The 3 Fighters (3 Viewers)

[tomo pauk]

German (day) fighters consistently denied German air space for RAF USAAC prior 1944 (and inflicting greater losses than receiving them, between Germany and Atlantic, same time frame). They were instrumental in swithing RAF bombers from day to night attacks, IIRC.
RAF fighters were extracting a major toll at LW bombers - denying the air space for LW that is.
The amount of losses to VVS bombers (and fighters) in 1941-42 was horrendous, wasn't it?
The ability of USAAC long-range fighters to achieve air superiority over German soil is well proven, too.

One can just imagine the horror for German ground forces, had the Stormovik's were to roam free. Those received rear gunners from 1943 on (with cost for numbers produced) - LW fighters were seen as a considerable threat I assume.

 

[parsifal]

To determine whether germany held air superiority over europe we first of all need to understand what the various states of air control are

These are the accepted states as defined by NATO

"Air supremacy" is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic "no-fly zone". Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will.

"Air superiority" is defined as the condition when the conduct of all types of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites.

"Local air superiority", which is purely geographic in nature, is characterized by well timed air attacks to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, re-turning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in sectors across the theater of military operations where the the enemy may not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal.

"Air parity" is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy some targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for direct support of ground forces. More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and strike missions to gain air superiority.
Usually determining the state of control of the air is done on a theatre by thatre basis. For World War II there is some disagreement about what constituted a theatre, but in my opinion for the ETO generally, we can probably define the TOs as follws

1) Western Europe: France, Low Countries British Isles

2) Central Europe: germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Austria

3) Balkans Southern Europe: Italy (except Sicily), Greece (except Crete), Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia

4) Eastern Front: Romania, USSR

5) Northern Europe

6) North africa and the middle east

There may be some debate about what constitutes a theatre, and im happy to listen to other suggestions

If a nation commits innsufficient forces to make a difference, or no forces, or its forces are ineffective, it cannot be said to hold any level of control of the skies

now, applying the theory to german control of the air what deductions can we make. specifically what is the situation viz western Europe it cannot be established that the germans held air superiority over the region, because they could not undertake all manner of operations with much prospect of success. That had been disputed in the BoB and eventually lost. They did enjoy elements of air parity but only to a limited extent. they could undertake air denial operations to a limited extent but with the forces available, would not have been able to mount effective attacks against enemy (ie allied) ground targets, either of a tactical or strategic nature). So, by defintion they were not exercising air superiority. Neither were they exercising local air superiority. they had some elements of air parity, which are sometimes referred to as air denial,. unofficially. Auir denial means the ability apply to a limited extent some ability to inflict losses so as to deny a limited area of airspace to some enemy operations

However the degree of that air denial in western europe is limited, as Glider points out. The losses to the RAF in terms of daylight operations were tolerable to low, and as time progressed the LW were less and less able to limit the range of missions that the RAF could undertake over occupied western euriope. all kinds of missions were undertaken by the RAF in western Europe....including transport, fighter bomber, bomber, naval interdiction naval strike. Less and less were the germans able to impede these missions, by day or night. In some parts of Western Europe, namely over the British Isles, thye Allies had achieved Air supremacy. you cannot have an opponent exercising air supremacy over critical parts of a front where you yourself are claimimg air superiority. the two terms are anthema to each other, when control to that level is being exercised by opposing forces. It might be possible to separate Britain from the rest of western Europe, but this would seem very arbitrary given that the force projections in Britain could affect operations in the rest of the geographical unit so dramatically

Over Central Europe it was a different story. The concentration of fighters was sufficient to make losses prohibitive, forcing the British to divert some of their operations to night bombing. even here, however the control of the air was not complete...german fighters were unable to completely deny all daylight operations, as the activities of the Mosquito intruders and the PRU forces clearly demonstrate. Even more conventional heavy bombers were able to operate in daylight....not sure, but werent the dambuster operations carried out in daylight?

Elsewhere, with the exception of the eastern front, and perhaps the southern front, Axis control was tenuous at best. In those areas one could, at best argure they enjoyed either local superiority or air parity, depending on how you want to view the situation. On the eastern front, for example, I would tend to classify Axis control of the skies as local superiority. They could take and dominate a section of the front, right through until 1943, but overall, had lost total air superiority by December 1941. For a time thereafter they maintained air parity, before losing that as well. At Kursk and over the Kuban in 1943, they were challenged, and ultimately lost even the ability to gain local air superiority. Thereafter German fighters could simply not inflict enough casualties to matter. whilst the russians also found it difficult with their skillsets and equipment to wrest complete control of the air, they were able to achieve air parity and local air superiority as required. Ther were no instances of Soviet air offensives being stopped after Kursk, and it is simply propaganda to claim that Sturmovik losses were excessively heavy. they were heavy, but not excessively so, and more to the point required the expenditure of resources for the germans intrying to stop them that they simply could not afford. german fighters and flak (which accounted for about 35% of Soviet losses) managed to shoot down 46000 Soviet aircraft during the war, whilst losing approiximately 35000 of all types of their own. Moreover, despite all that effort and loss, they failed to make any appreciable effect on the Soviet efficiency and ability to complete ground support missions or take military objectives.

Once again we are reduced to asking ourselves where is the clear strategic advantage being won solely by fighters. with a few notable exceptions, they werent. Fighters, like rifles and bread were essential to force projection, bu seldom were decisive in their own right

 

[Glider]

Well put and hard to argue against

 

[parsifal]

Thanks. Just so we are clear....fighters are indispensable, so in that sense I have to concede that they have strategic importance. But thats not the point(s) that I made, or responded to. In summary, if you will grant me this indulgence I think the points (some still in contention are

1) Fighters, whilst essential, generally dont or cant achieve a significant strategic advantage, except in exceptional circumstances, such as when the enemy does not have fighters, or fighters that are inneffective. Whilst fighters can tip the balance of losses for an attacker, most of their losses are inherent 9things like landing accidents, weather effects, flak, airframe fatigue and the like. Of course fighters inflict losses, but they are not the major determinat of losses, That shocks and alarms many peoiple. Moreover, except in exeptional circumstances, the side using fighters do not generally suffer a lower attrition rate. case in point, look at the Eastern Front. Despite being on the strategic defensive and committing at least 30% of their available fighters, with a far higher skills base, overall, there is not much difference in the loss rates of the Soviets or the LW. You cannot shoot down a lot of enemies, usually, without suffering a lot of losses yourself. It just doesnt work that way

Moreover, and finally producing lots of fighters when you are economically weaker might be forced on you, but of itself is not a winner. Germany was never going to win her defensive battle in 1944 by building nothing but fighters. her losses were always going to aat least equal those of the allies, as it turned out they exceeded those of the Americans in particular.....a fantastic rap for the P-51s combatting the LW, because that is something that should not have happened

2) Germany did not hold air superiority over any front from late 1941 on. On secondary fronts they might, or on maion fronts they might achieve local superiorities. Their air force remained potent, but applying the definition of air superiority they simply did not have it, because they could not undetake all manner of missions to all parts of each front. Whilst the allies and the Soviets had difficulty in doing that (as reflected in the losses they suffered), they could at least undertake such missions over a greater proportion of each front. Thats the issue so many people miss about the battles over France in 1941.....it was about being able to do things despite the wishes and efforts of the enemy. Without that vital first step, nothing else in the air was possible. The RAF could do it, the LW could not, its about as simple as that......it was slightly different and slightly later in the East, but a description of what had occurred by 1943 is perhaps that the russians could complete thei8r primary mission (ground support) at tolerable losses and achi8eve their intention (an advance on the ground), whereas the LW could neither significantly affect the ground battle, nor could it stop the Soviets from doing their thing....

3) As a generalization (a dangerous thing perhaps) fighters dont reduce losses strategically for a friendly bomber force, unless the escorting fighters massively outnumber those of the intercepting CAP. They do however, increase the losses of an enemy bomber force, unless that bomber force is massively escorted (another way of saying what I said in the first place) . Both sides found this to be the case during the war. perhaps also if the training levels or equipment quality is madssively different a stratyegically significant reault is possible.

 

[Njaco]

Just so we are clear....fighters are indispensable......

If my laptop hadn't crashed yesterday, that was one point I was gonna make. And #2 I totally agree with and was actually my argument!

 

[tomo pauk]

Sorry for a late reply, have had some network issues.

To determine whether germany held air superiority over europe we first of all need to understand what the various states of air control are

...
Usually determining the state of control of the air is done on a theatre by thatre basis. For World War II there is some disagreement about what constituted a theatre, but in my opinion for the ETO generally, we can probably define the TOs as follws
1) Western Europe: France, Low Countries British Isles

2) Central Europe: germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Austria

3) Balkans Southern Europe: Italy (except Sicily), Greece (except Crete), Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia

4) Eastern Front: Romania, USSR

5) Northern Europe

6) North africa and the middle east

There may be some debate about what constitutes a theatre, and im happy to listen to other suggestions

If a nation commits innsufficient forces to make a difference, or no forces, or its forces are ineffective, it cannot be said to hold any level of control of the skies

now, applying the theory to german control of the air what deductions can we make. specifically what is the situation viz western Europe it cannot be established that the germans held air superiority over the region, because they could not undertake all manner of operations with much prospect of success. That had been disputed in the BoB and eventually lost.

If we say: southern Poland is a region, or, Belgium is a region, than yes - Germans have won maintained air superiority over may regions of Europe. They we unable to win air superiority over UK, but we all know that. Many factors played their role over UK skies, one of them was inability of LW's main fighter to perform a job as an air-superiority fighter. Another one is that Germans were outproduced in the crucial days, in both fighter and pilots/crews.

They did enjoy elements of air parity but only to a limited extent. they could undertake air denial operations to a limited extent but with the forces available, would not have been able to mount effective attacks against enemy (ie allied) ground targets, either of a tactical or strategic nature). So, by defintion they were not exercising air superiority. Neither were they exercising local air superiority. they had some elements of air parity, which are sometimes referred to as air denial,. unofficially. Auir denial means the ability apply to a limited extent some ability to inflict losses so as to deny a limited area of airspace to some enemy operations

Saying that "Neither were they [LW]exercising local air superiority.", without stating the area is confusing; if it's the Channel, the local air superiority was most times in German hands than not.

However the degree of that air denial in western europe is limited, as Glider points out. The losses to the RAF in terms of daylight operations were tolerable to low, and as time progressed the LW were less and less able to limit the range of missions that the RAF could undertake over occupied western euriope. all kinds of missions were undertaken by the RAF in western Europe....including transport, fighter bomber, bomber, naval interdiction naval strike. Less and less were the germans able to impede these missions, by day or night. In some parts of Western Europe, namely over the British Isles, thye Allies had achieved Air supremacy. you cannot have an opponent exercising air supremacy over critical parts of a front where you yourself are claimimg air superiority. the two terms are anthema to each other, when control to that level is being exercised by opposing forces. It might be possible to separate Britain from the rest of western Europe, but this would seem very arbitrary given that the force projections in Britain could affect operations in the rest of the geographical unit so dramatically

Over Central Europe it was a different story. The concentration of fighters was sufficient to make losses prohibitive, forcing the British to divert some of their operations to night bombing. even here, however the control of the air was not complete...german fighters were unable to completely deny all daylight operations, as the activities of the Mosquito intruders and the PRU forces clearly demonstrate. Even more conventional heavy bombers were able to operate in daylight....not sure, but werent the dambuster operations carried out in daylight?

Lumping together what RAF was able to do in 1940, '41, '42 and '43, while taking in account air space from Manchester to Berlin, is hardly an analysis.
The LW day fighters made RAF paying big price for day bomber sorties, from Channel east, thus forcing the RAF to go for night bombing. Stating naval interdiction/strike as arguments for highlighting LW's inability to seal the skies from Atlantic to Berlin, in the time LW turned East, is self defeating. As for 'separating GB from W. Europe' - when Germans turned East, LW's goal was to hold RAF east from France, and they have had decent success in doing so.
Germans failed to produce a 'Mosquito' of their own, so Ju-88 had to attack Bari. Dambuster operation was conducted during night.

Elsewhere, with the exception of the eastern front, and perhaps the southern front, Axis control was tenuous at best. In those areas one could, at best argure they enjoyed either local superiority or air parity, depending on how you want to view the situation. On the eastern front, for example, I would tend to classify Axis control of the skies as local superiority.

By 1942, UK is outproducing Germany, Italy and Japan combined, in planes that is; LW is training far less pilots, too. In 1941, Soviets have built at least as much planes as Germans, let alone in after that. US planes are available as early as 1941, both for RAF VVS. That LW was able to achieve any kind of air superiority seems quite a feat - by summer of 1941 they have less than 1000 fighters in combat units. That's perhaps 4-5 per one km of front line at East.

They could take and dominate a section of the front, right through until 1943, but overall, had lost total air superiority by December 1941. For a time thereafter they maintained air parity, before losing that as well. At Kursk and over the Kuban in 1943, they were challenged, and ultimately lost even the ability to gain local air superiority. Thereafter German fighters could simply not inflict enough casualties to matter. whilst the russians also found it difficult with their skillsets and equipment to wrest complete control of the air, they were able to achieve air parity and local air superiority as required. Ther were no instances of Soviet air offensives being stopped after Kursk, and it is simply propaganda to claim that Sturmovik losses were excessively heavy. they were heavy, but not excessively so, and more to the point required the expenditure of resources for the germans intrying to stop them that they simply could not afford. german fighters and flak (which accounted for about 35% of Soviet losses) managed to shoot down 46000 Soviet aircraft during the war, whilst losing approiximately 35000 of all types of their own. Moreover, despite all that effort and loss, they failed to make any appreciable effect on the Soviet efficiency and ability to complete ground support missions or take military objectives.

VVS was enjoying perhaps 2:1 superiority in numbers by Kursk battle - should we expect that LW owns air space over the front line? With Soviets flying, for example, 1000 fighters 1000 bombers/attackers vs. 500 defending fighters, even a ratio of losses 2:1 in LW favor is hardly to stop VVS operation cold.

Once again we are reduced to asking ourselves where is the clear strategic advantage being won solely by fighters. with a few notable exceptions, they werent. Fighters, like rifles and bread were essential to force projection, bu seldom were decisive in their own right

Fighters are a part of a military force, I can agree with that.

 

[tomo pauk]

(2nd part)

Thanks. Just so we are clear....fighters are indispensable, so in that sense I have to concede that they have strategic importance. But thats not the point(s) that I made, or responded to. In summary, if you will grant me this indulgence I think the points (some still in contention are

1) Fighters, whilst essential, generally dont or cant achieve a significant strategic advantage, except in exceptional circumstances, such as when the enemy does not have fighters, or fighters that are inneffective. Whilst fighters can tip the balance of losses for an attacker, most of their losses are inherent 9things like landing accidents, weather effects, flak, airframe fatigue and the like. Of course fighters inflict losses, but they are not the major determinat of losses, That shocks and alarms many peoiple. Moreover, except in exeptional circumstances, the side using fighters do not generally suffer a lower attrition rate. case in point, look at the Eastern Front. Despite being on the strategic defensive and committing at least 30% of their available fighters, with a far higher skills base, overall, there is not much difference in the loss rates of the Soviets or the LW. You cannot shoot down a lot of enemies, usually, without suffering a lot of losses yourself. It just doesnt work that way

Again, if 500 defenders shoot down 300 (out of 2000 dispatched) attackers, with a loss of 150 to his own number, how long is defender bound to last as a force? We have the same T-34 vs. any-panzer issue: T-34s will suffer more casualties, but Soviets will advance.

Moreover, and finally producing lots of fighters when you are economically weaker might be forced on you, but of itself is not a winner. Germany was never going to win her defensive battle in 1944 by building nothing but fighters. her losses were always going to aat least equal those of the allies, as it turned out they exceeded those of the Americans in particular.....a fantastic rap for the P-51s combatting the LW, because that is something that should not have happened

Covered above - Germany was doomed after it failed to defeat Soviet Union, let alone when USA got fully involved.
By 1944, it was too late for another 1000 of 109s/190s (even if those could be fueled piloted properly) to revert the outcome

2) Germany did not hold air superiority over any front from late 1941 on. On secondary fronts they might, or on maion fronts they might achieve local superiorities. Their air force remained potent, but applying the definition of air superiority they simply did not have it, because they could not undetake all manner of missions to all parts of each front. Whilst the allies and the Soviets had difficulty in doing that (as reflected in the losses they suffered), they could at least undertake such missions over a greater proportion of each front. Thats the issue so many people miss about the battles over France in 1941.....it was about being able to do things despite the wishes and efforts of the enemy. Without that vital first step, nothing else in the air was possible. The RAF could do it, the LW could not, its about as simple as that......it was slightly different and slightly later in the East, but a description of what had occurred by 1943 is perhaps that the russians could complete thei8r primary mission (ground support) at tolerable losses and achi8eve their intention (an advance on the ground), whereas the LW could neither significantly affect the ground battle, nor could it stop the Soviets from doing their thing....

As for LW vs. RAF in 1941 at West, RAF was in possession of several:1 advantage in numbers of planes. No wonder they ventured into airspace above German-held territory, while LW was barely able to return the favor (low flying 190s). The number of fighters LW could muster per km of Eastern front was 1:several, at a good day, hence no wonder VVS command was pushing it's bombers to find a hole in LW 'wall'. The definition of 'tolerable losses' is not the same for VVS and other air forces anyway.

3) As a generalization (a dangerous thing perhaps) fighters dont reduce losses strategically for a friendly bomber force, unless the escorting fighters massively outnumber those of the intercepting CAP. They do however, increase the losses of an enemy bomber force, unless that bomber force is massively escorted (another way of saying what I said in the first place) . Both sides found this to be the case during the war. perhaps also if the training levels or equipment quality is madssively different a stratyegically significant reault is possible.

There is a poor job, and there is a bad job. Than there are good tools and bad tools. Plus, as you stated, the numbers. USAAC employment of numerous P-51 in 1944 was the example of a good tool doing a good job. LW employment of 109 in BoB was a barely-adequate tool doing a good job (until tasked with close escort - a bad job), without having a numerical advantage.
If a fighter can contest defenders even at 1:1 ratio, the bomber force will and did suffer less losses, since all the defending force can throw themselves onto bombers. As USAAC's 8th foound out the hard way.

 

[parsifal]

The trouble Tomo is in the detail of your reply. Defining a region is difficult i agree, but trying to exclude britain from western europe is more arbitrary than my approach. Aircraft based in England, could, and did, affect what was happening in france and flanders, and vice versa. My opinion in defining what is a region, is to think about the main bases of operations, and the geogrphical extent that they could affect surrounding areas. From a British perspective, despite numerical advantages, they could not, for example (at least until very late) affect directly what was happening in Poland, for example. But trying to define Belgium as a separate area, when clearly the control of its skies depended on activities of surrounding areas (including those in England) is too arbitrary, and serves no purpose.

Now, you claim that Germany controlled the skies over the Channel and the french coast more often than they didnt. If that were true, then the germans held air superiority, trouble is, its just not true. You also claim that casualties over france for the RAF were prohibitive. If the germans controlled the skies over the channel and the french coast, why didnt they undertake bomber and other non-fighter operations. allied shipping losses in the channel, for example, shrank from a respectable total of about 700000 tone in 1940, to about 50000 tons in 1942. and this was not a case of huge numbers. There were relatively few antishipping units in the Lw in 1940, and relatively few in 1942....no real change in numbers. The anit-shipping units had been moved to other, less demanding fronts by 1942, but if the Germans had control of the skies over the channel it seems inconceivable that they would not try and exploit that advantage at some point. The anti-shipping units that they did possess in the region (KG 40) were actually forced to move away from their operational areas because of RAF activity, and never undertook operations close to the French coast, or the Channel. if the germans controlled these skies, as you claim, why didnt they? why were they forced to make long over watrer flights to areas wher allied fighters could not reach? .

Moreover, the germans were unable to protect their battlesquadron (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, later Prinz Eugen) from RAF day or night airborne attack. if they controlled the skies over the Channel and the french coast "most of the time", why did they allow thjis to happen, to the eventiual point that these assets too had to be removed from the To 9with the eventual permanent diablement of one of the BCs) .

Looking at the issue in reverse, Allied losses on Axis shipping in the coastal waters off france steadily rose. There was never a lot of it, but it certainly rose as the war progressed. That further tends to disprove your claim that the Germans controlled the airspace. They had the ability to inflict some losses using their fighters, and that was about it. that is not a measure of air superiority. its a measure of air denial

But even here, your claims that British daylight raids over occupied western euriope were being decimated aere just not supported by the facts. Sure, the fighter losses were heavy, but thats because FC, to get the LW to rise up and fight, had to deliberately place themselves at tactical disadvantages.....put up bait so the Germans would come out and fight. galland himself in his book admits to this, and this goes a long way to explaining why FC (of which only a portion was ever employed in cross channel operations) was so roughly handled September to December '41.

The operations of the bomber groups making these daylight intrusions, principally Coastal command and 2 Gp, did not in fact suffer heavy losses. Some of this admittedly is because they didnt commit many bombers, but the loss to sotie rate for 2 Gp was lower than BC generally (which was mostly operating at night at this time).

Saying that the RAF had a great numerical advantage is also not quite looking at the situation properly. there were quite a number of occasions when raids and operations over France did see the RAF putting more aircraft into the operation than the LW, but it is simply untrue that the entire RAF was pitted against just two JGs. As previously alluded to, the RAF, to get the LW to come up, had to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up. the LW only would fly if the situation was tactically favourable to them.

But in any event, we are back at this point of equating losses to control of the air, which is fundamentally wrong. This is not the sole determinant of air superiority. The losses had to be worse than tolerable in order for it to be said that the RAF was denied access to those skies. Clearly they were not intolerable losses....the RAF kept coming back, suffering losses in daylight operations over france of around 2% (whilst their night bombers generally were suffering attrition rates of around 5%). In addition to inflicting prohibitive losses on the RAF (which they clearly failed to do) the germans would also have needed to be able to fly any and all manner of missions in that TO. Something they also could not do.

Again, air superiority has not much to do with losses. Except if those losses cause a curtailment of operations. The germans were forced to curtail their operations, I find no evidence of the RAF being forced to curtail their operations over France in 1941. Once again, all i can do is suggest you go back to the theory and work out what the term air superiority actually means.

 

[tomo pauk]

The trouble Tomo is in the detail of your reply. Defining a region is difficult i agree, but trying to exclude britain from western europe is more arbitrary than my approach. Aircraft based in England, could, and did, affect what was happening in france and flanders, and vice versa. My opinion in defining what is a region, is to think about the main bases of operations, and the geogrphical extent that they could affect surrounding areas. From a British perspective, despite numerical advantages, they could not, for example (at least until very late) affect directly what was happening in Poland, for example. But trying to define Belgium as a separate area, when clearly the control of its skies depended on activities of surrounding areas (including those in England) is too arbitrary, and serves no purpose.

Belgium and Poland should be looked as the examples of a 'region'. The war theare is a term describing a grater geographical area, 'containing' more regions.

Now, you claim that Germany controlled the skies over the Channel and the french coast more often than they didnt. If that were true, then the germans held air superiority, trouble is, its just not true.

Hence we disagree.

You also claim that casualties over france for the RAF were prohibitive.

Will you be so kind to remind me aboth where I've said that?

If the germans controlled the skies over the channel and the french coast, why didnt they undertake bomber and other non-fighter operations.

1. Having a control of the airspace, and having bombers using that airspace is not the asme thing - one thing requires fighters, other require bombers.
2. Whom should they bomb on the French coast?

allied shipping losses in the channel, for example, shrank from a respectable total of about 700000 tone in 1940, to about 50000 tons in 1942. and this was not a case of huge numbers.

LW bomber units were dispatched at the Eastern front, so requiring from LW to sink more ships in the Channel seems just a tad unrealistic.

There were relatively few antishipping units in the Lw in 1940, and relatively few in 1942....no real change in numbers.

You will recall that majority of shipping losses in 1940 were caused by ordinary bomber units, not the anit-shipping ones?

units had been moved to other, less demanding fronts by 1942, but if the Germans had control of the skies over the channel it seems inconceivable that they would not try and exploit that advantage at some point. The anti-shipping units that they did possess in the region (KG 40) were actually forced to move away from their operational areas because of RAF activity, and never undertook operations close to the French coast, or the Channel. if the germans controlled these skies, as you claim, why didnt they? why were they forced to make long over watrer flights to areas wher allied fighters could not reach?

.

With Op Barbarossa, 80% (give or take) of LW units are relocated to the support of the Operation. Asking from remaining units to conduct major operations in the face of majority of RAF forces is, again, unrealistic, not to say something that could got me warned, or worse.

Moreover, the germans were unable to protect their battlesquadron (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, later Prinz Eugen) from RAF day or night airborne attack. if they controlled the skies over the Channel and the french coast "most of the time", why did they allow thjis to happen, to the eventiual point that these assets too had to be removed from the To 9with the eventual permanent diablement of one of the BCs) .

If that was not the case, how come RAF failed to sink the ships, both while anchored during the Dash?

Looking at the issue in reverse, Allied losses on Axis shipping in the coastal waters off france steadily rose. There was never a lot of it, but it certainly rose as the war progressed. That further tends to disprove your claim that the Germans controlled the airspace. They had the ability to inflict some losses using their fighters, and that was about it. that is not a measure of air superiority. its a measure of air denial

1. I take it that sentence "Allied losses on Axis shipping" means "Axis shipping losses, made by Allies"?
2. Comparison of what LW was acieving vs. what RAF was achieving ove Channell would be most welcommed, with god data, of course.

But even here, your claims that British daylight raids over occupied western euriope were being decimated aere just not supported by the facts. Sure, the fighter losses were heavy, but thats because FC, to get the LW to rise up and fight, had to deliberately place themselves at tactical disadvantages.....put up bait so the Germans would come out and fight. galland himself in his book admits to this, and this goes a long way to explaining why FC (of which only a portion was ever employed in cross channel operations) was so roughly handled September to December '41.

The operations of the bomber groups making these daylight intrusions, principally Coastal command and 2 Gp, did not in fact suffer heavy losses. Some of this admittedly is because they didnt commit many bombers, but the loss to sotie rate for 2 Gp was lower than BC generally (which was mostly operating at night at this time).

Bombers went for night bombing - BC deeds support my claim. The bolded part supports my claim re. FC.

Saying that the RAF had a great numerical advantage is also not quite looking at the situation properly. there were quite a number of occasions when raids and operations over France did see the RAF putting more aircraft into the operation than the LW, but it is simply untrue that the entire RAF was pitted against just two JGs. As previously alluded to, the RAF, to get the LW to come up, had to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up. the LW only would fly if the situation was tactically favourable to them.

Until mid 1942 not a single Spitfire was operating away from GB, while wast majority of LW fighters was either in Eastern , or Med front. RAF has way more bombers than LW, in area between Rhine and Ireland. What should be the 'proper way into looking at situation'?
As for "to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up", was RAF expecting that LW commanders will suddenly believe that only 2-3 fighter wings are against them, in 1941-42, as if they have no radars? My take is that "placing deliberately at disadvantage..." stuff is either pie in the sky, or some kind of apology for the 'rough handling from Sept-Dec 1941'.

But in any event, we are back at this point of equating losses to control of the air, which is fundamentally wrong.

Accusing me of something I didn't say?

This is not the sole determinant of air superiority. The losses had to be worse than tolerable in order for it to be said that the RAF was denied access to those skies. Clearly they were not intolerable losses....the RAF kept coming back, suffering losses in daylight operations over france of around 2% (whilst their night bombers generally were suffering attrition rates of around 5%). In addition to inflicting prohibitive losses on the RAF (which they clearly failed to do) the germans would also have needed to be able to fly any and all manner of missions in that TO. Something they also could not do.

It would by wrong to say that RAF was doing in the air, between Channel and Germany, whatever it pleased. RAF was contesting LW, paying a price, waging the war. With it's bomber force away, along with the majority of fighers, there is no point to claim LW bombers were forbidden to conduct their operations. If RAF was really so dominant beyond Channel, BC's bombers would've been striking during day - but that was not the case.

Again, air superiority has not much to do with losses. Except if those losses cause a curtailment of operations. The germans were forced to curtail their operations, I find no evidence of the RAF being forced to curtail their operations over France in 1941. Once again, all i can do is suggest you go back to the theory and work out what the term air superiority actually means.

Once again, I'll suggest to you that it's time to step down from the pedestal and take into account that LW was not present at the West in 1941 in numbers as it was in 1940.

 

[parsifal]

Lots to disagree on I can see. a few minor points. The shipping losses in the channel and around the british isles were achieved, in the main by FKX units, which had ben formed prewar. Very few successes were scored by units not trained in naval strike operations. There were a few units in FKII that had received similar training, and that was about it. In 1942, when Luftlotte IV formed a specialist anti shipping unit (I think it was called Flieger fuhrer Meer.... of about three squadrons) for operations designed to blockade Sevastopol, it took nearly three months to get these units up to standard.

Air units untrained in anti shipping operations were not that successful.

In addition to the units of FKX, and some units of FKII, there were the units of KG40 that had operated from early 1940. these units too participated in sinking shipping around the british isles.

After the bulk of the Luftwaffe transferred to the east (it wasnt 80%......around 2900 of the Luftwaffes overall strength of 4200 frontline forces were transferred, the rest stayed in the west and on the southern fron to combat the British), they left behind FKX which transferred all but two Gerschwaders to the South where they nearly sank the Illustrious. The other two Geschwaders remained in western Europe for the very purpose wea re talking about....anti-shipping operations. They found they could not operate, because the germans could not provide sufficient protection for them. First, they moved about 100 miles to the south away from RAF interfernce, then they were shipped out of the theatre altogether.....to Norway where they were attached to LFV.

The other bomber unit unit that i know of left in France was KG40. this unit in the Summer of 1940 had started operations in the coastal waters around the british isles. That was fine whilst the germans held air superiority , but once it was lost air superiority over the channel, these units were soon forced to refocus their efforts away from the coast.

You keep saying that BC was forced to operate at night, and this was due to the efforts of the German fighters. That was true over germany, and for BC, but the majority of effort over france was not undertaken at night, and not by BC. you do understand that dont you. it was undertaken by 2 group, which eventually became 2TAF, and Coastal command. And these formation did not suffere catastrophic losses. they in fact suffered lower loss rates than BC, which was operating at night (sometimes over france, but also and mostly over Germany). But then you say that you didnt say that, so i guess the raf was not suffering lprohibitive losses over western Europe (which does not in this case include germany).

As for Until mid 1942 not a single Spitfire was operating away from GB, while wast majority of LW fighters was either in Eastern , or Med front. RAF has way more bombers than LW, in area between Rhine and Ireland. What should be the 'proper way into looking at situation'?"to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up", was RAF expecting that LW commanders will suddenly believe that only 2-3 fighter wings are against them, in 1941-42, as if they have no radars? My take is that "placing deliberately at disadvantage..." stuff is either pie in the sky, or some kind of apology for the 'rough handling from Sept-Dec 1941'.

its no apology. It was the price needed to be paid in order to produce the situation and control that which the British were seeking. And they achieved it, something dismissed and misunderstood to an alarming degree. Read Gallands book where he says quite a bit about this , but most relevantly "their (the JGs) element was to attack, to track, to hunt and to destroy the enemy. Only in this way can the eager and skilful fighter pilot display his ability to the full. Tie him to a narrow and confined task rob him of his intiative and you take away from him the best and most valuable qualities he posseses; aggressive spirit, joy of action and the passion of the hunter'. I understand that in postwar interviews galland confirmed that all these were denied the german forces on the western front after June. partly as you say because of the trasnfer of forces, but conjointly because of the activities of the RAF.

John Foreman, in his book "1941 Part 2 - The Blitz to the Non-Stop Offensive", says in his conclusion "(by the end of 1941) the air war had come full circle ...the british forces were firmly on the offensive having fought hard and won air superiority over western europe, including the channel, the british Isles and the French Coast......their opponents were now fighting a totally defensive war in the west, and were never to regain the initiaitive, and never able to challenge allied air superiority." evidently Foreman doesnt agree with you either.

As for spitfires not being deployed outside of Europe, why would they. they were not needed outside of Europe, and would have represented an unnecceary drain on supply. Spitfires were a dedicated , specialized fighter not thought suited at that time to any multi role functions like the hurricane, which for 1941, excelled at it. Moreover there were doubts at the time of the spitfires ability to operate from rough strips, and take off from carriers....concerns not so acutely held for the more docile Hurricanes. There is no evidence of excessive losses in the med for the hurricane equipped formations.

I have the details of losses in shipping and will dig them out in a day or so

 

[Glider]

Re the question of Air Superiority there is no question that the RAF No 2 Group and at times elements of Bomber Command could and did operate at will over Europe. The examples I gave were proof of that, if you want to pick any other day of the year I will do a similar exercise, I don't think that I can be fairer than that. Some were pin pricks others significant. The 94 aircraft Lancaster raid (unescorted) 300 miles behind the front line is clear evidence of the weakness of the German defences.

What would have happened had this been repeated we will never know. My guess is that the Luftwaffe would have reacted and soon losses would have climbed signficantly. But it doesn't alter the fact that the German forces in place at the time, were not strong enough in numbers or organisation. This raid was unexpected, well planned and lets be honest, the RAF got away with it.

This brings us to the Channel Dash. It was also well planned, totally unexpected and this time the Germans didn't get away with it. Both Battle Cruisers were seriously damaged. Not by bombs or torpedos dropped by Torpedo / Level / Dive bombers, but by mines dropped by the RAF. In other words the Luftwaffe had the strength to protect the Ships directly but didn't have the strength to keep the passage clear. Its also worth remembering why the Dash took place in the first place. It was because the ships were being attacked on a regular basis and taking damage in the French ports. Again the Luftwaffe didn't have the power to stop the attacks taking place, even in their own ports sometimes against unescorted bombers which were only armed with LMGs. RAF losses were often high, what else would you expect considering the strength of the defences but they still got through.

I certainly agree that its unreasonable to expect the Luftwaffe to increase their attacks on the UK at a time when most of their forces had been transferred to Russia.

BC aircraft were mainly used in Night Bombers that cannot be questions but without a fighter to escort them what else would you expect. There was a need to attack German cities and that could only be done in numbers at night. All airforces who tried long range attacks in daylight had to supply long range fighters or switch to night raids. There is no shame in that. However the daylight raids by No 2 Group grew in strength and were never really hindered by the Luftwaffe. The vast majority of the losses were to Flak not fighters. These No 2 Group raids shouldn't be dismissed, the Mosquito, B25, Ventura and Bostons carried loads similar to those carried by Luftwaffe bombers

I have already said that the Luftwaffe lacked the forces to bomb the UK due to transfers to Russia but its worth remembering that they almost completely failed in their PR missions. Its almost true to say that the UK coast only 25 miles away was a closed book to the Luftwaffe.

I also agree with you when you say that LW was not present at the West in 1941 in numbers as it was in 1940.
However I also say that this decrease, reduced the ability of the Luftwaffe to control the air.

 

[Tante Ju]

Re the question of Air Superiority there is no question that the RAF No 2 Group and at times elements of Bomber Command could and did operate at will over Europe. The examples I gave were proof of that, if you want to pick any other day of the year I will do a similar exercise, I don't think that I can be fairer than that. Some were pin pricks others significant. The 94 aircraft Lancaster raid (unescorted) 300 miles behind the front line is clear evidence of the weakness of the German defences.

What would have happened had this been repeated we will never know. My guess is that the Luftwaffe would have reacted and soon losses would have climbed signficantly. But it doesn't alter the fact that the German forces in place at the time, were not strong enough in numbers or organisation. This raid was unexpected, well planned and lets be honest, the RAF got away with it.

Yes complete true, but is this suffice to say air superiority? Because sometime formation was lucky and got away with it? This happened through war on all sides, even 1945 there were German aircraft over Britain and not caught.. but it would be foolish to say they had air superiority over Britain, in 1945, because some of their raid slipped through the defense net.. nor it is fair to conclude: defense net was weak. No system is perfect.

If I use an analouge, I find it for example strange that people say RAF had air superiority over Britain, because it met German bomber raids, most of time, caused losses - but far from always. In event the losses did not stop or prohibit a single raid, or not very too many. This is is similiar case as in 1941 over France IMHO, but for two similiar cases, how can one draw different conclusions? If being capable of causing senstive loss over Britain in 1940 means air superiority for the RAF, surely being capable of causing senstive loss over France in 1941 means air superiority for the LW..

This brings us to the Channel Dash. It was also well planned, totally unexpected and this time the Germans didn't get away with it. Both Battle Cruisers were seriously damaged. Not by bombs or torpedos dropped by Torpedo / Level / Dive bombers, but by mines dropped by the RAF. In other words the Luftwaffe had the strength to protect the Ships directly but didn't have the strength to keep the passage clear. Its also worth remembering why the Dash took place in the first place. It was because the ships were being attacked on a regular basis and taking damage in the French ports. Again the Luftwaffe didn't have the power to stop the attacks taking place, even in their own ports sometimes against unescorted bombers which were only armed with LMGs. RAF losses were often high, what else would you expect considering the strength of the defences but they still got through.

I do not understand - how were an air force supposed to fight mines? No air force was capable doing this 100% perfection. I think you draw too big conclusions from small facts..

But it is enjoyable interesting discussion!

 

[Glider]

Yes complete true, but is this suffice to say air superiority? Because sometime formation was lucky and got away with it? This happened through war on all sides, even 1945 there were German aircraft over Britain and not caught.. but it would be foolish to say they had air superiority over Britain, in 1945, because some of their raid slipped through the defense net.. nor it is fair to conclude: defense net was weak. No system is perfect.

There is a world of difference difference between a raid slipping through during a battle such as the BOB when the defences are at the point of being swamped by other attacks. Compared with a good sized raid getting through when there are no other actions in progress. The infrastructure at least was missing to cope with such a raid, one that would have taken approx 1 1/2 hours to reach safety after dropping their payload (allowing for a 200mph cruise speed). The German forces had plenty of warning and cannot claim to control the air, plus of course the other raids that took place if raids like that could get through.

If I use an analouge, I find it for example strange that people say RAF had air superiority over Britain, because it met German bomber raids, most of time, caused losses - but far from always. In event the losses did not stop or prohibit a single raid, or not very too many. This is is similiar case as in 1941 over France IMHO, but for two similiar cases, how can one draw different conclusions? If being capable of causing senstive loss over Britain in 1940 means air superiority for the RAF, surely being capable of causing senstive loss over France in 1941 means air superiority for the LW..

Towards the end of the BOB a number of German raids were turned back before reaching their targets, the RAF controlled the air over the UK.

I do not understand - how were an air force supposed to fight mines? No air force was capable doing this 100% perfection. I think you draw too big conclusions from small facts..

Easy. The Germans knew what route the Vessels were going to go and steps should have been taken to patrol those routes. They didn't and the Battle Cruisers were badly damaged by weapons dropped by the RAF. The Luftwaffe didn't have the strength to protect the vessels.

But it is enjoyable interesting discussion!

That I do agree with but I would appreciate your views on the lack of opposition to the No 2 Group raids and why the vast majority of the losses were to AA fire, if the Luftwaffe were in control of the air. Also your views on the lack of PR missions which penetrated over the UK when the RAF ones operated with much success over Europe and Germany, by day and night.

 

[tomo pauk]

Lots to disagree on I can see. a few minor points. The shipping losses in the channel and around the british isles were achieved, in the main by FKX units, which had ben formed prewar. Very few successes were scored by units not trained in naval strike operations. There were a few units in FKII that had received similar training, and that was about it. In 1942, when Luftlotte IV formed a specialist anti shipping unit (I think it was called Flieger fuhrer Meer.... of about three squadrons) for operations designed to blockade Sevastopol, it took nearly three months to get these units up to standard.

Air units untrained in anti shipping operations were not that successful.

In addition to the units of FKX, and some units of FKII, there were the units of KG40 that had operated from early 1940. these units too participated in sinking shipping around the british isles.

After the bulk of the Luftwaffe transferred to the east (it wasnt 80%......around 2900 of the Luftwaffes overall strength of 4200 frontline forces were transferred, the rest stayed in the west and on the southern fron to combat the British), they left behind FKX which transferred all but two Gerschwaders to the South where they nearly sank the Illustrious. The other two Geschwaders remained in western Europe for the very purpose wea re talking about....anti-shipping operations. They found they could not operate, because the germans could not provide sufficient protection for them. First, they moved about 100 miles to the south away from RAF interfernce, then they were shipped out of the theatre altogether.....to Norway where they were attached to LFV.

The other bomber unit unit that i know of left in France was KG40. this unit in the Summer of 1940 had started operations in the coastal waters around the british isles. That was fine whilst the germans held air superiority , but once it was lost air superiority over the channel, these units were soon forced to refocus their efforts away from the coast.

Think that we can agree about some issues here:
-LW units that participated at, among other things, the attacks vs. Channel shipping, were far more numerous in summer 1940, than a year after
-LW fighter force that needed to achieve air superiority over Channel were doing their job in the mentioned period in 1940, but not in summer 1941, since in 1941 they were present there at 1/4 of the strength a year before

You keep saying that BC was forced to operate at night, and this was due to the efforts of the German fighters. That was true over germany, and for BC, but the majority of effort over france was not undertaken at night, and not by BC. you do understand that dont you. it was undertaken by 2 group, which eventually became 2TAF, and Coastal command. And these formation did not suffere catastrophic losses. they in fact suffered lower loss rates than BC, which was operating at night (sometimes over france, but also and mostly over Germany). But then you say that you didnt say that, so i guess the raf was not suffering lprohibitive losses over western Europe (which does not in this case include germany).

Finding a proper adjective to attack to the term 'RAF losses in second half of 1941' seems like quite a task. Whatever we call them, you've stated that FC was rougly handled in that time, and mr. Brooks, apparently a well read member of this forum, stated:
Leigh-Mallory could never see the folly of sending fighter pilots to their deaths, in the useless "Rhubarbs." It took the likes of Johnson to get it stopped.

As for Until mid 1942 not a single Spitfire was operating away from GB, while wast majority of LW fighters was either in Eastern , or Med front. RAF has way more bombers than LW, in area between Rhine and Ireland. What should be the 'proper way into looking at situation'?"to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up", was RAF expecting that LW commanders will suddenly believe that only 2-3 fighter wings are against them, in 1941-42, as if they have no radars? My take is that "placing deliberately at disadvantage..." stuff is either pie in the sky, or some kind of apology for the 'rough handling from Sept-Dec 1941'.

its no apology. It was the price needed to be paid in order to produce the situation and control that which the British were seeking. And they achieved it, something dismissed and misunderstood to an alarming degree. Read Gallands book where he says quite a bit about this , but most relevantly "their (the JGs) element was to attack, to track, to hunt and to destroy the enemy. Only in this way can the eager and skilful fighter pilot display his ability to the full. Tie him to a narrow and confined task rob him of his intiative and you take away from him the best and most valuable qualities he posseses; aggressive spirit, joy of action and the passion of the hunter'. I understand that in postwar interviews galland confirmed that all these were denied the german forces on the western front after June. partly as you say because of the trasnfer of forces, but conjointly because of the activities of the RAF.

We can take Galland's word for it.
We can also agree that tactical possibilties/opportunities are shrinking when the enemy enjoys a disproportional advantage in numbers. Germans did have home turf advantage, not too dissimilar to what RAF enjoyed back in BoB days.

John Foreman, in his book "1941 Part 2 - The Blitz to the Non-Stop Offensive", says in his conclusion "(by the end of 1941) the air war had come full circle ...the british forces were firmly on the offensive having fought hard and won air superiority over western europe, including the channel, the british Isles and the French Coast......their opponents were now fighting a totally defensive war in the west, and were never to regain the initiaitive, and never able to challenge allied air superiority." evidently Foreman doesnt agree with you either.

Mr. Foreman says that RAF won air superiority over 'W. Europe, including the Channel, GB and French coast'. If that means that RAF was in charge of the airspace west from GB, than it says nothing - LW was never there anyway. RAF was not in possession of air superiority over Low countries, Norway, 95% of France - as they were not back in 1940. So mr. Foreman thinks it's great achivement that RAF was able to wrestle the air superiority away from LW over Channel and a (how big part?) of French coast, without admitting (at least in the quote) that enemy is suffering a multiple:1 disadvantage in numbers? If RAF has air supeiority over French coast, how come submarine pens in La Rochelle elsewhere are not turned to rubble?
Think mr. Foreman has a rather big bias.

As for spitfires not being deployed outside of Europe, why would they. they were not needed outside of Europe, and would have represented an unnecceary drain on supply. Spitfires were a dedicated , specialized fighter not thought suited at that time to any multi role functions like the hurricane, which for 1941, excelled at it. Moreover there were doubts at the time of the spitfires ability to operate from rough strips, and take off from carriers....concerns not so acutely held for the more docile Hurricanes.

My mention of Spitfires remaining in the UK was just to picture the dis-balance in available fighters from summer 1941 on, in the are between Rhine and Ireland....

There is no evidence of excessive losses in the med for the hurricane equipped formations.

..but since you've asked, here is what JoeB has to say (WW2-era USN aircraft vs. the Luftwaffe - how would they fare? - Tanknet - Page 2, post #35)

And Hurricane v Bf109E over Malta in 1941 was 0:35, ..... (Hurricane's record later v 109F's over Malta was actually better, though still several:1 against)

..plus the losses ratio vs. IJA/IJN (also by JoeB, mentioned in Whirlwind thread), in 1942, of typically 4:1 in Japanese favor

I have the details of losses in shipping and will dig them out in a day or so

That would be neat.

 

[parsifal]

-LW units that participated at, among other things, the attacks vs. Channel shipping, were far more numerous in summer 1940, than a year after


No, not correct, at least for the strike elements that carried out the actual attacks. Obviously you either were not listening, or just dont want to acknowledge. The attacks on British shipping in the North Sea were mostly (overwhelmingly) undertaken by specialist anti shipping units of the LW...mostly FKX, with some units of FKII also trained for that purpose. There were also units of the newly formed KG 40 attacking shipping around the british Isles....their deep penetration raids into the Atlantic proper didnt start until after July. A year later these units had been transferred, not because the channel was not a target rich environment, but because the gernmans had lost control of the skies over the water.

its a furphy that the attacks themselves were undertaken by general Luftwaffe formations.

The attacks were more numeropus, the reasons for the change is because of the loss of control of the skies over the water, not because untrained LW formations were participating in 1940, and not participating in 1941.

It had been the intention of the LW to maintain attacks in the coastal waters around Britain in 1941. They initially retained two full Gerschwaders for that purpose, plus KG40. KG40 was forced to attack deep into the Atlantic, whilst the bomber groups were transferred BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT UNDERTAKE THEIR MISSION.

Mr. Foreman says that RAF won air superiority over 'W. Europe, including the Channel, GB and French coast'. If that means that RAF was in charge of the airspace west from GB, than it says nothing - LW was never there anyway. RAF was not in possession of air superiority over Low countries, Norway, 95% of France - as they were not back in 1940. So mr. Foreman thinks it's great achivement that RAF was able to wrestle the air superiority away from LW over Channel and a (how big part?) of French coast, without admitting (at least in the quote) that enemy is suffering a multiple:1 disadvantage in numbers? If RAF has air supeiority over French coast, how come submarine pens in La Rochelle elsewhere are not turned to rubble?
Think mr. Foreman has a rather big bias.

Foreman is considered a good source by most. suggest you have a look at him before dismissing him as biased. He has some critical things to say about conduct of operations by the british, and he doesnt putll any punches as to where and how losses were being suffered by both sides.

Trying to argue that the Briish were not having a significant impact on german control of the skies over Western Europe is just not supported by the facts. Whilst the channel was of only passing interest to the germans, it was a critical issue for the british. It was a major toute for coastal trade around Britain, and more importantly control of the channel prevented any significant movement of German naval or mercantile traffic. The oft quoted channel dash by the Km in early '42, ignores why they had to be moved....they were under constant and increasingly effective attack and could not undertake work up, post refit or indeed any sort of prepratory training. they were stuck, completely bottled up in port, unable to move.

The germans did not control all of france, they controlled a little over half of it, with the deepest part at the belgian border being about 120 miles. RAF was directly disputing all along the coast, including belgium, to a depth of about 30 miles. The main limitation was of course the limited range of the RAF fighters , but 30/120 plus the entire channel and most of the North Sea is not insignificant, at least from a British POV. You see, as usual, I find it necessary to point out that continental european views of what is important is just not applicable to the british, and it was thjis essentially continental centric view that lost germany both world wars. For the british, it was critical to retain control of the seas , including the local seas, to the north, east and south of Briain (plus of course those bits to the west, which, contrary to what you are saying, the germans did challenge).


Trouble with claiming the RAF had a big advantage in numbers is once again a misrepresentation of what was happening. Oh they had the numbers, but the trouble is they (the british) could use them....deploying in Britain is not deploying over france . there were significant exceptions, but the LW generally avoided battles where it was an obviously one sided affair. I can only repeat what I have said to you three or four times now, air superiority has very little to do with loss rates, except if those loss rates affect the conduct of operations. Air Superiority is about who is able to do what in th air space (and on the ground). if i can get you to accept that then you will at last have an understanding of what air superiority actually is...

And Hurricane v Bf109E over Malta in 1941 was 0:35, ..... (Hurricane's record later v 109F's over Malta was actually better, though still several:1 against)

Dont know about the Far East, except that Hurricane loss rates against the japanese fighters in 1942-3 were no worse than Spitfire loss rates in 1943.

Over Malta, saying that 109e losses were a fraction of Hurrican losses is a total misrepresentation. In fact most of the aircraft sent to Malta were Spits. a total of 719 aircraft (not all of them fighters, but mostly Spits and Hurris) were sent to the island of which about 320 were lost in air combat, and a further 80 or so on the ground or whilst taxiing. In exchange they destroyed (confirmed) 552 Axis aircraft , all but 185 were German. moreover the airframes committed to attacking the island amounted to over 2000 machines...so whilst 719 airccraft are engaging 2000 enemies, shoot them down at roughly a rate of two for every one they lose, you want quibble about how many 109e to Hurricanes were lost....give me a break. And this was under conditions where maintaining even any presence on the island was done under the most difficult conditions, for reasons that had little to do with gaining air superiority

For the record, over ceylon where the IJN was engaged by Hurricanes, 29 aircraft (half of them Fulmars, were engaged by around 150 zekes (will check and confirm tonite) ....I wonder why they lost aircraft at a rate of 4:1?????

 

[parsifal]

January 1941

1.1.– 31.1.1941 waters around Great Britain Ger Airplanes sow altogether 481 air mines in British coast waters; focal points are the Thames mouth, Cardiff, Milford Haven and the Mersey estuary (liverpool) on the west coast as well as the Humberestuary on the east coast. In the zone of the Thames mouth losses to mines begin on the at the 2.1. the freighter Pinewood (2466 BRT), on the 6.1. the tug Lion (87 BRT), on the 8.1. the Strathearn (683 BRT), on the 16.1. the Trawler Desiree (213 BRT), and at the 24.1. the freighter Corheath (1096 BRT). On the west coast sinkings begin on the 10.1. with the Freighter Middlesex (9583 BRT) in Nells Point, on the 12.1. the Trawler Strathrye (212 BRT) in the irish Sea, on the 15.1. the Verklappungsschiff Mancunium (1286 BRT) near liverpool, on the 19.1. the Kümo Diana (312 BRT) südl. of Cardiff and on the 26.1. the niederl.
Freighter Beemsterdijk (6869 BRT) westl. Smalls skirt. neasr the east coast sunk on the 22.1. the small auxiliary warships Luda lady and St. Cyrus in the Humberestuary. — Damaged in the Thames mouth at the 1.1. the fleet tanker Attendant (1018 BRT), and on the 26.1. the Catford (1508 BRT), before Cardiff on the 9.1. the Dorset Coast (848 BRT),on the 11.1. the tanker British Fidelity (8465 BRT), on the 12.1. the Norwegian motor ship Tijuca (5498 BRT), on the 22.1. the cool ship Jamaica Planter (4098 BRT) and on the 28.1. the large tanker chalkboard mountain (13640 BRT), and on that 16.1. near Milford Haven of the navy tug Romsey.

I]4.-of 5/1/1941
Aerial war RAF Bomber Command attacks by 54 airplanes in Brest liegemde Ger. warships (among other things admiral of hip).
Hudson bombers sink the Norwegian freighter Snyg (1326 GRT) outside the port

2.– 5.1.1941 aerial warfare England night attacks of the German Air Force on Cardiff, Bristol and Avonmouth with 350 t explosive bombs and 2600 (won. Brandschüttkästen???). In Cardiff, Hole de (5252 BRT) is damaged.

5/1/1941
The North Sea
The Ger. outpost boat V306/Fritz Hinke sinks on a mine with Ijmuiden

7./ 8.1.1941 North Sea / channel unsuccessful attack by KM S boot (flottille?) against Convoy near the Thames mouth. The 1st Schnell Boote flottille (Kptlt. Birnbacher) S 101 (Oblt.z.S. Christiansen) southeasternly of Lowestoft sinks Steamer h h. Petersen (975 BRT). — Offensive mine operation "Renate" of the torpedo boats wolf and Kondor before Dover. On the retreat, wolf (Oblt.z.S . Peter †) sinks near Dünkirchen on mines, that were laid by RN Coastal vessels ((I think MTBs).

8/1/1941
The North Sea / English Channel
the torpedo boats Wolf and Condor before Dover. On the return to Dunkirk (these ships are sunk Wolf (Oblt.z. See of Peter †) before Dünkirchen on the mines which were laid by aircraft of the CC (source says laid by RN minesweepers, but barnett ("Engage the enemy more closely") says it was from air laid mines

10/11-1-41 Air attack heavier German aerial warfare England on the harbor by Portsmouth. In the Vosper shipyard, the fast boats are destroyed MTB 37, MTB 39, MTB 40, MTB 74, MTB 75 and MTB 108(II).

11.– 12.1.1941 aerial warfare England 278 dt. Airplanes throw altogether 299 t explosive bombs and 1421 Brandschüttkästen (incendiaries???) on London in 2 successive nights. The ship traffic is not damaged.

11.– 18.1.1941 Kattegat on the 11.1. the Swedish freighter Bertha (1216 BRT) is lost to air laid mine by the RAF near Copenhagen, the German freighter breach lake (688 BRT) near Malmö, and on the 18.1. the German freighter Godfried Bueren (4648 BRT) southwesternly of Laesoe.

12.– 30.1.1941 Norway near the west coast of Norway Allied 9th U flottille operates other and among other things includes the niederl. O. 21 and O. 23.

15./ 16.1.1941 aerial warfare Germany 76 bombers of the RAF attack Wilhelmshaven. The attack counts also the battle ship placed not yet in service Tirpitz and delays negligibly its Commissioning.

16.– 18.1.1941 aerial warfare England attacks of the German Air Force on the harbors of Avonmouth and Swansea. At the same time 4 freighters are damaged

23/24-1-41 Operation Rubble was a British blockade running operation in which five Norwegian merchant ships escaped from Sweden to Britain. The ships involved were Norwegian steamships Elizabeth Bakke (5450grt), John Bakke (4718grt), Tai Shan (6962grt), Taurus (4767grt) and the Ranja (6355grt). In addition to their cargoes also on board were many British and Norwegian sailors who had been in Sweden following the failure of the Allies' Norwegian campaign. The ships left Gotenburg on the 23rd of January and ran the German blockade of the Skagerrak. They narrowly avoided being intercepted by the two German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau who were just starting Operation Berlin in the Kattegat. The ships navigated the North Sea with various warships being despatched from the UK to act as escorts. These escorts included HMS Naiad, Aurora, Edinburgh Birmingham and the destroyers Escapade, Echo, Electra. The John Bakke and the Ranja were both under attack from the Luftwaffe when the cruisers found them. The ships reached Kirkwall in the Orkneys on the 25th January 1941.

The ships successfully delivered approximately 18,600 metric tons of materiel including ball bearings, machine tools, spare parts, iron, ingots, and steels of various qualities. The operation was directed by George Binney who was a temporary attache to Stockholm representing the UK Ministry of Supply. He was on steamer Tai Shan. This operation was the first of a series which also included Operation Performance, Operation Bridford and Operation Moonshine.

23./24.1.1941 canal offensive mine enterprise SWb "Wagner" before that roasted. Canal coast on the line Orfordness Scheveningen with the Minenlegern Roland (Kpt. Bentlage), Cobra, emperor and Skagerrak, secured through destroyer Richard Beitzen (KKpt. v. Davidson) and T boats lake eagle (Kptlt. Kohlauf) and Iltis (Kptlt. Jacobsen). Subsequently Richard Beitzen, lake eagle and Iltis transfer through the canal back after Brest (shrinking 28.1.).

26.– 30.1.1941 Norway mine ship group "north" (FKpt. v. beautiful mark) with the mine ships fir mountain, Brummer, queen Luise and Hanseatic league city Danzig leads to the north extension the "west rampart" -barriers, secured through the torpedo boats T 12 and falcon and the mine searchers M 15 and M 22, of Stavanger out of at the 26./27.1. the defensive mine enterprise 20 "Pomerania" through. — In the next night the same group puts, secured of the torpedo boats T 5 and T 9 in place of of falcon, the mine barrier 21 "or

26.– 30.1.1941 Norway ally submarine operations: On the 26.1. Cachalot lays a barrier of 50 mines before the Björnsund, no success. Attacks of Sunfish and Sealion before Kristiansand and Stadlandet remain unsuccessful.

30./ 31.1.1941 North Sea Coastal Command sows mines in the Elbe Estuary resulting in the loss of Ger Fährschiff king mountain Prussia (2530 BRT) on the 30.1 and on the 31.1. the Danish freighter Maja (2203 BRT)

31.1.1941 Great Britain the battle ship Queen Elizabeth leaves the navy shipyard Rosyth. the conclusion of a 3 year overhaul similar to that undertaken on her near sisters Warspite and Valiant.

Germany had to build an average of 200000 tons of shipping every year just to make good the losses she suffered. Most losses were in the Baltic, but a significant amount of shipping was lost along the Atlantic coastline as wll, most due to the operations of Coastal Command

 

[parsifal]

February

Apologies for the poor translation

1.– 15.2.1941 9th sub flottille (Sunfish and Sealion) (Cdr. Bryant) patrols off Norwegian coast. , on the 1.2. an attack on a convoy is unsuccessful. On the 5.2. the norweg. Route steamer Ryfylke (1151 BRT) is missed by a toreedo attack but is sunk by gunfire.

1.– 19.2.1941 Biskaya Allied sub ops, Tigris (LtCdr. Bone) on the 12.2. sinks the Vichy Steamer Jacobsen (523 BRT), , and on the 19.2. the Guilvenec (3273 BRT), enroute from Nantes to North Africa. Snapper is lost on the 11.2 west of Ouessant through depth charge attacks by KM minesweepers M 2, M 13 and M 25 . It is replaced the U boats Unbeaten, O. 21 and O. 23.

1.– 28.2.1941 waters around Great Britain German airplanes lay more than 1000 air mines in British coastal waters; focal points are the Thames mouth, Cardiff, Swansea and liverpool on the west coast as well as the Tyne- and especially the Humber on the east coast. – Through mine hits the following are lost: on the 4.2. the freighter Gwynwood (1177 BRT), on the 16.2. the wheel steamer Southsea (825 BRT) and on the 26.2. in the harbor of cover the Ladeprähme Brackelier, in the Bristol channel on the 14.2. the tanker Empire otter (4670 BRT), near Cardiff on the 20.2. the ore freighter fort Medine (5261 BRT) and on the 28.2. the Kümo Cabenda (534 BRT), in the Lyme bay at the 17.2. The Kümo Ben purely (156 BRT) and at the 23.2. the navy supply ship Shoal Fisher (698 BRT), Trawler Thomas Deas (276 BRT) and on the 27.2. the Minesweeper Trawler Remillo. Damaged outside Cardiff at the 8.2. the belg. Henri Jaspar (5780 BRT), near the Tynem estuary on the 19.2. Fulham II (1596 BRT) and near liverpool at the 27.2.. Cape Clear (5085 BRT).

2.– 27.2.1941 North Sea German airplanes sink the following ships: near Harwich on the 2.2. The Sultan (824 BRT), near Ramsgate on the 3.2. the Minesweeping Trawler Arctic Trapper (352 BRT), east of Dundee on the 7.2. the navy supply ship Fisher (575 BRT),) in the Moray Firth on the 11.2. the Trawler Eamont (227 BRT) and John Dunkin (202 BRT), near Peterhead on the 16.2. the Minesweeping trawler Ormonde (250 BRT) and east of Harwich on the 27.2. the freighter Old Charlton (1562 BRT). Damaged: on the 10.2. near Great Yarmouth the. Benmacdhui (6809 BRT), on the 13.2. before Whitby the Westcliffe hall (1900 BRT), on the 19.2. the tanker Athelsultan (8882 BRT), on the 26.2. near Cromarty the Empire Steelhead (7744 BRT), and on the 27.2. east of Harwich the Blacktoft (1109 BRT).

3./ 4.2.1941 North Sea minelaying ops by mine ship group north (FKpt. v. Schönermark) with Tannenberg and Brummer as 2nd part of the north extension the "west rampart" -barriers off the norweg. Coast. Eascort provided by the 1st and 2nd Torpedo Boote flottille and Torpedoboote Falke.

4.2.1941 aerial warfare France British air attacks on Channel Harbours heavily damages the Ger Supply Tanker Forbach (7908 BRT) near Le Havre (I think in fact this ship was wrecked so badly that she never sailed again) , the small tanker John A. Essberger (739 BRT) in Brest is sunk.

5./ 6.2.1941 North Sea in an attack bythe 2nd S flottille with S 30, S 33, S 34, S 54, S 58 and S 59; carried out between Ipswich and Newcastle on the FN. 101 S30 (Oblt.z.S. Feldt) sinks Freighter Angularity (501 BRT).

General Situation 6.2.1941 / Hitler Directive Nr 23 is released. "Guidelines for the warfare against the engl. economy". The Directives states the objective is to increase the effect on the enemy shipping by increased use of submarine and arborne antishipping forces. On the other hand the outline of the attacks is not supposed to be heavily dependant on the air component because other tasks will require other priorities for the air force. Also outlines that the LW will be needed in other TOs (not mentioned, but east and south) . Therefore the directive specifies that the air attacks are to concentrate predominantly against such goals, whose destruction has an (immediate) effect in tonnage warfare, like the attacks on coastal shipping. Hitler specifies that attacks on land targets in the blitz are to target and concentrate on terror attacks on residential districts with secondary emphasis on attacks against factories and manufacturing plants the coasts, (this bit I could not decipher) ...[no kriegsentscheidender success is to be expected" on the other hand].

15.2.1941 Norway HM Submarine Cachalot (LtCdr. Newton) lays a mine barrier (50 mines) near the Vestfjord (Lofoten) and makes an unsuccessful torpedo attack against a steamer.

19.2.1941 North Sea attack by the 1.S-Flottille with S 28, S 39, S 101 and S 102 into the Thames mouth. S 102 (Oblt.z.S. Töniges) sinks the Freighter Algarve (1355 BRT).

19.– 21.2.1941 aerial warfare England the LW drops 112 t explosive bombs and 1091 incendiaries with 125 airplanes on successive nights on Swansea. Extensive damage to the port is reported

19 - 27.2. 1941 North Sea Coastal Command mining ops. mine hits cause the following losses for the germans: in the Ems estuary on that 19.2 the steamer Enak (180 BRT), in the Elbe on the 26.2 the fish steamer Schaumburg-Lippe (200 BRT) and in the Außenjade on that 27.2 the steamer Adele Ohlrogge (1371 BRT).

20.2.1941 Channel an airplane of the KG. 2 sinks east of Lizard Is in a night attack the Freighter Rigmor (1278 BRT)

21./ 22.2.1941 aerial warfare Germany RAF bomber Command bombs Wilhelmshaven (with 35 Wellingtons and 14 Hampdens) .

22./ 23.2.1941 Norway out of Bergen mine ship group proceeds north with Brummer (KKpt. of von Schönermark), Cobra and Queen Luise, escorted by the 5th M flottille, and lays the mine barrier 23 "Swine" as 3rd part of the north extension the "west rampart" barriers in the maritime area between Shetland islands and Korsfjord.

25.2.1941 Germany Commissioning of the battle ship Tirpitz (52,600 t) in Wilhelmshaven.

25.2.1941 France admiral Darlan, representative and designated successor to marshal Pétains, is given the direction of the Foreign ministry, interior ministry and navy ministry in Vichy.

25.2.1941 North Sea S 30 (Oblt.z.S. Feldt) sinks the HM Escort destroyer Exmoor near Lowestoft.

25./ 26.2.1941 Channel the Torpedo Boote Iltis (Kptlt. Jacobsen) and jaguar (Kptlt. Hardstone) "Augsburg A" carry out mining ops near Eastbourne.

25./ 26.2.1941 RAF by Bomber Command on Brest, bombers of the type Avro Manchester are used for the first time.

26./ 27.2.1941 North Sea in an attack by the 1.S-Fl. S 28 (Kptlt. Wisely) sinks Freighter Minorca (1123 BRT) near Cromer.

28.2.1941 / Germany Hitler overrides Goring on the formation I. /KG 40 under the BdU (see 7.-31.1.41) and arranges the assembly of a "fleiger Fuhrer AtlantiK" in Lorient and a "Fleiger Fuhrer north" in Stavanger with the (primary) task of the reconfication over Atlantic, North Sea and European North Ocean.

28.2./ 1.3.1941 aerial warfare Germany air attack of the RAF bomber Command on Wilhelmshaven.

 

[parsifal]

March 1941

Norway / radio clarification
Operation "Claymore": More successfully brit. Thrust against Lofoten, besides, important kryptologische documents are carried off. Involved units: Destroyer Somali (Capt. Caslon), Eskimo, Tartar, Legion and Bedouin and the landing ships Queen Emma and Princess Beatrix with 500 men Kommando-Truppen aboard. Cover forces: Light cruisers Edinburgh and Nigeria. The submarine Sunfish serves as a "control point".

Damage to the Axis includes the fishing processing factories at Stamsund, Henningsvaer, Svolvaer and Brettesnes which are destroyed, as well as Axis merchant ships Hamburg (5470 GRT), Felix Heumann (2468 GRT), Pasajes (1996 GRT), Eilenau (1404 GRT), Bernhard Schulte (1058 GRT), Gumbinnen (1381 GRT) and Mira (1152). Norwegian . Fishing vessel Myrland (321 GRT) is captured, and 213 Germans and 12 Norwegians are arrested, 314 Norwegians go voluntarily with the RN to England. — However, this is only the officially widespread part of the history which covers a lot of other important success: Somali succeeds in putting the coastal defense boat NN 04 out of action and boarding her. To the Enterkommando important key documents fall in the hands, which brit. Clarification headquarters Bletchley park enable to decipher the Ger. radio traffic with the code » home bodies of water « for the time from the 13th to the 23.2nd and for different days after the 20.3 (cf 21.4.-10.5.).

(I mention the Lofoten raid because if the Germans held air superiority off the Norwegian Coast it would not have been possible to carry out this mission)

8/3/1941

S101 and 102 sunk by air laid mines in the north sea[/I][/I]




3.3.1941 RAF bomber Command attacks harbor plants in Rotterdam, Calais and Brest. Damage described in German records as "Moderate"

6.3.1941 Channel offensive mine enterprise "Augsburg" before Eastbourne by KM torpedo boats jaguar and Iltis.

7.3.1941 Norway mine ship Gp north consisting mine ships Brummer, Cobra and queen Luise, undertake a further stage of the "westwall Mine barrage, completing the mine barrier 24 "Wollin" ca. 50 sm east of the Shetlands as 4th and most northern part of that extended "west rampart" -barriers

The 1st S flottilles grasp 7./8.3.1941 North Sea before Cromer and Southwold (Kptlt. Birnbacher) with S 26, S 27, S 28, S 29, S 39, S 101, S 102, the 2nd S flottille (Kptlt. Petersen) with S 33, S 36, S 30, S 55 and the 3rd S flottille (Kptlt. Kemnade) with S 31, S 57, S 59, S 60 and S 61 shadow and attack Convoys FN. 26 and FS. 29 which are escorted by HM Korvetten Sheldrake and Puff. Forewarned by British aerial recon, the Brit ships defending and successfully force aside the boats of the 2nd S flottille. In the combats against FN. 26 S101 sinks (Oblt.z.S. Christiansen) the Brit Norman Queen (957 BRT), S 28 (Kptlt. Wisely) sinks the Brit Corduff (2345 BRT), S 27 (Oblt.z.S. Büchting) sinks the brit the Rye (1049 BRT), S 29 (Oblt.z.S v. me stream) sinks the the Dotterel (1385 BRT), at the FS. 29 S 102 (Oblt.z.S. Töniges)sinks the the Togston (1547 BRT), S 61 (Oblt.z.S. of Gernet) sinks the the Boulderpool (4805 BRT) and S 31 (Oblt.z.S. Meyer) sinks the Kenton (1047 BRT).

7.3.– 18.4.1941 Biskaya/Atlantic combat with the Submarines Otus, Olympus, Pandora and Tuna and the Dutch O. 21 and O. 23 are used to the protection of HG- and OG convoys west of the Biskaya. At the 7.3. Porpoise misses (LtCdr. Hopkins) in the Biskaya a submarine (probably U 97). In the same period and to the 18.4. the submarine Thunderbolt, Porpoise, Tribune and Talisman are used to the protection of SC- and HX convoys

10./11.3.1941 aerial warfare France RAF bomber Command attacks Le Havre. First use of 6 Halifax- bombers of the 35th Sqn RAF. No recorded losses. some sources say this was a daylight raid

10./11.3.1941 Norway the Minenlayers queen Luise and Cobra of the 5th M flottille, complete the the mine barrier 17a "Pregel" which complete the extension the "west rampart" -barriers to north. KM considers the putting of the mine barriers in the North Sea area is locked first of all. The mine ships transfer to overhaul in shipyards and subsequently into the Baltic Sea. (this assumption by the KM is wildly optimistic)

12.– 15.3.1941 North Sea out of the convoy FS. 32 S 28 sinks (Kptlt. Wisely) at the 12.3. sinks Brit Trevethoe (5257 BRT). the destroyer Worcester manages to force away some S boats of the convoy FS. 37. At the 14./15.3. the destroyers Holderness Versatile and Vanessa screens off 2 S-boat-torpedoes.

13.3.1941 aerial warfare England in the dt. Air attack on Liverpool centering on the port. Some ships in the harbour are attacked and sink. Freighter Buenos Aires (5644 BRT) sinks and heavily damages 7 further ships with 45,114 BRT, under that the fast motor ship used later with Maltas convoys imperially star (12,427 BRT) and the tankers Delphinula (8120 BRT), el Mirlo (8092 BRT), Elax (7403 BRT) and Scottish Chief (7008 BRT).

 

[tomo pauk]

Hi, parsifal,
Thanks you for posting the data about shipping losses. About the discussion in this thread:
We've touched many subjects here, and while we agree on some, we disagree on many more. Since it's unlikely that we would reach some major agreement, I'll refrain from further posting in this thread. Please, do not consider this as a sign of my disability to challenge your, or your sources' views, but, again, merely as a sign of my will to avoid a discussion that's unlikely to produce any major change of our views opinions about the subjects we've discussed.

Cheers

 

[parsifal]

Im still working through the loss sheets for the Axis in the Atlantic Coastal waters. Do you want to see the remainder of that data?