Terrible FAA Rule

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MIflyer

1st Lieutenant
6,230
11,933
May 30, 2011
Cape Canaveral
Something quite odd happened yesterday. A newspaper clipping I have never seen before appeared on my desk. I can only imagine that someone was using it as a bookmark in a used book I bought recently and it fell out without my noticing it at the time.

A scan of the clipping is attached. It describes a horrific mishap that occurred on 30 March 1967. The crew of a Delta DC-8 were demonstrating their ability to land the airplane with two engines out on one wing. They crashed and all were killed, as were 13 people on the ground, including 9 schoolgirls on their senior trip. An experienced pilot, a congressman, pointed out that such a dual engine failure on one wing had never occurred on any commercial crash.

I could discuss FAA screw-ups at length, as could, I am sure, many others, but this one really wins the stupid bureaucrats prize!
 

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Something quite odd happened yesterday. A newspaper clipping I have never seen before appeared on my desk. I can only imagine that someone was using it as a bookmark in a used book I bought recently and it fell out without my noticing it at the time.

A scan of the clipping is attached. It describes a horrific mishap that occurred on 30 March 1967. The crew of a Delta DC-8 were demonstrating their ability to land the airplane with two engines out on one wing. They crashed and all were killed, as were 13 people on the ground, including 9 schoolgirls on their senior trip. An experienced pilot, a congressman, pointed out that such a dual engine failure on one wing had never occurred on any commercial crash.

I could discuss FAA screw-ups at length, as could, I am sure, many others, but this one really wins the stupid bureaucrats prize!
Someone posted here years ago that training pilots for an "engine out" on Meteors took more lives than actual engine outs did.
 
While I agree with the comments about bureaucracy and the training regime it promoted, this was 1967.

Since then there have been cases where 4 engined aircraft have lost physically, not just the power of, both engines on the same wing. In one case the crew displayed exceptional skill at putting the aircraft on the ground, while no doubt using up a considerable amount of luck in the process. Another crew were not so lucky and nor were the victims on the ground.

And then we have Speedbird 9

Just how do you train crews for what may seem the unlikeliest of events? Do you even bother? Fortunately today there are much better simulators than in 1967.
 
Chilling (not intended as a pun...) read: "Adak The Rescue of Alpha Foxtrot 586" When things go wrong way beyond what the test guys ever consider....
 
Just how do you train crews for what may seem the unlikeliest of events? Do you even bother? Fortunately today there are much better simulators than in 1967.
That's the "big mitigator" in today's world that can avoid accidents like this. The full movement simulators used by major airline training centers are pretty awesome. I was fortunate enough to be able to get some training in one several years ago, amazing the failures that can be inputted into these sims.

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Asking a pilot to land with two engines out isnt training, it is an experiment, best done without sleeping children in the run off area, unless he did a lot of hours beforehand flying on just two engines.
 
Just how do you train crews for what may seem the unlikeliest of events? Do you even bother? Fortunately today there are much better simulators than in 1967.
I think that's it exactly. At NASA, both the flight crew and ground team entered joint simulations being able to execute every malfunction in the book. Then the sim team would try to come up with creative combinations of failures that exposed flaws in our malfunction procedures. After each sim, we'd debrief and revise procedures as necessary based on lessons learned from the sim.

The idea wasn't so much that you'd have a procedure for everything as it was that you'd know the systems so well that you could cobble together a new procedure in a matter of hours or a few days at most.

In flight, I don't ever recall experiencing one of the crazy sim cases the trainers came up with. But there were several in-flight failures that even they couldn't think of, and except for 51-L and STS-107, the flight and ground crews were able to react and devise new procedures to get home safely. As an example, I'd suggest the Space Flyer Unit berthing on STS-72, when both solar arrays failed to retract, and jettison procedures that didn't exist at launch were used to jettison the malfunctioning arrays. Another good example is the STS-93 ascent. Technically, no new procedures were used, but several decisions that hadn't been anticipated in the flight rules were made.
 
Someone posted here years ago that training pilots for an "engine out" on Meteors took more lives than actual engine outs did.

The following quote is from:

Canberra Boys
Fascinating Accounts from the Operators of an English Electric Classic

Andrew Brookes
Grub Street 2017

CHAPTER 23
LIFE IN THE OLD DOG

pp271 of 313
But right to very end, the Canberra could not be trifled with. When I worked
in the RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety, we calculated that more Canberras
were lost from practice asymmetric flying than from actual engine failures
themselves.
The last of these took place in March 1991 when the station
commander of RAF Wyton asked to perform a simulated engine failure after
take-off (SEFATO) in a T4 for his currency training. Start-up and take-off
were normal until just abeam the ATC tower, where the undercarriage had
just retracted when the station commander called for a SEFATO on the
starboard engine. The T4 was seen to roll slightly left and then right but then
hold a slight right bank at about 200 ft AGL. The T4 then began to roll and
turn to the right at an alarming rate before descending. It then struck a road
sweeper that was parked between two buildings before hitting a small garage
and bursting into flames. None of the three aircrew on board survived.
 
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The following quote is from:

Canberra Boys
Fascinating Accounts from the Operators of an English Electric Classic

Andrew Brookes
Grub Street 2017

CHAPTER 23
LIFE IN THE OLD DOG

pp271 of 313
But, how many didn't die because they did have training? Overall toll may have been way higher than what it was without training.
 
As I recall, the DC-10 that landed in a corn field, flown only by varying engine thrust, could not be sim flown by anyone, not even those pilots that did it in real life.
 
But, how many didn't die because they did have training? Overall toll may have been way higher than what it was without training.
One would have to look into each engine failure, it's severity, and then determine if the training received can be attributed to the safe termination of the flight.

A few things to point out here with regards to the OP;

More than likely during DC-8 certification, the aircraft was demonstrated to be flown with 2 engines out on the same wing. According to the NTSB report, there were errors made by the instructor that attributed to this accident. Delta Airlines would of had to had an approved training program blessed by the FAA and probably approved or at least critiqued by the manufacturer (McDonnel Douglas). I don't know if there were ever any other accidents like this prior or after and it seems the NTSB put no blame on the actual procedure and it probably remained in Delta's training program after the incident. Although Fletcher Thompson criticized the training requirement (based on his flying experience) there is nothing indicated that he was trained or had any DC-8 flight time to even comment on this with full authority.

It would be interesting to see what the actual Delta Flight Manual and training manuals say, as they flew the DC-8 until 1989
 
Look at US Airways Flight 1549 that losf both engines out due to a bird strike (actually a flock of Geese) while still climbing.

Or United 232, where all three hydraulic systems were lost when the #2 fan-blade let loose. IIRC, after that crash, they ran sims on that circumstance and all attempts resulted in a crash. Of course, irl they managed to save a good number of the passengers.
 
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Something quite odd happened yesterday. A newspaper clipping I have never seen before appeared on my desk. I can only imagine that someone was using it as a bookmark in a used book I bought recently and it fell out without my noticing it at the time.

A scan of the clipping is attached. It describes a horrific mishap that occurred on 30 March 1967. The crew of a Delta DC-8 were demonstrating their ability to land the airplane with two engines out on one wing. They crashed and all were killed, as were 13 people on the ground, including 9 schoolgirls on their senior trip. An experienced pilot, a congressman, pointed out that such a dual engine failure on one wing had never occurred on any commercial crash.

I could discuss FAA screw-ups at length, as could, I am sure, many others, but this one really wins the stupid bureaucrats prize!

This pales into insignificance with the Real Amateur Air Force B-707 crash at Longford in Victoria in October 1991.

There is anecdotal evidence that Boeing had told them it was suicidal but they did it anyway - double engine failure on one wing with rudder boost turned off which halves their rudder travel. The RAAF's 707 "qualified flight instructor" did not even know the basic flight characteristics when side-slipping a swept wing aircraft

Brutal departure | Flight Safety Australia is a good summary

Unfortunately the Aus equivalent of the FAA is heavily staffed with ex RAAF people who bring their RAAF training etc with them and they always know better than the civilians with years of experience on civil aircraft. Repeated ICAO audits contain findings of excessive military and (one) airline staff managing areas they have absolutely no experience in.
 
This pales into insignificance with the Real Amateur Air Force B-707 crash at Longford in Victoria in October 1991.

There is anecdotal evidence that Boeing had told them it was suicidal but they did it anyway - double engine failure on one wing with rudder boost turned off which halves their rudder travel. The RAAF's 707 "qualified flight instructor" did not even know the basic flight characteristics when side-slipping a swept wing aircraft

Brutal departure | Flight Safety Australia is a good summary
Great information! But I think the biggest take-away from this was:

"A BITTER IRONY WAS THAT VMCA ASYMMETRIC TRAINING WAS NOT IN THE BOEING 707 CONVERSION SYLLABUS."

In comparison to the Delta mishap, it seems this type of training was part of the training requirement and not faulted as a factor in the accident.
Unfortunately the Aus equivalent of the FAA is heavily staffed with ex RAAF people who bring their RAAF training etc with them and they always know better than the civilians with years of experience on civil aircraft. Repeated ICAO audits contain findings of excessive military and (one) airline staff managing areas they have absolutely no experience in.
As a contrast I found here in the states there are many within the FAA with time in the military however many of those hired have some experience in the civilian world, at least from what I experienced.
 
Yep. Those of us here who have worked under both regulators call the FAA the FRIENDLY Aviation Administration.

When it comes to new regulations the FAA publish NPRMs and listen to the input. Changes take forever but they are negotiated.

Here they started consultation committees in the mid 95 and I was my companies rep on several. Our first new reg was to do with bogus parts (unauthorized parts). The OLD produced a three page load of crap and we all said throw that out and take the FAR for most of it but use one para from the JAR. What became law for a few days was the three page crap with additions and included such wonderful requirements as a used part shall be affixed with a tag stating it is new.

They later went to NPRMs but ignore the input. Worse still they inflict their crap on foreign governments by way of AusAid.
 
Yep. Those of us here who have worked under both regulators call the FAA the FRIENDLY Aviation Administration.

When it comes to new regulations the FAA publish NPRMs and listen to the input. Changes take forever but they are negotiated.

Here they started consultation committees in the mid 95 and I was my companies rep on several. Our first new reg was to do with bogus parts (unauthorized parts). The OLD produced a three page load of crap and we all said throw that out and take the FAR for most of it but use one para from the JAR. What became law for a few days was the three page crap with additions and included such wonderful requirements as a used part shall be affixed with a tag stating it is new.

They later went to NPRMs but ignore the input. Worse still they inflict their crap on foreign governments by way of AusAid.
I have found similar situations in Canada. It's been almost 20 years the last time I dealt with Transport Canada, don't know if that mindset is still in place.
 

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