Balljoint
Senior Airman
Actually, IMO deep penetration daylight bombing before 44 was ill advised. But if the premise of this thread is the proper way to attain the mission objective, he was wrong.
I'll take a look for the source on the Me-262.
Target Schweinfurt
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Actually, IMO deep penetration daylight bombing before 44 was ill advised. But if the premise of this thread is the proper way to attain the mission objective, he was wrong.
I'll take a look for the source on the Me-262.
parsifal
Colonel
Only a proportion of Germanflak batteries were radar directeed, so darkness does affect flak effectiveness.
Moreover in 1943 German radar was severely affected by Chaff, first deplyed enmasse over Hamburg in July. RAF BC was reaching the zenith of its power in 1943 and to argue it was inneffective or thwarted by German night defences in 1943 is simply to ignore the effects and achievement of BC in 1943. In fact the Germans were forced to significantly beef up their night defences as a result of raids like Gomorrah.
The attack during the last week of July, 1943, Operation Gomorrah, created one of the greatest firestorms raised by the RAF and USAAF in World War II, killing 42,600 civilians and wounding 37,000 in Hamburg and practically destroying the entire city. It was easily the most devastating bombing raid in history, prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs and prior to the US firebombing raids on Japan in 1945. Residential coal cellar coal and coke supplies in Hamburg contributed considerably to the apartment building fires. The unusually warm weather and good conditions meant that the bombing was highly concentrated around the intended targets and also created a vortex and whirling updraft of super-heated air which created a 500m tornado of flame and ash, a totally unexpected effect. Various other previously used techniques and devices were instrumental as well, such as area bombing, Pathfinders, and H2S radar, which came together to work particularly effectively, such that the bombing accuracy of the night bombers in these raids actually exceed the accuracy of the USAAC day bombing efforts over Schweinfurt.
'Window', was successfully used for the first time by the RAF - clouds of shredded tinfoil dropped by Pathfinders as well as the initial bomber stream - in order to completely cloud German radar. The raids inflicted severe damage to German armaments production in Hamburg.
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No, you wont, as the experiences over Hamburg amply demonstrate.
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Nope, wrong again. What you are referring to here is the use of OBOE, but this was not possible over Hamburg either. H2S and the pathfinders would have had little trouble in finding Schweinfurt, unlike the terrible conditions BC found over Berlin. There is no reason to not assert that a raid of Gommorrah proportions over Schweinfurt would not have obliterated the city in the same way as hamburg was....
Gixxerman
Senior Airman
My opinion (in regard to hitting German power production) is that as much as we may have a liking to believe that WW2 'choke points' existed (and the Germans were no different with 'Operation Eisenhammer') surely the whole tale is one which shows that except for a limited tactical advantage the strategic worth of these attacks was never what was hoped for or expected?
German production was hammered relentlessly and yet they dispersed began again elsewhere, or in the case of transportation they just rebuilt and rebuilt and rebuilt.
I'm not sure anything other than a fairly temporary effect would be obvious....and I'd suggest that because of this then until the invasion was secured and eastern summer offensive of 1944 started the rapid ejection of nazi Germany from the conquered territory they held it would probably have been unwise to attempt.
My own view is that until the advent of incredibly accurate reliable 'smart weaponry' in numbers (cos even there the PR - certainly as far as Gulf War mk1 is concerned - was not quite in tune with the reality) and the systems which could reliably deliver them to maximum effect - in tandem with the pace of modern warfare - then the notion of 'choke points' probably in reality may well end up costing the attacker more than the true effect gained and only for a temporary effect.
The exception would probably be something like a 'decapitating' assassination plot (as per July '44) working out or pin-point raid getting lucky.
German production was hammered relentlessly and yet they dispersed began again elsewhere, or in the case of transportation they just rebuilt and rebuilt and rebuilt.
I'm not sure anything other than a fairly temporary effect would be obvious....and I'd suggest that because of this then until the invasion was secured and eastern summer offensive of 1944 started the rapid ejection of nazi Germany from the conquered territory they held it would probably have been unwise to attempt.
My own view is that until the advent of incredibly accurate reliable 'smart weaponry' in numbers (cos even there the PR - certainly as far as Gulf War mk1 is concerned - was not quite in tune with the reality) and the systems which could reliably deliver them to maximum effect - in tandem with the pace of modern warfare - then the notion of 'choke points' probably in reality may well end up costing the attacker more than the true effect gained and only for a temporary effect.
The exception would probably be something like a 'decapitating' assassination plot (as per July '44) working out or pin-point raid getting lucky.
parsifal
Colonel
I agree that choke points are overrated, but I dont agree at all that the WWII strategic bombing campaign did not profoundly affect Axis production. Even if you wish to discount the the effects of the bombing itself (which I dont...i think it affected german production capabilities greatly in itself), the Germans were spending well over 50% of their military budgets on air defence and civil defence by 1944, and had sucked out well over 2 million personnel either directly or indirectly in their attempts to counter the Allied bombers. For the RAF, this effect came at a cost of 12% of their military budget. Thats an excellent investment.
Then we have to factor in the effects of the bombing itself. There is a sharp wide difference of opinion on that score, but the USSBS and the post war British equivalent (the name escapes me, but I have read it), both estimate German production was affected/downgraded by up to 50% by the middle of 1944. There was no magic bullet, although targetting the oil industry comes close, and the allied effort came at a steep cost. it was an even steeper cost (and markedly so) for the Germans in their efforts at defence.
Even the Germans (the ones not attempting to rewrite history that is) acknowledge the strategically important effects of the bombing campaigns
Then we have to factor in the effects of the bombing itself. There is a sharp wide difference of opinion on that score, but the USSBS and the post war British equivalent (the name escapes me, but I have read it), both estimate German production was affected/downgraded by up to 50% by the middle of 1944. There was no magic bullet, although targetting the oil industry comes close, and the allied effort came at a steep cost. it was an even steeper cost (and markedly so) for the Germans in their efforts at defence.
Even the Germans (the ones not attempting to rewrite history that is) acknowledge the strategically important effects of the bombing campaigns
Balljoint
Senior Airman
The Regensburg Me plant was heavily hit destroyng 37 newly-minted Me 109 and resulting in lost production of 800 to 1000 109s. Also destroyed were the jigs for the 262. From Airforce Magazine February 2010
Gixxerman
Senior Airman
Sorry if I misled parsifal that was not my intent, in no way was I trying to say the allied bombing campaign was without great effect on German wartime production.
One can only speculate on the added and additional potential of German industry had the allies not been attacking it on the scale they did.
I'm just saying that choke points (esp with WW2 arms) seem an illusory target for anything other than short-term gain.
The dogged dismantling of German supply production infrastruction on the other hand did ultimately lead to a collapse in Germany's ability to field arms but that can hardly be said to have been a 'quick fix'.
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wuzak
Captain
There was a surplus of ball bearings, don't know if it was "huge".
After the scare with the Schweinfurt raid, some equipment was redesigned to use plain bearings, thus reducing the demand for them.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Per "The Other Battle" by Peter Hinchliffe.
RAF Bomber Command lost 2,225 aircraft on night operations during 1943. An additional 5,177 aircraft were damaged, 348 beyond repair. Confirmed German night fighter claims amount to 81% of total losses.
RAF Bomber Command lost 2,225 aircraft on night operations during 1943. An additional 5,177 aircraft were damaged, 348 beyond repair. Confirmed German night fighter claims amount to 81% of total losses.
parsifal
Colonel
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The numbers are too high (see below) and the number written off grossly wrong. Damaged might be correct, but am unsure. overall, Hinchcliffes numbers appear to be more based on claimed results rather than actual losses
Anyway, see below
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That directly conflicts with Westerman "Flak - Germana Anti Aircraft Defences" - Westermanns statistics are based on the RAF stremgth returns and the LW quartermaster reports, whereas Hinchcliffe I am led to believe are based on LW claims....correct?
In the first quarter BC lost 186 aircraft to German combat related activities....90 to flak and 96 to fighters. 805 other aircraft were damaged, of which 104 were eventually written off. 724 of the damaged a/c were due to flak, 81 were from the fighters. To achieve that result, the Germans spent 39million of their 132 RM budget on flak defences and 19 million on their night fighter forces in the 1st quarter of 1943.
Westermann goes on to write: "The RAF bombing campaign intensified the stresses on the german defencesby the middle of June; however the german air defences exacted a heavy toll during this period. RAF BC losses in the second qaurter totalled (354 a/c to fighters, and 225 to flak. Daylight operations added a further 21 losses to a/c and 4 to flak. British BC losses in the period provide several insights. First the fact that BC lost almost 600 combat losses in the period was indicative of the performance of the German air defences, but it also demonstrated the strength and size of the RAFs bober forces. Only a year osr so earlier, losses on this scale would have cripled BC. Second, flak was the dominant deterrent in the losses suffered by BC, in that period 1496 a/c were damaged, with 22 written off as beyond repair. Fighters in the second quarter accounted for 122 a/c damaged, of which 8 were written off. Overall losses to sortie rates accounted for 5.3% of sorties flown".
The trend continued for the last two quarters. the point being, fighters did not account for 81% of losses, not even 50%, and further, had a minute affect on a/c damaged. In westermanns opinion, flak also affected accuracy to a much greater extent than fighters (forcing the bombers to fly high and fast)..
BC statistics (see also others pages) BC Operational Stats
parsifal
Colonel
BC stats include non-operational losses, which can be misleading. A large number of aircrafty when operating in overloaded condition, and exceeding safety margins considerably are lost through no enemy action. For the germans this figure in the west (outside of Germany) was about 5-7% each and every month that it operated. The Allied tactical airforces suffered similar attrityional rates when operating from rough strips and difficult conditions. in the east, the LW suffered truly diabolical attrition rates even when not resisted by significant enemy action. Estimates do vary, but typically it is thought that between 20 and 40 percent of losses each month of the force structure wre lost to non-combat related causes. Easily about 70% of total German losses were due to no actyion by anyone except the rough way the germans used their air force.
Bomber Command noperating from well developed airfields deep within friendly territory in the home country suffered a monthly loss rate of just under 2% on average to noncombat related causes. If you look at the overall loss rates contained in the BC stats, it will be seen that more than half the RAFs losses had nothing to do with German action at all....landing accidents, takeoff accidents, nav errors, airborne engine or equipment failures for the most part....
Bomber Command noperating from well developed airfields deep within friendly territory in the home country suffered a monthly loss rate of just under 2% on average to noncombat related causes. If you look at the overall loss rates contained in the BC stats, it will be seen that more than half the RAFs losses had nothing to do with German action at all....landing accidents, takeoff accidents, nav errors, airborne engine or equipment failures for the most part....
A quote from Martin Middlebrook's "The Peenemunde Raid" is clearly in order.
"A claim made by General Eisenhower in his book "Crusade in Europe" is often quoted in support of the claim that the raid set the rocket programme back by six months or more;but Eisenhower's opinion that the invasion of Europe might have been "written off" had the Germans been able to use V weapons six months earlier.....referred rather to V-1 flying bombs than to V-2 rockets - and it must be emphasised once more that the RAF operation had nothing to do with flying bombs"
My italics.
As for Eisenhower's "six months" delay both British and German assessments were in curious agreement. Goebbels estimated the raid cost the rocket programme "six to eight weeks" and the British Official History states that the raid "may well have caused a delay of two months."
Statistically the RAF can claim to have prevented the launch of about 750 V-2 rockets. They also prevented,statistically,around 1,000 fatalities in London alone. To me that does not equate to a "flashier" target.
The death of propulsion specialist Dr Thiel had an adverse effect on the development of both the Wasserfall anti aircraft rocket system and the two stage A-9 rocket system.
Peenemunde's most effective defence turned out not to be Nightfighters or Flak of any calibre but a smokescreen,manned by old men and Russian volunteers.
Cheers
Steve
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The jigs for the Me 262 fuselage were damaged in that raid. A much more serious delay had been caused months earlier in March 1943 by Messerschmitt itself. On March 17th 1943 all the designers were removed from the Me 262 project and moved onto the Me 410!
Now that turned out to be an own goal.
There were other silly delays which indicate the lack of priority enjoyed by the 262 project. For example,in late 1943 flight trials in Leipheim had to be stopped because the airfield was occupied by Italian nightfighters.
Cheers
Steve
parsifal
Colonel
Happy to accept that, but the issue arose about claims made about the effectiveness of German defences and how the british would have been decimated if they had dared attack Schweinfurt. ive never denied RAF losses werent heavy. But in mid 1943 the RAF was hitting German cities with devastating effect, and the losses quoted are not all due to German activity. about half the losses suffered by the RAF had nothing at all to do with German activity. By comparison about 70% of German losses fall into the same category
Balljoint
Senior Airman
The jigs damage was at least an unavoidable setback. When the 262 did roll off the line Hitler shut it down and demanded that it be modified into the terror bomber he had been promised. At a later date he declared that all fighter production be terminated. Still this only delayed things for a few months.
Every of the many critical path delays pushed the 262 back enough so it made no telling impact.
The US losses 5548 heavy bomber in combat mission in ETO, of this only 657 are not from enemy triple A or aircraft (for '43 alone 1036 and 108) so imho the not enemy related losses of BC were not at 50%
TheMustangRider
Senior Airman
Do you have sources to back up those figures Vicenzo? It seems to me, given the abysmal weather conditions that prevailed over Northern Europe most of the time and the complexity of assembling bomber formations, fatigue, navigational errors and other direct or indirect causes, that only 600+ heavy bombers were lost in non-combat accidents.
sure the (US)AAF statistical digest world war II table 159. that are not all the losses in accidents are the losses for "other causes" in combat mission idk exactly what are "other causes", in all the heavy bomber losses in ETO were 6,592 (table 102)
