The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

[Conslaw]

No, the defense of island strongholds would depend on fast carrier forces to attack the invading armada.


Of course not, with their carrier forces intact and ours gone, they would be able to interdict supplies to Australia, take New Guinea, neutralize Hawaii, and push our forward bases back to California. A few strategically placed bombs on the Gatun Locks would make interocean transfers into lengthy hazardous endeavors. This makes submarine ops against the Empire's shipping problematical, and where you going to launch your B29s from now? With the Japanese in Dutch Harbor, Alaska is out, and China was always a shaky proposition, especially if the Japanese get themselves established on the Indian subcontinent.
With their empire secure, and their supplies of raw materials unthreatened, the Japanese could concentrate on producing the next generation of ships and aircraft to make our fight back even more of a challenge.
Perhaps, with Yamamoto still alive, they might even recognize the need for the philosophical change from a war of blitzkrieg conquest to a war of attrition, and make the necessary changes in strategy, logistics, and training to bring it about. OTOH, with their cultural affinity for the "single decisive blow" fighting style of the Samurai, that might be too radical a change in a highly conservative society and culture.
Cheers,
Wes

Even after a successful Midway campaign, the Combined Fleet would have needed to go back to the home islands for rest, resupply and rehabilitation. The IJN would not have had the fuel for a full-fleet sortee through the end of summer 1942. Assuming Japan actually successfully invaded and took Midway, Japan would have had to make a choice to reinforce and defend Midway or make a Southern assault toward Australia. They wouldn't have been able to do both at the same time. What part of Australia would Japan try to take? It is a huge country/continent.

 

[Shortround6]

What part of Australia would Japan try to take? It is a huge country/continent.

A part with a city in it?

only part joking

"Distance between Adelaide and Darwin is 2618 kilometers (1626 miles). Driving distance from Adelaide to Darwin is 3027 kilometers (1881 miles). "

and the road was not paved all the way until well after the war. There just aren't that many places away from the coast that are inhabitable by large numbers of people (the population cannot retreat into the interior) even if the scrub will support a few people/animals. Of course it works the same for the Japanese, there are only certain parts they can attack and/or move through without having to bring everything they need, including water.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Japan would have had to make a choice to reinforce and defend Midway or make a Southern assault toward Australia.

Defend Midway from what? With our PacFleet down to one carrier (if that), what threat is there to Midway? The Aussies are still tied up in New Guinea, and the Japanese don't have to invade and conquer them immediately, just wipe out their air power and then shut off their supply chain from Japan's new bases in Tulagi and Guadalcanal. An isolated Australia isn't an immediate threat.
And what's this talk of fuel shortages? By this time they'd been feasting on Southeast Asia oil for months, and the attrition of their merchant shipping hadn't really set in yet.
With all six of their big carriers still intact, and others on the ways, they should have been able to keep at least one, and most of the time two, formidable task forces at sea all the time.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[parsifal]

Japan was receiving far less oil from the east Indies than had been anticipated in prewar planning. Sizeable stockpiles had been accumulated at the forward base of
Truk with a much smaller and less secure base at rabaul. If the Japanese had actually succeeded at midway their requirements for domestic consumption coupled with their acute shortages of tankers would have effective sustained force projection into these distant fields impossible. The projected demands for an invasion of the Australian mainland coupled with the troop requirements made this suggestion impractical. There were many in the in that also knew that supply difficulties made any further military advances impossible

 

[nuuumannn]

Of course it works the same for the Japanese, there are only certain parts they can attack and/or move through without having to bring everything they need, including water.

As an aside, there is a story about what was coined The Brisbane Line; a defensive line drawn across the continent below which the population would retreat if the Japanese invaded. There are those who claim that it is a fantasy and did not exist. Info here:

https://www.ozatwar.com/ozatwar/brisbaneline.htm

 

[pinehilljoe]

A Naval victory at Midway would not have meant a successful landing was assured. Midway was very well fortified and ready at high alert. 3000 Marines would have been waiting for the initial 2500 Japanese wave. The total Japanese force was only 5000 men. This is far from the 3-1 odds that Marines had when assaulting islands. I think it would have been a Japanese blood bath, and its unlikely they would have made it to shore and stayed. The IJN didn't have the logistic train to stay in the Midway Area for extended periods, so a failed landing, with the IJN returning for resupply would have allowed Midway to be resupplied.

 

[parsifal]

It certainly would have been difficult. It is the opinion held in shattered sword. Despite all that weight of opinion stacked against the land operation being a success I still think the balance of probabilities favoured the Japanese force

 

[pinsog]

Defend Midway from what? With our PacFleet down to one carrier (if that), what threat is there to Midway? The Aussies are still tied up in New Guinea, and the Japanese don't have to invade and conquer them immediately, just wipe out their air power and then shut off their supply chain from Japan's new bases in Tulagi and Guadalcanal. An isolated Australia isn't an immediate threat.
And what's this talk of fuel shortages? By this time they'd been feasting on Southeast Asia oil for months, and the attrition of their merchant shipping hadn't really set in yet.
With all six of their big carriers still intact, and others on the ways, they should have been able to keep at least one, and most of the time two, formidable task forces at sea all the time.
Cheers,
Wes

If all 3 US carriers had been lost at Midway, we still had Saratoga (arriving at Hawaii at the end of the Midway battle) Wasp (arrived at San Diego on June 19 after delivering 2 loads of Spitfires to Malta and repairs at Norfolk shipyards) and Ranger (she was ferrying 2 loads of P40's to Africa, 68 on the first load, 72 on the 2nd load).

I would have used these 3 carriers to ferry fighters and single engine bombers to Hawaii until Hawaii couldn't hold any more, B17's and Catalina's from Hawaii patrolling a wide swath to make sure no Japanese carriers show up unannounced. I would not allow them to engage the Japanese fleet, strictly for ferrying aircraft.

If Midway had been successfully invaded (I have no idea if they could pull that off, Shattered Sword gives a reasonable justification that they couldn't) but if Midway did fall, I would harass a Japanese controlled Midway with night attacks by B17's using hundreds of 20-30 pound bombs and parafrags (if parafrags were available) only concerned with destroying aircraft on the runway, not punching holes in the runway with 500 and 1000 pound bombs as they would just be filled in every day by Japanese soldiers. Night attacks by B17's would neutralize Japanese fighters ability to intercept and should be relatively safe as Japanese flak wasn't that formidable. Flying boats would be the other prime target.

New US carriers start coming on line in 1943 along with much improved aircraft and then we start working our way back across the pacific.

If the Japanese cut the supply line through the pacific, could Australia be supplied by sailing around the south end of Africa and through the Indian Ocean? (That is a LONG trip)

In the end, the US has the B29 and 2 nukes, we draw some huge Japanese fleet into a battle and (assuming the concentrate their carriers like the US later did) drop a nuke right in the middle of 6-8 Japanese aircraft carriers in the center of their battle group and follow up with conventional airstrikes to finish them off

 

[Kevin J]

If all 3 US carriers had been lost at Midway, we still had Saratoga (arriving at Hawaii at the end of the Midway battle) Wasp (arrived at San Diego on June 19 after delivering 2 loads of Spitfires to Malta and repairs at Norfolk shipyards) and Ranger (she was ferrying 2 loads of P40's to Africa, 68 on the first load, 72 on the 2nd load).

I would have used these 3 carriers to ferry fighters and single engine bombers to Hawaii until Hawaii couldn't hold any more, B17's and Catalina's from Hawaii patrolling a wide swath to make sure no Japanese carriers show up unannounced. I would not allow them to engage the Japanese fleet, strictly for ferrying aircraft.

If Midway had been successfully invaded (I have no idea if they could pull that off, Shattered Sword gives a reasonable justification that they couldn't) but if Midway did fall, I would harass a Japanese controlled Midway with night attacks by B17's using hundreds of 20-30 pound bombs and parafrags (if parafrags were available) only concerned with destroying aircraft on the runway, not punching holes in the runway with 500 and 1000 pound bombs as they would just be filled in every day by Japanese soldiers. Night attacks by B17's would neutralize Japanese fighters ability to intercept and should be relatively safe as Japanese flak wasn't that formidable. Flying boats would be the other prime target.

New US carriers start coming on line in 1943 along with much improved aircraft and then we start working our way back across the pacific.

If the Japanese cut the supply line through the pacific, could Australia be supplied by sailing around the south end of Africa and through the Indian Ocean? (That is a LONG trip)

In the end, the US has the B29 and 2 nukes, we draw some huge Japanese fleet into a battle and (assuming the concentrate their carriers like the US later did) drop a nuke right in the middle of 6-8 Japanese aircraft carriers in the center of their battle group and follow up with conventional airstrikes to finish them off

I think you'll find that the supply route to Australia would remain open but would have been through Samoa, then New Zealand and over to Sydney, Australia. So maybe the Northern half of Australia gets overrun. Look up the Brisbane line.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

If the Japanese cut the supply line through the pacific, could Australia be supplied by sailing around the south end of Africa and through the Indian Ocean? (That is a LONG trip)

And a shaky one, testing the range limitations of most ships, and requiring supply convoys to stay down in the far south latitudes going by the East Indies to stay out of reach of Japanese long range airpower. Underway replenishment in the great southern ocean is an exceedingly risky business, and Japanese submarines were mostly long range operators. Australia would probably soon have become untenable as a US submarine base.
I do like the idea of nuking a task force rather than a city. Our post war PR issues re nuclear weapons would certainly have turned out differently than they did.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[pinehilljoe]

There are beginning to be so many what if's to this thread its difficult to follow. I don't think the IJN landing would have succeeded. They lacked the specialized equipment the US Marines had when attacking islands, and no where near the 3-1 ratio that was considered a minimum.

On the other side if we are talking what ifs, what if Saratoga had arrived back from the West Coast in time to participate in the battle. Yorktown may not have been lost, and the IJN defeat may have been greater.

 

[Schweik]

A raid into the indian ocean and invasion and conquest of Ceylon / Sri Lanka just as a base from which to disrupt merchant / naval communications could have had devastating results to the British war effort and they definitely could have done that.

 

[Shortround6]

A raid into the indian ocean and invasion and conquest of Ceylon / Sri Lanka just as a base from which to disrupt merchant / naval communications could have had devastating results to the British war effort and they definitely could have done that.

They should have done a lot of things, assuming of course they had the oil to fuel the ships, assuming they had the ships (cargo/sealift) in the first place.

 

[Schweik]

They should have done a lot of things, assuming of course they had the oil to fuel the ships, assuming they had the ships (cargo/sealift) in the first place.

I was referring specifically to the scenario where they had defeated the American carriers at Midway. They certainly had enough equipment to invade Guadalcanal and they sent thousands of troops to New Guinea as well (getting them past the Owen Stanley range was another story) so I'm sure they could have taken Sri Lanka. Look how they rolled over the Philippines, Malaysia, etc.

 

[Shortround6]

You ignored the sea lift capability. It is about 1500 Nautical miles from Singapore to Sri Lanka. Or nearly 8 days with an 8kt freighter. Not all Japanese bases, especially captured ones like SIngapore had the same capabilities. The Attack on Guadalcanal was based out of Truk which was Japans largest (by far) forward base.

Any ships rounding the Cape of Good Hope heading for Australia aren't going to come within 1000-1500 miles of Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka is 20-50 miles from India for about a 50-60 mile stretch of the Sri Lankan coast, It is going to be a whole lot easier for the British and India to resupply/support Sri Lanka than for the Japanese to resupply after the initial attack.

 

[Conslaw]

Defend Midway from what? With our PacFleet down to one carrier (if that), what threat is there to Midway? The Aussies are still tied up in New Guinea, and the Japanese don't have to invade and conquer them immediately, just wipe out their air power and then shut off their supply chain from Japan's new bases in Tulagi and Guadalcanal. An isolated Australia isn't an immediate threat.
And what's this talk of fuel shortages? By this time they'd been feasting on Southeast Asia oil for months, and the attrition of their merchant shipping hadn't really set in yet.
With all six of their big carriers still intact, and others on the ways, they should have been able to keep at least one, and most of the time two, formidable task forces at sea all the time.
Cheers,
Wes

What's the talk of fuel shortages? Fuel supply played a role in Japanese strategy from the attack on Pearl Harbor through the end of the war.


https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/INTA4803TP/Articles/Oil Logistics in the Pacific War=Donovan.pdf
Oil and Japanese Strategy in the Solomons: A Postulate

 

[Schweik]

You ignored the sea lift capability. It is about 1500 Nautical miles from Singapore to Sri Lanka. Or nearly 8 days with an 8kt freighter. Not all Japanese bases, especially captured ones like SIngapore had the same capabilities. The Attack on Guadalcanal was based out of Truk which was Japans largest (by far) forward base.

Any ships rounding the Cape of Good Hope heading for Australia aren't going to come within 1000-1500 miles of Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka is 20-50 miles from India for about a 50-60 mile stretch of the Sri Lankan coast, It is going to be a whole lot easier for the British and India to resupply/support Sri Lanka than for the Japanese to resupply after the initial attack.

I didn't ignore anything, and I think we both know that. You are looking for facts to suit your conclusion instead of the other way around.

The Japanese had ports on Sumatra, they had Rangoon (wrecked by the British during the retreat but repairable), they had Kuala Lampur, and yes they had Singapore. The supplies they positioned in Truk and Rabaul weren't there before the war, they had the ability to move logistics. They weren't bereft of shipping either and the situation with US torpedoes meant that it would still be a while after Midway before American submarines were making any kind of real dent in their mercantile fleet, especially considering how far from their supply lines they would be forced to operate, with most of the Pacific bases knocked out. I assume they would be relying on British bases in India and / or Australia but that is a pretty long haul.

IJN Operations in the Indian Ocean could probably be maintained with 1 or 2 carrier groups most of the time, they had such a range and quality advantage over the Royal Navy that they didn't need overwhelming odds. The IJA also demonstrated during the conquest of Burma that they could still handle British colonial forces in 1942. If the British made a major effort to challenge them there they could always move more assets in.

So I think if they hadn't been busy with the Yanks, India would have been an inviting and profitable target and Sri Lanka a useful base for Japan.

 

[parsifal]

If the Japanese had won at midway and continued operations geared toward further territorial gains they would have been making a terrible mistake. By the end of April they had just about reached the limits of their logistics such many othe
r advances or commitments were simply going to overload their supply network even further than it already suffered from.

A few exceptions to this generalisation can be made most notably moresby and Milne bay. Such advances were more consolidation than offensive in nature

In reality the Japanese offensive capability had reached its limi by midway. A one sided loss of us carrier capacity would curtail American capability but not affect Japanese offensive capability. A survival of Japanese car divs 1 and 2 would improve Japanese reaction capability that in turn could deliver time to firm up their defences

 

[Kevin J]

For those who think that the IJN could cut Australia off, think again. These are the South Pacific ferry routes.

 

[Shortround6]

I didn't ignore anything, and I think we both know that. You are looking for facts to suit your conclusion instead of the other way around.

Why on earth would I look for facts that don't suit my conclusion?
I haven't seen any facts that don't suit my conclusion. I have seen some conjecture or supposition.
What was the oil production of Java in 1942?
enough to support Japan as it was historically or enough to support various expeditions using tens of thousands of tons of fuel per week.?
WHat was the Japanese transport situation in the summer of 1942? enough to keep the home Islands supplied with imports (pretty much the pre-war goal of the Japanese merchant fleet + foreign hired shipping which tended to disappear in 1942) with how much surplus shipping to support some grand adventures?

The Japanese had ports on Sumatra, they had Rangoon (wrecked by the British during the retreat but repairable), they had Kuala Lampur, and yes they had Singapore

A port is NOT a base. A port might be a base if it has sufficient supplies and repair facilities for what you are trying to do.

The supplies they positioned in Truk and Rabaul weren't there before the war, they had the ability to move logistics.

Well, you may be technically correct in that much of the supplies at Truk and Rabaul were brought there after the war started, depending on exactly when you are talking about

" The Japanese had in fact developed considerable base facilities here before the war, including four separate airfields and storage for 77,200 tons of fuel oil, including a 10,000-ton underground tank and two 33,600-ton above-ground steel tanks (151.883E 7.369N). This was the largest Japanese fuel depot outside the home islands. "
from The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Truk

But your statement gives a rather false impression as how important Truk was to Japanese plans leading up to the war.
The above quote also shows some of the difference between a "port" and a "base"

The IJA also demonstrated during the conquest of Burma that they could still handle British colonial forces in 1942. If the British made a major effort to challenge them there they could always move more assets in.

Yes the Japanese did handle the colonial forces fairly well in Burma. But in Sri Lanka/India the numbers would be much more against the Japanese. Some accounts of the fighting in Burma/Singapore have it a fairly narrow race between the British surrendering and the Japanese running out of supplies. Yet you are proposing a bigger operation 1500 miles further away than Singapore?

I would note that the British torpedoes seemed to work fairly well at this point in the war. I would also note that the British submarine service achieved the 2nd highest kill to loss ratio of any submarine service in WW II. (the Americans were 1st) and that while they had only 3 Subs in the Pacific in Jan of 1942 they had 8 T class boats at Alexandria in Jan of 1942.