The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

[parsifal]

Oh lord!!!!!Another thread heading for the toilet because people are too ignorant to have intelligent debate, too obstinate to try and understand other peoples points of view and too stupid to care.

I'm outta here.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Navy fighter pilots are a superior breed, ha ha, like Eric Brown.

Fanboyism strikes again! While I hold Naval Aviators in high regard, I've seen too many of their foibles to hold with the mythology of supermen. USN Wildcat drivers got their noses bloodied and their tails waxed when they first met the Zero and discovered they had been trained wrong for that adversary. The survivability of their mount allowed enough of them to live long enough to work out new tactics and teamwork and begin to even the score.
Sea Hurricane pilots, fresh from the Atlantic/Med, despite their superior flying skills and their successes "back home" are likely to discover the tactics they're used to and comfortable with leave them vulnerable to this new opponent. AND, their kite is NOT a product of the Grumman Iron Works, and has the shortest legs on the sea, just about guaranteeing they'll enter most fights at a disadvantage.
Maybe if you bring enough of them to the fight to absorb the losses and still put up a credible force you can slow the melting of the snow. Brit CVs were noted for having large air wings, right?
Cheers,
Wes

 

[FLYBOYJ]

WOW.. Welcome Home !!
Hired a lot of Vietnam Vets .. and even a few former WW2 and KW Vets too that were all in technical and engineering fields.
Was interesting reading their resumes who worked on the early Curtis.

Some of VN guys were dangerous Alcoholics, especially after drinking at a bar or Disco.
Pot smokers were ok but along with the alcohol were the serious druggies.
Back then PCP was easily available.. ever hit a person on PCP or Cocaine...they do not go down !
Heroin users are either half asleep or on a withdrawal hangover. Mean but not violent.

Two incidents dealing with a swinging bat another a pistol.
Bat swinger wore himself out quickly but the gun one got interesting when he put it to his neck.
For some reason yelled out before you do that .. do you want a beer?
Not kidding he put the gun down, gave him the beer and got him some breakfast !

Got hurt getting them to calm down, or put them down, bail out of jail or hospital, got them some food, get them into a motel before police arrested them.
Learned quite quickly who fought or seriously exposed to the field like a Medic and who those that boasted they went to Vietnam.

Things I learned... do not patronize, do not talk about the war, let them talk.
When they drink do not take your eye off them !

Most of the VN Combat guys are dead from Agent Orange and other chem/bio war crap.
Few were my close friends an one shot himself after playing Tennis.

New guys from Iraq and Afghanistan I never say "thank you for your service. !"
To some that is Cringe Worthy and just want to walk away quietly.

Just better to just say welcome home !

Dan

You're ranting like a delusional idiot, please stay on topic or go away

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the C-47/C-46 and were there any competitors.

Passenger but eventually both. For the extra it could carry it still wasn't as cost effective as the C-47/DC-3. I've also read somewhere that Douglas had better product support and a better supply chain.

Well, the post war period covers a few years

Convair delivered their 100th Convair 240 in Jan 1949.
According to one source they could cruise at 291mph at 16,000ft using 67% power (178 gallons an hour)

The ex C-46s were cruising at 215-225mph at 10,000ft using 180-190 gallons an hour (60-67% power).

They could obviously cruise a bit slower and burn less fuel but the Convair was going to go over 25% further on the same fuel.

A converted C-54 or new build DC-4 was supposed to cruise at 239mph (75% power) at 10,000ft using 225 gallons an hour.

A pre war DC-3 with P & W GR-1830 S1CG engines (1200hp for take-off and 1050hp max continuous at 7500ft) was supposed to cruise at 204mph at 7500ft and burn 105 gallons and hour doing it at 75% power.

I would note that Douglas did a lot of refurbishing of the C-54s themselves while it seems independent companies did most of the conversion/recertifying work on the Curtiss aircraft.


What was available when and what prices could influence things but the C-46 didn't have good operating economics unless fully loaded.

figures are from Joseph Juptner's series "U.S. Civil aircraft and could well disagree with what is in manuals.

 

[michael rauls]

Imho, the allies win the war even if they lose at Midway and El Alamein IF they are willing to absorb the loses of an even more costly war and prosecute it to the end.
My reasoning is that as Schweik pointed out the Axis powers were successful in Blitzkrieg type attacks but were conversely at a disadvantage in a war of attrition. I would say due to industrial capacity and raw manpower amongst other things.
This means that unless the Axis powers are able to take and occupy at least one( and I would argue two) of the major allied powers homelands the war will nescesarily evolve into a war of attrition which the allies will certainly win given they are willing to bear the cost and continue to fight until unconditional surrender.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Getting back to the C-47/C-46 and were there any competitors.




Well, the post war period covers a few years

Convair delivered their 100th Convair 240 in Jan 1949.
According to one source they could cruise at 291mph at 16,000ft using 67% power (178 gallons an hour)

The ex C-46s were cruising at 215-225mph at 10,000ft using 180-190 gallons an hour (60-67% power).

They could obviously cruise a bit slower and burn less fuel but the Convair was going to go over 25% further on the same fuel.

A converted C-54 or new build DC-4 was supposed to cruise at 239mph (75% power) at 10,000ft using 225 gallons an hour.

A pre war DC-3 with P & W GR-1830 S1CG engines (1200hp for take-off and 1050hp max continuous at 7500ft) was supposed to cruise at 204mph at 7500ft and burn 105 gallons and hour doing it at 75% power.

I would note that Douglas did a lot of refurbishing of the C-54s themselves while it seems independent companies did most of the conversion/recertifying work on the Curtiss aircraft.


What was available when and what prices could influence things but the C-46 didn't have good operating economics unless fully loaded.

figures are from Joseph Juptner's series "U.S. Civil aircraft and could well disagree with what is in manuals.

At the end of the day, the DC-3 out lasted all of them and I think your numbers solidify that. The DC-3 had it's niche, almost like the way the 737 is today.

 

[michael rauls]

At the end of the day, the DC-3 out lasted all of them and I think your number solidify that. The DC-3 had it's niche, almost like the way the 737 is today.

It's really amazing, the lifespan of the C47/Dc3. Still occasionally see one used for transport to this day. I'll be watching a show on something off the beaten path in say Alaska of Africa and there's a C47 moving people and equipment.

 

[Dan Fahey]

You're ranting like a delusional idiot, please stay on topic or go away

Really?

 

[Kevin J]

Fanboyism strikes again! While I hold Naval Aviators in high regard, I've seen too many of their foibles to hold with the mythology of supermen. USN Wildcat drivers got their noses bloodied and their tails waxed when they first met the Zero and discovered they had been trained wrong for that adversary. The survivability of their mount allowed enough of them to live long enough to work out new tactics and teamwork and begin to even the score.
Sea Hurricane pilots, fresh from the Atlantic/Med, despite their superior flying skills and their successes "back home" are likely to discover the tactics they're used to and comfortable with leave them vulnerable to this new opponent. AND, their kite is NOT a product of the Grumman Iron Works, and has the shortest legs on the sea, just about guaranteeing they'll enter most fights at a disadvantage.
Maybe if you bring enough of them to the fight to absorb the losses and still put up a credible force you can slow the melting of the snow. Brit CVs were noted for having large air wings, right?
Cheers,
Wes

Okay, our Admiral Somerville knew that we would be licked in a daytime confrontation, but hey if you're intercepting incoming bombers its firepower and dive speed that matters, even the Fulmar had that. IIRC navy pilots do get a lot more training than their land based contemporaries.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Really?

Yes, please listen to the advice people are giving you.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Really?

REALLY!

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

WOW.. Welcome Home !!
Hired a lot of Vietnam Vets .. and even a few former WW2 and KW Vets too that were all in technical and engineering fields.
Was interesting reading their resumes who worked on the early Curtis.

Some of VN guys were dangerous Alcoholics, especially after drinking at a bar or Disco.
Pot smokers were ok but along with the alcohol were the serious druggies.
Back then PCP was easily available.. ever hit a person on PCP or Cocaine...they do not go down !
Heroin users are either half asleep or on a withdrawal hangover. Mean but not violent.

Two incidents dealing with a swinging bat another a pistol.
Bat swinger wore himself out quickly but the gun one got interesting when he put it to his neck.
For some reason yelled out before you do that .. do you want a beer?
Not kidding he put the gun down, gave him the beer and got him some breakfast !

Got hurt getting them to calm down, or put them down, bail out of jail or hospital, got them some food, get them into a motel before police arrested them.
Learned quite quickly who fought or seriously exposed to the field like a Medic and who those that boasted they went to Vietnam.

Things I learned... do not patronize, do not talk about the war, let them talk.
When they drink do not take your eye off them !

Most of the VN Combat guys are dead from Agent Orange and other chem/bio war crap.
Few were my close friends an one shot himself after playing Tennis.

New guys from Iraq and Afghanistan I never say "thank you for your service. !"
To some that is Cringe Worthy and just want to walk away quietly.

Just better to just say welcome home !

Dan

What does any of this have to do with the topic anyhow?

 

[pinsog]

I have the utmost respect for the British Royal navy, but the idea of their carriers in mid 1942 being able to repel an attack from Hiryu, Soryu, Kaga and Akagi is fantasy at best. This doesn't even take into account full aircraft strength (the air groups were not at full strength for Midway) much less the repaired Shokakau and Zuikaku with full strength air groups.

Lets assume that there is no secret nighttime ambush by the british, both sides are spotted by recon aircraft at say 400 miles. The Japanese first strike on Midway was about half their strength. 36 Kates, 36 Vals and 36 Zeros. They had about the same number and type of aircraft in reserve for the 2nd strike armed for shipping. It is my belief that had the US carrier force been spotted the night before, that the first strike intended for Midway, rearmed with torpedoes, would have been enough to sink or damage all 3 US carriers, the follow up strike finishing off any cripples.

Does anyone here actually think that 3-5 British carriers with aircraft compliments of 35-45 aircraft could have repelled an attack of 36 Kates, 36 Vals and 36 Zeros? What about the 2nd wave? What if they all came at once, 72 Kates, 72 Vals and 72 Zeros?
How many of the 35-45 aircraft on board are fighters? What are they Wildcats? Sea Hurricanes? Fulmars?

The Japanese had the ability to stand off beyond the range of most allied single engine aircraft and essentially pummel the British until their own magazines were empty of torpedoes and bombs and then retire. The Royal Navy would have been decimated

 

[pinsog]

If the US had been crushed at Midway, how would the war have changed?

Might depend on how bad Midway went. If the Japanese had ambushed the US carriers it might have been 3-0 for Japan. If the air groups had passed each other in the air it might have been 3-3 with only the Hiryu surviving. Shattered Sword lays out a pretty reasonable plan that Japan could not have taken Midway even if they sunk the US carriers, but for arguments sake, lets say they did.

Japan could not have taken Hawaii. They simply didn't have the sealift capacity nor the equipment.

30 days after Pearl Harbor, Hawaii had more planes than before the attack. If I was in charge, Wasp and Saratoga and Ranger would simply turn into aircraft ferries. All they do is run between California and Hawaii ferrying aircraft. All ships larger than destroyers are pulled back to the West Coast. Destroyers and aircraft form a safe corridor from submarines for ships to travel in. Search aircraft such as B17's and Catalinas keep an eye out for the Japanese fleet carriers trying for another raid. With no fleet carriers to supply, all Wildcats and other carrier planes are stockpiled on Hawaii. With several hundred fighters and carrier bombers now on Hawaii, it is impregnable.

Please remember that according to Shattered Sword, the Japanese lost about 20% of the attack force on the first, and only, raid on Midway Island. How many would they lose if they tried a second Pearl Harbor raid against an unsinkable island with 300 or more P40's, Wildcats, P38's and P39's that are in the air at 20,000 feet waiting on them?


The only other thing that matters is keeping the convoy lines open to Britain and Russia. Nothing changes the war of attrition on the eastern front as Soviet forces grind the Germans down.

How ever the war goes in the Pacific is probably irrelevant, even if we didn't sink a single Japanese carrier up until early August 1945 when a B29 flies over the Japanese version of the 3rd fleet and drops a nuke in the middle of the carrier force in the middle of the day, followed a few hours later by a second B29 dropping a 2nd nuke onto the battered Japanese fleet, followed up by the US Navy launching a massive raid to polish off the cripples

 

[Graeme]

What was available when and what prices could influence things but the C-46 didn't have good operating economics unless fully loaded.

A British source from the late 50's lists the typical total operating cost for the DC-3 at £85 per hour and £145 per hour for the C-46.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

A British source from the late 50's lists the typical total operating cost for the DC-3 at £85 per hour and £145 per hour for the C-46.

That sounds pretty decisive, even without considering that the Three was a sweetheart to fly and maintain, devoid of quirks and weirdnesses, while the Commando I've heard described, by some who've flown both, as "a cantankerous bastard".
If you were stuck in South Florida in the early 70s, "Cockroach Corner" at Miami International was a great place to spend the odd afternoon. A veritable museum of air transport history, all converted to marginal, shoestring, airfreight operations. The "collection" was heavily laced with obsolete foreign airliners converted to freighters, especially British and French.
Once they figured out you weren't a cop or a fed, they would fill your head with tales of daring-do and misfortune.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[parsifal]

In analysing Midway, the important things to remember are the vastly contrasting limitations affecting the USN and the IJN



For the USN the critical constraint affecting their ability for force projection was their carrier fleetin 1942. After 1943, this was no longer a constraint, but in 1942, it was the number of sea billets that affected US capabilities, particularly thir offensive capabilities. They simply did not have enough of them and replacements were some distance away. Moreover the worldwide commitments at the end of 1942 made this situation even more problematic.

Aircraft losses were not really a problem for the US. They could afford to lose aircraft and replace them very quickly. But without carriers the options available to the Allies were very limited. If the US could not launch successful attacks into the Pacific they would give the Japanese time to fortify, and more importantly stockpile resources and war materiel, USN subs held at arms length would be less effective at sinking ships. The Japanese reasoned that keeping the USN off balance would give their forces a fighting chance of blunting the inevitable US counterattack. It was an unrealistic strategy, but may have worked had the germans been able to bring Russia to its knees, thus forcing a greater allocation of resources by the US to the ETO and more importantly a greater diversion of manpower away from US production bases to increased military manpower. A german victory in the east would likely cause more steel allocations and dockyard capacity to merchant shipping and away from naval construction. A greater proportion of new tonnage would have to be diverted to the Atlantic, which would tend to slow and restrict deployments into the PTO. The americans might have their 100000 a/c, but they would not be able to deploy them as easily to foreign fields. Since the shipping demands in the PTO were roughly 10x that per man in the ETO it would be the PTO that would suffer cutbacks well before the ETO.

Ive said this before, and it has proven to be intensely unpopular, but the loss of the four IJN flat tops at Midway was not a critical setback for them. Their main constraint was fully trained air crew, a problem which they were never able to solve. For the Japanese to win at midway, they had to destroy at least two enemy carriers and lose less than 100 aircrew doing that…..and probably less than that even. The Number of IJN carriers that could be lost could be as many as four fleet carriers and still not materially affect their force projection abilities

Midway was a defeat for the Japanese because they lost four flat tops, 107 highly trained aircrew and failed to neutralise the USN carriers . They lost stuff for nothing in other words.

 

[Conslaw]

In analysing Midway, the important things to remember are the vastly contrasting limitations affecting the USN and the IJN



For the USN the critical constraint affecting their ability for force projection was their carrier fleetin 1942. After 1943, this was no longer a constraint, but in 1942, it was the number of sea billets that affected US capabilities, particularly thir offensive capabilities. They simply did not have enough of them and replacements were some distance away. Moreover the worldwide commitments at the end of 1942 made this situation even more problematic.

Aircraft losses were not really a problem for the US. They could afford to lose aircraft and replace them very quickly. But without carriers the options available to the Allies were very limited. If the US could not launch successful attacks into the Pacific they would give the Japanese time to fortify, and more importantly stockpile resources and war materiel, USN subs held at arms length would be less effective at sinking ships. The Japanese reasoned that keeping the USN off balance would give their forces a fighting chance of blunting the inevitable US counterattack. It was an unrealistic strategy, but may have worked had the germans been able to bring Russia to its knees, thus forcing a greater allocation of resources by the US to the ETO and more importantly a greater diversion of manpower away from US production bases to increased military manpower. A german victory in the east would likely cause more steel allocations and dockyard capacity to merchant shipping and away from naval construction. A greater proportion of new tonnage would have to be diverted to the Atlantic, which would tend to slow and restrict deployments into the PTO. The americans might have their 100000 a/c, but they would not be able to deploy them as easily to foreign fields. Since the shipping demands in the PTO were roughly 10x that per man in the ETO it would be the PTO that would suffer cutbacks well before the ETO.

Ive said this before, and it has proven to be intensely unpopular, but the loss of the four IJN flat tops at Midway was not a critical setback for them. Their main constraint was fully trained air crew, a problem which they were never able to solve. For the Japanese to win at midway, they had to destroy at least two enemy carriers and lose less than 100 aircrew doing that…..and probably less than that even. The Number of IJN carriers that could be lost could be as many as four fleet carriers and still not materially affect their force projection abilities

Midway was a defeat for the Japanese because they lost four flat tops, 107 highly trained aircrew and failed to neutralise the USN carriers . They lost stuff for nothing in other words.

Assuming Japan had more carriers after May 1942, they would have been able to train more aircrew - not enough - but more. I think Midway was in the long run almost irrelevant to the ultimate outcome of the war because the US had a critical bath to victory from 1943 to 1945 that didn't depend on the outcome of any previous battles. The US with its submarines, new fast carriers and later B-29s could have strangled Japan in 1945 even if they lost all three carriers at Midway. WIth the new ships and planes that came online in 1943-1944, the Americans could have marched across the central Pacific with overwhelming force., taking the Marshalls and Marianas at pretty much the same time that they actually did. They could havve even sped up things by taking Iwo Jima before or instead of the Phillipines in October 1944. The Americans could have gone to Okinawa next, again bypassing thePhillipines., or they could have gone to the Phillipines at that point.

The American capture of Ulithi without a fight showed how problematic it was for Japan to attempt to defend the Pacific using static defenses on island strongholds. The strongholds could just be bypassed, and airfields and facilities could be built on undeveloped islands.

 

[Schweik]

I'm not sure Japan would have been sitting on their hands for two years if the US had been beaten back during Midway. See my earlier post about raids into the Indian Ocean.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The American capture of Ulithi without a fight showed how problematic it was for Japan to attempt to defend the Pacific using static defenses on island strongholds.

No, the defense of island strongholds would depend on fast carrier forces to attack the invading armada.

I'm not sure Japan would have been sitting on their hands for two years if the US had been beaten back during Midway.

Of course not, with their carrier forces intact and ours gone, they would be able to interdict supplies to Australia, take New Guinea, neutralize Hawaii, and push our forward bases back to California. A few strategically placed bombs on the Gatun Locks would make interocean transfers into lengthy hazardous endeavors. This makes submarine ops against the Empire's shipping problematical, and where you going to launch your B29s from now? With the Japanese in Dutch Harbor, Alaska is out, and China was always a shaky proposition, especially if the Japanese get themselves established on the Indian subcontinent.
With their empire secure, and their supplies of raw materials unthreatened, the Japanese could concentrate on producing the next generation of ships and aircraft to make our fight back even more of a challenge.
Perhaps, with Yamamoto still alive, they might even recognize the need for the philosophical change from a war of blitzkrieg conquest to a war of attrition, and make the necessary changes in strategy, logistics, and training to bring it about. OTOH, with their cultural affinity for the "single decisive blow" fighting style of the Samurai, that might be too radical a change in a highly conservative society and culture.
Cheers,
Wes