Of course. I'm just trying to stop this particular misconception about Yak-9.
My small contribution into eternal struggle against fake news.
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.
- Thread starter michael rauls
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Of course. I'm just trying to stop this particular misconception about Yak-9.
My small contribution into eternal struggle against fake news.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,030
- Jun 25, 2013
There is a tendency for subordinates to exaggerate good news and downplay bad when reporting to bosses. In a capitalist system, the worst is likely to be getting fired and maybe blacklisted for unwanted news ( a high-level accountant, maybe the comptroller, at Convair was fired for reporting the CV-880 was being sold for less than cost of components and subcontracted work, even though it was true); in the Soviet system, imprisonment or even death could result.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
I don't think this kind of question has an answer as such. It's interesting but it's a struggle to talk sense without agreed criteria of evidence, definitions, means of evaluating sources, shared values even. There's even a place for epistemology : how do we know what we think we know about the path of war, it's turning points, the role of air power and advantages and disadvantages of candidate aircraft types. Any certainty or strongly held position is possibly not supported as strongly as proponents believe. Alternates to that strongly held position may have hidden merits. This is why we discuss things, to bring out those merits, to test what seems certain. At least, that is what I thought before the age of the internet.
That said and arguing from first principles
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.
The war taken from 1939 to 45. (taking the alternate from 1936 Manchuria invasion might give a different result)
Two tidal cycles can be identified: West and East, German and Japanese aggression. Each cycle has a flood tide of Axis expansion an Ebb tide of allied recovery, with an additional tide of Soviet expansion, (neglected in this analysis).
Was each turn, from flood to ebb, a point or a stage? Was the turn centred on an event ( for example the Battle of Midway) or a campaign ("Battle" of the Atlantic) or a process (rearmament)?
Taking the West first, there are a series of points at which the tide could have turned, two points where it did turn, three Campaigns and three processes
Points :
Battles for Poland, Netherlands, France. Dunkerque, BoB - take those together as Axis North West Europe Expansion point
Barbarossa first stages
Defence of Malta
Normandy Landings
Campaigns
"Battle" of the Atlantic
Barbarossa conceived widely, the Eastward expansion
Western Desert
Processes
Rearmament, attrition, war orientation - total war, formation of Alliance
Of those I choose the Battle of the Atlantic as the critical turn of tide, that could have gone either way. Malta came close, but could conceivably have been lost, and the Western Desert
Campaign, and the link from Europe to India/Australia without affecting the war outcome.
The airplane that did the most to turn that tide:
Candidates:
B24 Liberator
PBY Catalina
Short Sunderland
From which I pick : B24 Liberator as the one that closed the air gap
By a similar process for the Eastern tidal cycle of War I choose the Mitsubishi Zero as over confidence in this platform exemplified the underestimation of American strength as a democracy which led to war.
Thank you for a most interesting question.
And I could be wrong, especially about the Zero.
That said and arguing from first principles
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.
The war taken from 1939 to 45. (taking the alternate from 1936 Manchuria invasion might give a different result)
Two tidal cycles can be identified: West and East, German and Japanese aggression. Each cycle has a flood tide of Axis expansion an Ebb tide of allied recovery, with an additional tide of Soviet expansion, (neglected in this analysis).
Was each turn, from flood to ebb, a point or a stage? Was the turn centred on an event ( for example the Battle of Midway) or a campaign ("Battle" of the Atlantic) or a process (rearmament)?
Taking the West first, there are a series of points at which the tide could have turned, two points where it did turn, three Campaigns and three processes
Points :
Battles for Poland, Netherlands, France. Dunkerque, BoB - take those together as Axis North West Europe Expansion point
Barbarossa first stages
Defence of Malta
Normandy Landings
Campaigns
"Battle" of the Atlantic
Barbarossa conceived widely, the Eastward expansion
Western Desert
Processes
Rearmament, attrition, war orientation - total war, formation of Alliance
Of those I choose the Battle of the Atlantic as the critical turn of tide, that could have gone either way. Malta came close, but could conceivably have been lost, and the Western Desert
Campaign, and the link from Europe to India/Australia without affecting the war outcome.
The airplane that did the most to turn that tide:
Candidates:
B24 Liberator
PBY Catalina
Short Sunderland
From which I pick : B24 Liberator as the one that closed the air gap
By a similar process for the Eastern tidal cycle of War I choose the Mitsubishi Zero as over confidence in this platform exemplified the underestimation of American strength as a democracy which led to war.
Thank you for a most interesting question.
And I could be wrong, especially about the Zero.
HealzDevo
Staff Sergeant
I think it would have to be the Typhoon or the P-47 Thunderbolt. These aircraft made it impossible for Axis trains and ground forces to move. They increased an already difficult position to an impossible one for their enemies.
I agree, generally, with the 'break it down by Theater and Year' approach because it helps separate out the three arguments, namely
That said, while I agree with what I believe is a general consensus that the Soviet -German war was the most important in the overall War effort, I think people seem to be a little too dismissive of some of the other primary Theaters (like the Pacific) and by extension also the secondary and tertiary Theaters and their relevance to the outcome of the overall War.
We can look at raw production numbers and make certain assumptions, but as I have pointed out before, if production alone was sufficient to win wars the US would have won the Vietnam War, Afghanistan would have been pacified by the Soviets in the 80's and be pacified now by the Americans, Korea would be unified and under the American Sphere of Influence and so forth. Production capacity alone does not guarantee victory.
So we have direct fronts and what you might call indirect or 'supply chain' fronts. The Pacific War, the BoB and associated conflicts, the invasion of Normandy and subsequent campaign in Western Europe are all direct fronts / conflicts similar to the Soviet - German war if smaller in scale. The 'Battle of the Atlantic', the CBI, Greece and the Balkans, the Med and Middle East, and the secondary Theaters in the Pacific qualify as 'supply chain' fronts. If we assume the latter don't matter then aren't we also contradicting the idea that the production capacity is the deciding factor, or even a major factor?
For the Med, I think the 'breaking' of Fascist Italy and their removal or serious downgrading as an economic and technological force in the Axis War effort is more significant than people are assuming. But the big question is really - how badly does Britain really need that supply chain from South Asia? How badly do they need commerce and communication in the Med? I think a lot, probably more than we are generally taking into account.
Same for the CBI and this has relevance for the Pacific scenario because as I said before, (and I'll address this more in another post) if the Japanese had won at Midway and the Solomons they could have done a lot more harm in the Indian Ocean and on the Indian Subcontinent. But does it matter? How much does Britain need that link to India?
Similarly for the "Battle of the Atlantic" and the various other convoy fights. How badly did the Soviets really need the Lend Lease and other materiel and weapons that they received? How much could an Alaska route compensate if the Atlantic route was broken. How much could the Japanese have interfered with the latter if they had a freer hand due to defeating the Yanks? How badly did England need what they were getting cross-Atlantic from the Americans?
Only once you have some of these questions answered can you focus on which plane mattered the most. Or, as I would prefer, which planes, maybe a top 5 or top 10, broken down by time period and Theater.
- which Theater is the most relevant to war outcomes, or even a hierarchy of importance of the Theaters,
- which years are most key,
- and then separately which aircraft was the most important in each Theater and year.
That said, while I agree with what I believe is a general consensus that the Soviet -German war was the most important in the overall War effort, I think people seem to be a little too dismissive of some of the other primary Theaters (like the Pacific) and by extension also the secondary and tertiary Theaters and their relevance to the outcome of the overall War.
We can look at raw production numbers and make certain assumptions, but as I have pointed out before, if production alone was sufficient to win wars the US would have won the Vietnam War, Afghanistan would have been pacified by the Soviets in the 80's and be pacified now by the Americans, Korea would be unified and under the American Sphere of Influence and so forth. Production capacity alone does not guarantee victory.
So we have direct fronts and what you might call indirect or 'supply chain' fronts. The Pacific War, the BoB and associated conflicts, the invasion of Normandy and subsequent campaign in Western Europe are all direct fronts / conflicts similar to the Soviet - German war if smaller in scale. The 'Battle of the Atlantic', the CBI, Greece and the Balkans, the Med and Middle East, and the secondary Theaters in the Pacific qualify as 'supply chain' fronts. If we assume the latter don't matter then aren't we also contradicting the idea that the production capacity is the deciding factor, or even a major factor?
For the Med, I think the 'breaking' of Fascist Italy and their removal or serious downgrading as an economic and technological force in the Axis War effort is more significant than people are assuming. But the big question is really - how badly does Britain really need that supply chain from South Asia? How badly do they need commerce and communication in the Med? I think a lot, probably more than we are generally taking into account.
Same for the CBI and this has relevance for the Pacific scenario because as I said before, (and I'll address this more in another post) if the Japanese had won at Midway and the Solomons they could have done a lot more harm in the Indian Ocean and on the Indian Subcontinent. But does it matter? How much does Britain need that link to India?
Similarly for the "Battle of the Atlantic" and the various other convoy fights. How badly did the Soviets really need the Lend Lease and other materiel and weapons that they received? How much could an Alaska route compensate if the Atlantic route was broken. How much could the Japanese have interfered with the latter if they had a freer hand due to defeating the Yanks? How badly did England need what they were getting cross-Atlantic from the Americans?
Only once you have some of these questions answered can you focus on which plane mattered the most. Or, as I would prefer, which planes, maybe a top 5 or top 10, broken down by time period and Theater.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
- 751
- May 1, 2016
One part in the report I find very interesting, ," it is estimated that overseas sources contributed up to one-quarter of Soviet aircraft supplies (this was the peak recorded in late 1943) and up to one-fifth of tank supplies (in 1942); "
Lend Lease had a decisive part in Russia staying in the War. Try playing a Russian Front simulation game with 25% less Russian air units, and 20% less armor.
Kevin J
Banned
Not to mention all the locomotives and rolling stock that transported their troops and equipment to the front, nor the food supplies.
- Thread starter
- #728
michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
- 1,679
- Jul 15, 2016
I read an article recently and at least according to the author it was the trucks we shipped to them, by making there army highly mobile, that contributed the most to victory on the eastern front.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,030
- Jun 25, 2013
I've seen the same thing.
fubar57
General
The USSR also had over one hundred thousand ZIS-5 trucks at the start of Operation Barbarossa.
Wiki
Wiki
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
- 751
- May 1, 2016
Germany was beaten by Russian Blood and US $dollars.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
- 751
- May 1, 2016
It doesn't look as capable as a REO M-35 Deuce and a half.
I don't think it was. There's a picture out there on the net of a deuce and a half pulling Zis-5s out of the mud.
Wish I had one right now. My car is buried axle deep in the swamp that is my driveway.
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Well... In the Soviet system it depended on many factors. One could be executed and another one to be promoted for doing exactly the same things, - just in different periods or more or less smartly or just due lack/bad luck. Favouritism played big role as well.
If this sim game is precise, it should increase number of remaining Soviet (not Russian) air units flights as there will be more lend leased aviation gasoline available.
Greg Boeser
2nd Lieutenant
This load was never used in combat. But...
On May 4, 1942, Cpt Frank Allen, 19th Bomb Sq, 22nd BG, USAAF, Took off from Pearce Airdrome, Perth, West Australia, on a mission to seek out and sink a Japanese carrier reported to be in the vicinity of Geraldton. His B-26, #40-1498, Sea Wolf, with a crew of seven, was loaded with three 500 lb bombs, a 250 gallon auxiliary tank in the bomb bay, a Mk XIII torpedo, and overload ammo for all guns. This put his gross weight at take off well over 36000 lbs.
Fortunately, the carrier failed to materialize. I would hate to run into the CAP in a ship that overloaded.
Shortround6
Major General
That is a much more useful load than the max load I listed.
A 500GP bomb actually has more explosive than a 1600lb AP bomb and it doesn't have to dropped from a height thousands of feet higher than torpedo dropping height to be effective.
Of course you don't need a bomb that will go through 5-6 in of armor deck when dealing with a carrier either.
Interesting points, all of them.
I may be wrong in placing the Yak's overall above the P39 over Russia. Many of the VVS's top aces scored a huge number of kills in the P39 and it contributed massively during the massive air battles over Kuban in 1943. The LA 5 FN and to a smaller extent the LA 7 were also major ace makers. The Yak 3 by contrast seems to have arrived at a time when what few Luftwaffe the aircraft still had were increasingly being used in the West.
However, over Stalingrad, there were not many P39's yet. I believe the vast majority were still Lagg 3's, Yak 1B's, Yak 7's, maybe a very small number of Yak 9's. At Stalingrad, the failure of the Luftwaffe to supply even enough for minimum survival to the encircled 6th army was a very important factor in the loss. And while the weather, number of aircraft and fuel all played a part, they were able to supply far less than they had to the smaller pocket at Demyansk earlier in 1942. The major factor seems to have been losses of aircraft to Soviet fighters, even forcing the Germans to keep fighters inside the pocket, which would in turn gobble up valuable supplies.
But the Germans were far from beaten in 1943, so the P39 and Lavochkins have a serious claim too.
On the reliability of numbers, I don't think the German numbers deserve any more credibility than the Soviet ones do. They would equally fudge production numbers or over claim kills and fail to record damaged or written off aircraft in some cases. German generals after the war would also frequently overstate the numbers they faced on the Eastern front to make themselves look better. So the true numbers probably lie between the claims of both sides.
On the importance of the theatres, the biggest factor in Germany and Japan's loss was probably oil. Most of the world's supply was in the US, with the other major supplier being the Soviet Union. The Middle East had no infrastructure yet. The German army kept growing in size right up until 1943 and was not actually that low on tanks. But they were having to increasingly rely on horses and struggling to keep their tanks and aircraft fueled as time wore on. The Soviet Union may have collapsed if the Germans had captured and held onto the Caucasus oil fields and/or they could block Soviet supplies up the Volga. So probably any major battle and attrition that meant a major disruption of oil supply was decisive.
I may be wrong in placing the Yak's overall above the P39 over Russia. Many of the VVS's top aces scored a huge number of kills in the P39 and it contributed massively during the massive air battles over Kuban in 1943. The LA 5 FN and to a smaller extent the LA 7 were also major ace makers. The Yak 3 by contrast seems to have arrived at a time when what few Luftwaffe the aircraft still had were increasingly being used in the West.
However, over Stalingrad, there were not many P39's yet. I believe the vast majority were still Lagg 3's, Yak 1B's, Yak 7's, maybe a very small number of Yak 9's. At Stalingrad, the failure of the Luftwaffe to supply even enough for minimum survival to the encircled 6th army was a very important factor in the loss. And while the weather, number of aircraft and fuel all played a part, they were able to supply far less than they had to the smaller pocket at Demyansk earlier in 1942. The major factor seems to have been losses of aircraft to Soviet fighters, even forcing the Germans to keep fighters inside the pocket, which would in turn gobble up valuable supplies.
But the Germans were far from beaten in 1943, so the P39 and Lavochkins have a serious claim too.
On the reliability of numbers, I don't think the German numbers deserve any more credibility than the Soviet ones do. They would equally fudge production numbers or over claim kills and fail to record damaged or written off aircraft in some cases. German generals after the war would also frequently overstate the numbers they faced on the Eastern front to make themselves look better. So the true numbers probably lie between the claims of both sides.
On the importance of the theatres, the biggest factor in Germany and Japan's loss was probably oil. Most of the world's supply was in the US, with the other major supplier being the Soviet Union. The Middle East had no infrastructure yet. The German army kept growing in size right up until 1943 and was not actually that low on tanks. But they were having to increasingly rely on horses and struggling to keep their tanks and aircraft fueled as time wore on. The Soviet Union may have collapsed if the Germans had captured and held onto the Caucasus oil fields and/or they could block Soviet supplies up the Volga. So probably any major battle and attrition that meant a major disruption of oil supply was decisive.
bbear
Airman 1st Class
"So probably any major battle and attrition that meant a major disruption of oil supply was decisive."
Or denied the same to Axis powers? Or secured Oil supply routes? See Operation Countenance 1941. Anglo Soviet Invasion of Iran securing both the Persian Route and the Abadan refinery (8 million tons in 1940).
Or used up the oil the Axis had in operations? Meaning the Western Desert, air operations over Western Europe, U boat fuel, E boat fuel, . . .
Or used up time? Time for the Axis powers to make the critical mistake that would provoke America into full commitment as an ally at war.
You may believe in oil supply specifically or trucks supply or any other specific item being critical in offence. OR Aircobras, or Yaks or some other airframe being critical to later offensive and defensive battles. Alternatively you may believe that "American $ and Soviet blood" is a sufficient and necessary general summary of the critical aspects of an aggressive formula for victory. You may believe any some or all of those things. If you do so believe then it follows that the stemming of the Axis tide before routes are shutdown resources taken and too much blood spilt is also critical. To mount a good offence we must have a good enough defence in time to survive the initial onslaught.
Survival of the initial onslaught for the required time requires British territorial integrity, for the Arctic convoys and the Persian Route and Abadan and the bulk of the first year's supplies . Which in turn means contesting the Battle of the Atlantic, the Western desert campaign and the defense of Malta.
Which for the Western Theaters would make the Spitfire the plane that did the most to turn the tide of war. But it's all arguable, I don't think there is a right answer. There my be some wrong ones.
So back again to the oilfields of Rumania, and the B24 pops up again as it has so many times in this thread.
Cheers,
Wes
