The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

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Very true. The SBDs were part of a weapons system of the Carrier Wing with F4-Fs, SBD, and TBDs. Add to that the Naval Aviators in '42 who I would argue were some of the best pilots of the War. The men John Lundstrom called "the First Team" in his two books.
 
I have to say that the C-47 was indeed the backbone of the Allied effort - however, it was the fighters that cleared the path for them to be effective.
They didn't really turn the tide of war, they were able to do what they did after the skies were cleared of the enemy - in otherwords, after the tide had turned.

A classic example (or two) of what happens when transports are operating in contested airspace would be the Ju52/M3 and Me323 massacres in the MTO and again during the airlift at Stalingrad where the Luftwaffe threw everything into the effort from He111 and Ju88 bombers to Si204 trainers piloted by school instructors.
Without air supremacy, they were royally screwed.
 
I have two nominees.

firstly, the C-47. In my opinion it probably did more to influence the outcome of the war on so many theatres of operation.....Burma, Manchuria, new guinea, Italy, NW Europe, to name just a few.

secondly the IL-2. Despite its horrendous losses and disdain we in the wwest tend to view it, it probably did more than any other attack plane, or fighter due to the impact it had on the eastern front.

Least important are any and all the fighters of any nation. They were needed and they were important, but nowhere can it be said that they won the war, or even averted defeat. The nearest that this was achieved was probably Phil sea, but even if the IJN had broken through and a surface battle ensued, the Japanese fleet was so outclassed by that stage I think they would have lost in any case.

I don't agree with the B-29 argument. The dropping of the a-bombs had far less effect influencing the Japanese to surrender than Americans believe . It had an effect, but not critical. The invasion of Manchuria by the red army was more important as an influence to the Japanese surrender. It did lead to the Japanese acceding or forfeiting one of their last two conditions for surrender, namely that the home islands not be occupied, the other being that the emperor be respected. Even here, it is arguable that the Japanese gave up their resistance to being occupied solely because of the bomb being dropped. some believed, that with the 2.5 million Russians now in the war, the Japanese at last realized that the jig was up.

The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan ... Stalin Did
 
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What Joe, Mike and Dave said about the C-47, with a special mention of the B-29 and its future impact, in Soviet use and as a nuclear bomber. (tee hee)
 
Maybe it was not aircraft that was built but aircraft that were not built that turned the tide of war.
 

I agree, the jig was up, but what those 2 bombs did was to give the Japanese an excuse to surrender which they would never have had if the Americans hadn't dropped them. My view is that dropping the bombs was necessary to end the war with Japan because it gave them a face saving method for surrendering.
 


Agree with most of your comments but I have one exception to the "fighters were useless" rule. I'd present the Hurricane during the BoB as that exception. I don't want to get into (yet) another "would Operation Sea Lion succeed" discussion, but I think it's pretty self-evident that if Fighter Command had failed, then Churchill's government would have fallen and potentially replaced with a more supine alternative that may have taken Britain out of the war. No Britain means no success in North Africa, no containment (and ultimately invasion) of Italy and no D-Day. Now I will accept there are a lot of "probables" and "maybes" in that train of thought...but it's a potential course of action that's a lot more realistic than Germany having a nuclear bomber to attack America in 1946.

All that being said, the Hurri simply doesn't match up to the C-47...or several other types mentioned in this thread to-date.
 
parsifal said:
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Least important are any and all the fighters of any nation. They were needed and they were important, but nowhere can it be said that they won the war, or even averted defeat.
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Click to expand...

Hurricanes and Spitfires were crucial in winning Battle of Britain, unlike the Wellingtons, Battles or Blenheims.
 
While fighters may not have "won" the war, there was an awful lot that went on because fighters were there.

The light and medium bombers of the desert air force would have been much less effective without fighter escort.

I would note that even the vaunted IL-2 needed fighter escorts if it was to provide the close support it did without prohibitive losses.

Unescorted IL-2 operations on average didn't do so well.
 
Fighters were important, but not tide turning, even in the Battle of Britain. Sure fighters were needed by all the combatants, but they did not win any battles on their own, even for the BoB.

BoB was more lost by the LW over being won by FC. Moreover, deployment of Fighters to the SE was more about making a statement that the LW was getting nowhere, rather than any operational necessity to keep them there. Further, from the German perspective, the air battle in the south east was but a part of the overall strategy against Britain in the Summer 1940. The German goals were primarily to force Britain to seek terms of surrender. That was to be achieved by a cross channel attack. The German goals and the British need thwart them were demonstrably more important than the British objectives of essentially "blowing raspberries" along the Kentish coastline.

A precursor to that cross channel operation was the winning of air superiority over the SE coastline. The amphibious operation could certainly not progress without air superiority, but it is doubtful that even with air superiority, it could be successful.

The obvious alternative if German air force was able to force a withdrawal from the south east would be to deploy RAF assets to the north of London. This would ensure that the LW would at best achieve air parity over the South East, and that simply was not enough to secure success for the overall operation to which the air operations were linked. All Britain had to do was remain present over the battlefield, as opposed to being in it much less winning complete dominance over it.

The critical problem for the LW was the equipment failures, and inadequate logistics and re-supply. The Germans were never going to win air superiority in 1940 with a mix of vulnerable bombers and a short legged fighter, and all in too few numbers to overwhelm the British. As the Americans and BC found in 1944-5, winning control of the skies did not come cheap, and fighters in that campaign whilst critical in the conduct of operations, were not critical in the strategic objective of attritioning the LW out of the equation. During 1944, LW overall, lost well in excess of 30000 airframes. Fighters are believed to have been directly responsible for the loss of maybe 5000 of those losses. Overwhelmingly German losses were non-combat related. Many were burnt or simply abandoned due to a lack of fuel. Many were lost in accidents. It was the bombers and the ground attack aircraft that did the heavy lifting to achieve those results. Fighters were necessary, but more important in maintaining that unrelenting pressure was logistics and re-supply. Transport command was more important in that respect.

Note that I am not claiming that fighters were not required. They most certainly were to achieve operational outcomes they were needed, Operational success however does not turn the tide of war. We are talking about the most important aircraft that caused a turning point in the war. Tide turning means winning your objectives. Fighters, don't win objectives. There is not one example in WWII where aircraft alone won a battle completely on their own. Those that influenced ground battles, either by ground attack, logistic support, or perhaps even liaison or battlefield reconnaissance were more influential and tide turning influences over fighters. Fighters were in fact the least important factor turning the tide and winning strategic objectives.
 
I don't want to get into an argument over this but I fundamentally disagree with many of your statements. IMHO providing air defence up-threat of London was a vital strategic need and a key centre of gravity for the UK. Moving aircraft to the north of London isn't some arbitrary tactical withdrawal to some obscure grid reference. It's leaving the capital entirely exposed...or at least it would have been perceived as such by the civilians in the firing line. Under those circumstances, a change of government was almost inevitable...with the real risk that the strategic battle, that of keeping Britain in the fight, would have been lost.

Anyhoo...we can agree to disagree. We should probably get back to other aircraft that have a better claim to the subject of the thread.
 


This is quite true but then there are very few battles indeed where one type of weapon or unit won completely on their own. No tank (type) won a battle completely on it's own. NO artillery piece (25pdr, 105mm how, 155mm etc) won a battle completely on it's own. Few, if any ships won a battle completely on their own unless it was more of a one on one duel.

These weapons were all part of a team or group effort. We can say that fighters (in general) could not affect a land or sea battle with their own weapons to any great extent. But by using their weapons they could allow friendly bombers, or recon aircraft to operate and influence a battle to bigger degree, they could also deny the enemy the ability to use his bober and recon aircraft with as much freedom as he could wish and thus deny the enemy opportunities to influence the battle.
 
Coral Sea and Midway, as well as Phil Sea and Pearl Harbour, even the attacks on Force Z were fought with airpower. But they were not decided purely by air power alone. If airpower was the sole determinant, the Japanese would have won at both Coral Sea and Midway. The Americans should have defeated the IJN at Pearl and the air groups used in the attacks on force Z should have suffered far heavier losses than they did.

There were other factors at work that made each of these battles quite different to the norm

I will concede however, that these represent examples of battles decided by air power. A battle however, is not a campaign and it takes more than a battle to create a tide turning effect. Midway is often touted as the turning point of the war. Unfortunately it was not. Mounting Japanese losses, of which midway was one event, were the cause of the tide turning in the Pacific. The Japanese did not shelve their offensive intentions after Midway. What forced them onto the defensive, and hence a turning of the tide was the combined effects of midway and the vicious attrition they suffered on guadacanal.

Coral sea was more or less the same. Japan did not abandon her objective of capturing Moresby after coral sea, they merely adjusted their operational plans. Airpower in that situation was successful in influencing operations, but was not a strategic campaign altering event. The change in strategy was a combination of the defeat at sea in coral sea, and the defeat they suffered in the Owen Stanleys. Had the Japanese won coral sea, it is doubtful that their embarked ground force could have succeeded in dislodging the allies from the port anyway. Similar conclusions can be made about Midway. It is doubtful (or at least debateable), that Midway could have been taken with the IJN detachment charged with its capture.

In both cases, the real reasons underscoring the defeats wasn't just airpower. Its far more nuanced than that. A lot of it was the strategic overreach by the Japanese. They faced an unsolvable problem really. On the one hand they had a reviving USN that in the not too distant future would be able to overwhelm the Japanese. In the second instance, the Japanese had stretched their logistics well beyond what was sustainable for them

So, airpower can win battles, but it is harder to argue that they can win campaigns unaided. neither can any of the other machines of war, completely on their own.
 
Perhaps I am missing something here.

In the battle of Coral Sea and again at Midway, the enemies engaged each other solely by aircraft alone and the opposing fleets suffered damage and destruction solely by aircraft alone.

And it was the action of these aircraft that altered the intentions of the fleets - in the case of Coral Sea, the planned invasion of Port Moresby was abandoned and in the case of Midway, the invasion of Midway island was abandoned.

There were no engagements by surface ships or actions by submarines that influenced the course of either battle. The order to abandon the Port Moresby invasion was mainly due to the fact that the Japanese suspected there were more Allied carriers in the area...in otherwords, for the fear of more air attacks.
 
I think the thread went off topic with the B-29.

I think the B-29 was a revolutionary aircraft. A leap in technology for the time. With the Bomb it ended the war. But I don't think it turned the tide. There was no doubt about the outcome of the War in August of 45, it was a matter of when the fighting would end, and how many lives would be lost.
 


In my opinion you are missing something. A single battle does not cause a game changing change in strategy. To be fair no single aircraft type did. Neither did any other system. SR mentioned the same thing. To bring about the game changing change of strategy, the Japanese had to be defeated several times over. Capture of midway was not the end in itself. the strategy was to destroy the USN. the Japanese did not abandon that immediately after midway. Far greater damage was done to that aspiration in the November battleship action off guadacanal, and the mindset that led to that occurred in the 3month meatgrinder that preceded it.

For coral sea, the Japanese objective was the capture of Moresby. Whilst the battle led to the temporary postponement of the operation (which is how the Japanese viewed it at the time), it led to no cancellation of the operation. The Japanese intended to return after the midway operation to finish the job. of course they never did. But even then they would not abandon their strategy, so not even the combined effects of midway AND Coral Sea led to any change of strategy by the Japanese. it would take the combined effects of Midway, Coral sea, Guadacanal and Owen stanleys to induce the Japanese to change strategy, and moreover, for the allies to change their strategy as well.

Aircraft were capable of achieving operational successes. ive already conceded that, and that's what you are saying (though you dont seem to realise it). Strategic change is not one battle, or one operation. strategic change occurs when your overall objectives are forced to change. That didn't happen due to fighters at the BoB, and it didn't happen solely because of coral sea or midway. They were big operational successes, but they were not overwhelming strategic victories 9as is so often touted for them0 because they did not lead to any change in Japanese objectives at the time, or allied objectives either 9well maybe watchtower was made possible I guess)
 
But you stated that "no aircraft decided the outcome of a battle" and I cited two examples that run to the contrary.

To be realistic here, no single aircraft type was able to turn the tide of the war - the "war" being WWII as a whole or by theater. It took a team of aircraft types to inflict losses to the enemy's ability to wage war in kind.

However, in the case of a singular battle, there are elements, either on land or on sea that dictates the outcome of that particular battle. In the case of Coral Sea and Midway, it was the airplane that dictated the terms of the battle.
In the case of Coral Sea, the Japanese plan of invasion was halted - regardless of what they intended in the future, the bottom line is their intentions were stopped by air power alone. It was that instance of air power that altered the outcome.
In the case of Midway, yes the Japanese considered going back, but without airpower (all their carriers were gone) they were at risk from enemy aircraft revisiting them and the prospect of surface contact...so with the odds against them, it was decided not to risk it. So again, regardless of what they intended to do, the outcome was dictated by airpower alone.

And it has been pointed out that the battle of Midway was the turning point of the Pacific war...so that being the case, the aircraft that turned the tide would have to be the Douglas SBD, which inflicted fatal or ultimately fatal blows to the IJN that day and it was teamwork (by all types) that finished the job.
 
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