The idea that the Japanese could wipe out the hard core of the US surface fleet in one day or capture the Philippines in a matter of four months, let alone all the British and Dutch possessions in the Pacific - to take Singapore in a week in spite of the protection of two Battleships of what was supposed to be by far the greatest navy the world had ever seen (both quickly sunk on a single day). And all this in the context of what the Germans had done in Europe. They fought France in trenches for four years in WWI and lost, then in 1940 they take France down in six weeks. This was all unthinkable according to pre-war conventional wisdom. So things were in play, all assumptions and theories about Axis capabilities were suspect, real outcomes were up in the air as far as most people were concerned (including many military planners). I don't think there was so much confidence outside of maybe a few of the senior guys like Marshall.
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war. (2 Viewers)
- Thread starter michael rauls
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buffnut453
Captain
Calling Midway a "stepping stone" is a bit of a stretch. Its only practical use was as a refuelling stop for long-range patrol aircraft and a submarine resupply base. As a launching point for an invasion of Hawaii, it's a non-starter. As for Hawaii, by the middle of 1942, it had been significantly reinforced compared to December 1941. Thus the proposition of invasion was a real long-shot for Japan.
I still don't see how delaying the tipping point of the war by a year would have been "trouble" (apart from the inevitable increase in human losses). The main impact on Japanese shipping was not the US carrier fleet, it was the submarine force. Even with the loss of Midway, the US submarines would still have exacted considerable losses on the Japanese maritime forces, which Japan had to maintain just to resupply all its far-flung outposts.
It's worth remembering that, apart from China, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (and, perhaps, Burma), pretty much every other territory the Japanese took over was a net resource suck. Japan desperately needed raw materials and additional production capacity and yet yet they persisted in invading places that just added more and more materiel and logistical expense which they simply couldn't afford.
This takes us even deeper into speculation but Ok I'll explain what I think is obvious - delaying the tipping point by a year means an extra year for the Axis, and in particular the Germans, to get certain things sorted out. Like say, Jets. Or to win some of those crucial battles in Russia.
The Japanese as well had some critical technologies in development which if they had been able to come to full maturity before they were against the ropes, could have meant trouble.
You may be 100% certain that the Japanese couldn't have for example captured Hawaii, I am not so certain- but the more important fact is that people at that time could not afford to be so sure. If Midway had been lost, yawning vistas of potential disaster would open up that had to be closed before US attention could be focused elsewhere.
The Japanese as well had some critical technologies in development which if they had been able to come to full maturity before they were against the ropes, could have meant trouble.
You may be 100% certain that the Japanese couldn't have for example captured Hawaii, I am not so certain- but the more important fact is that people at that time could not afford to be so sure. If Midway had been lost, yawning vistas of potential disaster would open up that had to be closed before US attention could be focused elsewhere.
buffnut453
Captain
Even with the Germany First strategy, the bulk of American resources went to the Pacific anyhow. As to "take the whole Pacific", that's an impossibility. Again, Japan had outposts that were not mutually supporting. They never came close, at any stage, to "owning" even a substantial part of the Pacific. By the middle of 1942, invading Hawaii is simply a fanciful notion. From where would the invasion forces sail? How combat ready would an invading force be after several days at sea? 'Fraid that's not a viable outcome.
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michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
- 1,679
- Jul 15, 2016
Exactly. Its not so much what we know the capabilities/ possibilities were now. It's what they were starting to look like they might be then.
buffnut453
Captain
The arguments are getting rather hyperbolic. Why would the loss of Midway result in a "yawning vista of potential disaster" when the loss of Wake Island didn't? Is a small coral atoll named Midway really that much more significant than a small coral atoll called Midway? If Midway had been lost, the American people would have shrugged, and carried on. Midway was an inconsequential speck in the middle of the Pacific. It had precious little meaning to the average American.
I'm not suggesting the people at the time knew the war was a foregone conclusion. However, I have yet to see a serious contradiction of the relative strategic positions of Japan and Germany. Yes, Japan could and did cause trouble but even Japanese officers (eg Yamamoto, among others) did not believe Japan could win a protracted war. They gambled on America caving in after Pearl Harbor. As soon as that didn't happen, the writing was on the wall...and the more perceptive Japanese knew it at the time.
Navalwarrior
Staff Sergeant
- 764
- Jun 17, 2018
Exactly. Marshall promoted Eisenhower because of his pre-doctrine on the 'Next War in Europe' and his knowledge of the Pacific from having served under MacArthur. At Marshall's request, Eisenhower flew to Washington, DC to furnish his 'Two Front War Plan.' He told Marshall that every plane, ship and man sent to 'save' Courrigidor would be a waste; we had at the time too little to send too far! Halsey replaced more senior but less aggressive officers. Marshall cornered Gen Pershing when he was a Maj during WWI. Pershing was dissatisfied with his senior officers in preparing their dough boys for combat. After Pershing finished dressing them down, Maj Marshall put his hand on Pershing's shoulder as he turned to leave. Marshall then began to outline the problems they faced upon arrival . . . and most importantly, furnished details of what the command had done to address them. Once finished, Pershing thanked Marshall before leaving. Each time Pershing wanted to know anything, he contacted Maj Marshall. Marshall also confronted President Roosevelt in 1941 at the end of a Cabinet Meeting; as the others were filling out, Marshall . . . in a stern voice said . . . Mr President, we've talked about the need to act now, but today you still haven't signed the authorization to start the ball rolling. Sir, this needs to be signed (by you) today! The order was finalized and signed by Pres Roosevelt early the next morning. It's called Leadership.
Abolutely not. Very good point. However, that is not what I was saying. Losing Midway Atoll isn't a catastrophe - but if the battle had gone the other way (as I think many know it very well could have) and we had lost say 3 or 4 carriers, on top of the earlier losses of our battleships at Pearl Harbor, I think that would open the yawning chasm and etc.
With apologies for the literary allusions I suffer from notions of being a writer.
Maybe Yammamoto did. Maybe Marshall did. They were probably unusually prescient by the standards of their day.
I made a new thread here to explore the notion of the Japanese invading / capturing Hawaii if they had won at Midway
buffnut453
Captain
Thanks...should be an interesting discussion.
Marshall was an extremely unusual leader in the US military or for the Allies in general. There are many who can lead men in war, and who can make plans and administer, but few who can do it all and with such far sighted clarity. We are very lucky we had him at that dangerous time. He was also an expert at picking the right talent for many of the other jobs in the war.
Navalwarrior
Staff Sergeant
- 764
- Jun 17, 2018
Resp:
He also deferred praise toward him, always pushing 'alocades' to men below him. As a result, history has relegated Marshall to almost obscurity. He promoted Gen Devers over Patton and Bradley at the end of WWII. Devers commanded Joint Service Forces during the Southern Invasion of France in 1944, reaching the Rhine long before Patton/Bradly. The only thing that stopped his moving into Germany was EIsenhower. Shameful decision by Ike. Marshall knew who was capable, hence, Devers' promotion to 4 Star.
Yup, I agree with you about the Hellcat Schweik, but it proved itself superior to the current generation of carrier based fighters, for those reasons and more - it stood out was my point.
Yes, he isn't the last word and the intent wasn't to offer that, but how many people are there out there who have flown that many aircraft and been in combat in at least one of them? His words, although controversial are not to be immediately dismissed and the claim that his opinions have been debunked by people on this forum is, A) a bit of a stretch and assigning a degree of importance that perhaps warrants scrutiny and B) because they are his opinions and observations, how can they be debunked?
As for the claim that the Skua couldn't have done what the Dauntless did, prove it. The Skua, despite its deficiencies was only mildly inferior in performance to the SBD, having a faster cruise speed in fact. As for not matching enemy fighters, neither did the SBD; just because examples shot down enemy fighters doesn't make it superior to the Skua. Avro Ansons also shot down Bf 109s, that doesn't make them a suitable fighter. Yes, the Skua was older, first flying in 1937 and the SBD in 1940, but its genesis goes back to the Douglas BT-1, which was of the same generation as the Skua. The RN retired the Skua because it was designed to fulfil the role of fighter/dive bomber and it was replaced by the Fulmar, which again wasn't a sparkling fighter, but that's beside the point of this discusssion - it too was mildly successful despite itself and this too is my point - the SBD and the Swordfish, despite their faults and they both had them, led successful careers, which put them among the greats of WW2.
Traits that made the Dauntless a good dive bomber and a good aeroplane? Yup, I can only agree having never flown one, and the same can be said of the Swordfish, but again, beside the point. Both aircraft were successful despite their many faults. This doesn't make them bad, but would they have been remembered as much had there been no WW2 within in which they did their deeds?
No, the Swordfish could not match the Dauntless as a dive bomber - you are missing the point. The Swordfish was a torpedo bomber, not a dive bomber and both aircraft operated in very different environments, but both were operational successes. Let's put it this way, I'd rather go to war in a Grumman Avenger or a B5N than a Swordfish. This is the point I'm trying to make. As for the Dauntless, it wouldn't have made much difference between it, the Skua or the D3A to go to war in, and as for qualities, the latter out performed both aircraft and was equally as successful in its role against Allied shipping, being responsible for the destruction of the greatest amount of Allied shipping in the Pacific theatre. If the US Navy had D3As, I'm sure it would have done just as great things with them.
Yes, he isn't the last word and the intent wasn't to offer that, but how many people are there out there who have flown that many aircraft and been in combat in at least one of them? His words, although controversial are not to be immediately dismissed and the claim that his opinions have been debunked by people on this forum is, A) a bit of a stretch and assigning a degree of importance that perhaps warrants scrutiny and B) because they are his opinions and observations, how can they be debunked?
As for the claim that the Skua couldn't have done what the Dauntless did, prove it. The Skua, despite its deficiencies was only mildly inferior in performance to the SBD, having a faster cruise speed in fact. As for not matching enemy fighters, neither did the SBD; just because examples shot down enemy fighters doesn't make it superior to the Skua. Avro Ansons also shot down Bf 109s, that doesn't make them a suitable fighter. Yes, the Skua was older, first flying in 1937 and the SBD in 1940, but its genesis goes back to the Douglas BT-1, which was of the same generation as the Skua. The RN retired the Skua because it was designed to fulfil the role of fighter/dive bomber and it was replaced by the Fulmar, which again wasn't a sparkling fighter, but that's beside the point of this discusssion - it too was mildly successful despite itself and this too is my point - the SBD and the Swordfish, despite their faults and they both had them, led successful careers, which put them among the greats of WW2.
Traits that made the Dauntless a good dive bomber and a good aeroplane? Yup, I can only agree having never flown one, and the same can be said of the Swordfish, but again, beside the point. Both aircraft were successful despite their many faults. This doesn't make them bad, but would they have been remembered as much had there been no WW2 within in which they did their deeds?
No, the Swordfish could not match the Dauntless as a dive bomber - you are missing the point. The Swordfish was a torpedo bomber, not a dive bomber and both aircraft operated in very different environments, but both were operational successes. Let's put it this way, I'd rather go to war in a Grumman Avenger or a B5N than a Swordfish. This is the point I'm trying to make. As for the Dauntless, it wouldn't have made much difference between it, the Skua or the D3A to go to war in, and as for qualities, the latter out performed both aircraft and was equally as successful in its role against Allied shipping, being responsible for the destruction of the greatest amount of Allied shipping in the Pacific theatre. If the US Navy had D3As, I'm sure it would have done just as great things with them.
Oddly I agree with both perspectives and you both are talking the same but different. Mark is strategically on the nail, Schweik is exactly right too. Both situations are true enough. Japan was not going to win the war, but the US was not going to allow Japan to get so close to home without a fight.
I don't have a dog in that particular hunt to be honest, lets just say the folks who got real into that are not necessarily people I typically agree with on here. I like Eric Brown, think he is an interesting source and often has useful insights, but personally I don't myself take his word as gospel, not least in the sense that I wouldn't necessarily raise his evaluation over other wartime pilots who also flew the same aircraft (whether combat or test pilots). And I have read the memoirs and interviews of plenty of both. In the context of this discussion I think I explained my perception of why Eric Browns assessment of the SBD fell short of the mark.
Ok, if you insist.
- The Skua had a range of 760 miles. The Dauntless had a range of 1,115 miles. That is a 355 mile difference. Range is life in carrier warfare. That translates to a much wider search radius and strike range, (which is a fraction of the above numbers), also means loiter time for things like ASW.
- The Dauntless had a ceiling of 5,000 ft higher. It was important to be able to fly relatively high to evade flak and fighters.
- The Dauntless was 25 mph faster and had a better rate of climb. This translates into less interceptions and better evasion particularly after attacking.
- The Skua had an 890 hp engine and a power-weight ratio of 0.10 vs. 1,200 hp and 0.12 for the SBD (earlier marks had less power but were also lighter).
- The Dauntless was a more strongly made aircraft better able to handle high G maneuvers.
- The Dauntless could carry a 1,000 or 1,600 lb semi- or fully armor piercing bomb. Vital for sinking capital warships like BBs and CAs. The Skua was limited to a 500 lb bomb maximum.
More commonly SBDs carried a 500 lb bomb and Skuas carried a 250 lb bomb. Roughly twice the damage from the SBD - Here is a big one. According to this the Skua had only marginal armor and no self-sealing fuel tanks*. The SBD was well protected and legendary for it's ability to survive damage and bring the crew home (alive).
- The SBD was (arguably) better armed with 2 x .50 cal in the nose and (after Coral Sea) 2 x .30 cal defensive, vs. 4 x .303 in the wings and 1 x .303 defensive.
- The SBD had a reputation for being maneuverable and a good dogfighter - it shot down 120 enemy aircraft (claimed).
- The SBD and had the lowest loss rate of all carrier planes in the USN, only 80 aircraft were lost to enemy fighters. The Skua took 50% losses in at least three raids and had to be prematurely retired due to losses to enemy fighters.
- The SBD had a better proven rate of accuracy in bombing.
I don't consider the Swordfish "one of the greats of WW2".
As I said before I don't think the Dauntless had a lot of faults - I think it was one of the three best aircraft in it's class, in fact overall I would say it was the best in it's class for the early through mid-war.
No I am not missing the point, I am well aware of their different attack regimes, I was comparing the two aircraft vis a vis attacking enemy ships, such as at Midway. Both dive and torpedo bombers were used for that mission at the same time, and both the SBD and Swordfish were contemporaries.
Not for very long because due to the lack of armor and fuel system protection it had a loss rate much higher than the SBD, in fact even higher than the Skua probably. It's range was also a bit inferior to the SBD and it was far less well armed.
S
* There is a grimly amusing detail to this, to do with corks. From the linked website:
"An armoured windscreen and some armour plate behind the pilot was provided for combat squadrons in late 1940, but the poor TAG in the rear seat had no such protection and faced being roasted alive by the blow-torch flames of a burning fuel tank blown back by the airflow. It is reported that before each combat mission the TAG had to sign for a small bag which contained corks of various sizes with which he was expected to plug any bullet holes in the fuel tank!"
So the capabilities of the Skua were somewhere between 60 and 80% of that of the SBD across the board, except in terms of air to air combat and survival of flak damage where it would be more like 10 or 20%. The margins of success were narrow enough at Midway that I think if equipped with a demonstrably inferior aircraft like the Skua they would have almost definitely lost, barring some miracle. Just like if the Navy VF squadrons had been flying F2As like those poor Marines were instead of the slightly better F4F-3s they also probably would have lost.
Given the grim fate of the torpedo squadrons Swordfish could have probably played the same role as the TBD adequately enough, but if they had needed them to hit and sink anything I think you'd want a different aircraft for the Pacific Theater. The delicate, gracefully slow moving, wire and canvas Swordfish would have held up to Japanese carrier based fighters about as well as cotton candy to a blowtorch.
Given the grim fate of the torpedo squadrons Swordfish could have probably played the same role as the TBD adequately enough, but if they had needed them to hit and sink anything I think you'd want a different aircraft for the Pacific Theater. The delicate, gracefully slow moving, wire and canvas Swordfish would have held up to Japanese carrier based fighters about as well as cotton candy to a blowtorch.
I agree, Malta in partcular was significant; there may not have been a turning point at El Alamein if Malta had been lost to the Axis in the Spring of '42.
It is not given that the P-40's would have achieved air superiority without the Spitfires.
Luckily I don't think we have to debate that yet again. After mid 1942 the majority of the Luftwaffe was destroyed on the ground, and air superiority was achieved primarily through B-24s and B-25s hammering showers of bombs down onto parked Bf 109s and MC.202s sitting on Axis airfields. All the P-40s had to do was protect the bombers from Luftwaffe attack, while the Spitfires protected their own bases and both types kept the Axis fighters away from marauding fighter-bombers that were going after the Afrika Korps.
Since the Luftwaffe fighter groups didn't seem to particularly relish going after the bombers very much nor were they inclined to strafe Allied tanks, I doubt it would have gone any different. A few more of the older fighter bombers lost wouldn't have changed the course of the battle.
Since the Luftwaffe fighter groups didn't seem to particularly relish going after the bombers very much nor were they inclined to strafe Allied tanks, I doubt it would have gone any different. A few more of the older fighter bombers lost wouldn't have changed the course of the battle.
Navalwarrior
Staff Sergeant
- 764
- Jun 17, 2018
Resp:
Midway the Turning Point? I believe it was a psychological turning point for both sides. It showed the Japanese that they did not/could not have a free hand (Yamamoto believed long before hostilities that the US was a 'sleeping giant' that would wake up). For the Americans, it was a major success . . . that could be repeated.
