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Technology and Science from 1901 to 1945
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They only have a week ban. They have the opportunity to return, if they can act like adults.
parsifal
Colonel
Lets hope they think about why things happened as they did
In 1995 Feist and Culver published their Panther book
the following 2 claims are made on pages 169 and 170:
1
One action took place on the 21st of April 1945. The last ten
tanks of "Clausewitz", followed by a Puma 20 mm (Sd.Kfz.
234/1) recce vehicle, approached a US antitank-gun position
(76 mm AT gun M2) at the Weser/Elbe Canal. This first attack
took place at 2 o'clock in the morning. The Americans were
alert and fired illumination rounds. The leading Panther was
then hit and slipped into a ditch, the attack halted. Then the IR
Panthers moved into cover and after a short time located the
guns and fired some twenty rounds. The entire position was
destroyed, the crews and the accompanying infantry company
escaping in somewhat of a panic. The IR Panthers followed
up, destroying some lorries and further support vehicles.
This attack was a success, revealing the enormous possibili-
ties of the IR technology. It is not known, whether the IR
Panthers of "Clausewitz" were used a second time.
2
Some reports tell of a last action of thus equipped IR Panthers
when they met a British armored division. A British platoon
equipped with Comet tanks was engaged in April 1945 (at
night) by some Solution B IR Panthers. In a short, one-sided
and fierce firelight the entire platoon was annihilated..
These claims are repeated in their 1998 Panther book
they are also picked up in the 1996 Concord book ( page 66) and they match so closely they must be sourced in Culver and Feist
These 2 sites repeat the claims
Nightfighting Panthers
Achtung Panzer! - German Infrared Night-Vision Devices!
but they are so worded as to be obvious repeats of the Culver and Feist claims.
This indicates that there is only the one source, Culver and Feist.
It is interesting that though the Culver and Feist books mention a photograph of a solution B Panther in their 1995 book it is only printed in the 1996 Anderson book.
Unfortunately this photo turned out to be a fake and thus completely demolished the claim for a Solution B Panther.
Axis WWII Discussion Group: IR Panther KOed in Falaise
In this thread the author(Thomas Anderson) explains how he was duped.
Axis WWII Discussion Group: Fine Scale modeler: IR panther solution B thoughts?
The way I see it then we have the claim for the use of 2 IR Panthers on the night of 21st April 1945.
I found this
After Action April 1945
and the report for 21/4/45 states:
On 21 April, the Division attacked north from a line of departure DAHRE - SALZWEDEL with CCA on the left and CCR on the right. Just prior to the attack, CCA was counter-attacked by elements of Division "Clausewitz". Artillery fire was placed on the attacking forces and they broke and dispersed into the woods to the north.
CCA attacked against a determined enemy who had set up make shift defenses in the woods along the combat command's routes of advance. An increase in the use of anti-tank mines was observed, and fire from nebelwerfers and artillery pieces slowed the advance to some extent. At 2100, the 46th Amrd Inf Bn (married) was assembling for the night in the vicinity of GADDAU. The married "C" companies (46th Armd Inf Bn and 34th Tank Bn) went into position with the CCA CP near KLENZE and the 34th Tank Bn (married) assembled in the vicinity of BERGEN .
CCR was held up in its attack until 1500. The reason for this was that the resistance in front of CCA was such that the two combat commands could not parallel each other's advance, and thus a threat existed to the flank of either, if one was held up and the other moved too rapidly forward. After CCA had cracked the resistance in its sector, CCR attacked with the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) advancing north on the SALZWEDEL - LUCHOW road and the 10th Tank Bn (married) attacking on the left to clear the pockets in the woods near BOMBECK. The 47th met a good deal of resistance along its route, and mines were found strewn on the road with a minefield near SAASSE. Road blocks defended by AT guns, nebelwerfers, mortars, and infantry, were encountered all along the route and at 2000, heavy fire from LUCHOW, and vicinity, prompted the force to abandon its further advance that night. The battalion went into a security position near SAASSE. In the meantime, the 10th Tank Bn was attacking in the BOMBECK area. The woods in this vicinity had been reported to be a strong-point of enemy armor and infantry. The positions had been sealed off on the north and east by CCA's attack in the early part of the day. The attack was made with one married tank-infantry company moving south from SEEBEN to the railroad and holding there while the balance of the 10th attacked north from the south edge of the woods.
A quantity of enemy personnel was trapped and captured and material loss for the enemy was large. Three (3) tanks were known to have escaped the trap and these moved northwest into the CCA sector. The 10th Tank Bn secured for the night near GR GERSTEDT.
CCB, with the 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz attached, continued its clearing at the KLOTZE FORST. Many burned out enemy vehicles were found along with others which apparently had been abandoned. The combat command also maintained its road blocks on the western boundary of the sector in the WITTINGEN - ZASENBECK RADENBECK area, and kept contact with the 29th Inf Div to the north. An advance Division CP was established at SALZWEDEL and Division operations were directed from there.
(NOTE: Div Arty accomplished its usual efficient mission in a supporting role, and the disorganization and dispersal of enemy units attested to the accuracy of the artillery fire.)
Enemy losses were reported as follows:
personnel, PW's six hundred fifty (650), killed, one hundred fifty nine (159),
material captured or destroyed,
fourteen (14) tanks,
four (4) armored cars,
nine (9) half-tracks,
two (2) SP guns (1-75mm, 1-105mm),
two (2) 88mm AT/AA.guns,
four (4) 105mm guns,
two (2) 20mm flak guns,
seventy-two (72) miscellaneous cycles,
one (1) fuel-lubricant dump containing one hundred fifty (150) 50 gal drums of fuel.
There is no mention of 'panic' nor is there anything about IR Panthers. Why were they not noticed? The report also lists the 5th AD losses for the whole of April and only 1 57mm A/T gun was written off.
Perhaps the US Soldiers would not have known about IR and thus might have missed the signs?
A little further down the same page ( 6. COMMENTS: Section II - Intelligence Matters)
it says:
Two, apparently new and highly secret weapons of the enemy were captured during the period.
At STENAL, Germany a German research technician was taken prisoner. This technician had in his possession and installed on his automobile, Infrared equipment which he was removing from the vicinity of BERLIN and the ultimate danger of capture by the Russians. This equipment was designed for installation on tanks for the purpose of night fighting. The entire equipment, plus the technician was turned over to Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service, NINTH Army. A secret report has been subsequently rendered on this equipment and a copy of the report is on file at this Headquarters.
So it seems they did have the ability to recognise the importance of IR Equipment after all.
Lastly we have the claim about the Comets being 'wiped out.
The following links makes short work of this claim
Axis WWII Discussion Group: Exploding Comets, and myths.
It seems the two actions always quoted as proof of IR Panther success have serious problems of credibility
For info on Allied IR:
http://www.hmvf.co.uk/pdf/Tabby02.pdf
An article that appeared in Wheels And Tracks Magazine had details of IR night-driving set ups on Churchill and Cromwell tanks from 1943 . If no one has it I can post it here.
the following 2 claims are made on pages 169 and 170:
1
One action took place on the 21st of April 1945. The last ten
tanks of "Clausewitz", followed by a Puma 20 mm (Sd.Kfz.
234/1) recce vehicle, approached a US antitank-gun position
(76 mm AT gun M2) at the Weser/Elbe Canal. This first attack
took place at 2 o'clock in the morning. The Americans were
alert and fired illumination rounds. The leading Panther was
then hit and slipped into a ditch, the attack halted. Then the IR
Panthers moved into cover and after a short time located the
guns and fired some twenty rounds. The entire position was
destroyed, the crews and the accompanying infantry company
escaping in somewhat of a panic. The IR Panthers followed
up, destroying some lorries and further support vehicles.
This attack was a success, revealing the enormous possibili-
ties of the IR technology. It is not known, whether the IR
Panthers of "Clausewitz" were used a second time.
2
Some reports tell of a last action of thus equipped IR Panthers
when they met a British armored division. A British platoon
equipped with Comet tanks was engaged in April 1945 (at
night) by some Solution B IR Panthers. In a short, one-sided
and fierce firelight the entire platoon was annihilated..
These claims are repeated in their 1998 Panther book
they are also picked up in the 1996 Concord book ( page 66) and they match so closely they must be sourced in Culver and Feist
These 2 sites repeat the claims
Nightfighting Panthers
Achtung Panzer! - German Infrared Night-Vision Devices!
but they are so worded as to be obvious repeats of the Culver and Feist claims.
This indicates that there is only the one source, Culver and Feist.
It is interesting that though the Culver and Feist books mention a photograph of a solution B Panther in their 1995 book it is only printed in the 1996 Anderson book.
Unfortunately this photo turned out to be a fake and thus completely demolished the claim for a Solution B Panther.
Axis WWII Discussion Group: IR Panther KOed in Falaise
In this thread the author(Thomas Anderson) explains how he was duped.
Axis WWII Discussion Group: Fine Scale modeler: IR panther solution B thoughts?
The way I see it then we have the claim for the use of 2 IR Panthers on the night of 21st April 1945.
I found this
After Action April 1945
and the report for 21/4/45 states:
On 21 April, the Division attacked north from a line of departure DAHRE - SALZWEDEL with CCA on the left and CCR on the right. Just prior to the attack, CCA was counter-attacked by elements of Division "Clausewitz". Artillery fire was placed on the attacking forces and they broke and dispersed into the woods to the north.
CCA attacked against a determined enemy who had set up make shift defenses in the woods along the combat command's routes of advance. An increase in the use of anti-tank mines was observed, and fire from nebelwerfers and artillery pieces slowed the advance to some extent. At 2100, the 46th Amrd Inf Bn (married) was assembling for the night in the vicinity of GADDAU. The married "C" companies (46th Armd Inf Bn and 34th Tank Bn) went into position with the CCA CP near KLENZE and the 34th Tank Bn (married) assembled in the vicinity of BERGEN .
CCR was held up in its attack until 1500. The reason for this was that the resistance in front of CCA was such that the two combat commands could not parallel each other's advance, and thus a threat existed to the flank of either, if one was held up and the other moved too rapidly forward. After CCA had cracked the resistance in its sector, CCR attacked with the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) advancing north on the SALZWEDEL - LUCHOW road and the 10th Tank Bn (married) attacking on the left to clear the pockets in the woods near BOMBECK. The 47th met a good deal of resistance along its route, and mines were found strewn on the road with a minefield near SAASSE. Road blocks defended by AT guns, nebelwerfers, mortars, and infantry, were encountered all along the route and at 2000, heavy fire from LUCHOW, and vicinity, prompted the force to abandon its further advance that night. The battalion went into a security position near SAASSE. In the meantime, the 10th Tank Bn was attacking in the BOMBECK area. The woods in this vicinity had been reported to be a strong-point of enemy armor and infantry. The positions had been sealed off on the north and east by CCA's attack in the early part of the day. The attack was made with one married tank-infantry company moving south from SEEBEN to the railroad and holding there while the balance of the 10th attacked north from the south edge of the woods.
A quantity of enemy personnel was trapped and captured and material loss for the enemy was large. Three (3) tanks were known to have escaped the trap and these moved northwest into the CCA sector. The 10th Tank Bn secured for the night near GR GERSTEDT.
CCB, with the 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz attached, continued its clearing at the KLOTZE FORST. Many burned out enemy vehicles were found along with others which apparently had been abandoned. The combat command also maintained its road blocks on the western boundary of the sector in the WITTINGEN - ZASENBECK RADENBECK area, and kept contact with the 29th Inf Div to the north. An advance Division CP was established at SALZWEDEL and Division operations were directed from there.
(NOTE: Div Arty accomplished its usual efficient mission in a supporting role, and the disorganization and dispersal of enemy units attested to the accuracy of the artillery fire.)
Enemy losses were reported as follows:
personnel, PW's six hundred fifty (650), killed, one hundred fifty nine (159),
material captured or destroyed,
fourteen (14) tanks,
four (4) armored cars,
nine (9) half-tracks,
two (2) SP guns (1-75mm, 1-105mm),
two (2) 88mm AT/AA.guns,
four (4) 105mm guns,
two (2) 20mm flak guns,
seventy-two (72) miscellaneous cycles,
one (1) fuel-lubricant dump containing one hundred fifty (150) 50 gal drums of fuel.
There is no mention of 'panic' nor is there anything about IR Panthers. Why were they not noticed? The report also lists the 5th AD losses for the whole of April and only 1 57mm A/T gun was written off.
Perhaps the US Soldiers would not have known about IR and thus might have missed the signs?
A little further down the same page ( 6. COMMENTS: Section II - Intelligence Matters)
it says:
Two, apparently new and highly secret weapons of the enemy were captured during the period.
At STENAL, Germany a German research technician was taken prisoner. This technician had in his possession and installed on his automobile, Infrared equipment which he was removing from the vicinity of BERLIN and the ultimate danger of capture by the Russians. This equipment was designed for installation on tanks for the purpose of night fighting. The entire equipment, plus the technician was turned over to Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service, NINTH Army. A secret report has been subsequently rendered on this equipment and a copy of the report is on file at this Headquarters.
So it seems they did have the ability to recognise the importance of IR Equipment after all.
Lastly we have the claim about the Comets being 'wiped out.
The following links makes short work of this claim
Axis WWII Discussion Group: Exploding Comets, and myths.
It seems the two actions always quoted as proof of IR Panther success have serious problems of credibility
For info on Allied IR:
http://www.hmvf.co.uk/pdf/Tabby02.pdf
An article that appeared in Wheels And Tracks Magazine had details of IR night-driving set ups on Churchill and Cromwell tanks from 1943 . If no one has it I can post it here.
parsifal
Colonel
welcome back M-Kenny. An excellent post, and please do post your material up on Allied IR equipped tanks. Jones hints at it, but is just a little tantalizingly vague to confirm anything. I did stumble across a webpage giving some broad based information on US usage of man-portable IR used on Okinawa in 1945. I'll see if I can find it.
Whilst Jones is vague about the land based IR, he does give a pretty good summary on IR research up to 1939, and some comparison to the German state of reseach. It is pretty clear from Jones' book entries that the British were more advanced in their research (but I am not sure about development), than the Germans. Perhaps the Germans were at a higher state of development, but were using cruder research and theory in their equipment development???
Whilst Jones is vague about the land based IR, he does give a pretty good summary on IR research up to 1939, and some comparison to the German state of reseach. It is pretty clear from Jones' book entries that the British were more advanced in their research (but I am not sure about development), than the Germans. Perhaps the Germans were at a higher state of development, but were using cruder research and theory in their equipment development???
Glider
Captain
Can I second Parsifal's post and ask for the details of the Infra Red lamps on Churchill and Cromwell tanks
parsifal
Colonel
A summary of US man portable IR equipment
Fight at Night: U.S Army Night Vision 1945-1980
On the T120 Snipewrscope and M2 Snooperscope
M1 Carbine Information, M1 Carbine Reference Articles - FindTarget Reference
Relevantly it makes the following performance appraisals
The M3 carbine (a selective-fire M2 with the M1 infrared night sight or sniperscope) was first used in combat by Army units during the invasion of Okinawa. For the first time, U.S. soldiers had a weapon that allowed them to visually detect Japanese infiltrating into American lines at night, even during pitch blackness. A team of two or three soldiers was used to operate the weapon and provide support. At night, the scope would be used to detect Japanese patrols and assault units moving forwards. At that point, the operator would fire a burst of automatic fire at the greenish images of enemy soldiers. The M3 with the M1 sight had an effective range of about 70 yards (limited by the visual capabilities of the sight). Fog and rain further reduced the weapon's effective range. It is estimated that fully 30% of Japanese casualties inflicted by rifle and carbine fire during the Okinawan campaign were caused by the M3 carbine and its M1 sniperscope.
Fight at Night: U.S Army Night Vision 1945-1980
On the T120 Snipewrscope and M2 Snooperscope
M1 Carbine Information, M1 Carbine Reference Articles - FindTarget Reference
Relevantly it makes the following performance appraisals
The M3 carbine (a selective-fire M2 with the M1 infrared night sight or sniperscope) was first used in combat by Army units during the invasion of Okinawa. For the first time, U.S. soldiers had a weapon that allowed them to visually detect Japanese infiltrating into American lines at night, even during pitch blackness. A team of two or three soldiers was used to operate the weapon and provide support. At night, the scope would be used to detect Japanese patrols and assault units moving forwards. At that point, the operator would fire a burst of automatic fire at the greenish images of enemy soldiers. The M3 with the M1 sight had an effective range of about 70 yards (limited by the visual capabilities of the sight). Fog and rain further reduced the weapon's effective range. It is estimated that fully 30% of Japanese casualties inflicted by rifle and carbine fire during the Okinawan campaign were caused by the M3 carbine and its M1 sniperscope.
Hello Parsifal and Glider
with a little imagination using m_kenny's link I found this http://www.hmvf.co.uk/pdf/Tabby01.pdf
it's on British systems
Juha
And Thanks m_kenny for the excellent message and links.
with a little imagination using m_kenny's link I found this http://www.hmvf.co.uk/pdf/Tabby01.pdf
it's on British systems
Juha
And Thanks m_kenny for the excellent message and links.
parsifal
Colonel
Juha
Excellent find. I read that document very quickly. It appears that the Brits were utilising passive and active IR detection systems, in which case they were even further ahead than I had first thought. Passive IR systems are3 generally conside3red to be "2nd generation", whereas active systems are associated with 1st generation. The main problem with active systems are their tendencey to give their own positions away.
I will go back and have another look
Excellent find. I read that document very quickly. It appears that the Brits were utilising passive and active IR detection systems, in which case they were even further ahead than I had first thought. Passive IR systems are3 generally conside3red to be "2nd generation", whereas active systems are associated with 1st generation. The main problem with active systems are their tendencey to give their own positions away.
I will go back and have another look
Glider
Captain
Juha
Once again I would second parsifal's comments. The only ones I had heard of were the ones fitted to RAF bombers and nightfighters. The bombers were often those few aircraft fitted with the type D turret with its built in radar. The gunners often had a radar reading before they could see anything but if they fired on the radar, then it was too often another bomber that they shot at.
I had no idea that infra red was so widely issued from so early on in the war.
Once again I would second parsifal's comments. The only ones I had heard of were the ones fitted to RAF bombers and nightfighters. The bombers were often those few aircraft fitted with the type D turret with its built in radar. The gunners often had a radar reading before they could see anything but if they fired on the radar, then it was too often another bomber that they shot at.
I had no idea that infra red was so widely issued from so early on in the war.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The German Vampir Zielgerät 1229 system was in use, though not wide-spread, on both the western and eastern fronts late in the war. While it's development goes back a number of years, for some reason, it was never fully utilized.
Same goes for the FG 1250 system, which was part of the Vampir "Infrarot-Scheinwerfer" design. The intention was to have the IR equipped Panther (or other large panzer) deploy along with the SdKfz 251 "Uhu" on the battlefield. Aparently, only 50 Pzkfw V Panthers ever got the FG 1250, and those were deployed both to the eastern front and the western front. Also equipped, was the Marder II and various other armored vehicles, as the FG 1250 with it's 60cm searchlight was easily mounted.
Having the equipment is one thing, actually surving to use it was another. I would have to question some of the "stories" that involve the IR equipped tanks, but I have no doubt that there were IR equipped men and machines engaged in battle during the war.
Sdkfz 251 Uhu:
Same goes for the FG 1250 system, which was part of the Vampir "Infrarot-Scheinwerfer" design. The intention was to have the IR equipped Panther (or other large panzer) deploy along with the SdKfz 251 "Uhu" on the battlefield. Aparently, only 50 Pzkfw V Panthers ever got the FG 1250, and those were deployed both to the eastern front and the western front. Also equipped, was the Marder II and various other armored vehicles, as the FG 1250 with it's 60cm searchlight was easily mounted.
Having the equipment is one thing, actually surving to use it was another. I would have to question some of the "stories" that involve the IR equipped tanks, but I have no doubt that there were IR equipped men and machines engaged in battle during the war.
Sdkfz 251 Uhu:
Attachments
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
parsifal
Colonel
I dont think there are too many folks here saying the equipment wasnt avilable to the germans. There are three points of contention, however. The first was that it was used operationally on the western front. The second was that it was effective (specifically that it shot up an American AT unit, and a British unit of Comets). The third point of contention is that it was superior technologically to anything opposed to that German equipment
M-Kenny has produced some fairly solid evidence to suggest that either the germans did not use the equipment, or, if it was, it was not effective.
The technological development is either inconclusive as to who held the lead, or suggests that the allies in fact held the technological edge in this field
M-Kenny has produced some fairly solid evidence to suggest that either the germans did not use the equipment, or, if it was, it was not effective.
The technological development is either inconclusive as to who held the lead, or suggests that the allies in fact held the technological edge in this field
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
I would surmise that the German leaders treated the Vampir system as a second thought over more conventional technology, as they did in a number of cases, until it was too late in the war to make a difference.
As far as the superiority aspect, I would venture to say that the IR systems on both sides would have been comparable technology, with the Germans only having the noteriety of developing it first.
If I remember right, the unit of IR equipped (FG 1250) Panthers that trained for operation Wacht Am Rhein (Battle of the Bulge), were never deployed in that action. FG 1250 equipped Panthers did see some (very limited) action in Hungary though, and more notably, in the defense of Berlin during the night attack on the Soviet's Reitwein lines (April 1945) along with Vampir equipped PanzerGrenadiers.
One of the problems with the vehicle mounted system, was it's inability to handle shock, and when mounted on the Panther, suffered infra-red pollution by the Panther's exhaust. To add to that problem, the short range of the searchlight (600-700m) would have limited it's ability to engage at a safe range in a running battle.
I would imagine that the Allied IR equipment would be comparable in this respect, seeing as how the technology was still new, and hadn't had much time for working out bugs.
It would be interesting to see the environmental conditions of the two battles where IR was supposedly used (involving U.S. AT and British Comets) on the western front. If there were a full moon on those evenings, perhaps that would have led to the Panther's crews being able to effectively engage at night as they did have excellent optics.
As far as the superiority aspect, I would venture to say that the IR systems on both sides would have been comparable technology, with the Germans only having the noteriety of developing it first.
If I remember right, the unit of IR equipped (FG 1250) Panthers that trained for operation Wacht Am Rhein (Battle of the Bulge), were never deployed in that action. FG 1250 equipped Panthers did see some (very limited) action in Hungary though, and more notably, in the defense of Berlin during the night attack on the Soviet's Reitwein lines (April 1945) along with Vampir equipped PanzerGrenadiers.
One of the problems with the vehicle mounted system, was it's inability to handle shock, and when mounted on the Panther, suffered infra-red pollution by the Panther's exhaust. To add to that problem, the short range of the searchlight (600-700m) would have limited it's ability to engage at a safe range in a running battle.
I would imagine that the Allied IR equipment would be comparable in this respect, seeing as how the technology was still new, and hadn't had much time for working out bugs.
It would be interesting to see the environmental conditions of the two battles where IR was supposedly used (involving U.S. AT and British Comets) on the western front. If there were a full moon on those evenings, perhaps that would have led to the Panther's crews being able to effectively engage at night as they did have excellent optics.
Well that is incorrect I'm afraid. The Germans fielded much better IR imaging equipement, the excellent image quality making it suitable for use on AFV's, the FG-1250 for example providing clear imaging out to 600m while other versions provided two or six times greater range (These were used on a/c). Allied IR equipment could only be used at ranges of 30 to 50m, rendering it useless for use on AFV's and other any purpose demanding greater visibillity range.
Furthermore the Germans were the first to field their better IR equipment, equipped units seeing action in 1944. The Allies first fielded their IR equipment in May 45 on Okinawa. But that's not all, the Germans also fielded IR equipment on their a/c, like the Spanner I-IV: Pauke, Pauke! » Spanner I-IV
Bf-110 with Spanner (Searchlight mounted under nose, detector in front windscreen):
Do-17Z10 with Spanner (Searchlight in nose, detector in front windscreen):
And then there was the FuG280 "Kiel" developed by Zeiss. Operating using lead sulphite photocells amplified in a vision screen, it provided a clear imaging range of 4000m, while weighing only 42 kg.
Also note that the Germans had working IR equipment in 1936.
Glider
Captain
Soren
Would I be right in saying that those pictures are of experimental/test examples. The Do17 is clearly an early aircraft and that 110 looks like an early version to me.
I have never seen an operational version in use in the front line or on any photo of a Ju88 or 110G.
If this is the case and they were not deployed (and I could be wrong) why wasn't this equipment deployed if it was so good?
Would I be right in saying that those pictures are of experimental/test examples. The Do17 is clearly an early aircraft and that 110 looks like an early version to me.
I have never seen an operational version in use in the front line or on any photo of a Ju88 or 110G.
If this is the case and they were not deployed (and I could be wrong) why wasn't this equipment deployed if it was so good?
parsifal
Colonel
Welcome back soren.
The British in fact had an airborne operational IR unit from early 1939. This is according to Jones, who worked on the equipment. Jones, in his Book, "Most Secret War" makes the point that British IR technology was clearly superior to anything the Germans were working on. I dont know that I can fully subscribe to that, but just given the fact that the British had their IR technology functional (1934-5) at a time that the Germans had not even really begun their research for military purposes (According to WIKI, they commenced military research into the physics in 1936) suggests that the British had a lead in the Research side of the Technology. What is not clear, is who held the lead in the development side of the technology, namely, thye conversion of the theoretical, or the experimental, to the operational. Jones does make the passing observation in his book that in 1942, certain discoveries made concerning the state of German research in 1942 was at about the same level as the British had been in 1937
The British were the only ones who apparently found even a theoretical answer to the chief problem to IR technology at the time namely, the ability to estimate range. They achieved this prewar by puksed emissions
I cant actually prove it, but just looking at the diagrams for the respective technologies, it looks to me that the Brits had some wartime equipment that used image enghancement, that is it uses a passive light source rather than an active light source. If this is the case, the British were reaching into what is referred to as "2nd generation" technology with IR.
On the other hand, and in support of the Germans, the Germans seem to have reached a higher stage of development over the allies......allied sets claim maximum ranges out to 400metres, for ground based systems, whilst the German FG 1250 had a maximum range out to 600metres. Allied effective ranges were roughly 1/3 that listed as the maximum rangese foir their ground based systems, I dont know the "effective" range for the FG 1250, but clearly if its maximum range is 600metres, its effective range is going to be less. I have not seen any ground based equipment used or developed in the wartime eera, that bettered the FG 1250. You say that there was equipment 4 times more effective than that, we'd better have a look at it if you can be more specific please
Lastly, US equipment was operational from 1943, not 1945, whilst the British had operational (but non-combat Night Vision equipment for land based applications, from 1941. Churchill was unwilling to commit the technology to battle until it could be iontroduced on a large scale for all battlke fronts. This goes a long way to explaining why evidence of British applications are so tantalizingly hard to find.
My opinion, based on the above is that it cannot be stated unequivocally that the germans held the lead. In terms of Research and theory, I think it was the Allies who were ahead, however in terms of military application, it may well be the Germans who held the lead at the end of the war
The British in fact had an airborne operational IR unit from early 1939. This is according to Jones, who worked on the equipment. Jones, in his Book, "Most Secret War" makes the point that British IR technology was clearly superior to anything the Germans were working on. I dont know that I can fully subscribe to that, but just given the fact that the British had their IR technology functional (1934-5) at a time that the Germans had not even really begun their research for military purposes (According to WIKI, they commenced military research into the physics in 1936) suggests that the British had a lead in the Research side of the Technology. What is not clear, is who held the lead in the development side of the technology, namely, thye conversion of the theoretical, or the experimental, to the operational. Jones does make the passing observation in his book that in 1942, certain discoveries made concerning the state of German research in 1942 was at about the same level as the British had been in 1937
The British were the only ones who apparently found even a theoretical answer to the chief problem to IR technology at the time namely, the ability to estimate range. They achieved this prewar by puksed emissions
I cant actually prove it, but just looking at the diagrams for the respective technologies, it looks to me that the Brits had some wartime equipment that used image enghancement, that is it uses a passive light source rather than an active light source. If this is the case, the British were reaching into what is referred to as "2nd generation" technology with IR.
On the other hand, and in support of the Germans, the Germans seem to have reached a higher stage of development over the allies......allied sets claim maximum ranges out to 400metres, for ground based systems, whilst the German FG 1250 had a maximum range out to 600metres. Allied effective ranges were roughly 1/3 that listed as the maximum rangese foir their ground based systems, I dont know the "effective" range for the FG 1250, but clearly if its maximum range is 600metres, its effective range is going to be less. I have not seen any ground based equipment used or developed in the wartime eera, that bettered the FG 1250. You say that there was equipment 4 times more effective than that, we'd better have a look at it if you can be more specific please
Lastly, US equipment was operational from 1943, not 1945, whilst the British had operational (but non-combat Night Vision equipment for land based applications, from 1941. Churchill was unwilling to commit the technology to battle until it could be iontroduced on a large scale for all battlke fronts. This goes a long way to explaining why evidence of British applications are so tantalizingly hard to find.
My opinion, based on the above is that it cannot be stated unequivocally that the germans held the lead. In terms of Research and theory, I think it was the Allies who were ahead, however in terms of military application, it may well be the Germans who held the lead at the end of the war
It was deployed Glider.
The FG-1250, Spanner, FuG-280 etc etc all used passive light sources and accurate range estimation was one of their advantages, and finally versions of them were operational in 42. So Spooner doesn't seem to know what he's talking about.
Parsifal the Germans list the ranges up to which all is clearly visible, the max range was longer. The Allied IR sets only provided a 40 to 50m clear visibility range, not 400m which was the absolute max range of the aparatus. The FG-1250 had a clear visibility range of 600m, and the a/c equipment like the Spanner I-IV had four to six times as long a clear visibility range, the FuG-280 for one providing a 4000m clear visibility range.
The Germans were well ahead in this area.
parsifal
Colonel
Can you produce your sources for the claims that you make in the above posts.
A passive system is a system that can rely on the ambient light sources. If the Sperber was a Passive system, why then does it have this 200mm lamp included in the drawings, as are all the other systems that you have illustrated.
With regards to the range claims that you are making you need to show documentation to support those claims, rather than just making the claims. There is far better body of information produced to this point within this thread to support the counterargument against you than the claims that you make.
In other words, it is just not adequate for you to make the claim....the evidence at this point that has been presented simply underscuts whatever claims you are trying to make....you need to start producing the evidence.
A passive system is a system that can rely on the ambient light sources. If the Sperber was a Passive system, why then does it have this 200mm lamp included in the drawings, as are all the other systems that you have illustrated.
With regards to the range claims that you are making you need to show documentation to support those claims, rather than just making the claims. There is far better body of information produced to this point within this thread to support the counterargument against you than the claims that you make.
In other words, it is just not adequate for you to make the claim....the evidence at this point that has been presented simply underscuts whatever claims you are trying to make....you need to start producing the evidence.
Glider
Captain
I have been looking into it and as I understand it Spanner I was only deployed in a handfull (not all) of the Do217 nightfighters which in themselves were only in service for a short time, and a couple of experimental Me110D aircraft.
If it was any good it presumably would have been used in the Ju88 and 110G nightfighters which formed the backbone of the nightfighter forces.
So you are correct in that it was deployed but so were a number of other devices on both sides, but wasn't a success like so many ideas.
Spanner I didn't use passive light and Spanner II which did, was never used or produced.
FUG - 280 did use passive light but only a handfull were built right at the end of the war
FG-1250 didn't use passive light, in fact, I believe it was an Infra Red Searchlight/scope the total opposite of what you claim.
So on this basis the only passive equipment the Germans used were the handful of FuG-280s built at the end of the war.
I could of course be wrong on the above and if you could quote your sources to support your statements it could get interesting.
If it helps the following site gave me the info the the Spanner I/Spanner II as well as the FuG 280
Skylighters, The Web Site of the 225th AAA Searchlight Battalion: Radar in WW II
The following gave me the description of the FG-1250
Nightfighting Panthers
If it was any good it presumably would have been used in the Ju88 and 110G nightfighters which formed the backbone of the nightfighter forces.
So you are correct in that it was deployed but so were a number of other devices on both sides, but wasn't a success like so many ideas.
Spanner I didn't use passive light and Spanner II which did, was never used or produced.
FUG - 280 did use passive light but only a handfull were built right at the end of the war
FG-1250 didn't use passive light, in fact, I believe it was an Infra Red Searchlight/scope the total opposite of what you claim.
So on this basis the only passive equipment the Germans used were the handful of FuG-280s built at the end of the war.
I could of course be wrong on the above and if you could quote your sources to support your statements it could get interesting.
If it helps the following site gave me the info the the Spanner I/Spanner II as well as the FuG 280
Skylighters, The Web Site of the 225th AAA Searchlight Battalion: Radar in WW II
The following gave me the description of the FG-1250
Nightfighting Panthers
