excluding certain losses. its that type of creative accounting that skews numbers and hides realities. A non-combat loss is just that, doesnt matter how it gets itself lost, if it is permanently lost or permanently unavailable, its a loss. if the loss is directly because it was because of enemy action, its a combat loss. If its a loss for any other reason, its a non combat loss. The US lost 180000 airframes during the war to all causes, of which about 20000 were combat related. Any other methodology of including or not including losses for whatever reason just skews the reult and hides the true effect. And it certainly means the results shown in the statistical digest, or cannot be compared in any way to BC losses, because we dont know what losses were included and what werent, and if not, why not.

And yes this numbers are true your imagination worth nothing.

No need to get rude my friend, just becausde your asserions are being chanllenged here. im not using or disputing the losses listed in the statisitical digest, because Ive seen such creative accounting excercises done by every belligerent at one time or another. If a source excludes certain losses from its account, for whatever reason, then the numbers listed in that account immediately become unable to be compared with anything because we dont know what losses were excluded and why. They may say why, but the number isd stil suspect. For example, what do you say about an aircraft that returns but is scrapped due to damage. is that a loss. By the parameter you are stating its not a loss. Since flak accounts for about 7 times the number of aircraft damaged, to those actually shot down, the methodology you are so strenuously defending immediately discounts by a dfactor of up to 7 times, the effect of the German flak guns. The whole argument of excluding certain losses from the accounting is just so non-sequitur and something Ive never accepted.

The numbers are relatively similar to BC number, yes are lower but BC flying most on night so in obvious get more trouble.

No, they are not. They are significantly different in size, and because they have selectively included obly certain types of lossess (eg excluded aircraft scrapped that returned to base) cannot be compared to BC losses. We dont know the parameters of the BC accounts, and whether what they include in their loss sheets are the same as those for the US.

is not me that non include is specified losses are enemy related or accidents so a planes scrapped for wear is not a losses almost for usaaf

.

Just because the table you are reading from displays losses in a certain way, and excludes certain losses, does not mean that an aircraft scrapped is not a loss. its just that your table doesnt include it as a loss. I can tell you that aircraft not avaiilable for operations, for whatever reason are treated as a loss from the force structure. thats not my idea, incidentally, its the way daily strength returns are reported in the military. actually the daily servicieability sheets are morre detailed than that, because they list permanent losses and how long damaged aircraft will be before they return, but an aircrafdt scrapped is counted as a loss, I can assure you.