Kevin J
Banned
More likely be would have incriminated Hirohito.
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General Yamashita Tomoyuki, "the Tiger of Malaya" was an anomaly in the Japanese military, as a non samurai with enlisted experience who rose to high rank in a class conscious institution. He was such a brilliant leader and tactician that he scared MacArthur (who was responsible for post-war governance of Japan) into executing him through a "kangaroo court" proceeding in the Philippines outside of the regular war criminal trial system. Mac didn't trust the trial system to get rid of him, and feared him as potential political dynamite if he ever got back to Japan.
Cheers,
Wes
As others have mentioned, the Japanese industry in the 1930's was producing world-class equipment. Their warships, aircraft and vehicles were certainly up to the task but once the war started and their raw material and skilled labor base started dwindling, their equipment quality started to decline. We can also make a similar comparison to Germany in this respect, too.My understanding of the Japanese post-War analysis for their failure was that their equipment lacked sufficient quality. My proof, Japanese automotive and electronic goods.
Greetings Navalwarrior and thank you for your reply,Resp:
Preparing for an offense is a far cry from knowing an attack was about to occur. Japan instigated a plan of attack after a German merchant raider boarded an Austrialian commercial vessel carrying a British assessment of Singapore defenses, noting the British's lack of advanced fighters and inadequate forces/equipment to defend an attack from inland. 6 mos from the assessment seizure Yamamoto set into motion the attack on Pearl Harbor. His prior assessment was that the two Allied forces were too much for Japan to take on, but when he found out that Singapore's defenses were weak, he ordered an attack plan be set in motion.
As others have mentioned, the Japanese industry in the 1930's was producing world-class equipment. Their warships, aircraft and vehicles were certainly up to the task but once the war started and their raw material and skilled labor base started dwindling, their equipment quality started to decline. We can also make a similar comparison to Germany in this respect, too.
Not sure how many people in the forum might recall this, but in the late 60's and early 70's, there was a saying to the effect that they may have lost WWII, but they're having their revenge with the global market because their automobiles and electronics were displacing American and European products at an alarming rate. You can't do that with garbage...
I believe the main Japanese strategic error was starting a war with a country that has double the population and a material production advantage that is off the charts. As I understand it, the Willow Run factory was building more B24's than the entire Japanese air industry for all types of aircraft combined. The USA could probably have established air superiority over the Japanese home islands using B24's alone! (Assuming a 1 to 1 loss ratio of B24 to Japanese fighters) This was also back before the USA developed 'rules of engagement', 'fair fight', 'collateral damage' and other war losing catch phrases. Unless the Japanese developed nukes the war was lost for them the very instant they started it.The Japanese kit was first rate, they made a strategic error to do with attrition as some others have mentioned, the Germans basically made a similar error.
When you consider just two generations earlier they were still walking around with Samurai swords, it's really astonishing.
I believe the main Japanese strategic error was starting a war with a country that has double the population and a material production advantage that is off the charts.
As I understand it, the Willow Run factory was building more B24's than the entire Japanese air industry for all types of aircraft combined. The USA could probably have established air superiority over the Japanese home islands using B24's alone! (Assuming a 1 to 1 loss ratio of B24 to Japanese fighters) This was also back before the USA developed 'rules of engagement', 'fair fight', 'collateral damage' and other war losing catch phrases. Unless the Japanese developed nukes the war was lost for them the very instant they started it.
Much has been written that Germany lost because they built a few super tanks, ships planes etc instead of a lot of 'good enough' equipment like the Sherman and T34. I don't agree with that, you can't win a war of attrition with equal equipment when your enemies out produce you 50 to 1. Combining USA, USSR and British production against Germany and they never had a chance.
There were many rules and restrictions in the Korean War: can't bomb MIG15 bases, can't pursue MIG15 across border, can't bomb bridges Chinese troops were using to cross into Korea, can't bomb Chinese troops massing in ManchuriaIt's debatable whether they really had a choice. Have you ever listened to Dan Carlin's series on the Japanese in WW2? It's pretty eye-opening.
I'm not sure 'fair fight' etc. rules are always the problem - we used an absolutely no holds barred strategy against North Korea and we still didn't win that war, despite apparently destroying every single building in the country. We just sent them underground.
Key to winning a war is knowing what you are fighting for to begin with.
I agree a qualitative edge was needed by both the Japanese and the Germans, and they both demonstrated how effective that cold be in an age of rapidly advancing technological development. But neither Germany or Japan prepared for an intermediate phase between (to use in a general and not specific sense) "Blitzkrieg" and full attrition warfare.
With regard to fighters, both had excellent but also seriously flawed designs - the German Bf 109 and later Fw 190, the Japanese A6M and Ki43. The Bf 109 was crippled by a lack of range, the A6M by a lack of armor etc.. Both were excellent, war-winning designs in 1941. By 1943 though both were showing their age a bit. The Bf 109 was still a good interceptor and short range air superiority fighter, but they really needed a longer ranged fighter and they were losing their edge against the competition in general. The Fw 190 fixed that for a while, but it too fell behind the competition (or at least, didn't remain decisively ahead).
The A6M was still a good carrier fighter but they really needed something more robust, higher flying and faster both for use as interceptors and for the attrition campaigns going on in the Islands. Ki-43 while very good, was not ideal for attrition warfare and was fairly useless against high altitude bombers.
Neither country fielded significant new fighters in 1942 or 1943. Only incremental improvements or what amounted to failed projects. The Germans could have had what they needed with the Jets, but for complex reasons that didn't work out. If it had been available earlier, things could have been seriously strained for the Allies.
One problem the Germans had was a lack of certain rare metals and elements needed to make jet engines. Interestingly the Japanese had many of these materials, but had no easy way to get them to Germany. The I-53 submarine, which was sunk by the Americans, contained 9.8 tons of molybdenum, 11 tons of tungsten which would have been helpful in the German war-effort. Molybdenum in particular was one of the rare elements needed to mass produce the Jumo 004 engine. If that sub and a bunch like it had been able to make it to Germany on a routine basis perhaps again, things could have been different.
Japanese submarine I-52 (1942) - Wikipedia
I think the other major Strategic errors made by the main Axis powers was being overly aggressive. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor probably wasn't necessary - a 24 hour warning probably would not have led to a Japanese defeat IMO (though that could be a good debate. The Germans with their mass-murder program and extermination campaigns in the East made it hard to find middle ground to put it mildly. Thus they instigated a very risky policy that ultimately led to doom. If it had been more like the wars of the earlier pre-industrial eras they may well have ended with Japan and / or Germany expanding their power substantially over the long run.
Political dynamite of the worst kind. Keeping Hirohito free of blame was the key to a peaceful occupation. You can bomb 'em you can starve 'em, you can burn 'em out, just don't trample on their living deity, the core of their national identity. MacArthur was an old "Asia hand" and understood this intrinsically.More likely be would have incriminated Hirohito.
As Yamamoto Isoroku so famously pointed out.the war was lost for them the very instant they started it.
There were many rules and restrictions in the Korean War: can't bomb MIG15 bases, can't pursue MIG15 across border, can't bomb bridges Chinese troops were using to cross into Korea, can't bomb Chinese troops massing in Manchuria
My point is that if the war was Total War, as in a fight to the death, they couldn't win. But if it's the sort of territorial / zone of influence war as took place routinely in the Early Modern period (or even WW I) or later in the Cold War, i.e. both fights fight until a new equilibrium is reached and fighting becomes too expensive to continue, then they the Japanese (and the Germans) could have succeeded. The Japanese decision to attack by surprise, and the German ethnic cleansing etc., made Total War a guarantee.
And despite seriously considering it, Truman ultimately wouldn't let LeMay and MacArthur nuke China.
Read up on the bombing Campaign on North Korea if you aren't familiar with it, it's rather eye-opening. All the extreme measures the US was held back from in Vietnam were taken. It didn't win us the war but it certainly wrecked that country and contributed to the kind of regime they have today:
Bombing of North Korea 1950-1953 - Wikipedia
Yes there is always some limit as a war keeps escalating wider and wider, in this case the limit being not wanting to directly get into a war with the Soviets and / or a nuclear war. I don't think that was so much some kind of postmodern timidity as very pragmatic realpolitik. But considering that the war went all the way down to the South of the country and then balanced back out at the 38th Parallel bombing on the Chinese border alone probably wouldn't have made that difference. We had all the bridges from the Taedong river to Busan to bomb.
WW III was (and is) extremely high stakes, which the US leadership at that time decided Korea wasn't worth. Pulling back just from that brink of nuking China is not some hippy move. Maybe it's just a matter of not wanting to cross the proverbial Rubicon like Japan or Germany did in WW II (and possibly pay the same gruesome price).
Even in WW II we didn't use chemical or biological weapons. War almost always has some limits. When it doesn't sometimes there is a steep price to pay.
And despite seriously considering it, Truman ultimately wouldn't let LeMay and MacArthur nuke China.
Read up on the bombing Campaign on North Korea if you aren't familiar with it, it's rather eye-opening. All the extreme measures the US was held back from in Vietnam were taken. It didn't win us the war but it certainly wrecked that country and contributed to the kind of regime they have today:
Bombing of North Korea 1950-1953 - Wikipedia
Yes there is always some limit as a war keeps escalating wider and wider, in this case the limit being not wanting to directly get into a war with the Soviets and / or a nuclear war. I don't think that was so much some kind of postmodern timidity as very pragmatic realpolitik. But considering that the war went all the way down to the South of the country and then balanced back out at the 38th Parallel bombing on the Chinese border alone probably wouldn't have made that difference. We had all the bridges from the Taedong river to Busan to bomb.
WW III was (and is) extremely high stakes, which the US leadership at that time decided Korea wasn't worth. Pulling back just from that brink of nuking China is not some hippy move. Maybe it's just a matter of not wanting to cross the proverbial Rubicon like Japan or Germany did in WW II (and possibly pay the same gruesome price).
Even in WW II we didn't use chemical or biological weapons. War almost always has some limits. When it doesn't sometimes there is a steep price to pay.
Huge can of worms ...
Whole new thread for this discussion
Foregone conclusion. We couldn't have manufactured ordnance fast enough to keep up with Chinese demographics.The real question would be if we ran out of ordinance before China ran out of people.
A couple of points:
1. Please explain how WW1 was NOT a fight to the death? Clearly, it wasn't from the US perspective but the Europiean powers would likely disagree with that assessment.
2. The Japanese did not decide to attack by surprise. It was a screw-up due to decoding issues.
Wars are not a fight "to the death" unconditional surrender is all they are fought for, no one advocates killing every man, woman and child of their enemy, if they did they would certainly lose because you make a fanatical enemy of everyone who isn't your closest friend. This is actually what the Nazis and followers of Tojo did and both lost.A couple of points:
1. Please explain how WW1 was NOT a fight to the death? Clearly, it wasn't from the US perspective but the Europiean powers would likely disagree with that assessment.
2. The Japanese did not decide to attack by surprise. It was a screw-up due to decoding issues.
Which wars were fought to "the death" in any era in Europe?Wars to unconditional surrender are also pretty rare historically, at least in Europe.